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Abstract 
This dissertation responds to the question, "What would it be like, what would it mean, to approach texts 
lovingly?" in terms of the work of 20th-century theorists, writers, and thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Roland 
Barthes, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Brian Massumi, Jean-Luc Marion, E. 
E. Cummings, Rainer Maria Rilke, Teresa Brennan, and W. J. T. Mitchell. In order to demonstrate the 
appropriateness and place of love in the philosophical canon, the dissertation combines a consideration of 
affect with these writers' work. Beginning with an exemplary reading of Cy Twombly's painting The Ceiling, 
the then dissertation adapts Mitchell's question "What do pictures want" to an approach to texts, as defined 
with reference to Barthes. An introduction and literature review trace the places love in texts by Plato, Freud, 
Lacan, Cixous, and a host of writers who fall under the rubric of 'affect theorists'. Because an approach to texts 
is the dissertation's focus, a chapter is spent discussing the possibilities for deconstruction to be part of such an 
approach. Derrida's work is constellated with that of Cixous, Irigaray, Marion, and Brennan in order to 
emphasise the integrity of sensory and affective information to such an approach. The writing of Rilke and 
Cummings provides examples of an authorial approach to texts that can inform a readerly one, and serves to 
further expand the canon of texts that suggest the possibility of this approach. The final chapter is a second 
exemplary reading of the story of Moses and the burning bush. Deliberately aiming to stretch the expectations 
of scholarly work, I combine the anecdotal, the affective, and the textual as modes of engaging with and ways 
of knowing about love. 
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An opening foray: 
reading Twombly's The Ceiling 
7 
A. 'How to initiate intimacy with objects': 
Cy Twombly, The Ceiling, 2007-2009 (Musee du Louvre, Paris) 
Seven out of the thirty historians I talked to admitted to crying in front of 
paintings, but several thousand saw my questionnaire and didn't answer at all. The 
response rate among academics, as a sociologist would say, was unusually low. The 
overwhelming majority don't cry, never have, and don't wish they could. How can 
I explain that fact, unless I say that many people who become academics fail to feel 
anything very strongly? [ ... J Absence of strong emotion becomes the norm, and I 
think many academics end up living their lives pretty much without it. I 
To be "in the literal sense of the word-sym-pathetic; not necessarily to approve, 
but to feel along with it as a thing that is like no other".2 
As a prelude to this dissertation, and its ideas about the possibility of constructing a loving approach 
to texts-as well as as a concrete demonstration of what I meant when I wrote in the abstract that I 
aim in part to push at the boundaries of what academic work is and how it is constituted-I want to 
offer an example of my own. Because this section engages with a painting, its coherence vis-a-vis an 
approach to texts may not be immediately clear. However, the approach described in this dissertation 
has as one source the intimations of an approach (based on desire) in W. J. T. Mitchell's work. He 
writes that "[all] the tropes of vitality and desire we apply to visual works of art are transferred and 
transferrable to the domain of textuality", although of course "not without translation or 
modif1cation".3 Mitchell's own considerations of texts within a monograph on images offers parity: 
although Mitchell acknowledges that literary and visual images (as he calls them) are different,4 they 
are related to one another by their enactment of and capacity for desire. In part it is this desire that 
creates the relation between texts and images-a relation of tension, in which pictures "want equal 
rights with language, not to be turned into language".s The dissertation takes its understanding of 
text from the work of Roland Barthes; he, too, does not limit considerations of text to one 'kind' of 
text, arguing that we "cannot by right restrict the text to what is written (to literature r.6 To do so 
would focus on product over process-the text as an ongoing or continual making calls for a focus 
1 Elkins,James. Pictures and Tears (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 103. 
2 Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth Century Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 63, 
quoted in W J:r. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves tiflmages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010).82. 
3 Mitchell, W J.T. What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 55. 
4 'Ihe literary image "does not have to be faced directly, but is distanced by the secondary mediation oflanguagc" (31). 
5 Mitchell,47. 
6 Barthes, Roland. "'Ihcory of the Text" in Untying the Text, Robert Young, cd. (Boston: Routlege & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1981), 
41. 
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on the latter. Barthes' text is expansive enough to accommodate 'texts' which appear as objects,? like 
Cy Twombly's The Ceiling. If the text is, as Barthes says, "what is written",8 then it is fair to say that 
this painting, considered especially in the context of Twombly's interest in writing as a form of mark-
making (and vice-versa) can be considered a text for the purposes of this dissertation. Furthermore, 
others ofBarthes' descriptions of , text' are aptly applied to Twombly's work: that it is "a fragment of 
language'? that it is "massive, rather than numerative".10 
The question of intimacy with objects is a difficult and unusual one. The tendency exists, as will be 
demonstrated in parts of the literature review and in Chapter 1, for 'soft' subjects to adopt the 
methodologies of their hard' counterparts in order to represent themselves in the light which is 
generally considered favourable (for funding bodies, of course, but also in academic institutions 
generally). II Intimacy with objects puts the interlocutor or interrogator (the subject) into a place of 
some equality with the object they interrogate, forcing consideration not only of the desires of the 
subject, but of the form "those desires take as they are projected back at us [by the object], making 
demands upon us, seducing us to feel and act in specific ways". 12 To initiate intimacy with an object 
in a scholarly context is to trouble the structuring boundaries between the other, especially the 
objectified other, and the self which have informed Western thought for centuries, and which 
manifest themselves in concerns for 'objectivity: as well as in the repression of data which cannot be 
confirmed empirically-information gleaned from our senses, feelings, and emotions. The repression 
of the felt in fovour tfthe known or proven means that in an environment that exclusively privileges 
'objectivity' (or the uncrossed division between the subject and the object), intimacy cannot be a way 
of producing knowledge. But that such a repression exists and informs some scholarship does not 
rule out feeling as an approach to wisdom; it just designates it to some extent a fringe tactic. I3 W'here 
modes of objectivity engender iconoclasm-the critical 'smashing' of the object in order to overturn 
its power-an approach to the object that acknowledges its effects on the self requires a simultaneous 
nod to the object as an other capable of affecting us, and the inappropriateness of 'smashing such an 
7 Not to mention discussion earlier in this dissertation about the etymological and homophonic relations between 
text/textile/material/stufE See Chapter 2. 
8 Barthes, 1981, 32. 
9 Ibid,35. 
10 Ibid, 40. To say The Ceiling is 'massive, rather than numerative' is to say that it is non-count, that it is 'much' rather than 
'many'. In other words, its structure is not noticeably partite. Of course, massive also carries connotations of huge size, 
impressiveness. 
11 Chapter I, Section B, which deals with the treatment of creative writing in the Research Excellence Framework. 
12 Mitchell,25. 
13 That is to say, neither scholarship via subjective involvement-via one's emotions, let's say-nor via access to some idealised 
and probably inaccessible 'objectiVity' are more 'real' or 'authentic' producers of knowledge than one another. 'Ihey are 
simply additional or companionable possible modes of making thought. A saw docs not take away from the skill of a 
carpenter who is good with a lathe; it provides another approach. 
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(equal or responsive) other. Mitchell submits the possibility of a creative model which would not 
'smash' the other, but break its silence, asking it (or providing a space for it) ro "speak and resonate 
[ ... J transforming its hollowness into an echo chamber for human thought". To initiate intimacy with 
an object, then, is in part to acknowledge its effects; in part to understand that knowledge can 
originate with things that cannot be understood rationally or iterated methodically; and to sense the 
resonance, i.e. the possibility for meaning, of the object or of one's relationship to the object. 
By the same token, to approach an object (or any text) without aiming to Hx it, to refuse a claim of 
knowing it absolutely in favour of acknowledgement that it can only ever be known partially, is in 
the terms of this dissertation to come toward the object lovingly.14 Insofar as love can be understood 
as respect for the otherness of the other, l S then a non-rational, non-totalising knowledge of the other-
object is such an approach, however it is gone about. The question remains about how to initiate 
intimacy with objects (or texts)-about the circumstances in which it could happen. Mitchell writes 
that the "life ofimages is not a private or individual matter",16 and though he is speaking to the fact 
that images take part in an explicitly visual and therefore public or shared life, his statement also 
gestures to the possibility of the life of images contradicting a fundamental tenet of an empirical, 
method-based way of studying them, in favour of an approach which considers their effects and 
desires. That tenet is the idea of the affectively isolated, single subject on which a whole history of 
scholarship-including study of images-depends. 
Teresa Brennan's work points out the possibility of receiving information, knowledge, and even 
wisdom through channels other than empirical, rational, or methodical ones. It also develops the 
theory that emotions and affect are not contained by the individual, circulating under the skin but 
intransmissible; instead, the transmission of affect is a bodily and embodied process that contradicts 
the emotionally bounded subject of Western philosophy. Such a subject, Brennan argues, is an 
"aberration ", 17 a construction that has been convenient for a philosophy and social structure that 
seeks "knowledge as a means to control [ ... J aligned with discipline imposed from without, or 
objectification",18 but not 'natural' or necessary. Recognising the transmission of affect means 
recognising what one projects onto the other. It provides the possibility to transform and "reorder 
14 See the discussion of Levin as' conceptions oflove in Chapter 4, to which this sentence refers. 
15 Per Derrida; see Chapter 3. 
16 Mitchell,93. 
17 Brennan, Teresa. The Transmission of Affict. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 2004). 25. 
18 Brennan, 106. 
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aggression".19 But this recognition "requires being in the world [ ... ] subjecting oneself to eddies or 
even torrents of affect, while somehow maintaining equilibrium".20 Recognising that affect flows 
between subjects (or objects and subjects) means recognising that those subjects are not bounded as 
we might believe. I f the subject is in fact not bounded, then all of the senses and all of the different 
kinds of sensory information can be used to construct understanding. 
Brennan shows how the constitution of the subject is not an entirely self-contained and autogenic 
process by recourse, for example, to the interaction of hormones and pheromones. Even the sense of 
smell (by which pheromones enter the body) is penetrative, physically crossing the boundaries of the 
individual body and creating sensations which in turn create knowledge about the environment and 
others in it. The self understood as penetrable and affectively related to its surroundings (including 
the human and non-human others around it) forces a reconsideration both of the other as object 
(and one's perception as 'objective') and of the role of "sensing and feeling"21 in the creation of 
knowledge. 
For example. consider what Brennan calls the' foundational fantasy'. For Brennan, this fantasy is 
what predicates the bounded, Western individual and "explains how it is that we come to think of 
ourselves as separate from others" ;22 it is formed in the binary pairs of! am good/You are bad and You 
are good/! am bad.23 The foundational fantasy, which relies on bounded and separate individual 
subjects, does not allow for the possibility of the object's affect or its effect on the subject. It clings to 
a situation in which power goes one direction. But such clinging "will limit thinking unless it is 
actively resisted. It also limits practice".24 A fundamental disconnect from the other, even the non-
human other. rules out certain kinds of practice and certain ways of gathering knowledge or creating 
wisdom, thus creating a knowledge base which is inherently partial-biased, and not 'objective', if 
objective can be taken to mean being "fair, honest and methodical" about "the whole range where 
subjective experience affects objective facts". 2S In other words, if the subject is bounded and 
affectively disconnected from its surroundings, then "studying what one has experienced oneself and 
valuing it" (Brennan's definition of subjectivity) is ruled out; the objective is understood as "in some 
19 Brennan, 135. 
20 Brennan. 134. 
21 Brennan. 19. 
22 Brennan. 14. 
23 Brennan. 13. 
24 Brennan. 14. 
25 Midgley. Mary. Science and Poetry. (New York and London: Routledge Classics. 2006).172-173. 
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way free from affect".Z6 
Brennan proposes alternate ways of being with others in order to acknowledge the non-containment 
of the subject and the transmission of affect; she calls these discernment or living attention. and 
contrasts them to the projection of the foundational fantasy by which the separation between 
subjects is accomplished. Both love and reason are aspects of this attention and "the embodiment of 
its connective ability"P Living attention. or being with the other without projecting onto the other 
the qualities we do not desire in ourselves. allows for discernment. To discern. rather than to project. 
is to react to situations according to "information from the body's divers systems [ ... ] gleaned 
precisely by feeling or sensing".28 An "active yet receptive" state.29 discernment cannot be based on 
the boundaries assumed to be present in the healthy' subject. because some of those boundaries "are 
formed by unconscious projection" which "directs affects outward without consciously (as a rule) 
acknowledging that it is doing SO".30 By contrast. discernment consciously examines affect and does 
not rely on separating the self from the other via the projection of negative affect. 
Asking what pictures want rather than what they mean or do goes against the "usual way of sorting 
out" our cultural 'double consciousness' about images as 'living' things. In a move that exemplifies 
Brennan's definition of projection. we "attribute one side of it (generally the naIve. magical. 
superstitious side) to someone else. and claim the hardheaded. critical. and skeptical positions as 
[ our] own ".31 Rather than severing us from" affective connections with the surrounding 
environment and others in it".32 attention of the kind to which Brennan and Mitchell allude returns 
the scholar to a connection with the circuits and currents that come to her from outside herself, and 
allows her to ask what these could mean. and what kind of knowledge could come from interacting 
with them. 
To sound the icons rather than smash them is to step. momentarily. outside of the critical norm and 
to "permit entry into a new idea ",33 Thinking with our feelings-but not allowing ourselves to be 
dominated by them; that is, allowing them to take part in the discourse we create and which creates 
us-allows us to admit that our thoughts are inflected, informed, and even created by our feelings 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brennan, 41. 
28 Brennan, 23. 
29 Brennan, 135. 
30 Brennan, II. 
31 Mitchell, 7. 
32 Mitchell, 19. 
33 Ibid. 
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and sensings. It allows for a more complete and more honest 'world-making'. It also acknowledges 
that the objects of our study affect us-that our 'objectivity' is flavoured with traces of ourselves. 
Brennan's concept of discernment follows closely along these lines. In arguing for the importance of a 
theory of the transmission of affect, Brennan is not arguing for the replacement of'thought' with 
, feeling' (where those terms stand falsely opposite one another), or for some theory of the personal in 
its selfish, ego-bound form. She is arguing for an understanding of ourselves and others which takes 
into account both the way we see and the reasons we see how we see, an understanding based in 
"comparison, detachment and living attention".34 
Before I begin addressing Twombly's Ceiling directly, I want to bring in one more strand to this 
braid: Jean Luc Marion's discussion of the I of philosophy. He wrote that the" I of philosophers [ ... ] 
is supposed to be universal, a disengaged spectator [ ... ] a spokesman for each and everyone because he 
thinks exclusively what anyone can by right know in the place of anyone else [ ... ] : that which 
concerns no one personally".35 It is against this unembodied, transcendental I that Marion writes 
(adopting the first-person pronoun, saying "one must speak oflove in the san1e way as one must 
love-in the first person").36 To write about love, to think about love is to think about "that which 
affects each of us as such".37 To write, therefore, about an object-a visual text-which I love. to 
initiate intimacy with it. I use the I: the fallible. individual. without the whole canon of'disembodied 
spectators'. and. as Marion does, "at my own risk and peril".38 
Intimacy with objects allows the writer to put aside the 'necessity' of an apparently unemotional 
'objectivity' and to acknowledge the subjective relationship which informs our study-and which 
appears as simply as the feelingofliking or disliking the 'object' of study. Initiating intimacy with 
objects is a question of vulnerability, of conceding the possibility that such relationships can affect us 
as much as they do the objects in question. In such a concession we are vulnerable both to the 
effects/affect of the objects, and to the judgment of others in our community who might not see the 
value of such an approach. Nevertheless. this is the approach taken by James Elkins in Pictures and 
Tears. 39 
34 Brennan, 122. 
35 Marion,Jean-Luc. The Erotic Phenomenon (Chicago: lhe University of Chicago Press, 2007),9. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Marion, 2007:10. 
39 It is also the approach taken by Mitchell when he argues that we would do well to begin our studies of paintings with the 
question of pictures' own desires; and the approach advocated by Irigaray's call for a more 'musical, touchful, artistic' way of 
being with the other, which, this dissertation presumes, is to include the textual other. 
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How does one go about crying in front of a painting? Why would one want to, and what would such 
a response mean? Is it possible to read a painting via the experience of crying in front of it, such that 
the painting and the tears become coextensive, somehow implicated in one another? Can the 'text' of 
the painting accommodate such a response, or even call for it? Can the text of the history of scholarly 
writing, criticism, theory, and art history accommodate such a response? 
To cry in front of a painting: there is no method one can follow in order for this to take place.4\] It 
either happens or it does not; one cannot follow the examples of the 'literature' and assume a similar 
result will occur. To cry in front of a painting, then, is a private and even irreplicable kind of 
scholarship. It requires foregoing the part of oneself which, in response to training or social norms or 
milieu, might register the sentimental and dismiss it as such. It requires a kind of surprise which 
Elkins associates with the time bifore one has the history of an object to 'contaminate' one's 
emotional experience of it.41 But the association of tears and a 'pure: pre-knowledge state is limiting. 
It assumes that tears have something to teach us that can only take place before the 'corruption' of 
knowledge. Instead of separating tears and knowledge into two realms of unrelated or competing 
'authenticity', perhaps what tears have to offer is something which can also be read, and so forms part 
of, even as it might provide challenges to, the idea of knowledge. Perhaps crying in front of paintings 
indicates something about that knowledge (or about what is knowledge) that does not have to do 
with classifying one thing as more 'pure' than another, but with a relationship between kinds of 
knowing and ways of knowing. 
Elkins is clear that his aim is not "to separate tears from history" but to show that "every response is 
partial, and any emotion is mixed with its companion thoughts":12 Crying in front of a painting, 
however spontaneous or personal it may seem, is the product of all that brings one to that point-
including awareness of history, theory, and one's own disciplinary tendency to look dry-eyed at the 
objects of study. Crying in front of a painting elides none of these qualities necessarily-except dry-
eyedness. To cry in front of a painting is to allow one's response to take the form of something other 
than an essay, a set of sketches, a critique; that is, something other than the syntaxes of mark-making 
(writing and draWing) that comprise our history of knowledge. Crying as a critical response-that is, 
crying as the response a critic or scholar makes to a painting-is one way to incorporate the body 
40 "Ihis is not to say that there is no literature on how to laUe about the experience of crying in front of paintings. Elkins' book is 
an obvious place to begin; the work done in this prelude obviously engages with this. 
41 Elkins makes this association because, in his findings and personal cxperiem:e, the more an art historian knows, the less likely 
he or she is to have cried in front of a painting. 
42 Elkins, 93. 
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into the work of thinking. Crying produces a work that is ephemeral and to some extent inexplicable 
and unapproachable: seeming completely personal, but still related to other, supposedly less personal, 
productions of work. 
C.I: Forensics: an examination of public crying 
forensics: Origin mid 17th cent.: from Latinforensis 'in open court, public,' from 
forum (from Latin. literally 'what is out of doors,' originally denoting an enclosure 
surrounding a house; related tofores '{outside} door') 
On May 14[h, 2010, at about six o'clock in the evening, I was in Paris. Specifically, I was in the Louvre 
with a companion who had never been there. Toward this museum I have the unfortunate attitude of 
someone who, having spent a good deal of time in a place, no longer sees the strangeness and beauty 
of it. I had spent many days in Paris when I lived in France (and had returned several times since 
then), and my preference ran to smaller museums-fewer people, less ornament, less ostentation. So I 
went to the Louvre reluctantly and at the behest of my companion. My feelings about this visit are 
important to this account because they indicate that I was in no particular state ofheightened 
anticipation. I f anything, I was prepared to be a little bored. My focus was elsewhere, not on the 
museum. I did have one reason I wanted to go to the Louvre, however, and this was my condition for 
going at all: I wanted to see a new painting by Cy Twombly that I heard had been installed. I had no 
real idea about this painting. I hadn't read anything about it. At this point, I can't even recall how I 
knew that it existed. But I did, and as I have a special affection for Twombly's work, I wanted to go 
and see it. 
My affection for Twombly's work had always in the past been limited to an aesthetic appreciation: I 
admired his techniques and his ways of creating meaning with marks; I liked his works that dealt 
with history and natural history. My attitude toward him was that of an enthusiastic student toward 
her teacher, not that of an acolyte. Again, although I wanted to see his painting, I had no especial 
desire to visit it. This was not a pilgrimage. I f my companion had not already wanted to go to the 
Louvre, I would not have made a visit just to see this painting. 
We walked through sections of European paintings from the Renaissance (obligatory stop by the 
Mona Lisa and the Botticellis) and then, following small plaques on the wall, made our way through 
rooms of Roman metalwork. The floors were cool, pale marble. The woodwork was dark. In the 
rooms, the cases of gold and lead objects glowed. I walked into an antechamber containing two such 
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cases and stood facing the room I'd come from to look at them. They were small and dark and the 
room, despite being lit with museum lights and the light from the window. felt relatively dark, too. I 
turned to walk into the next room. 
Elkins lays out what he imagines to be the ideal conditions under which one might cry while looking 
at a painting: to go to a museum alone; to avoid trying to see everything. fi)Cusing instead on a room 
or two; to minimise distraction and to try to be alone in the rooms; to take your time; to pay full 
attention; to "do your own thinking". by which he seems to mean to avoid others' interpretations. 
especially those of'experts'; to watch out for others who are "really looking" and to speak with them 
about their experiences; and to be faithful-to spend time with paintings repeatedly. In short. 
although he has never cried in front of a painting. he imagines that part of what prompts such a 
response is a living attention to the object-a being-with that opens the viewer up to receive affect. 
although he doesn't put it in those terms. Elkins imagines that by being with the painting on one's 
own (and its own) terms. by ignoring others' readings of it. and by spending time alone with it. it 
might be possible to cry in front of-or because of-it. The idea of being 'alone' with the painting_ 
alone. without the burden of history or of knowledge. of others' interpretations-relegates crying in 
front of paintings again to the realm of the 'pure' experience. removed from the taint of the known. 
In my experience. crying was not divorced from knowing; it was simply an extension beyond the 
(verbal) language I had at the time and into another kind of expression. which I am now hard-
pressed to explain. I knew; I just couldn't talk about it yet. 
Elkins writes of Rothko's biographer haVing felt the "need to sit. and even to sleep. in front of 
Rothko's paintings. even though he was not tired":H In front of the heaviness and glow of Rothko's 
canvases. that human body reacted bodily. As in a relation with another human being. the feeling of 
the paintings has an effect on the viewer. particularly on the viewer who is for some reason especially 
sensitive to that painting at that time. My reaction had to do with the size of The Ceiling; something 
about how big it was impelled me to cry. I was overwhelmed with it. by it. and by the feeling that the 
room itself, by grace of the painting. was full of love. I felt something like what was described by Mary 
Muller. an art historian who has cried in front of a painting: she experienced "a sudden total 
identification [ ... ] the recognition of something similar. the experience of being part of it. and maybe 
even a feeling of grace. a moment of unforgettable happiness".44 
43 Elkins, 172. 
44 Elkins. 179. 
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The feeling of the ceiling is, as far as I could tell then or can now, what caused the crying. I had a 
sense of it being huge, unbearably large, but in a good way-the way certain holy buildings feel large 
but welcoming or containing. I felt welcomed by the size of the painting. The immensity of The 
Ceiling is part of the problem of describing my experience. It is indeed, as the text is in Barthes' 
words, "massive, rather than n u m e r a t i v e " . ~ s s W'hat about this massiveness called for an immediate 
affective reaction. rather than an immediate rational one? W'hy did I start crying there, standing in 
the doorway to a room that was suddenly blue and white and gold? W'hat in the painting asked for or 
provoked that response instead of another kind of awe, accompanied by a more methodical, iterable 
reaction? 
In factual terms, the work, The Ceiling, can be measured and its details can be noted and filed away in 
the correct art-historical filing cabinet (waiting to be called up in newspaper articles or research or 
gallery didactics), so why is it so difficult to record the feeling of the painting? Why did I cry in front 
of this painting and not in front of any other, even paintings I've loved, or even others of Cy 
Twombly's works, ones I've admired? Although these questions demand answers, I'm not sure that I 
can provide them. What comes to mind in reply is simply the size of the painting: how large, how 
high, and how it filled the whole room-and how that size seemed to impart a kind of generosity to 
the work. It filled the room without stifling it. In fact, it seemed to fill me in such a way as to 
welcome me rather than require my silence or obedience. In short, and in a way I have not otherwise 
experienced, The Ceiling called me to be in a relation with it which included both my body and my 
intellect, not one or the other. It was a path leading off of the one I had assumed I had to take 
(because it was the 'pure' or 'authentic' way of making academic work)-the path of apparently dry-
eyed, primarily rational scholarship. Like the jar in Tennessee of Wallace Stevens' poem, the painting 
made the room surround it. It beckoned to me and to my ways of thinking. It was a burning bush 
standing there speaking. and sobbing in the doorway was the first response I could offer. 
C.2: The contribution of tears 
The question is not only why did I cry, but what can my experience of crying in front of this painting 
impart to my approach of it? How can I speak or write of this experience in such a way as to honour 
that response? How can my tears become something besides the single experience of them-that is, 
can they become part of the theory I make? Is there a place for them in my scholarship? If! choose to 
45 Barthcs, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang. 1981).40. 
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ignore the fact of crying in front of The Ceiling in favour of some more 'dry-eyed' approach, how can 
I acknowledge that such an approach is partial, askew, biased-albeit in the academically 
comfortable mode of the 'objective'? Does crying in front of a painting and then writing about it-
about the painting. but also about the crying-make me a bad' academic? When he takes his students 
to see an exhibition that has been 'manipulated' (lighting, music) to evoke feelings in the viewers 
instead of presenting the paintings in an emotionally sterile field, one response (derisive) is that the 
curators "want you to love the paintings, not just appreciate t h e m " . ~ ~ Even Elkins, sympathetic to 
crying in front of paintings, at one point says he "thought [the student who had cried in front of a 
painting] hadn't behaved as a good art historian should [ ... ]. [Her duty was] to understand how 
works of art were supposed to affect other people [ ... J . She should have been analyzing [sic J the show, 
not letting herself get swept away by i t " . 4 ~ ~ But are getting 'swept away' by Ihe ('('iling and analysing it 
necessarily such different propositions? 
To relate to The Ceiling in tears was to have related to it in the subjective mode. It was /, only I, who 
stood there bawling. It would have been impossible to hide behind the name or words of another. 
My tears were my signature, my "way of taking on tradition [ ... J accepting or rejecting it and its 
authority".48 Authorised to some extent by Elkins-but indirectly also by Irigaray, Cixous, Deleuze, 
Barthes, Derrida, Levinas-I have taken on their calls for other ways of being. other ways of reading. 
and, in the doorway of the Salle des Bronzes, made it my own. 
The signature of one's own tears: in what way is this 'academic'? Elkins writes that when asked 
whether "there might be a link between the 'knowledge' gained by crying and the knowledge-not in 
quotation marks-gained by studying" most of the art historians he asked replied, unambiguously, 
that "crying is not part of the discipline, and has nothing to contribute".49 Other replies called crying 
"private, irrelevant, incommunicable, misguided, and ignorant [ ... J unprofessional, embarrassing. 
, feminine', unreliable, incoherent, private, and largely inexplicable [ ... J philosophically dubious and 
historically outdated". so None of these respondents denied that crying could happen in front of 
paintings (although few of them had experienced the phenomenon), but almost all of them seemed 
to believe that the appropriate scholarly gesture was one which divided such an experience from the 
appropriate matters for and stimuli of scholarship. 
46 Elkins, 184. 
47 Elkins, 185-186. 
48 Naas, Michael. Taking on The Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of Deconstruction. (Stanford. California: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). xviii. 
49 Elkins, 94. 
50 Elkins, 95. 
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But delimiting crying in front of a painting from the scope of appropriate, even intellectual, possible 
reactions to it also places limitations on what can be 'intellect'. To walk into the Salle des Bronzes at 
the Louvre and start crying describes the dimensions of Twombly's painting more viscerally than a 
factual statement of the width and breadth of it, the time spent making it, or the forms that fill it. 
Although recounting my 'unprofessional, embarrassing, feminine' reaction to the ceiling will not tell 
a reader in the first instance that the ground of the painting is a rich cobalt blue marked with spindly 
Greek letters and the glowing bodies of spheres in whites, yellows, and golds, it provides a field 
within which these physical descriptions can resonate. That that field is the personal should not 
automatically relegate it to the sidelines of scholarship. It is honest to admit partiality, non-
objectivity. Subjectivity. It also does not rule out the combination of the personal with a more 'dry-
eyed' approach. 
For me, that day, there was nothing to be done in that room that could have been accomplishedflrst 
with my rational intellect. My intellect is small. This is not false modesty: I anI not talking about 
'intelligence', the category of ways of knowing which encompasses ways I know how I know what I 
know and ways I don't, but 'intellect', the faculty of reasoning and understanding 'objectively'-as my 
dictionary puts it. Understood this way, intellect is partial, and not even the greatest part of my 
experience. That is, it is something I am aware of; it is something whose reactions and tendencies and 
aims I generally know. It needs a small thing, or a manageable large thing, to look at or relate to, if it 
is going to stay afloat (which is to say, if it is going to try to hold back, rather than be overwhelmed 
by or even work with, my emotions). The Ceiling is many things, but it is not manageable. It is 
engulfing. It surrounds, it welcomes. My intellect, in the face of something which was so much bigger 
than it, deferred to an emotional response as primary. It was not some other person having that 
response to the painting: it was me, the scholar, thinker, and writer who has seen and studied and 
thought and written about other paintings without a tear. The Ceiling simply mobilised a different 
response and left me to allow-or not-that response to inflect my work. 
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C.3: Reading The Ceiling 
"Paintings are intellectual things. It's not normal love. ",)1 
I am trying to puzzle out whether perhaps there is a way I can conceive of-or can expand my 
conception to encompass-crying as an academic response. as a production of knowledge, and fro rn 
that to read this painting in particular. I want to approach this work via its first effect on me, rather 
than ignore that effect. 
I am used to understanding my scholarly work as taking certain forms. This is one of them-the 
written record of ideas. with footnotes. tides. But much in the san1e way that a piece of performance 
art is suspended somewhere between the performance and its documentation, I t1nd myself 
questioning the location of my scholarship of The Ceiling. It seems to me that my tears were an 
intellectual product (that is. they created meaning that I can understand) but one that I cannot 
replicate by writing about them. no matter how much I circle or how often I try to recapture that 
moment. I want to say that I am trying to understand them. but I know as I say it that in fact I have 
understood them, It is the demand for a translation that I feel. Crying in front of l1)e C e i l i n ~ ~ I 
wasn't able to phrase the question. but now. with the distance of time and the English Channel 
reducing that immediacy. I can ask. what did this picture want? 
The answer that I receive. both when I imagine myself in the Salle des Bronzes and when I look at 
photographs taken that day of the ceiling and the room. is nothing. The Ceiling does not seem to 
need anything. The fact that it is suspended above you as you enter the room, filling the room 
without being oppressive. makes The Ceiling the most complete thing you can see. Like the sky. it 
appears everywhere. The Ceiling is so large that one cannot stand in front of it and see it all; even 
standing in the doorway. looking into the room. parts are not visible. The edges of the room. with 
their decorative mouldings. give the sense of being in a temple without a roof. They appear to 
support something that appears not to be there: of course. they are actually supporting the ceiling 
over which The Ceiling is stretched. But they seem to support nothing and open instead to a bright 
blue field floating with words and spheres. The temple is open to the heavens. At the far end. against 
the wall. four Corinthian columns and a portico decorated with gold reinforce the feeling of being in 
a temple. Along the wall, tall, rectangular windows let in daylight that complements the light of the 
51 Elkins. 185. 
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gold, the lights in the cases of bronzes. and the light reflecting from the paler spheres. The blue of the 
field; the pale gold, deep indigo, blue-grey, yellow. and white of the spheres along the edge-these act 
together to make the movement of the painting one that gestures to the centre, which seems to 
recede, just as the sky does when one lies and looks up at it. 
The word 'temple' comes from Latin: templum meant space which was open or consecrated, separate. 
Insofar as the Salle des Bronzes might be said to be consecrated, it is only consecrated to the memory 
of a religion no longer practiced, or perhaps to the non-religious conservation of the memory of past 
beliefs and their relics. But it is separate-a room with only one door, off another room, a way from 
the main corridors. And it is an open space, or feels like one. An open space, a vacuum, may not 
'want' to be filled, but it does lack the quality of being-full. A person who enters that space fills it, or 
at least renders it not-empty. In the case of The Ceilin1J> the sense that the painting is the sky, 
receding above you, is what creates the feeling of being in a temple (the same feeling does not exist 
for me in rooms with much older 'sky' paintings, surrounded by cherubs, women, billowing yards of 
clothing). This sense of recession is perhaps the origin of the feeling of welcome that overwhelmed 
me: The Ceiling felt like it was waiting for a viewer to come in and see it there. Its largeness and its 
pervasion of the room did not push me out (intruder!) but welcomed me in; made space for me. That 
the painting makes its home in a room which is open via doors at one end and windows along the 
sides further enhances the feeling of welcome: I had opportunities to leave, to look away, and to 
move. At the same time. The Ceiling was always there, waiting for me (or any other viewer) to see it. 
stand under it, make connections between it and the delicate bronzes and the room around it. It 
makes space for others to be with it, and this space is temple-like both in its connectivity and in its 
openness. 
The temple as a religious site: religion, perhaps related to the Latin 'ligare', which means to link or to 
bind. Religion here as the feeling of connection between things, and temple as a site of opening. The 
Salle des Bronzes as a site of religion is non-dogmatic; it preaches no sermon. There is a sense of being 
'at home', of welcome, as I said above. But there is also disconnection-as soon as the sense of 
belonging or home, of'ligare', linking, is felt, there is also the reminder, the poignancy, that this is not 
home, that this does not belong to you or you to it. The Ceiling is welcoming but aloof. It does not 
incorporate the viewer. The connections that are made between it and the human body are 
connections of difference, rather than assimilation. There are no human bodies in this painting; 
nothing of my scale or form to which to compare myself: no allegorical position I can assume within 
the painting. I cannot make the painting be about me or about beings who look like me. This keeps 
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me d.istant from The Ceiling and preserves my own sense of self even as I experience an overwhelming 
feeling of being surrounded by and rdated to the painting. The feeling of connection-disconnection 
is what kept me there, looking at the ceiling, almost attached but not quite, almost absorbed. but not 
quite. The obstacle in the way of assimilation is the paintings insistence on its own difference and its 
own distance. In this temple, this religious site, the links that occur are possible rather than necessary. 
The size and composition of The Ceiling at least contribute to, if they don't actually create, the sense 
of warm encompassment by the painting. In the essay" Art and Objecthood", Michael Fried uses the 
word 'presentness' to stand for "the quality some artworks have of being immediately thtre. fllling the 
field of experience, absorbing the viewer's gaze and thoughts". 52 'Presentness', of course. has echoes of 
'presence' and through these to a transcendental or authentic presence that is outside of or beyond 
the bodies of things. But 'presentness: the thtreness of art objects, is not about their fullness in terms 
of something beyond them, but about their being full as they are; the fullness of the single experience 
of them. If they transcend, this transcendence cannot be assured for anyone other than the subject 
experiencing that feeling of transcendence; if they absorb. it is likewise the single viewer's gaze and 
thoughts that are absorbed. Dogma and doctrine cannot be made out of presentness, which preserves 
in itself the contradiction of transcendence which is non-iterable, non-transferable. 'Presentness' is 
not a transcendent transcendence, then, but an immanent one. The Ceiling by grace of its physical 
properties, does actually' fill the field of experience'. It is very immediately thtre. materially present in 
the first view of the Salle des Bronzes almost no matter how one enters (unless it is with one's eyes 
fixed on the floor). The attributes of the painting are such that it is with the viewer, even an 
unwitting or unintentioned viewer, as soon as the viewer enters the room. 
Another figure used by art historians who have come to the ends of their descriptive rope when 
approaching paintings is related more directly to the feeling of being in a temple, albeit one which is 
no longer consecrated to anything, or one in which the gods to whom it was consecrated have fallen 
out ofbelie£ This figure is grace. Fried concludes his essay with the sentence ·Presentness is grace". 
Both words are possible "euphemisms for religious experience"; Elkins names the "numinous; the 
frightening. intimate, overwhelming presence of the sacred'" as a synonymic euphemism. 53 The 
'presentness' of The Ceiling is intimate and overwhelming. That this is immanent rather than 
transcendent fits the painting and its space: this decommissioned or never-holy temple-like space 
filled not with the Authorised Presence of God but with the material and physical presentness of The 
52 Elkins, 179. 
53 Elkins, 180. 
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Ceiling has a grace which is not reliant on belief in something 'out there' but on experience of what is 
physically present here: the geometry of the room, the space of it, the painting on the ceiling. The 
Ceiling is an offering, simply appearing in the same way as the sky does. Unlike the sky, it speaks. 
Inscribed in rectangular lozenges are words (Greek words, in contrast to the Hebrew words inscribed 
in the tablets of the example with which I'll dose this dissertation), or, more precisely, the names of 
Greek sculptors-although not sculptors whose works appear in the Salle des Bronzes. If"language 
makes it possible to evoke what is not there"54 then Twombly's painted names evoke the presence of 
these sculptors-and, metonymically, of an ongoing process of creation, making them present 
despite their actual absence (and they are doubly absent: both dead and thus not in the room, and 
unrepresented by their work). 
Immanent presentness; religion as a linking or a connection; the subjective experience of the 
painting; the painting speaking: these ways of talking about The Ceiling are really ways of talking 
about how-by its size. its visibility. its positioning, or qualities that can't be named, only 
experienced-the painting puts itself into. and seems, by doing so. to desire. relation with the viewer. 
In the end, the experience of a painting is always entered into as a relation: the painting alone cannot 
be viewed, and without a painting I cannot become the viewer of one. What the painting lacks. waits 
for. is to be seen. Which is to say, to be in relation. The question is. what kind of relation? Instead of 
the historical relationship between icon and iconoclast (as articulated by Mitchell), a relationship 
that takes into consideration the possibility of desire on the part of the painting. A relationship, 
then, that is totemic-that believes in the special significance and relationship between the painting 
and the viewer. It might be silly to say the painting has desires in the way that a human being has 
desires. or even in the way an animal or plant can be said to 'want' something. But the paintings 
desire for relation is built into its structure. And the desire for relation is most often a desire for 
relation that will take care with that relation. will not be violent toward it. The Ceiling seems to call 
for this kind of relation by the way it is present to the viewer, but also by its situation as something 
which recalls the sacred without invoking a particular transcendence. 
54 Richard Leeman, quoted in -Louvre an books: Cy Twombly·, a post on 
http://www.cveninpllaftemoon.com/20 IlIOZllouvre-an-books-cy-rwombly.htrnl, accessed 15 July 2011. 
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C.4: Other ways of reading 
"Whole histories of painting assume that modernism has an analytic, deconstructive heart",55 and 
perhaps it does. But that is not to say that such a heart is necessarily unconcerned with or unaffected 
by relation to the other, or the non-rational ways and kinds oflcnowing that attend relation, any 
more than the general noun' science' is uninflected by desire ( to know) or by feelings (curiosity, 
intuition). If deconstruction can be taken to mean, at its most fundamental, a deep, living attention 
to the other, then that attention extends to how we go about responding to others, including 
paintings (or traditions of painting). This understanding of deconstruction offers the possibility for 
analysis to live in the same space as-or at times stem from, or appear as-emotional or non-rational 
responses, such as crying. In order to participate in the tradition of deconstruction, it is not a matter 
only of restating arguments in familiar forms, or engaging 'methodically' with a certain category of 
subject matter; it is a question of"affirm[ing] and contest[ing] not only the arguments and claims of 
the tradition but traditional ways of making arguments and claims, of claiming authority, prodUCing 
evidence, and gaining conviction, traditional modes of receiving and reading the tradition·. 56 
At one point, puzzled by his own inability to cry in front of a painting, and thinking through the 
reaction of his graduate student who did cry at an exhibition, Elkins writes, ·Would I have cried if I 
hadn't been so much on the defensive? I fI hadn't been so intent on resisting whatever the show had 
to offer?". 57 Elkins is privileging crying here, assigning it a value which is not inherent, because he 
'can't' do it. But the f.u:t that some people will cry in front of paintings and some will not; that some 
people will take crying as a kind of thought and some will dismiss it as meaningless to scholarship 
would be falsely construed as a drama in which one thing is triumphantly Good and the other 
abjectly Bad. The point of crying here is to complicate ideas that there could be a single, 'authentic' 
way to experience thought or to produce it, and tears themselves are no more 'authentic' than any 
other response. Elkins' reintroduction of the question of tears in the study of art is, however, an 
attempt to redress the tendency (his tendency) to dismiss what does not come from the dry-eyed 
intellect. 
Of course, in the end, there is not just one way of going about making knowledge or of interacting 
with objects. The idea is not that tears are categorically better or more appropriate or more 
55 Elkins. 200. 
56 Naas. 2003: xix. 
57 Elkins. 185. 
24, 
meaningful than intellectualising or arguing or theorising or thinking or laughing or jumping up and 
down. It is simply that tears also fall on the spectrum of possible human responses, even the responses 
of scholars, and that, as such, it is possible that tears, too, can teach us-and may even be able to 
teach things which drier eyes cannot. 
I was able to cry because I had the time to do so. There was nowhere to go, no deadline to make. 
There was nothing that pressured me out of that response and into another mode. I had no role, 
officially. I was free to find my own way toward the painting. and the way I found was in tears. My 
crying in front of The Ceiling did not supplant my ability to think about it as an art historian; it 
complemented it and provided me with a more nuanced response. I came to an understanding of this 
painting that is different from that which I have of any other painting in front of which I have not 
cried. Moreover, crying in front of this painting demonstrated to me the possibility of intellectual 
knowledge originating in a non-objective experience. The written law which makes room for 
interpretation, the space in fundamental stories for the unknowable, the possibility of scholarship 
arising from tears, the way that each of these demonstrates connection rather than separation: 
connection between the reader and the text, connection between the object and the subject. It is this 
connection which begs an approach that is delicate while critical, sensitive while rigorous; an 
approach which acknowledges the whole person who senses, feels, and thinks-who both effects 
changes in the text and is affected by it. 
2S 
Introduction and literature review 
A. Introduction 
"Again. there was always a context. she never simply held forth. She situated." 
C. D. Wright) 
"When I draw a straight line or conceive of an arrangement of tangible elements [ ... ] I inevitably 
impose my own order on matter." 
Anne Truitr 
Looking at the night sky in my first weeks in England, I was glad to see the shapes of Orion, the Big 
Dipper, and Cassiopeia. The presence of these familiar figures in a strange country was reassuring. 
The comfort I found in those constellations was arbitrary, based my recognition ofimagined lines 
between a few bright stars describing a legendary hunter. Despite this contingency, however, the 
comfort-the meaning-was there. Finding those stars, I was no longer lost and foreign; I belonged, 
things made sense. Such is the role of the constellation, whether the word refers to the well-known 
ancient groupings of stars or is used figuratively: juxtaposition, copresence create meaning.3 The 
figure of the constellation as a model for knowing, understanding, or finding out occurs in the 
writings of Walter Benjamin ("image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with 
the now to form a constellation";4 "Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars"5) and, later, 
Theodor Adorno (" As a constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept it would like to unseal, 
hoping that it may fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in response, not to a 
single key or a single number, but to a combination of numbers"6). It is through this figure that this 
dissertation will broach the question oflove as a mode of approach to texts. A constellation is a 
fitting figure for such an action, in that it emphasises production rather than creation: although new 
'lines' might be drawn in the sky, the stars that the lines join are already there. 
The central question of this dissertation is, "What would it be like, what would it mean, to approach 
texts lovingly?". Such an approach is a consideration of relation to the other in which "the relation is 
1 Wright, C. D. Cooling rmu: An American Poetry Vigil. (Port Townsend. Washington: Copper Canyon Press. 2005). p. 34. 
2 Truitt. Anne. From Daybook: The Journal of an Artist (J 974-79). excerpted in Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art. 
Ed. Kristina Stiles. Peter Howard Sdz. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1996). p. 99. 
3 The power of constellated objects is of course also at play in Twombly's The Ceiling. 
4 Benjamin. Walter. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. (Cambridge. Mass.: HalVard University 
Press. 2004). p. 463. 
5 Benjamin. Walter. Origin of the German Mourning Play. p. 34. quoted in Weber. Samuel. Benjamin's -abilities. (Cambridge. 
Mass: Harvard University Press. 2008). p. 313. 
6 Adorno. Theodor. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2005). p. 
163. 
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the smallest possible unit of analysis".7 As with any constellating. the question does not come out of! 
thin air, but out of the greater assembly; in this case, the voices of writers in the canon of20"'-cennuy 
theory and literature who gesture independently toward such a way of being with texts. These voices . 
speak of a desire for a relation with the other, and consider that relation in terms of the word clove-. 
For example, there is the voice ofLuce lrigaray: -To go in search of oneself, especially in the relation 
with the other, represents a work not yet carried out by our culture of speaking'" and -To go toward 
the other, to welcome the other into oneself open [ s] non-vertical dimensions in the relation".9 T h ~ ~ . 
is the voice of Roland Barthes, who writes, "I unceasingly affinn love, within myself, as a value"; 10 and.·. 
"The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its own ideas-for my body does not'; 
have the same ideas I do" .11 
The body having its own ideas is echoed in the writing of Emmanuel Uvinas-he writes that -the 
caress is a mode of the subject's being [ ... ] The seeking of the caress does not know what it seeks". and . 
continues, "This 'not knowing'. this fundamental disorder, is the essential", placing the unknown at 
the centre.12 In writings by a Catholic theologian Oean-Luc Marion) and a German poet (Rainer 
Maria Rilke), in the poems ofE.E. Cummings and the theory ofW. J. T. Mitchell, are calls for 
relation with the other as an essentially unknowable being. Such a relation, in such terms, resists 
assimilation of one party by another by its awareness of the otherness of the other. 
It is Derrida who establishes the necessity of the otherness of the other for this dissertation, saying 
that to "ask a question, you must nrst tell the Other that I am speaking to you. Even to oppose or 
challenge the Other, you must say 'at least I speak to you', cI say yes to our being in common 
together'''. He goes on to say that "this is what I meant by love, this reaffirmation of the 
affirmation".13 In this case, the relation between the self and the other is underwritten by an 
acknowledgement of the other as an entity separate from the self, and Derrida speaks about it in 
reference to love as an ethos in his work. Love for the other is not, however, the only necessary 
7 Haraway, Donna. The Companion Species Manifesto. (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2(03). p. 20. 
S Irigaray, Luee. The Way of Love. (London and New York: Continuum. 2(02). p. 43. 
9 Ibid. 149. 
10 Barthes, Roland. A Lover's Discourse: Fragmmts. Trans. R. Howard. (London: Vintage. 2(02). p. 22. 
11 Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. Trans. R. Miller. (New York: Hill and Wang. 1975). p. 17. 
12 Uvinas, Emmanuel. The Levinas Ruder. Ed. S. Hand. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 51. 
13 Derrida,Jacques .• An Interview with Jacques Derrida-. Interview with Nikhil Padgaonhr. Originally published in Biblio: d 
ReviewofBoolu, Vol. 3. no. I.January-February 1997. Posted on Scribd and accessed there onI5/10/2010. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6990116/Derrida-Interview-on-LoveN ikhil-PadJaonkar. Originally posted on 
http://www.csun.edu/coms/pd/jd.nik.html.andaccessed there 27/10/2008. N. pag. 
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quantity in this relation. In Points de suspension, Derrida replies to a question about deconstruction 
as a term by saying, 
La deconstruction comme telle ne se rcduit ni a une methode ni a une analyse [ ... ] elle va au-dcla 
de la decision critique m ~ m e . . C'est pourquoi dIe n'est pas negative, bien qu'on l'ait souvent, 
malgre tant de precautions, interpretee ainsi. Pour moi, dIe accompagne toujours une exigence 
affirmative, je dirai meme qu'elle ne va jamais sans amour.14 
That deconstruction accompanies and is accompanied by love (that it doesn't happen without love) 
means that the encounter with the other is marked by this attitude. In order for an encounter to 
take place-in order for a 'yes' to be able to be said and to be said-to-there must be two parties (at 
least): an I who is speaking and a you who is spoken to. That deconstruction in these two instances is 
referred to by Derrida as something that takes place with love, and that it is something enacted by 
someone in reference to something implies both that two mutually non-assimilated parties are 
necessary and that love has something to do with the parties' non-assimilation. Derrida's definition 
oflove in deconstruction is not singular or simple; the affirmation of the other is not its limit, and 
involvement with the other does not necessarily equal an effacement of the sel£ Indeed Derrida 
acknowledges the relationship between love and narcissism in Points, saying, 
n n'y a pas Ie narcissisme et Ie non-narcissisme ; il y a des narcissismes plus ou moins 
comprehensifs, genereux, ouverts, etendus, et ce qu'on appelle Ie non-narcissisme n'est en 
general que l ' ~ c o n o m i e e d'un narcissisme beaucoup plus accueillant, hospitalier et ouvert a 
l'cxperience de l'autre comme autre.Je crois que sans un mouvement de reappropriation 
narcissique, Ie rapport l'autre serait absolument detmit, serait detruit d'avance. II faut que 
Ie rapport a l'autre[ ... ]-mcme s'il reste dissymetrique, ouvert sans reappropriation 
possible- il faut qu'il esquisse un mouvement de reappropriation dans l'image de soi-
meme pour que l'amour soit possible, par exemple. L'amour est narcissique".15 
That is, without an open realization of the role of the self in the love of the other-the role of the 
love of the self which must be present in order for there to be a self which can love-relations with 
the other would be completely destroyed. A lack of relation to the self, a lack of a 'generous, open, 
reaching-out, welcoming' kind of narcissism (the effacement of the selfin relations with the other) is 
not love; love is possible via a retaking of certain narcissisms. So when Derrida says that the love in 
deconstruction is 'saying yes to the other', what is present in that statement is not only a 'yes' to an 
other, but the a priori existence of the self who says yes {who desires a relation, whose relation to the 
other comes about because it is not assimilated to the other any more than it assimUates the other to 
14 Derrich, Jacques. Points de suspmsion: mlrtNms, Choisis et presentes par Elisabeth Weher. (Paris: Galilee, 1992): 88-89. 
15 Ibid, 212-213. 
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it) as well as the other whose being is not assimilated to the self Love occurs between an assured self 
and an assured other, rather than between an obliterated self and an assured other, or vice-versa, or 
between two obliterated selves. It is, therefore, a way of knowing the other which at the same time 
requires a discerning attention to the self and to the currents between the self and the other. 
As a sustained discussion contained in the literature review at the end of this introduction shows, 
there has been a turn within the humanities toward theories of affect and studies of the senses, and 
to some extent it is within this turn that this dissertation falls. I am interested in the possibility of 
love as a way of knowing. or love even as a challenge to (not a replacement for, but a complement to) 
other ways of knowing. Insofar as love, like affect and the body, has been repressed by a desire, or the 
imitation of a desire, to appear untouched by the personal, the subjective, this thesis benefits from 
the work done in affect theory. 
While affect theory (with its emphasis on the bodily and felt as sites of knowing and its recourse to 
scientific language and ways of gathering information) provides a somatic counter to the heavy 
textualism of deconstruction, Derrida's work in particular offers balance to approaches that 
centralize life or vitality by insisting that the experience of life is mediated by structures such as 
language which distance us from it, and that life is thus only possible via the anticipation of life's 
opposite-nonpresence, death. This balance, in addition to the focus on the text, and the 
expansiveness with which 'text' is considered in deconstruction, are the reasoning behind my 
recourse to deconstruction here. 
The third area into which this work falls, or from which it comes, is the movement of women's 
writing called ecriture feminine, and in particular the writing of Helene Cixous, with its insistence 
on the body as something that writes, is written, reads, and is read. Cixous' work (discussed at the 
end of the literature review) offers precedent for the inclusion of the body and personal, emotional 
experience not only within the set of , things to be studied' but within the set of , things that can be 
read' and 'things that can write', and provides and example of a mode of writing which is ethical in 
ways that I would like my writing to be. 
The dissertation combines areas of recent work in affect theory with aspects ofDerrida's work and 
the work of other writers to ask how to understand love as a way of being with texts. What would 
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the qualities of such a relation be? Uvinas, Derrida, Barthes, Irigaray, Marion, Rilke, Cummings, 
and others speak to this relation. This dissertation aims to bring their ideas together in concert, and 
from them to develop a way of approaching texts with love. To continue the metaphor from the 
opening of this section, these voices are bright stars which, when ligamented, make a figure. 
Dissertation as astronomer: the work here is a situating. an 'arrangement of tangible elements' -and 
an activation of these voices in the context of each other in order to demonstrate both the desire for 
and the gestures toward a loving approach. 
Derrida's statements about 'the love in deconstruction', and Mitchell's work on relations with 
pictures in particular, provide an impetus for considering that relation as with an other typically 
conceived as object: in Mitchell's case, paintings; in the case of this dissertation, texts. Given models 
of love as a relation between people, how might one understand love as a way of being with texts? 
What would the qualities of such a relation be? The voices of Levinas, Derrida, Barthes, Irigaray, 
Marion, Rilke, Cummings, and others speak to this relation. However, although these voices appear, 
they have not yet been concerted; that is the role of this dissertation, which orchestrates this 
conversation and builds from it a loving approach to texts. To continue the metaphor from the 
opening of this section, these voices are bright stars which, when ligamented, make a figure. 
Dissertation as astronomer: the work here is a situating. making an 'arrangement of tangible 
elements' -and an activation of these voices in the context of each other in order to demonstrate 
both the desire for and the gestures toward a loving approach. 
B. The place of this dissertation; its themes 
This dissertation concerns itself with the possibility oflove being a way of approaching texts. In order 
to do so, it has to work out responses to the questions "What is a text?" and "What is love?". These 
responses take as their central idea that of distance. For Barthes, through whose writings the concept 
of text is explored. the text-as-erotic is characterised by its ongoing self-production, its limitlessness; 
the text "is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving".16The result of this ongoing production 
is that an object which is to be called 'text', a complete and final version of itself, is never achieved. 
Instead, the defining quality of text is its expansion. The way this dissertation approaches love is, 
similarly, through a trope of wideness. Rainer Maria Rilke conceived of love not as an assimilation of 
one person by another, but as a recognition that "between even the closest human beings infinite 
16 Barthcs.1975: 65. 
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distances continue to exist" and exhorted the young poet to whom he addressed his letters to -[love] 
the distances"P Rilke's attention to the role of non-identity in love is given a textual tum ." 
Derrida's understanding of the 'love in deconstruction' -an attention to the otherness of the other. 
To approach texts with love is to approach without assimilating. with respect for their difference and 
for their unknowability; to see them as "whole and against a wide Sky".18 
Adapting W. J. T. Mitchell's approach to pictures, this dissertation proposes ways of being with texts . 
that consider them as others. It identifies points in the literature which suggest the possibility of such 
an approach, or which begin to advance it. As such, this dissertation is to some extent concerned With 
methodology; specifically, it aims to develop a 'methodology' for reading or being-with texts which 
draws a distinction between 'approach' (the term that will be active here) and 'method' (a more USUal 
term). Part of the question this dissertation addresses is the nature of such an approach: what would 
it resemble? How would it be practiced? Take, for a gestural example of such an approach,lrwin 
Panofsky's image of "meeting with 'an acquaintance' who 'greets me on the street by removing his 
hat'''.19 Rather than a methodology as such, then, this dissertation offers a motion of method, an 
approach that takes up that gesture of recognition. It proposes that, latent in the literature alluded to 
above, there is both a desire and a possibility for the construction of such an approach. 
As far as the question of potential: the possibilities for this approach lie in the varied suggestions of 
such a way of reading or being-with found in the work of writers such as Helene Cixous, Luce 
Irigaray, Teresa Brennan, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Uvinas, andJean-Luc 
Marion, whose work appears throughout the dissertation. This dissertation synthesises instances or 
suggestions of this approach in order to put in concert writers and thinkers whose work indicates 
that in some way loving concern, or love itself, is part of a thoughtful and critical approach to the 
other and to the text.zo It will concern itself with what happens when we interact with texts lovingly. 
In response to the question of what 'lovingly' means, the dissertation will refer to a history oflove in 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, ecriture feminine (specifically Cixous' writings), and affect theory to be 
found in the literature review which caps this introduction. First, however, a brief discussion of the 
choice of 'approach' instead of'method'. 
17 Rilke. Rainer Maria. Rj/Jee on Love and Other Difficulties. Ed. and trans. John J. L. Mood. (N cw York: Norton. 1975). p. 28. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Quoted in Mitchell. 48. 
20 The question of what a text is. for the purposes of this dissertation. can be answered briefly: it is that which operates within a 
signifying structure-it means, refers. signifies {even if what is signified is absence)-and which by this signification extends 
outside of its perceptual borders. creating an ongoing 'opening, whether to other meanings or other approaches. For an 
extended discussion. please see Chapter 2. "An Ontology Of/For Texts-. 
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C. 'Method': a brief history 
The scene upon which Structuralism arrived in the middle of the long 20th century was, politically, 
intellectually, and artistically, one concerned with methods and with the systematization thereo£ 
Althusser's Marxism represented ·scientificity in politics".21 Freudian psychoanalysis bridged the gap 
between psychology and science with a vocabulary of 'hypothesis' and 'method'. Thinkers of the 20th 
century made a radical break with metaphysical philosophical traditions and with the positivist 
tradition of classical science, but, unsurprisingly, remnants of both continued to inform both 
scholastic and popular thought, especially as the 'space age' dawned and science filled childhood 
games, cured the body's problems in middle age, and offered the tempting prospect of defrosted life 
after death, or exportation to other planets. This milieu not only formed or perhaps called for the 
Structuralist view from which culture, language, and meaning could be reduced to underlying and 
fundamental forms, but would also shape the later appearance of post-structural critiques of 
Structuralism. The embedding of Structuralism and post-structuralism within European and 
American academic institutions,ll where value is placed on empiricism and objectivity, must likewise 
have influenced the forms that the expressions of these theories took. 
The 'science of criticism' identified by Barthes23 speaks to the perhaps tacit pressure for theoretical 
work in 'soft' disciplines, such as philosophy and linguistics, to stand up to the rigorous and objective 
testing of theoretical work in corresponding hard' science. But also requires the development of a 
form that resembles those of other sciences-a method by which to communicate, but also by which 
a standard of examination and of investigation could be assured. Barthes' continual resort to the term 
'science' indicates the centrality, conscious or not, of a method that could be 'scientific' to 
Structuralism. Although, as Jonathan Culler notes, ·science in French [ ... ] means systematic thought, 
not, as in English, an empirical and experimental enterprise",24 it was not simply that the application 
of a name to a process informed the theories ofBarthes and other structuralists; nor does the nuance 
Culler nnds between 'systematic thought' and empiricism change the fact that here, theoretical work 
in the humanities would adopt an explicit method. 
21 Althusscr, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy, and other mays. (New York: Mondy Review Press, 1972). p. 65. 
22 For example, Derrida's 1966 ddivery of ·Structure, Sign. and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences· at Johns 
Hopkins University. 
23 Barthes, Roland. Criticism and Truth, trans. Katrine P. Keunemen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1987).73. 
24 Culler, Jonathan. Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, linguistics, and the study of literature (London: Routledge Classics. 
2002). ix. 
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Briefly. when 'science' is invoked here. it is shorthand for a tradition of positivist, empiricist science 
which employed a method that believed in the observer as separate from the field of observation. an 
authority whose less-dependable modes of knowing (feeling. sensing. loving) had to be switched oft 
'Science' in this usage does not imply. for example. 20th-century physics (Bohr, Einstein). The critiquL 
is not of science as such. but of the separation presumed by some scholarly traditions. including those 
within which I am writing. between the observer and the observed-and the way that inflects textual 
theories to the point that the reader becomes, in the middle of the 20th century. separate from the 
text.2S As above, this dissertation argues that the smallest unit of analysis is relation. The problem of a 
presumed objectivity is the removal of the relation on which it depends: objectivity ignores the 
potential interaction between subject and object. Approaching via a concern for relations. the 
boundary between subject (myself and you-who-are-like-me) and object (you-who-arc:-not-like-me) 
becomes tenuous. or even collapses. Such a collapse extends to the 'object' the possibility of relations 
and agency, desire and meaning. similar to that otherwise only extended to 'subjects'. This includes 
the possibility of 'objects' acting on 'subjects' or causing them to experience changes (in aff'c:ct, for 
example). But it is impossible to consider such a collapse in the tradition of positivist, empiricist 
science. 
To some extent. the post-structUral response to structUralism takes issue with the uniformity that a 
method, especially a 'scientific' one, presupposes. Despite great differences among the work and 
practices of writers who are now called post-structUralists, the tendency to reject underlying notions 
of structure: or fundamental truths is a working generality. which would seem to indicate: a 
coextensive rejection of the methods by which these truths were 'uncovered' or displayed. This 
generality is reflected in the destabilisation of meaning which occurs in much post-structUralist 
writing. such destabilisation being one way of bringing 'truth' itself into question and of clouding 
the process by which one arrives at such ends. I f slippery language: indicates that there arc: no truths. 
the way taken to find these non-existent truths must also be slippery-if it exists at all. 
Post-structuralism, however. arose within the context of the French (and other) education systems; 
its 'practitioners: if they were ever to accept such a tide. were embedded in the: modes of that systelll 
even as they worked to exit or deconstruct it. Appropriate to thinkers for whom the binary was a false 
structure, their writing and lectures both continued and attempted to derail the systems from which 
25 Obviously. the work of Barthes and others runs counter to this. The question of the reader/writer-ten relation is dealt \1Iritb 
in Chapter 2. 
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they came. Thus, despite Derrida's insistence that deconstruction, a central strategy or action of many 
post-structuralist writings, is not a method, his very writings on deconstruction came out of the 
methodised, structured, ritualised setting of the French academy, and have been since used (by 
Culler, among others, as will be discussed in Chapter 3) if not as step-by-step instructions, at least as 
a set of possibilities for action or an outline for one's attitude 'as a deconstructionist'. Of course, any 
'method' used by a scholar in the humanities, whether or not he or she identifies as a 
deconstructionist, will differ in application, in use, and in form from the scientific method 
standardised among laboratories and scientific disciplines. But it is the idea of a method appearing in 
literary theory at all which is at stake here. 
The term 'method' is at stake because it links disciplines which cannot be empirical to others which 
are rooted in empiricism; because it proposes the possibility of singular ways of dealing with others; 
and because it sets the one who conducts the research apart from her subject. This dissertation 
concerns itself in the flrst instance with questions of methodology. It aims to offer an approach to 
texts which will draw a distinction between that term-approach-and 'method: a more generally 
used term. It will locate intimations of such a methodology in the writings of theorists of the late 20th 
century, many of whom are identified with Structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction. It 
will synthesise instances or suggestions of such a methodology in order to mobilise a collectivity-
writers who have already offered or gestured toward a way of being with texts which is both loving 
and critical. 
Since 'method' is the term in question, let us proceed by undertaking an examination of that term. A 
method is a form or procedure for accomplishing something; an orderliness of thought or behaviour. 
Methodos, via Greek: the pursuit of knowledge, from meta- (development) + hodos (way). The 
pursuit of knowledge via a set procedure, the ensconcement of knowledge within an institution, a 
form. A C method' proposes a way which is already set-discovered by another whose authority is 
followed. even ifvestigial1y. It offers a path to follow, a procedure. It has intimations ofiterability (as 
any map does), and in those intimations lie part of its value-that of exact, or near, reproduction. All 
this conspires to create the aura of order that surrounds method. 
The appropriateness of this orderliness to scholarly work is not up for debate in this dissertation; a 
certain adherence to form and convention both shape and locate the dissertation as a product of 
scholarly culture, as well as the field within which dissertations fall. But orderliness is not necessarily 
the same as form or procedure; order is relational-one thing relating to another, as in perceptions 
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of chronology or hierarchy or alphabet. (And a certain 'disorder'is elemental to the relation between 
texts identified as 'deconstructionist' and 'post-structuralist'.) What is in question is the 
appropriateness of , method' as a term to describe setting fonh in pursuit of wisdom, or as a term used 
to imply that the pursuit of knowledge is a set procedure, to be followed by a subject who applies it 
to an object. 
The use of the term 'method' in the pursuit of philosophical knowledge, and the importance of that 
term to Western thought, can be traced at least to the 1637 publication of Descartes' Discourseoj'the 
Method oj'lOghtly Conducting Reason. Descartes, taking the capability of mathematical reasoning to 
achieve 'perfect' knowledge, or certainty, as a desirable end, proposes an intellectual process for 
philosophy which emulates the one by which mathematical knowledge is achieved. While more 
direct descendants of Descartes' thought now belong to traditions of analytic philosophy rather than 
Continental ones, Descartes' role in the development of modem philosophy cannot be overlooked 
even in a consideration of non-analytic philosophy, if only because it is from Descartes' work that the 
use of the specific term 'method' emerges. Descartes' thinking on subjecthood and thought itself 
formed cornerstones of philosophical inquiry. Therefore, what might seem like a minor question of 
word-choice (choosing 'methode' over other possible synonyms or desCriptors of his practice) 
nevenheless has had widening consequences for the practice of philosophy even to the present day, 
Of course, the choice of , method' is not a minor one. It indicates that, from Descartes on, it would be 
possible to proceed in questions of philosophy in the same manner in which one proceeds in 
questions of mathematics: first of all, in an objective or empirical way, and second of all, as a subject 
acting upon an inert, observable object to which there is no necessary relationship. If there is a 
relationship to be described in terms of method, it is a one-way relation: that of o b s e ~ e r r or actor 
observing or acting on the object of observation or action. It is hardly necessary to trace the 
implications of this relationship in the history of Western thought-or its practical significance in 
disciplines influenced by philosophy, including history, politics, literary studies. 
Descartes' own relationship to the narrative of Western thought intimates the place method as an 
informing construct would take. This construct is echoed, for example, in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' 
('Wissenschaft') and the establishment by his students and followers of a Hegelian 'method' (the 
procedure of theSis/antithesis/synthesis). Regardless of whether Hegel's intent was to demonstrate a 
procedure or method, and despite thoughtful application and use, this method has become a pat 
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formula useful for explaining Hegel's thought. 26 and at the same time further embeds the idea of a 
scientific. procedural process in the hean of philosophy. Philosophy's connection to Descanes' use of 
the term 'method' persists: although Descanes' work comes under fire in the 20th centurf7 from 
HusserL Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, these criticisms do not directly broach the 
issue of the word 'method'. In fact. the term is consistently used to describe the work even of thinkers 
who object. directly or indirectly, to central Canesian concepts.28 It is pertinent to note here that 
'method' is often a term applied post-hoc to processes of thought as attempts are made to replicate 
26 See, for example, GuiJe to philosophy by C. E. M. Joad. Courier Dover Publications. 1957. where 'method' appears about 50 
times, among which are references to Hegel's method as well as Spinoza's (122). the scientific method (111.187. 531). the 
-traditional method of philosophy· or the -method of philosophY- (respectively. 174. footnote: 412). and the -method of 
the Hegelian dialectic· (421). Method here is not only the practice of philosophy (i.e. how one arrives at conclusions). but 
also the way in which arguments arc communicated. as in a method of writing-still with the implication that there is a 
procedure which has been followed and by which the writer has arrived at their present state of eloquence (or difficulty). See 
-Hegel's Phenomenological Method·. Kenley R. Dove. The &view of MetaphySics. Vol 23 .• No.4 Uune 1970). pp. 615-41 for 
a further example of the application of the term. 
27 Descartes' work was also criticised by a contemporary, Anne Conway. whose critique includes arguments against Cartesian 
dualism. See Sarah Hutton's book Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) for 
a full discussion of Conway's critiques of Descartes. their origins. and their effects. 
28 A few examples, from early to late. of references to Heideggcr and 'method': ·Heidegger's method seems to consist in the 
familiar handling of metaphysical problems through a prior analysis of human nature- (. A Note on the Philosophy of 
Heideggcr·. Marjorie Glicksman. The Journal of Philosophy, VoL 35. No.4 (Feb. 17. 1938). p. 93): ·Presuming two 
Hcideggcrs. even if one is continuous with the other. do the two lend themselves to a unified hermeneutical method?· (-From 
Heideggcr to Derrida to Chance: Doubling and (Poetic) Language·. Joseph N. Riddel: boundary 2. Vol. 4. No.2. Martin 
Heideggcr and Literature (Winter. 1976). p. 572. my emphasis) : -Hcideggcr's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal 
Indications·. Daniel O. Dahlstrom: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 47 (1994». 
For references to Husserl's 'method'. see -Lebenswelt and Lebensformen: Husser! and Wittgenstein on the Goal and 
Method of Philosophy·. Earl Taylor: Human Studies, Vol. 1. No.2 (April. 1978). pp.184-200: ·can we not say that Husserl's 
method of analysing intention may be described as just the method of using such' guiding principles'-. (-On the Relationship 
Between Husserl's Phenomenology and Psychological Insight-. Ludwig Binswanger: Philosophy and Phenomenological 
.&sUTch. Vol. 2. No.2 (Dec .• 1941). p. 202). 
Additionally, Paul dcMan refers to literary theory as something which cannot be -studied according to methods which 
arc scientiflc rather than historical·. but employs the term 'method' nonetheless (Daedalus. Vol. 99. No.2. Theory in 
Humanistic Studies (Spring. 1970). p. 402). And. despite Derrida's famous resistance to the application of the word 'method' 
to deconstruction. Daniel O'Hara. reviewing OfGrammatology. refers to deconstruction (by capitalised name) as -Derrida's 
method for making problematical the entire question of 'reading. and later as "Derrida's method of adamant indecision-. 
placing deconsttuction not only within the form of method and the ideological rules that govern that form. but also as. in 
both cases. firmly -Derrida's·. belonging to or originating from Derrida, fixed and set by him and by his practice. iterable (if 
iteration follows the original) in the way that methods arc: followed correcdy. they yield a correct result ("Review: 
[UntidecW. TheJoumal oj Aesthetics and.Art Criticism. Vol 36. No.3. Critical Interpretation (Spring. 1978). p. 363). A 
further reference to -Derrida's method of deconsttuction-. which of course implies not only that there is (arc) a method(s) to 
deconstruction. but also that Derrida in particular has his own such method. is to be found in Michael Ryan's 1976 review of 
Jeffery Mehlman's A Structural StuJy oj Autobiography: Proust, Uris, Sartre, Levi-Strauss (Diacritics. Vol. 6. No.1 (Spring. 
1976). p. 35). These recurrences of the problematic term serve, if nothing else. to demonstrate how deeply entrenched in 
critical usc the word 'method' is. when talking about the ways in which theorists and theoretical writing (or philosophers and 
philosophical Writing) rdate to other texts. 
Note, however. that at least in some instances. 'method' is not the term adopted. In his 1986 article "The Hollow King: 
A Heideggcrian Approach to George Seferis's 'The King of Asini'·. Alexander Argyros uses the same word I will adopt in this 
dissertation-'approach' (boundary 2. Vol. 15. No. 1/2 (Autumn. 1986 - Winter. 1987). pp. 305-321). Likewise. in a review 
of Of Grammatology in diacritics in 1972. Alexander Gelley makes reference to critical activity in the form of both 
·'approach'· (his application of quotation marks) and -method- (diacritics, Vol. 2. No.1 (Spring. 1972). p. 9). 
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their results. It is also apposite that the term 'method' in 20th-century theoretical practices such as 
structuralism makes a kind of sense, given structuralism's basis in linguistics-treading the line 
between soft and hard science, a method does apply to linguistics-although the appropriateness ofa 
term to one practice alone is not sufficient reason for the continued use of that term in other 
practices, or across time. Nevertheless, the continued currency of ' method.' as a term for the gathering 
of and movement through knowledge indicates two things: first of all, an unsevered tie to 
Cartesianism, and second, an underlying or repressed belief within philosophy that it, like science, 
can be empirical and objective, and produce replicable results via the application of a uniform 
procedure. 
This dissertation finds its heritage in late 20th-century theory, but from that heritage and context will 
demonstrate that, despite predominant use of the term 'method' to characterise what a theorist does 
with a text, there are precedents in the literature for another way of being-with a text or an other. It 
will begin to consider the possibilities for something other than a 'method' employed in the reading 
of texts; the term which this dissertation suggests in place of , method' is 'approach'. 
D. 'Method' :t; 'approach' 
Having already discussed the root of , method' in its philosophical usages, as well as the implications 
the activation of such a term has for philosophy, I now tum to a discussion of the term that will he 
called upon in this dissertation-'approach: At its etymological roots, the word has in it the idea of 
relation. 'Approach' descends from French (approcher) via Latin (appropriare = 'go nearer to'). '!he 
ablative 'ad.' of Latin becomes 'a[p ]-' and its indication of movement toward combines with the sense 
in '-proach' (from 'propriare' [come nearer], think of French 'prochaine', or next) ofincreased 
nearness. To approach something. then, combines the purposeful action of movement implied by the 
ablative morpheme 'a.' with the connotations of nearness and proximity of'proach'. To move toward 
something puts the mover into relation with that something because without relationality the 
concept of moving toward or moving into proximity with could not be understood. However, I want 
to differentiate between 'method', which also has etymological connotations of movement, and 
approach: the 'hodos' ('way') of method indicates a singular path that is to be taken. 'Approach,' on 
the other hand, is simply about moving toward, without designating which path to take. 'Approach' 
foregrounds relation to the other; 'method', to the path one takes. So it is because of this basic 
position of being in relation that this dissertation adopts the term 'approach: but also as a measure of 
38 
discipline for the work itself as it is undertaken here. Adopting a term outside of regular use means a 
forced and continual attention to and consideration of seemingly minor facets of communication. 
This attention is a way of attending to, respecting, and gesturing toward the relation that the word 
'approach' implies as a possibility in the making of theory. 
Beyond the etymological traces from which I have begun, there are of course other reasons for the 
choice of , approach' over 'method'. As outlined briefly in the introductory section of this chapter, one 
objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate the desirability of this methodology. This desirability, 
again, lies in the possibility for openness, respect for difference, and affirmation which an 'approach: 
rather than a 'method: could offer. I will consider each of these characteristics here. All three 
characteristics are linked to the etymological senses in which 'approach' contains an idea of 
separation and relation; that is their strength. 
First of all, to open up what is meant here by 'respect for difference'. 'Approach' is a state which is 
incomplete. Lacking arrival, the 'approach' cannot close the metaphorical gap and achieve full 
understanding; there is always something between the one who approaches and the one who is 
approached-territory still to be covered, room for a further approach. The 'approach' necessarily 
respects difference between the one and the other because it inherently acknowledges that 
achievement of total understanding cannot occur. How this respect occurs, how it is manifest-these 
are questions which cannot be answered in general, only in situations, because the idea of the 
approach is site-speciRc, unknowable in sum. That is, the idea of approach, being one of relation, 
cannot be outlined and reduced to a schematic. It must be practiced carefully and attentively, and 
will require different things in each case where it is put into play, because rdation is always a question 
of adaptation to the needs and ways of the concerned parties. Secondly, the question of ' openness'. 
The openness of'approach' lies in its unknowability. Its openness is both the imagined space of 
unknowing and the space between the one and the other that this unknowing shows to exist. This is 
also the openness that permits the other to be as they are, does not subject them to a prodding or a 
bending to Rt a mould pre-designed to contain them despite their different form. Both of these Rrst 
points lead to the third, the idea of , affirmation', which is the explicit acknowledgement of what is 
tacit in approach, in respect for the other, and in openness. Affirmation is the a priori 'yes' that must 
be said in order for rdation to occur at all; it is the ·original ethics"29 without which relation in terms 
of difference cannot occur. 
29 Dcrrida, Interview (1997). 
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The desirability of such an approach can also be inferred by certain gestures of valuation made 
toward these qualities which have been made by other practitioners of literary and cultural theory. I 
term these' gestures' in part because that is what they are: there is no explicit place in the literature 
where each writer, using my terminology and to my ends, theorises an approach. But there are 
intimations, movements of parts of the literary-theoretical body which express the possibility of such 
a thing. I also use the term 'gestures' in response to Luce Irigaray's call for a "touchful way of sJ>eaking 
or saying and oflistening".30 With its connotations of bodily movement, the word 'gestures' reminds 
me that what is communicable is not only spoken through the word or in what is completely and 
neatly executed: the story is often, like a gesture of the hand, only partial and achieved through the: 
collection of structures which work together for a kind of metonymy. 'Gesture' here is a gesture 
itself-to Irigaray, of course, but also to Panofsky's gentleman tipping his hat, and to Agamben.31 It 
is also a gesture to the necessary incompleteness of the movements this dissertation makes. 
Like 'gesture: 'approach' contains its own incompleteness or imperfection. Approach is ongoing and 
progressive; it is tentative-as in 'making an approach' to someone-something which has no 
concrete or certain ends. Reliance on the metaphor of , method' to describe a theoretical interaction 
with texts means relying on a metaphor which implies a procedure can be planned out in advance. 
Method at its most procedural is less a way of discovering than of fitting a thing into the confines of 
what is expected about it. In the section to follow this one, I will briefly introduce these gestures of 
approach. They will be revisited in depth in Chapters 3 through 5. 
E. Gesturing toward approach 
The desirability and indeed the potential for a methodology like the one which this dissertation 
proposes is suggested in the literature which forms its context; that is to say, the canon of theoretical 
and philosophical writing in the humanities (literary theory, art history/theory, philosophy) of the 
20th and 2IIt Centuries. This section will very briefly light upon examples of such suggestions in the: 
literature. These examples will in most cases be developed more fully in later sections of this 
dissertation. Therefore, this section should not be seen either as an exhaustive list of occurrences of 
support for the approached proposed by this dissertation, or as the final word on how such sUPPOrt: 
27 Irigaray. xx. 
28 Agamben. Giorgio. 'Notes on Gesture-, Infancy and History: The Destruction ofExptrimce. (London: Verson, 1993), pp. 133-
140. 
occurs in the named sources. Instead. this section will serve as a 'road map' or ' p l a y b i l 1 ~ ~ with the 
intent to equip the reader for what lies ahead by introducing the major players and their roles. 
Suggestions of the value of or desire for a methodology such as the one this dissertation proposes are 
various and sometimes indirect; they occur across the work of writers and theorists whose work 
otherwise seems to be at odds in certain ways (such as intimations of such a methodology in both 
famously anti-foundational Derrida and Catholic theologian Jean-Luc Marion). The way of being 
with a text which this dissertation terms 'approach' is intimated in instances such as Mary Midgley's 
arguments against the repression of poetry in science.32 where the desirability of a so-called 'scientific' 
(meaning objective) method is challenged; in the work of Jacques Ranciere. writing about his own 
"method" ;33 and in the art-historical methodology presented in W. J. T. Mitchell's What Do Pictures 
Want!: The Lives and Loves of/mages. which adopts a mode of being with pictures that assumes they 
have some kind of (relational) agency. It is also. as noted in the section above. present in Luce 
Irigaray's call for a "touchful" way of writing. speaking. and listening. as well as in Helene Cixous' 
desire for thinking with the ·whole body".34 Such a methodology is further intimated by Roland 
Barthes in A Lover's Discourse. where he asserts the "exile" of love from "science. techniques. arts"35 
and goes on to insist that the separation of the lover's discourse "from all gregarity" means that the 
discourse (in its position as exile) has "no recourse but to become the site. however exiguous. of an 
affirmation".36 When Uvinas calls for a relationship with the other which involves approaching the 
other through" sympathy or love. ways of being that are different from impassive contemplation" .37 
he never mentions ' m e t h o d ~ ~ but he specifically differentiates love and sympathy as ways of being from 
'impassive contemplation: the cornerstone of scientific (or. could we say. academic) rigour. and 
identifies them as desirable. And Derrida's assertion that deconstruction is always accompanied by 
love. which he makes in a 1982 interview in Le MonJe38 and on which he elaborates in a later 
interview.39 links deconstruction and its methodlessness to the ethical position of openness and 
affirmation toward the otherness of the other. 
29 See Chapter 1. 
33 Jacques Rancien: .• A few remarks on the method of Jacques Ranciere- Parall4x. 15:3 (2009). pp. 114-123. 
34 Helene Cixous. The Cixous kader. Ed. Susan Sellers. (New York: Roudedge. 1994). p. 203. Note that Mary Midgley also 
refers specifically to the importancc of'wholc body' thinking: "Thought involvcs communication [ ... ] . What thin!es has to be 
the whole person, IJving in a pub/k worilr (Science and Poetry (London: Routledge Classics. 2006) pp. 118-119). 
35 Barthcs. Roland. A L o l l e r ~ ~Discourse: Fragments (London: Vintage. 2002). prcface (n. pag). 
36 Ibid, italics in original. 
37 Emmanud Uvinas. On Thinlting-ofthe-Other (Entre Now). trans. Michael B. Smith & Barbara Harshav. (London: Athalone. 
1998).5. 
38 Jacques Dcrrida. ·Sur les traces dc la philosophic-. With C. Deschamps. Entretims allec Ie Montie: Philosophies. Ed. Le Montie. 
(Paris: La D«ouvcrtc/Lc Monde, 1984). 
39 Dcrrida. Interview (1997). 
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The specific cases outlined in the paragraph above-and the very &ct that many thinkers and writers 
have called for or undertaken a way ofbcing with texts and others that renounces a method 
straitjacketed into objectivity-form the impetus for this dissertation, as well as demarcating its place 
in the literature. That so many have approached the territory this dissertation seeks to engage but 
that the area remains diffuse is precisely what impels this dissertation's consideration of these writers 
in terms of a synthesising moment, a constellation. Major writers and thinkers of this century and 
the last have brought a loving approach to texts and to the other into their work-momentarily.1his 
dissertation, taking these moments, will trace lines between them in order to demonstrate the 
possibilities for, and the inherence of, such an approach to its field. 
F. A note on lexicon 
Before continuing to a more thorough examination of the sources noted above, I would like to 
establish the terms which this dissertation will engage. Because the aim of this work is in part to 
provide an alternative model to the dominant methodological framework (method, with its 
connotations of regularity and objectivity), the dissertation is responsible for providing alternative 
lexical choices. The objection to 'method' as a unit of vocabulary and as a practice means that other 
words that accompany 'method' and its practice, are also in question. I will here undertake a brief 
exposition of these words, and propose alternatives in order to develop a substitute nomenclature. 
~ p p l y ' ' is a word which often accompanies 'method' and which articulates the tacit, one-way 
relationship that method relies upon. To apply something to something else first of all presumes a 
hierarchy: a place from which something may be applied to something else. The word itself comes Via 
Latin-with the same lad-I preflx as 'approach'. Its dative sense comes from this pren 
Metaphorically, application takes its tenor from the action of something being laid onto something 
else; the one doing the applying is thus in a higher position (literally or metaphOrically) than the 
thing or person onto which X is applied. When talking about making an approach, I will subStitute 
the word 'attend' in place of'apply' in this dissertation. ~ t t e n d ' ' is rooted in a care which is not 
necessarily hierarchical, or which, when hierarchical, may also be honorific-that is, directed from a 
subject in a lower position in hierarchy to a subject in a higher one. Secondly, the double meaning of 
'attend'-to be present and to look after-produces this sense of care; a third meaning, the sense of 
escorting someone (as in a bridal attendant, or, in older diction, a 'lady-in-waiting') displays the tie 
between waiting on someone and waitin&for them in order to go together. In addition, Teresa 
Brennan defines love as a form of'living attention'40 by which one can approach the other without 
violence. I hope that 'attend' can be a humble way to approach texts within this dissertation: in 
'attending to' texts, the dissertation disavows mastery of them. As Massumi writes, if you 
apply a concept or system of connection between concepts, it is the material you apply it to that 
undergoes change. much more markedly than do the concepts. The change is imposed upon the 
material by the concepts' systematicity and constitutes a becoming homologous of the material 
to the system [ ... ] It has less to do with invention than mastery and control.'il 
The research that simply stands near, or waits upon, or attends to the needs of another text is at its 
best a text-among-texts. Which leads to my next point. 
This dissertation has exchanged the more typical language of the 'case study' for that of the 'exemplar'. 
The case study assumes to some extent that what is to be examined fits or can be fitted within the 
outline of the project which it supports. It is used to illustrate a principle or to stand as a record of 
observation of the object of research. As with 'apply: embedded in the term is a hierarchical 
discourse: the researcher looks at the case study, which does not look back. This implies the 
possibility of detachment from one's subject, as well as the value of empiricism and objectivity. While 
these qualities may be desirable (if perhaps, as Midgley argues, unattainable) in a laboratory situation, 
they are not possible or even applicable in a dissertation such as this one. This dissertation takes its 
cue from Midgley's argument that it is in the best interests of both researchers and their research to 
be • objective-that is, fair, honest and methodical-about the whole range of the subjective ... the 
whole range where subjective experience affects objective facts".42 And, following from this, it will 
take on Massumi's assertion that ·writing in the humanities can be affirmative",43 which is to say, can 
be a writing that says 'yes' to the other. In the place of vocabulary which emphasises fitting things 
into the form of something pre-designed. as in the case study, this dissertation will suggest • an 
'exemplary' method".44The example is 
neither general (as is a system of concepts) nor particular (as is the material to which the 
system is applied). It is 'singular'. It is defined by a disjunctive self-inclusion: a belonging 
to itself that is Simultaneously an extendability to everything else: with which it might be 
connected [ ... ] In short, exemplification is the logical category corresponding to se:lf-
rclation.4s 
40 Brennan. Teresa. The Transmission of Affm. (New York: Cornell University Prc:ss, 2004). p. 41.. 
41 Brian Massumi. Parahfes for the nrlU41 (Durham & London: Duke University Prc:ss. 2002). p. 17. 
42 Midgley, Mary. Sdmce AIUl Poetry. (Oxfordshire: Roudedge Classics, 2006), p. 172-173. Her emphasis. 
43 Massumi, 17. 
44 Ibid. Of course. 'method' here is Massumi's word. This dissertation will consider the exemplary in terms of an approach. 
45 Ibid, 17-18. 
43 
Where the case study displays the results of the application of a system to an object. the example 
stands as itself, by itself, but in relation to what surrounds it; it comprises what Massumi calls 
"microexample[s]",46 the details which make up the example and are activated by it. The exemplary 
approach is inseparable from a layered and active attention to details because its" success [ ... ] hinga 
on the details. Every little one matters".47This approach is particularly apt in tenns of this 
dissertation's relationship to deconstruction, which is herein to be considered a non-systematisable 
way of being with texts. Again, the preferred term throughout this dissertation to replace 'method' 
will be the word 'approach: for reasons outlined above. 
Finally, just as this dissertation will try to avoid thinking of what it considers in tenns of an 
application of one thing to another, it will attempt to keep its distance from 'use'. Thinking in teans 
of how one thing is useful, put to use, employed, by another brings a hierarchical relationship into 
play; it also ignores the bidirectional quality of most relationships, even those with 'inanimate 
objects'. In place of 'use' and its corollaries, this dissertation proposes questions of value. Since value is 
subjective and questionable, any priority that this dissertation places on one concept over another 
will be unstable and non-absolute. What is valuable here may not be valuable (i.e. 'of use') e l s e w h e ~ ~
In the course of the dissertation, it is possible that words outlined above may occur. In reference to 
others' writing. others' ideas, and sources, I will use the vocabulary present in the original. And of 
course, despite my desire to construct an approach to texts which both acknowledges my own 
participation and in some ways evens the playing field between researcher and researched, I must 
concede from the start my own tendency to fail. This concession is part of" studying what one has 
experienced oneself and valuing it, or valuing the subjective side of one's interactions with the object 
studied" and rejecting the notion that to think or study well the "individual has to be severed from 
affective connections with the surrounding environment and others in it".48 Like Midgley, Teresa 
Brennan rejects the "particular understanding of objectivity [ ... ] based on the notion that the 
objective is somehow free of affect".49 
I am sure there will be places where my work shows the difficulty of adhering to its own constraints. 
However, it is possible that such failures go to show the very nature of an 'approach: which, since it is 
not a 'method: cannot be absolutely systematised, and therefore may include instances ofits own 




failure. These are not precluded. because, after all, the loving approach to some extent moulds itself 
to the needs of the text in front of it at any given time. And that must include this text. As an overall 
guide-above any concept of absolute in lexicon or way of being-is the principle of saying yes to 
the other. 
This principle comes from Jacques Derrida's assertion of the central or even, in his words, "original"so 
place of the affirmation of the other as the love in deconstruction. Deconstruction perhaps comes 
closest to what this dissertation attempts to propose as a way of being with texts, not only for 
Derrida's insistence on the affirmation at its heart but also because of the way in which Derrida 
insisted that it was not a method or system by which one could read texts or construct meanings. 
However, in practice (and these assertions will be dealt with in Chapter 3), deconstruction has been 
used as a method or treated as a system. Therefore, deconstruction alone is not enough. Or, to put it 
better, deconstruction understood as the application ofDerrida's ideas to texts is not enough, because 
this application implies a systemisation or method, and it does violence to the texts that receive this 
application. It also ignores the affirmation possible via deconstruction when it is treated not as a 
method, but as an exemplar. Deconstruction is, in Massumi's terms, exemplary because it is, in its 
best practices, not about -mastery and control".51 It takes joy in its digressions, it "harbors terrible 
powers of deviation and digression",52 points from which "the openness of the system will spread".53 
As an exemplar, deconstruction is only itself-but as an exemplar, deconstruction's self-relation 
indicates the possibility of relation to all things (this extension is Massumi's characteristic of the 
exemplar).1hese ideas will be treated in more detail in Chapter 3. I bring them up here simply to 
acknowledge during this discussion of nomenclature that an approach which corresponds to the one 
this dissertation proposes already exists, to some extent, or can at least be constelIated from the work 
of others. 
G. Literature Review 
The conjunction oflove and philosophy is as old as the concept of philosophy itself, embedded as the 
Greek word for one kind oflove (philia) is within the word that meant the pursuit (and love) of 
wisdom. While love and wisdom, the knowledge of the body and that of the mind, have endured a 
long separation in the history of philosophy, there arc places where their recombination erupts and 
50 Derrida: Interview (1997), 
51 Massumi. 17. 
52 Massumi. 18. 
53 Massumi, 19. 
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makes itself heard. Given the irnponance oflove to this dissertation and to certain strains oflate-
twentieth and early-twenty-flrst century thought (such as Icriture fbninine), and given the fact that 
more and more cultural studies and critical theory scholars are accepting affect as a subject worthy of 
consideration, this literature review will track the role oflove in early philosophy; understandinS' of 
love in Freud and Lacan; the emergence of considerations of affect in humanities scholarship; and 
the role of the body in the same, via the work of Helene Cixous. 
G.!: Plato's Symposium 
The wisdom the philosopher loves is "absorbed in the pleasures of the soul-.S4 From the beginning. as Plato 
depicts Socrates' argument about philosopher-kings, information that comes from the body is differentiated 
from that which comes from the soul, or mind. The pleasures of the soul are better pleasures; wisdom is better 
than "bodily pleasure", and the mark of a "sham" philosopher is his absorbtion in bodily pleasure. We knoW' 
immediately in this argument. then, that there is a distinction in purpose and in value between information 
gathered or knowledge won by the body and the gathered or won by the mind. When Plato describes the 
philosopher as one who "always love[s] knowledge of a son which shows them the eternal nature not varying 
from generation and corruption",ss we also understand that this is knowledge which is available to the 
intellect if not to the senses; that the Platonic ideal is an unchanging one, beyond the experience of the 
material world, after which philosophers continually quest. Such questing implies that the knowledge in 
question is out of reach, and that the act of philosophizing is not a restive state of knowing. but a moving state 
of pursuit. The philosopher's love of wisdom does not have a measure, at which point no more wisdom is 
required; instead, this "desire" is "drawn toward knowledge in every form-.56 We are left with two 
understandings of philosophy: fust, that true philosophers are absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, rejecting 
those of the body; second, that the desire of a philosopher is 'drawn' toward wisdom-which does not imply 
that it necessarily reaches its goal. 
The gathering described in The Symposium comes about because of questions about the rightness ofloving. 
the right ways ofloving. and the relationship between love and the work of being a philosopher. Early on in 
the gathering, Phaedrus identifies love as something-though not the only thing (he mentions 
family ties and public office)-that effectively imparts guidance to the individual wishing to lead "a 
good life". Love gives the '"ability to feel shame at disgraceful behaviour and pride in good 
behaviour", without which "no individual or community could achieve anything great or flne",5? 
54 Plato. Republic, Book VI. http://dassics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html.accessed 10 December 2012. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Plato, The Symposium. trans. Robin Waterncld. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994). 11 (178 c). 
Love is, therefore, linked to one's own good life, but also to the good life of the individual in the 
community, because one's ability to feel shame comes in part from a sense of being seen to conform 
or not conform to expectations or rules. Individual conformity or non-conformity to rules in tum 
affects the community. 'Greatness' and' fineness' depend on one's ability to distinguish between 
between behaviour that is acceptable or praiseworthy, and behaviour that is condemnable, 
undesirable, destructive. But something has to happen in order for the individual to aim for greatness 
and fineness; these are not natural targets. Thus the suggestion oflove (or family ties, or public 
office) as motivators. First, love (and family, and governance) put the individual into relation with 
others which in some way makes the individual visible-his or her actions can be seen. Second, these 
relations, in making the individual visible, render his or her actions not neutral but tinted with 
goodness and badness. In relation to others, the individual can register the timbre of his or her 
actions; he or she can also register the perception of these actions. Third, in love, as in families and in 
governments in the best of circumstances, the perception of one's actions matters. How one is 
thought of by one's beloved (or mother, or constituents) matters. This sense of wanting to do well in 
the eyes of someone else is a motivation to behave correctly; as such, it partially constitutes what 
Plato identifies as necessary guidance for those who want to live a good life. Love is one means to this 
end. 
But what is love, in an ontological sense? What is this thing that can be a means to a good life? What 
is it made of, where does it come from? In the Symposium, where philosophers gather to drink and 
think and talk about thought, love and knowledge are bound up together, not least because the role 
of the older philosopher is in part that of teacher to his younger lovers. Teaching about philosophy, 
teaching how to think, and teaching how to love intertwine. In fact, the love of the beautiful (or 
otherwise attractive) individual is a stepping stone to a more general love of physical beauty, and then 
the love of what bodies can do, and then the love of how people can think, and then to the love of 
intellectual endeavours in general. If, as Phaedrus claims, "Love is a primordial god",S8 originary, 
fundamental, then it is in part fundamental to thought. This relation, however, is not a necessary but 
a contingent one. Love and thought are related only in places like Athens and Sparta, where matters 
oflove (such as whether or not one ought to go after one's young and beautiful students, or with 
which students to share one's array of erotic and philosophical knowledge) are complex. Where the 
-guidelines of convention"S9 are tricky, argument about the nature of love becomes necessary. Indeed, 
the straightforward social acceptance of gratifying a lover is a sign of" mental sluggishness on the part 
58 Ibid, 10 (178 c). 
59 Ibid, 15 (182 a}. 
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of the rule-makers".60 Those who make the rules decide on the kind oflove that is acceptable. In a 
society of philosophers, love is thought-an aphorism with an etymological core: in Plato's language. 
philosophy is composed of , love' and 'wisdom'. But love is also thought (verb in the passive sense); the 
role of the philosopher is to ngure out what love is and what it does. In the Symposium, a distinction 
is drawn between kinds oflove (a lover is "bad ifhe is of the common type, who loves the body rather 
than the mind"61) that splits the love of beauty from the love of knowledge. Bodily love is in service 
to philosophy, and its end is to "scorn and think litde of'62 the individual body to which one is 
attached. The project is generalisation rather than focus. Although love is always love tf something. 
what the something is is not predetermined. It is the role of the lover to nnd or develop a love which 
is virtUous (not only of the body) and which motivates via the ability to feel shame and pride; that is, 
it is the role of the lover to nnd love which aids in the creation of a good life. 
But what love is is not the same as what it does. Socrates argues that love is relational; one ofits 
characteristics is to "stand in relation to something".63 Love, he says, loves something, not nothing; 
desire is "necessarily desire for something which is lacking",64 not for the lack itsel£ If Love desires the 
beautiful and the good. then this indicates that these qualities are lacking on Love's part; if Love 
desires knowledge (if Love is love of knowledge), this indicates a lack of wisdom, which is 
nevertheless not ignorance, since Love at least knows that knowledge exists, and to desire it (i.e. that 
it is lacking). As Diotima says, a bit later, if"a person isn't aware of alack, he [sic] can't desire the 
thing which he isn't aware oflacking".6s Love falls into a middle ground, in particular in its relation 
to wisdom: it knows what it lacks (is not ignorant) and yet still lacks it (is not wise). 
Diotima also demonstrates that Love is neither a god (because it lacks good and attractive attributes. 
and it is not wise), nor mortal. Instead, it "occupies middle ground" between the human and the 
divine, "translating and carrying messages from men to gods and gods to men", making "the universe 
an interconnected whole".66 Between the lacking human and the complete divine goes Love, back: 
and forth, aware of its own desire. If this hack-and-forth results in a wholeness, an 
interconnectedness that resembles more a web than a block of cement, then the resulting network is 
60 Ibid. 16 (182 d). 
61 Ibid. 17 (183 c). 
62 Ibid. 48 (210 b). 
63 Ibid. 38 (199 d). 
64 Ibid. 39 (200 a). 
65 Ibid. 45 (204 a). 
66 Ibid. 43 (202 d-c). 
a way of drawing in the known and loved. The "desire for and pursuit of wholeness"67 in the fable of 
the bodies cleaved into two human halves is also a desire for wisdom, a desire for the good, and a 
desire to be able to rest with some stability in a sense of the good. Diotima concludes that "the object 
oflove is the permanent possession of goodness for oneself",68 which results in heterosexual unions in 
the procreative impulse, and in homosexual ones such as those between the philosophers and their 
students in the propagation of knowledge and wisdom; in teaching. But the possession of goodness 
that equates to the bearing and raising of children or the teaching of one's students is limited by these 
things. Diotima's model for the possession of goodness creates an outer border within which 
goodness can take place but no sense that crossing that boundary might also offer ways of making a 
good life; that is, that Love's transit need not be relegated to short hops, but can withstand longer 
flights over unknown territories. 
In order to possess goodness permanently, however, more than pursuit of goodness must take place. 
A construction of belief must accompany this pursuit-a belief in one's own good (the value of one's 
own knowledge). After all, says Diotima, .. [it's] only when a person describes what he's [sic] got as 
good and what he [sic] hasn't as bad that he's [sic] capable of being contented with what belongs to 
him [sic]: Although "the sole object of people's love is goodness", goodness in Diotima's terms also 
depends on the establishment of relative goodness, whereby I assure the goodness of what I have by 
comparing it favourably to what I don't have. What any other has, by this logic, unless it resembles 
what I have, is bad. Besides furnishing me with a compass for my own actions (shame/pride) love 
also provides me a way of evaluating the actions and possessions of others. In the comparison 
between what I have and what I don't, what I don't have has to look undesirable; otherwise, I'm cast 
into doubt about the goodness of what I have. Love as a motivator toward goodness relies, as long as 
goodness is limited to 'what is good for me/what belongs to me and my good life: on a distinction 
between mine/theirs. The love Diotima and Socrates talk about. which is predicated on knowing 
what is good and what is bad, relies on a clear line between inside and outside. While this might be 
usefUl in terms of social mores-familial and social ties establishing 'good life' to include things like 
not marrying cousins creates a stable in-group who substantiate the taboo by reference to out-groups 
who 'disgustingly' engage in the practice-it limits the ability oflove to do more than hold things in 
their places once those places are established, or to drive people toward what has been determined to 
be 'good'. This docs, of course, require continued examination of what 'good' is-one role of the 
philosopher. As long as love remains a motivating factor for living out some idea of good. and as long 
67 Ibid. 29 (129 e). 
68 Ibid, 48 (206 a). 
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as what 'good' is is the domain of the philosopher, love also remains in the territory of thought. 
The potential for love to delineate what is good and what is bad, and the tendency to disassociate 
oneself from what one has defined as undesirable, leaving the desirable located in the self or the in-
group is at the root oflater explorations of the role of the self in the love relationship. Whether a 
familial, friendly, or amorous/erotic relation, the self at the center must first be. In its being, the 
loving self establishes itself as important-integral-to the love relationship, as integral as the other. 
Love, therefore, is not only a relation to the other but to the sel£ Given that for love to exist there 
must be two parties (not only a beloved other but a self who loves), and given that one function of 
love is to demarcate territory along lines of' good' and 'bad: it stands to reason that love can actually 
reinforce the sense of the self as good and the other as not-good, rather than necessarily including the 
other in 'good'ness or extending this concept of the 'good' to the other. In love, it is possible for the 
self who loves to be absorbed in the 'good'ness ofloving, even to the denigration or neglect of the 
beloved other. In other words, love is not a necessarily or exclusively other-focussed action; it 
concerns the self as much, and therefore contains within itself the danger or possibility of self.. 
involvement, egotism. 
G.2: Freud and Lacan 
Over the centuries that follow the Symposium, the centrality of love to the life of the philosopher 
may not stay as apparent as it does there. Certainly, where it appears, the idea oflove changes to fit 
social mores as well as the particular aims of the person writing or thinking about it. Although only 
rarely central to thought-more often so as we near the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century, when love becomes an acceptable reason to do things like get married-love does appear 
where writers and thinkers are forced to confront the actuality of human relationships. 
Psychoanalysis, with its consideration of human relationships and the relation between the conscious 
and unconscious, as well as Freud's theory of the sexual (not amorous, but not always too far) origin 
of neuroses is an obvious point when thought about love reemerges. In terms of this dissertation, the 
discussion oflove in Classical philosophy serves to ground the thesis in its long history and give a 
sense of the longevity of the relation between love and philosophy. Here, a consideration of 
psychoanalysis in terms of two great theoretical practitioners, Freud and Lacan, will examine the 
ways that love is invoked within psychoanalysis, especially as it pertains to a sense of the self and the 
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other. Psychoanalysis is one of the long 20th century's major modes of thinking, and imbues all 
manner of discourses, from popular television to scholarly writing. Because psychoanalysis is, in 
particular, an accepted approach to texts within the umbrella of theory, it is especially appropriate to 
outline its treatment of the topic of this dissertation. 
To begin with a brief detour: in tenns of this dissertation's focus on ways of knowing other than 
those which have historically been privileged in scholarship (empiricism, observation, intellect), it is 
interesting to note that Freud, in advancing the idea that dreams are meaningful, can be interpreted, 
can be understood. was arguing for ways of knowing that are not based in the concrete real of our 
waking lives. Of course, in "On Dreams·, Freud does refer to "the necessity for applying the 
technical rules which [he] gave·,69 eliding the charge that psychoanalysis as a practice could slip 
completdyoutside the boundaries of ways of knowing which are more 'scientific' than superstitious. 
After translating dreams, with recourse to dream-symbolism, one moves on to the process of analysis; 
Freud writes, in "An Autobiographical Study·, "I have always felt it a gross injustice that people have 
refUsed to treat psychoanalysis as any other science"70. However, despite Freud's repeated insistence 
that there be, for example a "strictly scientific treatment" of the field of human love,?1 the possibility 
of meaning arriving from a source not primarily intellectual is there. 
Freud identifies a stage in human development that arises before the Oedipal, before the attachment 
of the libido to the parental figures. In this stage, in which "there were no such [parental/Oedipal] 
objects", Freud identifies a "state in which the subject's libido filled his [sic] own ego and had that for 
its object" and calls this state "TIII1'Cissism or self-Iove".72 He goes on to say that "this state never 
completdyceascs [ ... the] ego remains the great reservoir of [the subject's] libido".73 The ego, site of 
conscious perceptions of the world and of self-awareness, is also the seat of the libido, "from which 
object-cathexes are sent out and into which the libido can stream back again from the objects",74 If 
the ego is the site of this libidinal energy, to which it returns and from which it originates, then sexual 
energy is implicated in the concern of the sdf for the sel£ Narcissism, or sdf-Iove, is foundational for 
the love of or relation to the other. Preceding even an Oedipal relation to a parent, 
psychoanalytically speaking the love of self is original love. Love for the other, fascination with the 
other (catha) arises from this love, from the deposits of libido in the ego which are 'sent out' towards 
69 Freud. Sigmund. ·On Dreams-, The Freud RetuIer, cd. Peter Gay. London: Vintage, 1995, p. 171. 
70 Ibid. "An Autobiographical Study·, p. 37. 
71 Ibid. "ASpccial Choice ofObjccts Made by Men (Contributions to the Psychology of Love W, p. 388. 
72 Ibid. "An Autobiographical Study·, p. 35 
73 Ibid, • An Autobiographical Study·, p. 35 
74 Ibid. "An Autobiographical Study·, p. 35 
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the object of interest. Although Freud does not explicitly call narcissism or self-love 'natural: he does 
refer to the self as one of the two 'original sexual objects'75 and to self-love as "the primal state from 
which instinctual life proceeds",76 Because of the position this kind oflove takes both 
chronologically (occurring before any other kind of love) and relationally (it fllls the ego, thereby 
constituting the self at least in part), we can understand narcissism or self-love as a sort of default 
position, which despite not being called natural by Freud is treated as though it is, and which is 
identified as 'primal'. 
For Freud, narcissism or self-love is fundamental in terms of the ego's relation to its surroundings; 
from the beginning, sexual instincts are "attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts".77The ego 
and its love for itself are the source of the ability to relate to others, and self-love both precedes and 
outlasts even very early kinds of attachment (such as the Oedipal). But Freud's treatment oflove in 
other of his essays suggests that he senses a difference between love for the self and love for the other, 
or, perhaps, that he needs for some reason to separate love of the other from a healthy or 'natural' 
narcissism. While narcissism or self-love imbues a subject's life from its earliest days and continues to 
be a source of direction and information, consciously or unconsciously, for the desires and deciSions 
of that subject, Freud notes that "things that have to do with love are incommensurable with 
everything else",78 In the psychoanalytic relationship, in fact, it seems that love is the source of little 
but difficulty, or even sabotage. For example, Freud refers to a desire "to destroy the doctor's 
authority by bringing him down to the level of a 10ver"79 as a motive for positive transference (the 
process wherein a patient falls in love with an analyst). Love, in this case, is still a way of relating to 
what is outside the ego, but it is speci6.cally destructive. It destroys the authority of the doctor. 
Moreover, it upsets the 'natural' hierarchy of wise and powerful doctor/sick and incapable patient. 
bringing the doctor 'down to the level of the lover'. The way Freud phrases this-the violence of 
'destroy', the authority of the doctor (vs. the presumed non-authority of the [female] patient. the 
'level' to which the doctor is brought down (the level of being a lover somehow beneath that ofbcing 
a doctor )-makes it clear that this sort of love is undesirable, unacceptable. Transference of feelings 
to an analyst is perhaps undesirable in that it might inhibit the progress of analysis, but for Freud 
there seems to be something more at stake. He refers later in this essay to "Genuine love", which 
75 Ibid, ·On Narcissism: An Introduction-, p. 554. 
76 Ibid, "Mourning and Melancholia·, p. 588. 
77 Ibid, ·On Narcissism: An Introduction-, p. 553. 
78 Ibid, ·Observations in Transference-Love·, p. 379. 
79 Ibid, "Observations in Transference-Love·, p. 381. 
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would make the patient "docile and intensify her readiness to solve the problems of her case".80 In 
other words, real love-"a real happy love corresponds to the primal condition in which object-
libido and ego-libido cannot be distinguished"8J-is not directed toward the other, but toward the 
self; in the case of the psychoanalytic relationship, transference oflove toward the analyst prevents 
the analysand from grasping her situation. The patient's docility and willingness to solve her 
problems would, by contrast, demonstrate the presence of self-love in her desire to be well. Before 
love of the other can take place, the subject must be willing to pay attention to the self and to 
develop a healthy form of self-love. 
Freud's attention to the debasement of the doctor which the transference of the patient's amorous 
feelings enacts reveals an attitude toward love which persists in several of his essays. Freud explains 
the necessity of science-of psychoanalysis-to engage with the question of and conditions for 
loving in part because writers and artists. to whom such examination has been left. "are under the 
necessity to produce intellectual and aesthetic pleasure. as well as certain emotional effects". Because 
of this. writers and artists "cannot reproduce the stuff of reality unchanged, but must isolate portions 
of it, remove disturbing associations. tone down the whole. and 6ll in what is missing". 82 Where 
artists and writers owe some debt to 'pleasure: Freud writes. science, which is "the most complete 
renunciation of the pleasure principle of which our mental activity is capable",83 does not. Love 
debases; it brings authorities low or strips them of their authority; it requires a 'scientific treatment' 
because any other will overlook its 'disturbing associations'. None of this criticism is to imply that 
love is some 'pure' thing. a field of meadowflowers through which all lovers frolic. endlessly, and 
endlessly content. But Freud's anecdote about the patient who poses such a threat to her analyst 
(perhaps in part because of Freud's encouragement of his patients to deconstruct and question his 
authority). and the disgust that tinges words like 'destroy' and 'bring him down to the level of a lover' 
are themselves not markers of a neutral or 'scientific' attention to the idea oflove. The desire to 
'rescue' love by talking about it scientifically is a model of the separation of feeling from thought 
which has structured much of Western thought, from the exile of the poets in The Republic to the 
Cartesian body-mind split. Love. deranging and debasing. can be saved by regarding it with the 
80 Ibid. ·Observations in Transferencc-Lovc-, p. 384. While I understand why Freud idcntiflcs transfcrcnce as an 
inappropriate/bad form of lovc and 'docility' as genuinc love in analysis, it is not unproblcmatic that thc fcmalc subjcct of 
whom hc writes hcre is a bettcr subjcct if/whcn she is 'docilc' and willing to follow thc authoritative lead of the (male) 
doctOr. Thc activc female subjcct is castigated, the passive onc idcal (Freud contrasts this docility to the patient's ·smbbom 
and rebdlious spirit-, on thc samc page). 
81 Ibid. ·On Narcissism: An Introduction-, p. 561. 
82 Ibid. ·A Special Choicc ofObjccts Madc by Mcn (Contributions to the Psychology of Love I)", p. 387. 
83 Ibid. -A Special Choice ofObjccts Made by Men {Contributions to the Psychology ofLovc I)", p. 388. 
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dispassionate eye of objectivity, which can" reproduce the stuff of reality unchanged".84 
In other words, love can be rescued by including all of its parts, by treating it as whole rather than by 
ignoring what does not seem to fit. In "On the Unique Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of 
Love (Contributions to the Psychology of Love II)", however, Freud introduces the idea of "two 
currents" in love, "the affectionate and the sensual current", the union of which is "necessary to enSUre 
a completely normal attitude in love".85 1hese two currents, on the one hand "sacred" (i.e., non-
sexual, impotent, or repressive) and on the other "profane or animal" (sexual), when out of balance. 
cause what Freud refers to as "psychical impotence".86 For those in whom the currents are not in 
union, "[what] they love they do not desire, and [what] they desire they cannot love". Instead, these 
people "seek objects which they do not need to love, in order to keep their sensuality away from the 
objects they love".87 Instead of imagining a split between the body (sensual current) and mind 
(affectionate current), Freud advocates for "people in whom the two currents [ ... ] have become 
properly fused". In those who lack 'properly fused currents: he warns, "the man almost always feels his 
respect for the woman acting as a restriction on his sexual activity". Wholeness, rather than 
separation, is valued {experienced by "only a few educated people"),88 and this valuing echoes Freud's 
descriptions of the development of the ego in the individual, which must be developed to 
incorporate both self-love and attention to the other. 
Later in the 20th century, Freud's ideas are addressed by Jacques Lacan, who writes that "Freud's 
thought is the most perennially open to revision",89 and it is in this sense of'revision'-re-seeing, re-
imagining, reconstructing, revisiting, and revising as one would a text which was imperfect in its first 
manifestation that Lacan relates to Freud in his seminars. Of course, the seminar itself is a site of re-
vision, where histories or ideas the seminar-conductor has already thought through, at least in part, 
are represented to other listeners. 
Through the writings of both Freud and Lacan we see that the question oflove is integral to the 
human being, not only to philosophers or to the practice of philosophy {which is not the implication 
of the Symposium except insofar as it does not explicitly and materially extend its consideration of 
84 Ibid. "A Special Choice of Objects Made by Men (Contributions to the Psychology of Love I)". p. 388. 
85 Ibid. "On the Unique Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love {Contributions to the Psychology of Love lIt. p. 395. 
86 Ibid. "On the Unique Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love {Contributions to the Psychology of Love II)". p. 397. 
87 Ibid. ·On the Unique Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love {Contributions to the Psychology of Love lIt. p. 397. 
88 Ibid. "On the Unique Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love { C o n t r i b u ~ o n s s to the Psychology of Love II)". p. 397. 
89 Lacan. Jacques. The SeminArS of Jacques Lacan, Boole I: Freud's Papm on Techmque, 1953-1954. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. 
Trans. and notes John Forrester. New York: Norton. 1988. p. 1. 
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love beyond the room full of philosophers in which this takes place; any such extension is theoretical 
and general). For Freud and for Lacan, love, under the banner of narcissism or self-love, takes place 
before the other even comes along; it takes place, that is, regardless of the advent or arrival of the 
other. If the human is, they love. Although Lacan calls himself a Freudian, he is not uncritical of 
Freud, and his method differs from Freud's in that he emphasises the ideological structures which 
cause the subject to come to self-knowledge and knowledge of the other, rather than focusing on the 
biological causes of behaviour; in addition, Lacan's primary metaphor or way of understanding these 
structUres is linguistic. Language and its use constitute a break with the material (real) world; the 
subject develops through his or her misrecognition of the real in favor of a reality (based on 
projection and fantasy) that is constructed through language in response to pressures from social 
conditions such as law, meaning, convention, manners, and (appropriate) desires. In respect to 
narcissism in particular, Lacan does not treat it as automatic in the way the Freud does; instead. 
narcissism comes about through the approval of a parent or other who holds the mirror in which the 
child sees him- or herscl£ This approval is what causes the image of the self to become so important. 
Despite the differences in their approaches, Freud remains a platform from which Lacan begins 
many of his discussions. At one point, Lacan refers to what he perceives as an oversight in Freud to 
demonstrate the validity of his own assertions about self-love or narcissism; amused that Freud "at 
first attributed the perversions to women», Lacan goes on to say that that "is truly a conflrmation 
that, when one is a man, one sees in one's partner what one props oneself up on, what one is propped 
up by narcissistically-.90 Even Freud's own beliefs about sexual behaviour, Lacan is saying, show how 
we go out of our way to associate with the Other what we believe about, need, or desire the Other to 
be. regardless of the Other's actual state. It is not the Other whom one loves, but "one's own ego that 
one loves in love, one's own ego made real on the imaginary level-.91 Desire is a misrecognition of 
presence where there is in fact only a sort of , screen' onto which we project our self-involved 
fantasies-our narcissism or self-love-constructed by the conventions in which we live. Because our 
desires are created through fantasies that are entangled in cultural constructions rather than the 
materiality of our bodies and sexuality, they have more to do with what is absent (materially) than 
with what is present. Desire is thus constituted in part by what is not there, by the lack of the object of 
desire. and this lack. ensures desire's continuity. 
90 Lacan. Jacques. The SeminArs ofJlUIJUts lAcAn. &oIe XX: On Feminine SexUAlity, the Limits of Love and Knowledge. 1972-
1973, Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 1998, p. 87. 
91 LacanI988,p.142. 
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The 'perversion'Lacan refers to is the idea in psychoanalytical discourse that "one's jouissance of the 
Other taken as a body is always inadequate-perverse. on the one hand. insofar as the Other u· 
reduced to object a [the imaginary]'",92 Perversion is located "at the limit of the register of 
recognition". and it is "this gap in human desire [ ... ] whereby human desire in its entirety is exposed. 
in the deepest sense of the term. to the desire of the other" .93 In love. both men and women aft 
caught up in fantasy or ideal images of the self and the other. This embeddedness in fantasy tnean.s 
that instead of being able to relate to the other as they arc. we relate to the other as we imagine them. 
desire them. or make demands for them to be. In other words. the love relation stems from a relation 
to the interior self, perhaps the unarticulated self, which projects its desires onto the other. lbat 
which we prop ourselves up on is our perception of the world. a fantasy we convince ourselves is real. 
Through analysis. Lacan writes. it is possible to demonstrate that "the substance of what is 
supposedly object-like (objectat) [ ... ] is in fact that which constitutes a remainder in desire" and 
which ·sustains desire through its lack of satisfaction (imam/action). and even its impossibility".H 
The body of the other. which is supposedly what is desired, or which is what triggers desire. becomes 
a side-note once desire is entered into; in fuct, the relationship is between one's projection and 
oneself, rather than between oneself and another. The place where we situate desire (the object. the 
other) becomes instead the remainder. left over from the expression of desire as the relation between 
the self and its projections. At that point. the relationship is between the self and the imagined other. 
the projections of one's own desire onto the other. Because of the gap between the imagined other 
and the other as she or he is. there is a perpetual lag. a space desire cannot bound across. The body, the 
other as she or he is. becomes a remainder in desire-the part that is left over or the part that is yet to 
come-not its centre. Despite our tendency to narrate love stories with the other (the beloved. the 
damsel in distress) at their centre. Lacan's psychoanalysis contends that this is a mask that covers up 
the narcissism of the imaginary. The demands it makes are unsatisflable because they are demands on 
an other who docs not exist; we undergo a misrecognition of the other that stems from our 
individual need to construct a sense of the other's 'reality'. Films and novels may offer a romantic 
portrait of the 'One'. but the "One everyone talks about all the time is. first of all. a kind of mirage of 
the One you believe yourself to be" .95 Relation to the other is a relation to the self-to one's own 
projections and to the loss and lack that the difference between these projections and reality 
constitute. 
92 Lacan 1998, p. 144. 
93 Lacan 1988. p. 221. 
94 Lacan 1998. p. 6. 
95 Ibid. p. 47. 
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An understanding of the idea oflove through a 20th-century theoretical lens cannot ignore Lacan 
and Freud's interpretations of the relation between the lover and herself. Psychoanalytical 
perspectives on love help to complicate traditional understandings of love. showing the ways in 
which love is self-love. In the chapter on Rilke later in this dissertation the idea of distance or 
separation-a preserved solitude-will be discussed. Lacan and Freud's understanding oflove can 
help explain this separation and perhaps underscore Rilke's assertion of its necessity to love: self-love 
both concretises the self (establishing a self who might be able to demand solitude) and establishes, as 
Rilke does. the impossibility of truly approaching the other without overwhelming them with one's 
own projections and expectations-allowing an expression of the necessary distance between ones 
who love. 
Obviously, despite my treatment so far. love is not exclusively an intellectual phenomenon; it takes 
place in the body as well. It therefore requires a thought that takes the body into consideration, one 
that reads not only the words a body produces with its hand or its mouth. but the language the body 
itself speaks, which is not always in words. Since this dissertation will consider the ways in which 
humans interact with nonhuman objects (texts), it asks for theories which deal with the relationship 
not only between humans but between humans and nonhumans (which, depending on when we are, 
could include not only obviously nonhuman objects such as texts but subjects whom we would now 
think of as human-women, non-white people, people with disabilities, people who identify with a 
gender other than the one they were born with ... ). Two related areas oflate-20m century thinking 
complement this consideration: they are affect theory and ecriture feminine-specifically the work 
of Helene Cixous. I willflrst address affect theory, which this dissertation will approach as a way 
among ways of imagining relations. rather than as a single and Axed path to understanding them. 
Affect theory refers to a movement toward the inclusion of the body (whether human, animal, other, 
or hybrid) and its sensations in scholarship. The idea of affect has arisen over the past few decades 
within contemporary scholarship spanning political phUosophy, neuroscience, psychology (out of 
the work ofSUvan Tomkins, which is generally acknowledged as the origin point of current thinking 
on affect, despite the divergences in how it is now used and made), history, social theory (including 
queer theory, developed at first in the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick), film studies, ethics, and 
aesthetics. In the area delineated by the amorphous title of ' critical theory', which includes 
considerations of many of these areas, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's considerations of the 
phUosophy ofSpinoza and Bergson signaled the emergence of the field; writers such as Brian 
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Massumi, Patricia Clough, Teresa Brennan, Michael Hardt, and Sara Ahmed, among others, all have 
used or attempted to define ideas of affect in their work. Among others, Clare Hemmings and Ruth 
Leys have offered critiques of affect theory, especially as Massumi uses it and with regard to the 
appropriation by writers and scholars in the humanities of work on emotions done in the sciences. 
Two edited volumes, The Affect Theory Reader (2010) and The Affictive Turn: Theorizing the Social 
(2007), a dedicated special issue of the joumalParrhesia (2011), and a roundtable at the 2012 MLA 
Conference attest to current scholarly interest in affect and to the seriousness with which it is taken 
as a subject of inquiry across many areas of study. 
The word 'affect' originally referred to the relation between emotion or desire and behaviour or 
action-to the idea the one might be compelled to do something not as the result of an intellectual 
procedure but by other forces at work within and upon the body. In Gilles Deleuze's lectures on 
Spinoza, affect (Spinoza's affectus) is first defined as "any mode of thought which doesn't represent 
anything", "constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of perfection to 
another".96The use of this word in other contemporary theorizations of affect is likewise not limited 
to emotion or desire, moving past 'affect as synonym or descriptor for feeling' and into the territory 
of ' affect as affect: differentiated as a term within the range of terms for the receipt and sensing of 
information by human and other bodies. 'Affect' is variously understood to be "synonymous with 
force or forces of encounter" or "a body's ",pability to affect and to be affected";'T7 or something that 
places an individual "in a circuit of feeling and response";98 or an attention to the textures of 
intersubjective experience to replace or supplement an attention to structures of truth, a way to shift 
"the emphasis of some interdisciplinary conversations away from the recent fixation on 
epitstemology";99 or, in fact, almost as many other things as there are people who write about it. 
'What, precisely, affect 'is' and how it works is not agreed upon by the many writers who use the term 
or think through it. Because the field is enormously broad-ranging from neuroscience to cultural 
theory-this section will focus primarily on affect theory as it relates to cultural theory, as 
exemplifled by the work ofDeleuze and Massumi, as well as on Ruth Leys' critique of affect as 
adopted by scholars in the humanities. A later chapter will introduce the work of Teresa Brennan. 
96 Deleuze, Gilles. -Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza's Concept of Affect.- Trans. ~ m i l i e e andJulien Deleuze. Accessed 28 Augllst 
2012. <http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommairc.html> 
97 Gregg. Melissa, and Gregory J. Scigworth. -An Inventory of Shimmers-, The Affect Theory ReaJer, cd. Gregg and Scigworth. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 2. 
98 Hemmings. Clare. -Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Tum-. Cultural Studies Vol 19, No.5 Septeillber 
2005, pp. 548·567. p. 552. 
99 Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Touching Feeling: Afficl, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2003.p.17. 
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Western philosophy admits the transfer of information from mind to mind-we see this in the 
foundational texts of the discipline; look at Socrates-and the image of the teacher or the 
philosopher-as-teacher is the image of this transfer from mind to mind. However, the subject has 
been understood to be bounded in other ways when it comes to what is felt, sensed. While the life of 
the mind might be open, the life of the body, the heart, the nerves, the vapours, the spirit are private 
and circumscribed. Or so we have believed, and so we often behave. Affect theory tells us, rightly or 
wrongly, that there are communications which go on without our consent or even our knowledge; 
that things are transmitted to us across the boundaries which we believe are there. In other words, it 
attempts to address -the singularly and intimately impersonal-even sub-personal or pre-personal-
folds ofbdongmg (or non-belonging) to a world-.1°O The feeling, sensing, affect-ive and affect-ed 
subject is not singular, but composed. How is this pertinent to a dissertation on love and on love as a 
means of approaching an other-specifically a textual other? If there are things we receive without 
knowing; if our human subject is not bounded as we believe (in the ways we believe), then those 
other ways of knowing or of being passed-on-to might also make for fruitful approaches to study. 
1he ways in which affect is understood to cross boundaries otherwise thought of as stable suggests an 
analogy for the ways in which nonhuman agents, such as texts, might also relate and be related to by 
humans. The incorporation of the body into affect theory is a welcome contrast to parts of the 
tradition of critique which avoid or disallow knowledge that takes place in terms of feeling and 
sensing rather than observing. Moreover, as Gregg and Seigworth write, there is no one theory of 
affeCt, unifying and codifying what affect might mean; instead there are -infinitely multiple 
iterations of affect and theories of affect: theories as diverse and singularly delineated as their own 
highly particular encounters with bodies, affects, worlds-. This awareness of multiplicity as a native 
function of affect theory offers the possibility of operating "with a certain modest methodological 
vitality rather that impressing [a theory] upon a wiggling world like a snap-on grid of shape-setting 
interpretability-,101 In this way, affect theory, despite its imperfections, helps to make a space into 
which this dissertation might come. 
Massumi writes that we should -[reserve] the term 'emotion' for the personalised content, and affect 
for the continUation. Emotion is contextual. Affect is situational: eventfully ingressive to context. 
Serially so: affect is trans-situational-.102 Massumi's idea of emotion being contextual and 
personalised fills along the line of Eric Shouse's definition of feeling as personal and biographical; as 
100 Gregg and Seigworth. p. 3. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Massumi, Brian. P",AbIes for the VirtuAl. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2002. p. 217. 
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"a sensation that has been checked against previous experiences and labelled" .103 All three 
descriptors-personal. contextual. biographical-conceive of the felt or the emotional104 as 
something that happens within the context of time and space. with reference to what has already 
been undergone. Emotion as personal means that it is non-transferable. It does not extend. It is. 
instead. the acting-out of the individual within their individual context, moment to moment. By 
contrast. affect understood as situational and then as trans-situational must also be understood. as 
not-personal. The situational has nothing to do with the individual. insofar as it is not generated by 
the individual and does not pertain. as emotion does. to a sense of how I react or how I behave in a 
given context. The affect is the context. and as such is greater than individual experience or 
expression. Context is an influence: we know this. We know that a foetus in utero absorbs whatever 
its mother consumes. In the same way. affect as context tinges and forms our perceptions and 
emotions. 
The idea of extension as a way of understanding relation is not unique to Massumi. It also appears in 
the work ofDeleuze and Guattari. specifically in their conception of the rhizome. A rhizome. unlike 
a root system, which "plots a point, fixes an order",los has no identifiable origin point. It is not linear 
in that way. Instead. "any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything else. and must be" .106 1he 
rhizome as a metaphor for the production and understanding of knowledge is an argument in favour 
of connection and difference. It is. moreover. an argument in terms of relation which is multi-
directional and assembled, rather than homogenous. Deleuze and Guattari identify 'tree logic' as -a 
logic of tracing and reproduction" whose "goal is to describe a de facto state. to maintain balance in 
intersubjective relations. or to explore an unconscious that is already there from the start" and which 
"consists of tracing [ ... ] something that comes ready-made" .107 This 'tree logic' is associated by 
Deleuze and Guattari with linguistics and with psychoanalysis they call it a "variation on the oldest 
form of thought". lOB (In its place. they propose ' s c h i z o a n a l y s i s ~ ~ which "treats the unconscious as an 
acentred system [ ... ] and thus arrives at an entirely different state of the unconscious",109 aiming at 
the production. rather than description thereof) Instead of tracing. Deleuze and Guattari argue for 
103 Shouse. Eric. -Feeling. Emotion. Affect". The Journal oj Media and Culture. Volume 8. Issue 6. December 2ooS. 
Accessed 28 August 2012. <http://joumal.media-cuiture.org.au/0512103-shouse.php> 
104 Shouse differentiates between' feding (sensation in biographical context) and 'emotion' (projection or display of a 
feeling). Massumi does not address this difference. However. the overlap in terminology ('personal') provides a way to look. at 
both as compared to the way Massumi uses the word 'affect'. 
105 Deleuze Gilles. and Felix Guattari. trans. Brian Massumi. A Thousand PlAteaus (London and New York: Continun_ 
. -". 2004). p.l3. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. p. 12. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, p. 18 
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mapping. "oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real".lIO What might that mean? 
In contrast to the tracing of something' ready-made' (a story generalisable to each patient, such as the 
Oedipal one, for example), experimentation-oriented mapping implies responsiveness to what is 
there-perceived or sensed-in the unexpected moment. Furthermore, the rhizome and its mapping 
tendency foster" connections between fields"; the map is "open and connectable in all of its 
dimensions, [ ... ] susceptible to constant modiflcation".l1l Where 'tree logic' is uni-directional (down; 
out) and linear (from this point to that), that of the rhizome is to cross and recross, to decentre itself. 
to be revised, to be entered from multiple points. Ddeuze and Guattari are careful, however, to note 
that the rhizome is not purely itself; that there are "knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and 
rhizomatic offshoots in roots" just as there are "despotic forms of immanence and channelization 
speciflc to rhizomes· and "anarchic deformations in the transcendent system of trees".ll2Their 
argument seems to be in favour of a mixed or hybrid understanding, against the idea of purity, rather 
than simply against to one construction of knowledge and for another. "The important point," they 
write. "is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models [ ... J. It is not a question 
of this or that place on earth, or of a given moment in history, still less of this or that category of 
thought. It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing".113 The model of 
thought which is perpetually in construction is a model of expansion. Expansion can of course be 
colonial, imperial, taking over what does not belong to it and assimilating it. But it might also be 
inclusive, open. and humble, offering space at a table no longer reserved only for one kind of person 
or way of thinking. Within the context of thinking about affect. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 
the rhizome-a plant form whose generative nodes are networked and extensive rather than linear 
and intensive-expresses the non-centrality or trans-locating tendencies of affect itselE The 
undecidability of what is meant by-or experienced or communicated as-affect is an expression of 
an understanding of the world that eludes polarities for their own sake (things are more connected 
than we know) but that at the same time resists consolidation (there is yet more we do not 
know/there are places we do not connect). 
There are several ways in which. despite some differences which I will address a bit later in this 
section, Massumi's work follows on from Deleuze and Guattari's. For one. Massumi writes that 
intensity (a word he sometimes uses in place of affect) is "embodied in purely autonomic reactions 
most directly manifested in the skin-at the surface of the body, at its interface with things" (my 
110 Ibid, P. 12. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, p. 20. 
113 Ibid. 
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emphasis).1I4The image of the body-the skin-interfacing with other things owes a clear debt at 
least of representation to Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome; the 'interfacing' of a wasp and an orchid in 
their work is analogous to the interface between the skin and 'other things' here in Massumi's. 
Massumi's description of the event taking place" on both levels [the superlinear and linear. which aR 
also two orders oflanguage for Massumi]-and between both levels. as they resonate together to 
form a larger system composed of two interacting subsystems following entirely different rules of 
formation" contains echoes ofDeleuze and Guattari's assertion that a semiotic chain understood 
rhizomatically "is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts. not only linguistic. but also perceptive, 
mimetic, gestural. and cognitive". ll5 This makes sense, of course. since Massumi is consciously 
working in and deviating from the path trod by Deleuze and Guattari. He wrote the introduction to 
A Thousand Plateaus; his first monograph was in part entided Deviations from Deleuze and G ~ ~
and later edited the collection A Shock to Thought: Expression After Deleuze and Guattari. Despite 
this relationship (or perhaps unsurprisingly. since Deleuze and Guattari's work itself deals with the 
integrity of divergence and difference within a rhizomatic system). Massumi attends to his own 
concerns which fall nevertheless within the field of approach into which Deleuze and Guattari's 
thinking on rhizome and on affect also fall. Massumi's concept of affect as "a way of talking aboUt 
that margin of manoeuvrability. the 'where we might be able to go and what we might be able to do· 
in every present situation" contains echoes of the rhizome.116 
Massumi's concern for 'every present situation: "being right where you are-more intensely",117 helps 
to define his understanding of affect as it is linked to intensity. The density of'everyness' and of 
presentness': the awareness of an infolded present which bears more than what is perceived or 
recognized gives us affect as something other than one's own feeling: like Spinoza, Massumi is 
thinking of the body in its capability to affect and to be affected. and these "are not two different 
capacities-they always go together. When you affect something. you are at the same time opening 
yourself up to being affected in turn. and in a slightly different way than you might have been the 
moment before. You have made a transition. however slight".118 For Massumi. this transition 
represents a change in capacity. Intensity is brought about through the interfacing of one thing With 
another. of two things which respond or communicate. and especially. it seems through the 
interfacing of two things. one of which (the human) does not 'understand' the action of the interface 
114 Massumi. p. 25. 
115 Deleuze and Guattari. 1987. p. 7. 





in any usual way, because, according to Massumi, the information which passes is embodied not in 
cognitive responsiveness (decision, desire) but in something which precedes even that-the 
autonomic. Autonomy, of course, means self-government; freedom from outside control.l19 But in 
terms of the body, it also refers to physical, anatomical systems which are self-regulating: the breath, 
the hair that rises, the reflexes, the heartbeat. And at the point of the autonomic, affect theory crosses 
from the humanities into the sciences.l20 
One side effect of Massumi's approach in Parables for the Virtual is placing affect not only in terms of 
its history and treatment within cultural studies (Spinoza's affectus/affectio, for example) but in 
terms of cross-disciplinary research being done contemporaneously with his own. Ruth Leys writes 
that affect theorists like Massumi and some neuroscientists share" a commitment to the idea that 
there is a gap between the subject's affects and its cognition or appraisal of the affective situation or 
object, such that cognition or thinking comes 'too late' for reasons, beliefs, intentions, and meanings 
to play the role in behavior usually accorded to them·. The result of this commitment, Leys goes on 
to say, is that "action and behavior are held to be determined by affective dispositions"121 which are 
outside of the control of the mind, outside of consciousness. Her critique of Massumi's work 
specifically and that of affect theorists more generally rests on their adoption of this thesis, as well as 
on what she sees as the misappropriation of neuroscience of the emotions for the purposes of 
humanities scholarship. Leys' argument is not that every experience is cognitive or that a pre-
cognitive affect would have no place in the study of emotion (from a neuroscientific point of view) 
or that of affect as it has come to be understood in the humanities. But she does take issue with 
Massumi's interpretations of scientific data. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, who propose a theory 
which is addressed to text to some extent and to a further extent on a critique of psychoanalysis, Leys 
takes Massumi's understanding of affect as resting in part on empirical data he takes from a pair of 
studies done by media researchers in Germany in the 1980s. Insofar as this kind of data purports to 
scientificity and therefore to some kind of , truth' or reliability or solidity, the interpretation of the 
data matters. It especially matters if, as Leys writes, Massumi's theoretical moves are "seemingly 
unwarranted by the experimental rcsults".l22 However, Massumi is working within the field of 
"philosophically inflected cultural studies· ;123 Leys is reading him as though he is working in 
119 And to Kant it meant the freedom to act without the influence of desires. Perhaps replacing 'without' by 'beyond' or 
'before' would bring the Kantian understanding of'autonomy' closer to an affective one? 
120 1his is a point that the work of Teresa Brennan interrogates; her investigation of affect as it relates to pheromones takes 
into account the possibility (and meaningfulness) of autonomic responses to the presence of others. 
121 Lcys, Ruth. -The Tum to Affect: A Critique-. Criticallnq";ry, 37 (Spring 2011), pp. 434472, p. 443. 
122 Ibid. p. 448. 
123 Gregg and Seigworth. p.7. 
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quantum-/neuro-/cognitive sciences. ("1 for one don't count my way around town",124 writes 
Massumi, exemplifying his leanings toward a qualitative rather than quantitative approach to 
understanding what surrounds him.) Because it interprets the German researchers' findings, pemaps 
Massumi's work can be seen as open to Leys' critique. But what if we consider it not from the point 
of view of those scientific disciplines which are interested in the study of affect but from the point of 
view of the humanities disciplines that are? This is not to say that a connection between these 
disciplines would be severed, but it might suggest a way to conceptualise different approaches to the 
same data. Without advocating for "abandon [ing] the social sciences entirely", it is possible to aim 
for "a new academic attitude rather than a new method".12S 
Is our role, or one of our roles, as humanities researchers to bring the sciences, the social sciences, and 
the humanities closer together? If or when we think it is, then how are we to go about that? Is it 
useful in terms of this purpose to interpret data for our own (humanities) uses, even if the 
interpretations we come up with do not in actuality follow the norm of interpretation for such data 
in the (social) sciences? Without denying the potential that information, data, research and 
scholarship from the social sciences and sciences holds for the humanities, I do wonder why 
methodologies like Massumi's are understood as adapting to a 'scientific' mode of revealed or 
observed truth (which is where Leys' criticism lies), instead of as approaching the whole ofit as story, 
anecdote, analogy, and metaphor. Social science data interpreted by social scientists (or humanities 
scholars, or scientists) as data can produce one kind of meaning; the same data as an allegory can 
produce another. Without a necessary debt to the empirical, positive, or absolute, story and 
metaphor do what Massumi and Dcleuze and Guattari talk about: they resonate. In the spaces of 
their resonance we become responsible for finding new ways of speaking about and to them. I am not 
denying that there is value in work that would join or approximate the sciences and the humanities. 
There is, and no dispensation is needed for that work to continue. But what this dissertation intends 
to show, in part, is that for a very long time philosophy in particular has felt the weight of the 
scientific (meaning the provable, positivist, empirical) as an ideal approach, even in those occasional 
situations (such as, for example, the study oflove) when as an approach it is incomplete or 
insufficient. Scientific approaches have their use; so do non-scientific approaches. It is not an either-
or question, but one of balance. The remedy in the case of this dissertation may be in more 
figuration, more access to the poetic, not a restriction thereo£ 
124 Massumi, p. 181. 
125 Hemmings, p. 563. 
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P.mcr Helene Cixous. 
. If aftCct theory provides this dissertation a model for unbounded relation -for the possibility of 
bcingtouched. moved. without one's consent, or even without one's (fore)knowledge. Helene 
Cimus's writing provides a model for the approach of an open, an unbounded, reader to the text. 
Both in her writings about writing itself and in writings through which she approaches other 
work-in particular the writings of Clarice Lispector-Cixous engages in a reading which attempts 
to -find the apple by feeling [her] way along in the dark·, 126 which, she writes, is a condition both of 
discovery and of love. What is a reading that tries to flnd without looking. or to find in a place where 
looking is not possible? It is a reading that is not at its strongest or easiest, a reading without its most 
aailable and accustomed sense (sight). A reading which therefore takes its own vulnerability and 
quationability as a first principle. It is also a reading which 'feels' its way along: feels, as in touch; 
fec:b, as in intuition. Feels, as in receives signals even when those signals are not codified into 
language. Feeling not in opposition to understanding or knowing, but as a way of knowing: Cixous 
writes of this kind of reading that it -is not a question of not having understood [ ... ] but of not 
letting oneself get locked into comprehension·. 127 Standing in the middle of the translated text, I 
must feel my way into the multiplicity of meanings that run through its languages; I am responsible 
for unlocking my singular mode of comprehension and moving into the space of "the parentheses in 
which our 'why-nots' live-, 128 where many voices make more than one thing possible. 
Cb:ous's way of reading requires in me "this lightness, this active passivity, this capacity to let things 
, come through, this submission to the process-129 of reading, of meaning-creation by the text/by the 
mader/in the text/in the reader. She writes often of something like 'lightness' in her approach to the 
tats she loves, calling writing -touching the mystery, delicately, with the tips of the words, trying 
DOt to crush it-,130 and the texts she loves (actively. loving them by reading them and being read by 
·i ... them), she describes as for example -an immense book of respect. Book of the right distance-.l3l Distance 
is what one attains by a ·relendess process of de-selfing, de-egoization ".132 Distance. respect-these 
ram forms of not-being-close to what one approaches. One might read across such a distance: too 
121» Cimus, H ~ e . . -Coming to Writing· tUUl Other EssAys. cd. Deborah Jenson. with an introductory essay by Susan Rubin 
saldman Trans. Sarah Comdl. Deborah Jenson. Ann Liddle, Susan Sellers. Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
I'raI, 1991. p. 161. 
111 Ibid. 
128 lbid,p.179. 
129 Ibid, pp. 113-114. 
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near, and the letters become invisible. The book assimilates into the blur of the reader's periphery. To 
read as Comus reads requires distance. It therefore also requires some detachment from the centrality 
and the correctness and even the activeness of the sd£ An entry into the active passivity of the reader 
who is read by her text, who" stages the having, makes it palpitate, move slighdy, vibrate, she does not 
consume it, she does not devour it" .133 With distance between the reader and the read, there is sa&ty 
for both-safety from immolation, assimilation. Detachment from readerlyego allows the 
prescrvation of both reader and read, and allows for a patient reading; one that "pay[s] attention: 
doing nothing, not upsetting, filling, replacing, taking up the space. Leaving the space alone. 
Thinking delicately of" .134 Paying attention, in Comus's terminology, means the smallest of 
movements, and awareness of the effects of thosc movements on one's surroundings, on one's others. 
It is directed toward the other not as a scarchlight (which reveals), but as a "look that recognizes. [ ... J 
that respects, doesn't take, doesn't claw" and instead "contemplates and reads, caresscs, bathes, makes 
the other gleam".I3S What Cixous calls a "practice of the greatest passivity" is a way of reading 
through which one opens the sclf, rather than opening the text; or they are co-opened. A way in 
which one allows things to pass through onesclf, of "getting to know things by letting ourselves be 
known by them" which does not "scek to master. To demonstrate, explain, grasp. And then to lock 
away in a strongbox" but instead aims to "transmit: to make things loved by making them known -.136 
This is a reading which loosens. 
Reading, ifI am to follow Cixous as she reads (as she is read), is scekingwhat isftlt primarily: 
primarily in the sense of ordinally nrst, and in the scnsc of the felt as a point of origin for other kinds 
of thinking, such as writing. Writing about painting, Cixous says that she loves it "the way the blind 
love the sun". 137 Without seeing, that is. With an attention to what sensations it causes in the body: 
"feeling it, breathing it in, [ ... ] knowing it through the skin" .138 With my eyes closed, the world is 
immersive. The separation between my body and what surrounds it is less immediately knowable. 
What I do know surrounds and penetrates me: sound seems to occur within my body itself, rather 
than to emerge from something outside of me and to remain there. Currents of air are warm or caol 
and affect my body's response (I relax; 1 tense; hair rises). "'[T]his thing' that is the book", writes 
Cixous, "is 1".139 The book is the writer, the book is the reader; or at least the boundary is more 








delicate and porous than we might imagine. 
I want to retUrn for one moment to the non-exclusive pairing of allegorical and scientific 
interpretation of data that was brought up toward the end of the discussion of affect theory, in order 
to clarify, with reference to Cixous, the possibilities that affect as a metaphor holds for this 
dissertation. At one point, Cixous refers specifically to a moment in a text by Lispcctor where she 
(Uspcctor) writes about the positive potential in becoming an object in her own story-a vine, rather 
than, say, a narrator. Cixous points to this transformation and acknowledges that we "might say that 
this is only metaphor·.I<tO Only metaphor, meaning not 'real'; meaning an illustration to direct us 
toWard something but not the thing itself. But, Cixous goes on, "it is the dream of every author to 
arrive at such a transfiguration of the self, such a remove that I become the vine". The distance is not 
only between the reader and the reading-self. but between the writer and her writing-self; the ego to 
be done away with is likewise not exclusively that of the reader. In a metaphor, the verb makes an = 
sign. The quantity on one side becomes the one on the other, becomes its equal. There might the 
writer might also enter into a communion with the objects of her writing so close, so detached from 
the necessity of being-being human, being central, being the one doing the determining-that she 
might become those objects, even momentarily, even as 'only metaphor'. Cixous calls this a "way of 
remembering that my self is only one of the elements of the immense material universe" which is 
"haunted by the imaginary·.I"1 It is one way to look at metaphor, and it is something that metaphor 
provides for writing-the sense of being involved with other things, of being integrally bound to 
them. and of being transversed by them, which is why affect as a metaphor is appropriate. We can 
enact the kind of reading for which Cixous advocates (reading with a patience that "pays attention·, 
that is "terse, active, discreet, warm, almost imperceptiblelO)l42 with or without a neuroscientific basis 
for it. It is not that finding out whether or not there is such a basis on which humanities scholarship 
might be built doesn't matter; again, as Cixous writes and as I quoted above, it is a question of "not 
letting oneself get locked into comprehension· .143 The metaphor is functional. Whether humanities 
scholarship can adequately or appropriately reflect and extend the work on affect done in scientific 
communities matters, but it isn't the only thing that matters. When Cixous lets herself be read by 
Lispector's text, she performs an affective rdation-a relation based on attention, be-touchedness, 
fcdingor felt perception-without looking to a scientific (or other) discourse to shore up her 
140 Ibid. p. 106. emphasis mine. 
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reading and her being-read. l44 Cixous' writing, and the writing of others (such as Luce Irigaray, 
whose work appears later in this dissertation) provide both justification and precedent for the 
conceptual, scholarly articulation of emotional experience. It is the experience writing in this way. of 
being in relation via the body, which malees it mean: -Life becomes text starting out from my 
body".14s From this point-the point at which the body is entered by text, ortransversed by them. 
the point at which the body is within the text, the point at which the body is a text-generative 
organ-I will try to make inroads towards an ethics of reading, a way of reading which considers 
texts as others, and which asks how one might love them. 
H.Routemap 
To recapitulate: this dissertation concerns itself with love as a way of approaching texts; it proposes 
ways of being with texts which consider them as others, collapsing the boundary between subject and 
object which is tacitly observed in much literary theory and criticism, and which has its roots in a 
scientific neglect of the relation between the two. The dissertation began with an exemplary reading 
of Cy Twombly's painting The Ceiling, demonstrating both the tone and the mode of approach that 
characterise its further investigation. This introduction and literature review offer particular POints 
of access or collision or contingency that are of use in understanding the roots of the questions the 
dissertation poses about love. 
Chapter 1 will examine the relation between science and poetry, between philosophy and love, and 
go on to offer a reading ofW. J. T. Mitchell's 'delicate critical method: which is figured as a sounding 
of icons, rather than a smashing of them. Mitchell's question, 'What do pictures want?', may SCem 
outlandish in a traditional subject-views-object sense, but in terms of an approach which 
acknowledges the ways in which pictures (or texts) may work upon or actually construct their viewers 
(readers), or an approach which acknowledges the otherness of the other who is gazed upon, this 
question is integral. In this dissertation, the approach being developed is a textual one; therefore in 
most cases the 'other' is a textual other. Mitchell's consideration of pictures' desire gives precedent for 
considering the 'desires' of non-living others. Because the textual or pictorial other cannot speak (in 
language, in response to questions, the way people can), its being epitomises the unknowable as a 
144 In fact. Cixous explicidy counterposes "knowing how to live" and "scholarly knowledge" (p. 161). Which is not to say 
scientific scholarly knowledge alone. 
145 Cixous.1991. p. 51. 
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qwaIity of any other. 
'Ihc unknowable itself is, as discussed in Chapter 2, characteristic of texts (understood via Barthes) as 
chings that are continually in production or ongoing creation. The text in its state of becoming is 
aock-the erotic being a state of not-yet-achieved bliss (or total knowledge). Resistance in the text 
to being-known is an indication of its eroties, and of its tendency to continually generate meaning. 
i.e. itsd£ Love is, therefore, a flgure in the approach to a text which allows for this unknown quality 
to be, unharassed. The centrality of the text as what is approached in terms of this dissertation 
demands an examination of other modes of textual study, philosophies with the text also at their 
centre, in order to see where this approach flts and what its precedents might be. 
Olapter 3 is occupied with a reading of deconstruction. Deconstruction is perhaps the closest-or 
iWIat-articulation of this approach which exists in the literature, in that Derrida insisted that 
deconstruction was not a method or system, and that it was based on respect for the otherness of the 
. other. which he termed 'the love in deconstruction'. However, in practice deconstruction has been 
ued methodolOgically. Deconstruction alone is not enough, insofar as deconstruction as a practice 
of reading has generally focused on the application ofDerrida's ideas to texts. Derrida's insistence on 
the wmameability of deconstruction, and on the 'love in deconstruction' are an indication that 
. deconstruction itself can be read against a Cartesian split self that privileges absolute knowledge. The 
dissertation argues that deconstruction can be approached (and approaches others-other texts) 
: Ioringly; that the respect for the otherness of the other which its fundamental to deconstruction is an 
overturning of methods whose primary goal is to know all. 
Chapter 4 introduces the work of Uvinas, both as the origin of Derrida's 'yes' and in terms of his 
. attempts to define love, both as what it is not (grasping. possessing. knowing) and what it is 
(responsibility to the other). The first section revisits the Franciscanism or poverty-space of all 
possibility-that is first discussed in Chapter 2. Following Uvinas is a continuation of the reading of 
Teraa Brennan's writing (introduced in the 'opening foray'), whose work on affect argues that the 
body and its ability to feel (and create knowledge) are not limited, as in the Western concept of the 
singular subject, but shared. This suggests that connections are being made continuously and often 
without our rational 'approval'. Brennan goes on to argue for feeling and sensing (especially gaining 
. knowledge with senses other than Sight) as methodological tools that constitute a connection with 
the object of study, instead of a separation between scholar-subject and specimen-object as is 
indicated in a relationship based on sight and cognition. The affective non-containment of the 
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individual allows for the possibility of knowledge via the body and for a relation not only between 
thinking and feeling. but between subject and object (or other subject). In both Brennan's writing 
and Levinas: thinking is not subjugated to feeling; instead, both reconsider feeling as another route 
to wisdom. The extension of the self into the world is figured as part of a loving approach by natuR 
of its relation to tenderness; this concept is explored via the work of Richard Rorty. Roland Barthes, 
and Derrida. The section concludes with a gloss of tenderness as the possibility of extension outside 
oneself so as to be nearer to others-imaginatively speaking-and to still respect the ungraspabllity 
of the other. Here. the section moves into a consideration of philosophy in terms of its (linguistic) 
roots in both love and wisdom. which brings it to ecriture feminine. and then to a longer 
consideration of Luce Irigaray's writing on love, particularly in her book The Way of Love. The last 
two sections of the chapter look at Irigaray's and Barthes' work for the way they construe love as a 
way of being-with the other. of speaking (or revising speech as it stands-communicating with voice, 
gesture. touch), and of creating space. Both Barthes and Irigaray, in writing about love in terms of 
space, make distance between the one and the other an integral part of a loving relation or 
communication. This provides a figure for Derrida's insistence on the primacy of the other's 
otherness, and signposts the figures of separation, space, and distance in Chapter S. The chapter ends 
with a meditation on the word 'yes' as an exorbitant answer, which takes its place as part of a IOYing 
approach because such an approach welcomes what it 'should not', or what is otherwise exorbitant: 
wisdom from the body; love in philosophy; relations between subject and 'object'. The approach that 
is exorbitant realises the impossibility of grasping and therefore comes toward the other with 
tenderness-with an extension of the self that never actually reaches full knowledge of the other. 
Chapter 5 is an engagement with texts by Rainer Maria Rilke and E. E. Cummings that are at once 
performative of love as an approach to texts and contribute to the theorisation of such an approach. 
Their authorial approaches to texts can be a model for a readerly approach as well-and not only to 
texts about love (which these happen to be). but to any texts. Reading Rilke and Cummings, I 
continue to delineate the possibility for approaching the other; the presence of these authors here 
also signifies that such an approach is not only the province of one 'kind' of writing. but crosses 
disciplinary and generic boundaries. Their inclusion supports Barthes' assertion of the endlessly 
created text-the dissertation does not draw only on one 'kind' of text because all kinds of texts m.ake 
up text itsel£ However, by virtue of their diSciplinary distance from scientificity, Rilke's essay and 
Cummings' poems are free to enact what lrigaray refers to as a 'more musical, artistic. touchful way of 
speaking'. This is their further contribution. 
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following Chapter S. I offer a second exemplary reading: a coda to echo the prdude in which I 
wrote about CyTwombly's The Ceiling. In this coda. I read the story of Moses and the burning bush 
in the book of Exodus in order to find suggestions of the copresence of the unorthodox and the 
orthodox. the ordered and the disorderly. within even a very fundamental text such as this one. My 
reading of the burning bush story attempts to find a gap in which the unknown. the affective. the 
intuitive can make its home. It is my hope that by refusing to dose down and pin the being of the 
(tc:xtual) other. in insisting on continual difference and distance. my approach will help make that 
gap visible, and, across that gap. affirm-lovingly-the otherness of that other. 
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Chapter 1/ 
Between science and poetry I philosophy and love: 
A brief genealogy of repreSSion 




"we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning with the verses· 
Plato, Republic, III 
"[The] imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he indulges the irrational 
nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the same thing at 
one time great and at another small-he is a manufacturer of images and is very far 
removed from the truth.· 
"And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence 
serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of 
our State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason 
constrained us.· 
Plato, RepubliC, X 
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A.Couplets 
This section begins with a pair of couplets: science and poetry, and philosophy and love. Despite the 
potential in pairs such as these for the blurring of boundaries, and despite their unintuitive pairings 
(mon: likely pairs: science and myth, poetry and prose), in the contexts in which this dissertation will 
consider them, the two couplets function like binaries. A binary, of course, is any unit composed of 
two parts-which their coupling here accomplishes. And although poetry and prose, or science and 
myth might most obviously be defined as a binary in a structuralist sense, the way that poetry (as a 
metonym for creative, subject-acknowledging activity) is excluded by science. and the way that 
philosophy traditionally. to some extent, ignores love (as a way of knowing via the body, as a way of 
bcingwith the other/the object) means that each of these defines itselfin part by what it is not. They 
can, therefore, function as binaries. if unconventional ones. The exclusion of poetry from science and 
love from philosophy is in question in this chapter. 
However, despite the significance of these couplets to this dissertation, of course they do not 
originate with it. They are already in action. despite some theorists' (and others') desires to work 
against them; for instance, in the way in which affect-based readings an: discriminated against in the 
humanities, not to mention the almost laughably obvious incompatibility of the way poets know 
(observation of the world inflected by the interior life of the individual) and the way scientists know 
(observation of the world supposedly uninflected by the interior life of the individual). Of course 
these binaries. and the example just provided. do not hold. This section will deal with these 
questionable binaries, demonstrate their presence in the context that surrounds this dissertation, and 
present support from that context for questioning them in the first place. A brief note on items of 
vocabulary here: although it is clear that the lexical items 'poetry' and 'love', and 'science' and 
'philosophy' an: distinct, in this section I will to some extent be using them interchangeably, because 
of the way that, in the history of science and philosophy, the latter two are intertwined (as well as the 
pseudO-Scientific attitudes of philosophers aiming to authorise their writings); additional support for 
this use comes from Luce lrigaray's identification of love and poetic language in her revisions of 
philosophy (discussion later in this section). 
My question when binaries such as these are brought into consideration is how. How is science at 
odds with poetry? How should philosophy be forgetful of the part of its name that means love? And 
how do we continue to pn:tend, if we acknowledge that these binaries are in fact false fronts, that 
feeling and thinking are two separate things or share no common ground, or cannot teach one 
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another? The answer to these questions is a simple one. but one with roots that go back to the 
foundations of the ways we think. and think. about thinking: science represses poetry because poetry 
is its other. the thing which. if acknowledged. would make it less itself-The scientificity of science is 
maintained by this repression. and we call it objectivity. Likewise. philosophy maintains its authority 
to speak on thought and thinking by repressing what is called 'irrational'-feeling. The work of Mary 
Midgley on the historical and contemporary relationship between science and poetry. and that of 
Luce lrigarayon the place oflove in philosophy informs the work that will be done here. 
Although this section does begin with the idea of binaries. it also begins with an example of these 
binaries in action. a section from Plato's Republic that comes from its tenth section. in which Socrates 
discusses the banishment of poets from his just city. Although poetry and its makers may be ·SWeet 
and holy and wonderful"" in the just city they "are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow 
them "2 because the poet creates imitations of knowledge without possessing knowledge. "will make a 
likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling".3 Here. at the beginning of 
philosophy and of the pedagogy of philosophy. is the separation between ways of knOwing. The 
knowledge that belongs in the just city is a knowledge not based in imitation (as poetry is for 
Socrates). Therefore. if"all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers". then 
"knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to them":' The opposition of 'poetical imitations' 
and 'knowledge of ... true nature' within the city that represents the project of philosophy means that 
almost from its inception this project has contained the idea of such a separation as. if not natural. 
then necessary. 
B. Science and poetry 
Just as the separation between poetry and philosophy can be traced at least to Plato's city, the history 
of separation between poetry and science-or even love and science-has a similarly lengthy 
genealogy. Midgley locates the moment that love as a discourse evaporates from scientific (and, we 
may extrapolate. academic and scholarly) thought in the Renaissance. In its last appearance in 
scientific literature. Johannes Kepler uses the word 'love' to describe gravitational forces. 'While 
Kepler's ideas were rejected by Galileo. the idea of attraction between bodies that he proposed 
structured Newton's theory of gravitational attraction-but, unlike Kepler's figure of attraction 
I Plato. &public III. http://classics.mit.cdu/Plato/republic.html. accessed I I August 2011. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Plato &public X. http://classics.mit.cdu/Placo/republic.html. accessed II August 2011. 
4 Ibid. 
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within bodies. "what made [Newton's] mysterious attraction possible was a divine miracle",s 
Newton's ideas proposed underlying and originary external forces of compulsion fundamentally 
different to Kepler's ideas of attractions among bodies. Of course, neither Newton nor the spumed 
Kepler was talking about actual love or actual attraction; these are figures used to describe the 
behaviour of non-human bodies, Regardless, the disappearance oflove as a figure and as a legitimate 
way of describing scientiflc phenomena has implications for the way that figure is present (or not) in 
c:lisciplines that aim or have a history of aiming at a 'scientmc' mode of inquiry, which in the terms of 
this dissertation includes literary theory and phUosophy more broadly, Because of the ways in which 
history of science entwines itself with phUosophy. when she writes about what she calls 'science and 
p o e t r y ~ ~ Midgley is also writing about the attitudes and assumptions that thinkers in the tradition of 
Western phUosophy have been conditioned to make. 
Donna Haraway identifies these assumptions (about objectivity. separation. and non-
contamination) as "a founding gesture of what we call modernity".6 This gesture requires the 
-separation of expert knowledge from mere opinion as the legitimating knowledge for ways of life, 
without appeal to [ ... ] abstract certainty of any kind",7 It manifests itself in part in a rhetorical style 
which is divorced from the personal, the anecdotal, the unempirical, and the unprovable: this 
-rhetoric of the modest witness" requires an "unadorned, factual" manner of writing-unblemished 
by the presence of the human who writes (whose 'modesty' permits him to witness without 
inSucncing; i.e. to remove the consideration of subjectivity from the practice of observation), The 
-facts and the witnesses inhabit the privUeged zones of 'objective' reality through a powerful writing 
technology".s This 'founding gesture' precludes the involvement of the senses (except sight) and 
situates knowledge production only in terms of what can be reiterated and demonstrated to be 
untarnished even by figurative emotional, affective, or sensuous information. It is not unlike what 
Jean-Lue Marion identifies when he writes about the "] of phUosophers, that] who is supposed to be 
universal, a disengaged spectator",9 
If statements about love, figurative or not, have been traditionally impermissible in science, they will 
have no place in a phUosophy that models itself on such a method. Which is why, in the end, love 
S MIdgley. 58-59, 
, Donna J, Haraway, Motkst_Wilness@SecoruCMillmnium. FemakMan@_Meets_OncoMouse": Feminism and Technoscienct 
(New York and London: Roudcdgc. 1997). p. 24, 
71bid.U. 
8 Jbld.26, 
9 Marion,Jcan-Luc, The Erotic Phenomenon. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008). p. 9. For further discussion. please 
ICC Chapter 4. Section C. 
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figurative or actual does have a place in an approach that challenges the received method of 
understanding the world. or the idea of a method at all.10 Such an approach. in splitting from its 
lineage. is responsible for fmding a way of being that reflects that split. 
A philosophy that does not repress its roots in love (philios) requires a mode of speech that reflects 
that. In the place of the "closed word" which "must convey a meaning in some way closed, in which 
the speaking subject converses above all with their own self and with speech" and "which is always 
already a testamentary legacy" .11 established and fixed. a philosophy which acknowledges the place of 
love within it establishes a conversation between subjects (I no longer discourse about something ttl 
another; I talk with her about it). And in place of empiricism or empirical curiosity which by nature 
of its observational stance divorces itself from its ' o b j e c t ~ ~ this "knowledge of the other also demands 
sympathy or love. ways of being that are different from impassive contemplation". 12 
Let us return to the separation between poetry and science by way of Midgley again. Her choice of 
terms here is not accidental: what is poetic is imaginative. emotional, and strictly divided from what 
is understood to be scientific by the boundaries of imaginative and emotional experience. The divide 
oflove from science, or poetry from science-or any feeling knowledge from empirical knowledge_ 
is defended by science's 'triumphant opposition' to "both feeling and fancy ... [which are] dramatised 
in terms of gender ... making reason the exclusive mark of Man and stigmatising feeling as a female 
weakness".13 The hallmark of science (or a scientific philosophy) is its objectivity, which is to say its 
detachment from its other. Feeling is objectivity's antithesis. It cannot be proven. it cannot be relied 
upon. Therefore. in a philosophy or a science that takes a verifiable truth as its foundation, feeling 
has no place. What this syllogism ignores, however, is the problematic assumption that 'objectivity' is 
an absolute term. In fact, "the notion that the objective is somehow free of affect"!4 is a way of 
thinking that "conceives of minds [ ... ] unrealistically as self-contained, isolated both from each other 
and from the world around them".!S Midgley argues that we must be "objective-that is, fair, honest 
and methodical-about the whole range of the subjective ... the whole range where subjectivc 
expericnce affects objective facts".!6 Of course, the effacement of subjectivity from the 'hard' sciences 
extends literally into any discourses that attempt to imitate this objectivity. 
lOAn assertion which will be addressed later in this section (via lrigaray) as well as in Chapter 2. 
11 lrigaray. 24-25. 
12 Levinas. 1998: 5. 
13 Midglcy.67. 
14 Brennan. 19. 
15 Midglcy.117. 
16 Midglcy.ln-l73 (emphasis in original). 
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.' 'Ihe most pronounced scientific attitude in discourses that are not, strictly speaking, scientific-that 
. iiB, discourses like philosophy, theory, and criticism-is that of objectivity. One need go no further 
than the famous article by William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, "The Affective Fallacy", to find 
:arguments against "deriv[ing] the standards of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem". 
,the effects of which, they insist, cause "the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment 
. ,,(...) to disappear".17 Note that in Wimsatt and Beardsley's analysis the poem is the object of criticism. 
of jwJgmmt. Judgment, in either the sense of the ability to make considered decisions (my dictionary 
~ a I S O O emphasises the ability to come to 'sensible conclusions', a wording that hearkens interestingly to 
olcler meanings of ' s e n s i b l e ~ ~ still retained in French, which denote sensitivity, i.e. emotional 
attention, rather than reason, or intellectual attention) or in the sense of a decision handed down 
from an authority Oudge, God, expert). is about standing outside of the thing one looks at and 
pronouncing upon it. It is a matter of what Stanley Fish calls "[exclusion] by legislation",18 the 
official effacement of, in this case, the reader from the act of reading-the exclusion of subjectivity 
, £rom the experience of criticism. What is effaced in the sciences, beginning with Kepler in the 
.'. &naissance, is the place of feeling, which extends to the place of the subject(ive). As instances such 
as the Wimsatt/Beardsley article show, such effacement is however not limited to science . 
. Instead of acknowledging that it is made by and for and within a system that includes the subject and 
:..w,jectivity, the discourse of objectivity that surrounds scientific examinations of the world imagines 
.icIeIf to be removed from that world and therefore untouched by it. The model of the scientist in the 
.anpirical tradition is formed by the constraints of that tradition, which is to say, is constrained to 
understanding the world only through what can be seen, observed, and verified by observation and 
experience. The position of the empiricist (literally speaking as well as figuratively) is above or 
. outside that which is observed, a position which seems to denote a separation between the one and 
dac other, and a removal of the person doing the observing from a relationship on an equal footing, 
as it were, with what is observed. Scientificity, in imagining itself removed from and untouched by 
.. the world, buUds a denial of subjective experience into its framework. I f removal or detachment is 
the aim, then a rejection of "feeling and sensing [ ... ] as methodological tools for studying the object 
17 Wimsatt. William Kurtz. in collaboration with Monroe C. Beardsley. "The Affective Fallacy· in The Verbal/con: Studies in 
tlltMMllillgofPoetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1954). p. 21. The article is famously responded to by Stanley 
Filil in his essay "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics· {Fish. Stanley. "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics·. 
N. LIter"" History. VoL 2. No.1. A Symposium on Literary History (Autumn. 1970). pp. 123-162 ). which presents the 
'aWcctWe fallacy &llacy' and &lls in line with Midgley's concept of an objectivity that is objective about 'the whole range of the 
1IIbjeedve' rather than dismissive or wilfully ignorant of it. 
18 JIbh. 123 .. 
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[ ... ] because they constitute a connection with the object"19 makes sense. But it does not make sense if 
the aim is to be with others (whether texts or humans or other others) on their terms as well as one's 
own, or if the aim is a deeper connection to the world, because such a detachment is expliddy not 
concerned with connection; the two terms are incompatible. 
The copresence of the binaries on which this section hinges brings modes of expression (sciences 
philosophy, poetry) as well as modes of perception (wisdom, knowledge, emotion) into relation with 
one another. And while of course such absolute distinctions can't be drawn between the expression 
of knowing and the mode by which one arrives at it, we might employ a kind of double-belief,20 a 
position in which we both know the falsity of this distinction and acknowledge the ways in which it 
is made real in the world. Questions of mode entail thinking about how information is received or 
put into the world, and the difference between how answers to questions are permitted to be arrived 
at in science or philosophy as opposed to how they are permitted to emerge in poetry is pertinent to 
the question of approach. If we are to understand 'method' as it is generally used in the humanities as 
a pseudo-scientiflc way of engaging with texts and others from a disengaged and distant standpoint. 
then the flgure for that engagement continues to be, as it is in the scientiflc tradition of empiricism. 
the flgure of sight (observable, vermable phenomena enter into the ranks of what is knOWn). 
~ p p r o a c h : : by contrast, cannot depend solely on tropes of vision. It cannot depend solely on sight. 
individualism, and cognition, which are "associated with the subject/object distinction, with 
thinking in terms of subject and object", 21 because it is to some extent involved in a being-with that 
includes the 'object of s t u d y ~ ~ where observation loses its connotations of unilateral affect. An 
approach that represses neither its poetics nor its tendency (which still may not disappear) to 
separate itself from and to observe its subject has to take subjectivity into account, and rely also on 
"knowledge gleaned precisely by feeling or sensing-.22 1hat is to say, because the barriers erected by 
empiricism do not hold exclusively once a relationship with the text or the other is undertaken. it 
becomes necessary to " [ study] what one has experienced oneself and [value] it, or [value] the 
subjective side of one's interactions with the object studied·2J and to reject the notion that to think 
or study well the "individual has to be severed from affective connections with the surrounding 
environment and others in it".24 
19 Brennan. 19. 
20 I'm indebted to W. J. T. Mitchell for the idea of double-belief. on which the last section of this chapter focwes. 
21 Brennan. 19. 
22 Brennan. 23. 
23 Brennan. 19. 
24 Brennan. 19. 
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1he tradition of empiricism is not entirely suited for use as a figure in a discussion of philosophy. 
however. Philosophy. after all, is about wisdom. not just fact-and so cannot be verified in the way 
that empiricism demands. Moreover. the uses and expressions of both scientific and philosophical 
knowledges have different uses and positions in the academy and in public life. The pairing in this 
chapter of the two has a dual rationale: first. to show the ways in which the modern Western 
tradition of philosophy is rooted in an understanding of its practices as to some extent figuratively 
scientific; and second, to demonstrate the already understood dynamic in which a weaker or 
faninised discourse will take on attributes of a stronger or masculinised one in order to claim some 
kind of authority. And so, to return to the beginning of this section with a reminder that there are in 
&ct two binaries being examined and brought forward in this chapter: not only poetry/science. but 
also philosophy/love. Where science represses its poetics (as well. literally, as its recourse to the word 
'love' and amorous figuration) in order to maintain a distance from the world it observes 'objectively'. 
philosophy maintains its authority by repressing its roots in love. This repression in philosophy 
mirrors and to some extent imitates the repression of poetics in science; as discussed above. 
philosophy as a 'soft' science resorts to the language and figures of 'harder' empirical sciences in order 
to give credence to its positions and concerns. Given that language is not a neutral medium, and that 
certain discourses therefore are either centralised or othered by result of their relation to the mastery 
oflanguage, there can be understood to be a hierarchy or structure ofless dominant/more dominant 
language such as that proposed by the poststructuralist theoretical feminists who wrote what is now 
widely called tcriture fbninine who opposed "women's bodily experience [ ... ] to the phallic/symbolic 
patterns embedded in Western thought-.2S Likewise, given that it is the dominant position in a 
discourse that confers authority (i.e. which centralises an utterance or a position), non-dominant 
discourses that see this will tend to adopt the attitudes. styles, or lexica of dominant ones as one way 
of gaining mastery. A famous example is Northrup Frye's "Polemical Introduction-to his Anatomy of 
Crilidsm. which argues for "naturalistic and scientific analogies of criticism-26 and literature. Despite 
contemporary discrediting of work like Frye's. the struggle for mastery of discourse serves to explain 
the adoption by philosophical. theoretical. or other 'soft' disciplines of terminology with its roots in 
the empiricism and authority of the 'hard' sciences. 
Where the occurrence of the 'scientific' term 'method' even in humanities work explicitly identifies 
the two, Luce Irigaray's examination of the withering of love in philosophy demonstrates that even 
2Sjona. Ann Rosalind. ·Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding ofl'hcriture Feminine". in The New Feminist Criticism: 
Esuys on Women, Literature and Theory. cd. Elaine Showalter (London: Pantheon. 1985). p. 366 .. 
26 Mitdld1. W.J. T. Whlll Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves oflmAgts. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010). p. 
81. 
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without such identification the softer root of the discipline is neglected. even forgotten. The word 
'philosophy', divisible into two morphemes of equal length denoting 'love' and 'wisdom: now implies 
primarily the latter-a search for wisdom which ignores its roots outside the domain of the rational. 
'What happens when love disappears from a discourse, when philosophy forgets its roots in the 
wisdom to be had in loving, which in Irigaray's terminology is to speak (also) through making art. 
making music, sensing with all the parts of the body that can create meaning? Ironically, without the 
repression of love from philosophical discourse, the place for rethinking philosophy and theory via 
love that this dissertation occupies would not exist. 
One result of repression is the emergence around the margins of the repressed thing. In the tenns by 
which post-structuralism approaches the world. it is necessary to take into account the instability of 
binaries previously taken as absolute. By this approach, what is central can be called into question, 
making room for the marginalised (which in tum may become authorised. further expc1ling 
something else to its margin). Without the repression oflove in philosophy (or poetry in science), 
love could not be part of the approach that this dissertation proposes as a complement to other 
approaches to wisdom and to being-together. Likewise, it is from the site of a philosophy which has 
effaced or overlooks love that Irigaray and other post-structuralist theoretical feminists can begin not 
only to name that effacement, but to theorise new ways of being-together, in language which • does 
not contain, it carries; it does not hold back, it makes possible".27 1hese writers' work will appear in a 
more central role in Chapter 3, but they are introduced here because Irigaray explicitly takes on the 
invisibility of 'philos' in philosophy, and. in so doing, prepares the way for the approach this 
dissertation proposes. 
It is the repression of love, its invisibility in philosophical practice and discourse, which is the force 
behind Irigaray's assertion in The Way of Love that philosophy has forgotten love, and. in so dOing, 
has cut itself off from the specific wisdoms that are made possible through love. First of all, to gloss 
' l o v e ~ ~ or to give nuance to its use, both in Irigaray and in this section: the word here does not only 
refer to deep affection or a romantic or sexual attachment. As the neglected half of philosophy, 'love' 
as a term is defined in relation to philosophy's connotations of rationality. 'Love', then, represents the 
presence and input and knowledge of the body, not only the rational mind. It represents a gesture 
towards a "language that is more communicative and less subjected to information",28 that is, a 
language which is not about mastering the other or overpowering the listener. Love as a way of being 
27 Cixous. H C 1 ~ n c . . -Thc Laugh of thc Medusa-. (Signs Vol. 1. No.4. Summcr 1976) p. 889. 
28 lrigaray. 2002: 42. 
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it c. matter of being attentive to what is proper to the other without wanting to appropriate i t ' ' , 2 ~ ~ or, 
in other words, a matter of letting "beings be, [understanding] them as independent of the 
pen:eption that discovers and grasps them-.30 The loss oflove (i.e. consideration for the other as 
other. and communication and knowledge that comes from the body and its 'irrational' senses, not 
oalyvia the mind) in philosophy means a devaluing of those kinds of knowledge and of that kind of 
consideration. Philosophy without love becomes "formal knowledge [ ... J reduced to a mental 
ererdse. passed on from a master to disciples, of use in populating universities and in having 
discussions among the uninitiated but without the impact on our lives that a wisdom presupposes"31 
because it pretends or assumes a divide between experience thought by a mind removed from other 
beings and the physical world and experience thought by an (irrational) body. 
In the place of information, Irigaray proposes "an artistic, musical, touchful way of speaking or saying 
and of listening able to be perceived in a written text [ ... ] not reduced to a simple assistance for 
remembering meaning or to some code to be respected-.32 That philosophy without love is to be 
teplaced by a way of speaking that incorporates not only the mind but also the voice, the senses, and 
the body implies that philosophy leaves those things out in the flrst place. Irigaray's inclusion of the 
voice/body/senses in her renewal of philosophy is a turn towards 'whole body' thinking, and shows 
. that philosophy does not take account of all the ways in which thought is created. Therefore, loveless 
. philosophy is an incomplete view of the world and has no claim on the objectivity 'philosophy' 
avows-it either tms no notice of or deliberately turns a blind eye to the fact that objectivity is 
.implya subjectivity which ignores the subject's role in its creation. A philosophy that did not repress 
its roots in love would be able to gather information through all of its channels, aD of which would 
be wlid and valuable. It would, in other words, be "objective-that is, fair, honest and methodical-
about the whole range of the subjective ... the whole range where subjective experience affects 
objective facts .33 
But it is not that science absolutely represses its poetics; not that philosophy completely forgets its 
roots in love. Few scientists or theorists would probably renounce either in absolute terms; as Paul 
Feryerabend writes, "there are many ways of ordering the world around us [ ... J the hated constraints 
29 Iripzay, 2002: 37. 
30 u.tnM, 1998: 6. 
31 lrIpray. 2002: 3. 
32 lrIpray, 2002: XL 
33 Midpy, 172-73. her emphasis. 
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of one set of standards may be broken by freely accepting standards of a different kind-.l4 And 
certainly within the specific academic contexts of this dissertation (humanities departments, English 
departments, comparative literature departments) there are people who affirm the relationships 
between science and poetry, phUosophy and love, thinking and feeling. However, in practice, in the 
context within which this dissertation is written, the separation between thinking and feeling is a 
matter of daily, if seemingly inconsequential, filet. The very fact that dissertations (expressions of 
authority-in-training) in these fields adopt as though natural jargon linking their practice to a 
scientific one, rather than a creative one (we typically use methods rather than develop or perform a 
practice) places authority with language that expresses facticity, objectivity. Consider the actual 
discrepancy, no matter how often wished or pretended away, that exists between practitioners of 
creative writing and their scholarly counterparts in English departments.3s For one example, in the 
literature for the 2008 RAE (Research Excellence Exercise; the device by which academic 
departments in the UK are evaluated for the quality of their research), while 'creative writing is 
included on relatively equal footing with other forms of ·output- (specifically, '"Books, including 
scholarly editions and translations [ .. ,] edited collections of archival and other similar material.. and 
creative writing-36), it is the only category for which a supplementary text must be produced til 
specific terms. This text, ·a factual statement of no more than 200 words- should outline the faculty 
member's "research contribution in terms of the key criteria of originality, significance and rigour-, 
The guidelines conclude with the warning that the ·sub-panel will disregard unsubstantiated 
assertions or opinions on the quality of research-,37 Translations, the only other "output8 with a 
caveat, require only "a succinct description of how the output meets the RAE definition of 
34 Feyerabend, Paul. Against Methoa' (London: Verso, 1993), p. 162. 
35 Obviously, the very distinction between 'scholarly' writing and 'creative' writing begs a deconstruction: understanding or 
taking part in either makes it clear that both do complementary, and sometimes overlapping. work. But the fact remains that 
in practice these two kinds of cultural production are not regarded in the same way within the academic Gdd. If they Were. 
assertions such as Ron Mcfarland's that though -regardea' with jauna'icea' eye by some traditionalists in English departments, 
the poets and authors who teach creative writing have in the past ten or twenty years won general though sometimes ~ , ,
acceptance- (-An Apologia for Creative Writing·, 29; my emphasis), or Michad Mdrvin's that, in an -unscientiGc poll of 
colleagues around the country who teach contemporary American literature was not very surprising. although certainly 
disheartening. Many admit that they do not teach poetry at all· ("Why Contemporary Poetry Is Not Taught in the 
Academy·, 89), would not need to be made. For further buttressing of the different value placed on 'scholarly' work to the 
detriment of' creative' work. see Hutner et aI, -The Situation of American Writing. 1999-. 
However, deGnitions of advanced 'creative' writing which lean on "the writer's personal resources of memory, emotion and 
passion [ ... ] [his or her] subconscious urges· and locate the 'creative' writer's energy as coming -from the aquifers of the self" 
(Lancaster University Department of English and Creative Writing. 'Framework for PhD Supervision in Creative Writing'; 
httJ.:lIwww.lancs.ac.uklfasslprojects/pammon/crewlphdcrewframework.htm. accessed 11 August 2011) , with 
their inward focus and lack of explicit understanding of the process of'crcative' writing as an inteosc, involved, and 5Crious 
approach to the world not far removed from the practice of , scholarly' writing. do as much to perpetuate divisions in actuaL 
academic fact as any theoretical or actual repression of poetry from science and love from philosophy. 
36 M57-1, p. 3, §16.b. 
37 M57 -I. p. 84, §22. 
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raearch-.38 Although both translations and 'creative' work require extra support in order to flll the 
h:quircmcnt for knowledge-production, only 'creative writing requires an explicitly "factual" 
statement, its authorisation as 'excellent' depending on justification in terms that resound with the 
similarly' factual' other kinds of writing ("scholarly editions", etc.). This 'double belief', whereby the 
field both affirms and negates the equal value of modes of perception, of kinds of knowledge, and of 
means of production of that knowledge, is a characteristic of a philosophy which represses love, or a 
science that represses poetry: since these binaries are in effect false, the impulse for both will float to 
the sur&ce over and over. So why not an approach that acknowledges both? 
c. For example: W. J. T. Mitchell and What Do Pictures Want? 
'Ibis section explores the possibilities of developing an approach to texts via an approach to paintings 
proposed by the art, media, and literary theorist W. J. T. Mitchell in his book What Do Pictures 
W.tf The Lives and Loves of Images. Mitchell proposes a rethinking of the ways in which we 
. consider the objects around us, and in particular those object he calls 'pictures' -an appellation he 
mends to things far beyond paintings, photographs, and films, to include such things as the World 
. Trade Center towers. Mitchell's methodology has at its heart an acknowledgement of the otherness 
inherent in objects, and a desire to address those objects in terms of their otherness in such a way as 
• to a1low them to 'speak'. In thinking of a way to allow objects to speak, Mitchell does accede to the 
potential such an approach holds for problematic relationships with objects (such as idolatry) but 
proposes that in fact our 'double consciousness' already holds images and object sacred-and that 
what he calls a' critical iconoclasm' would allow us to recognise the importance of images as well as to 
, think about what they mean, do, and want. 
I adopt and adapt Mitchell's approach in the spirit of Bill Brown's statement that "history can 
. unabashedly begin with things and with the senses by which we apprehend them"39 in order to provide 
a base for the approach I will make to texts in the rest of this dissertation. Mitchell's 'delicate critical 
method' and Brown's unabashed centralising of objects and the senses we use to apprehend them 
work together with Teresa Brennan's ideas of living attention and Roland Barthes' understanding of 
tcItS as signifying practices throughout this project and the development or constellation of a 
delicate and loving approach to texts and others. 
38 MS7-1, p. 83 §20. 
39 Blown. Bill -Thing Theory-. Criticlll Inquiry 28. 1 (Fall 200 1). p. 2; my emphasis. 
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Briefly, this section examines Mitchell's approach and its components (pictures, desire), and expands 
on that approach in preparation for the chapters that will follow this one. 
C. 1: Objects that desire 
"The conversation in cultural studies has turned, in recent years, toward material 
culture. objecthood. and physical things [ ... ]the more closely we look at both 
Romanticism and the physical world. the more difficult it becomes to sustain [the 
illusion of the physical as "an escape from old-fashioned 'Romantic idealism'·]. The 
physical is a thoroughly metaphysical concept; [ ... ] objects only make sense in 
relation to thinking, speaking subjects [ ... ]. The slogan for our times. then, is not 
'things fall apan'. but 'things come alive'-.40 
"These days. history can unabashedly begin with things and with the senses by 
which we apprehend them-.4) 
Recent movements in cultural and critical production42 have centred themselves on the subject-and 
not only the human subject, but the posthuman subject, the non-human subject, and the 
consideration of objects as subjects or quasi-subjects, not to mention considerations of the structures 
(social, psychological) that subjects create. Bill Brown's statement that history can now begin 
"unabashedly" with objects and with our senses could serve as a manifesto for this movement away 
from the historically bounded subject43• That scholarship can now 'unabashedly' make history thar 
looks at the objects that surround us via the many senses by which we perceive them offers the 
possibility of liberation from the kind of history-making which would have dealt with those things 
only bashfully, if at all. Out of the closet, as it were, and unabashed about integrating the kinds of 
information offered to us by our sense and by the objects which surround us and with which we have 
relationships. this scholarship is in a position to make a kind of history which takes into account 
much more than a single. linear story (although perhaps it loses the stability and reassurance that 
such a story creates). What Do Pictures ~ n t ? - t h e e question itself, as well as the book which is so 
titled-offers a new mode for making (art) theory with the 'objects' of that theory in mind. 
As in W. J. T. Mitchell's argument. the consideration of things as somehow 'alive' or 'living' is tied to 
an understanding of relation between 'objects' and subjects. When the question "What do pictuta 
40 Mitchell, W.}. T. What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images. (New York: University Of Chicago Press, 20(6). 
pp. 170-172. 
41 Brown,2. 
42 The scope of my survey here is discourses from the last 30 years of the 20th century and from the beginning of this one. 
especially discourses that have come out of postcolonial studies or feminist studies and that have focused on a rethinking of 
what. how, and who a subject is. 
43 A more complete discussion of this subject (whose taXonomy I borrow from Brennan) follows later. 
want?- is broached, any consideration of the subject and the object must also take into consideration 
the question of their relation. This consideration includes how relation happens, how it is, and what 
it means for the way we understand subjectivity and objectivity. I f objects such as pictures really 
·only make sense in relation to thinking, speaking subjects",44 they are implicated in our discourse, 
which could not happen without them. Within a system that takes the relationality of objects as a 
serious question, objects such as pictures can be thought of in terms that make them "not merely 
sips for living things, but signs as living things".45 Thinking relation when thinking about our 
relation to thingr means thinking bidirectionally, conceiving a relation where things, too, can 
transmit affect-not just humans, the traditional makers (and masters) of things46-and where that 
afFect acts as a sort of guarantee or proof of the relation, and relation as a proof of the subject-like-
ness of the object. 
Befure I undertake a more detailed exploration of Mitchell's concepts of relation as it applies to 
pictures and the people who look at them, I would like to outline briefly some origins of this idea in 
the phUosophy of the 20th century. The question of the subject in the world of objects can of course 
be traced much further than any recent concern; Heideggerian Dasein is fundamentally a question of 
how the subject is in the world, an idea that necessitates relational thinking. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception laid out (in 1945) the idea that there might be a sort of 
conversation between ourselves and our things, writing that "our senses question things, and things 
reply to them".47 Though Merleau-Ponty has been criticised48 for the way his phenomenology 
initially preserved a subject-centred ontology and thereby an idea of inherent division or hierarchy 
between the perceiver and the perceived, his later work develops the idea of all things as one chair, or 
flesh. of the world,49 thereby proposing a transformation of the relation between a subject and a 
perceived object into a fluctuating space of relation where perception is a shifting, shimmering 
connection between and among things. The study of culture in terms of its material aspects which 
emerged in the 19805 and was further developed by work such as Thomas Schlereth's Cultural 
Jljstory and Material Culture (1991) is another locus of the consideration of the relation between 
.. MIrcbc1I. 171. 
fS Mircbdl.6. 
46 Akhough I will not discuss this point in detail. I want to clarify my nomination of humans as the 'traditional' makers of 
cbiqa hen: because in the consideration of things as potentially relational and affective. it might be worth acknowledging 
.. t:hcre are makers of things which are exclusively non-living (computers constructing their own scripts; automated 
cImca in factories). 
f1 w.Jcau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge Classics. 2002). p. 319 . 
.. Sec for example the conclusion of Monica Langer's Merkau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' (New York: Macmillian, 
.989). Merleau-Ponty himself criticises this in The Vuible and the Invisible (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1968). 
49 ... idea of a unity in one flesh is, of course. not a new one in Western thought. being as it is one cornerstone of Christian 
daouabt. 
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subjects and objects as they have traditionally been conceived, as well as of how objects might be 
subject-like; that is, how things might act on us, manifest their desires, or speak. In the last ten years 
or so, a number of new works that consider the (inter)relation between subjects and objects. or the 
lives of objects themselves, have been published.50 
If architecture can have (a) sex or have a life,sl be raped or killed or tell stories; and if pictures can 
want; and if melancholy can be made manifest by objects and pictures can make us cry; can we not 
lOgically extend the possibility of desire to the objects we call texts? This question is operational at 
this point because, of course, this dissertation considers texts and is active in a field that considers 
them. The answer the dissertation gives is obviously affirmative, but not only tautolOgically SO (the 
answer is not yes because the answer is yes): the dissertation extends the possibUity of desire and 
agency to texts as others in contiguity with other practitioners of textual study, and in order to Illove 
toward an approach to texts which takes their otherness and the possibility of their agency/desire 
seriously. The end result of this would be a practice which actively challenges the boundary between 
the subject (capable of feeling, acting) and object (incapable of such) and thereby extends to the 
'object' the possibility of relation and agency. 
Extending the possibility of desire to texts does not collapse the differences between texts and other 
objects, but provides a possible model for thinking about texts on their own terms, as acting on their 
readers, as desiring. as speaking. As such, this model does pose the questions 'What is a text?' and 
'How are texts?' As a category among the many categories of things humans create, verbal. literary 
texts are in some ways the most homely and intimate: the written word is a picture of the things we 
say, the vibrations our bodies make into and receive as sound. But text is also strange. unf.unUiar. and 
50 James Elkins' Pictures and Tears (New York: Routledge. 2004) is an extended study of affect and painting, in which Works of 
art 'make' their viewers cry (see Chapter 6 of this dissertation for more). Peter Schwenger examines the mdancholy we 
attribute to objects in The Tears oj Things: Melancholy and Physical Objects (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006); however. his thesis is not that objects fecI. but that we imbue them with a mdancholy that comes &om our awareness 
of an absence at the core of objecthood. Neverthdess he presents this thesis is in terms that do place things in the 
(grammatical) category of 'subject' as well as attribute to those things qualities of feding, like mdancholy. that complClllent 
Mitchell's idea of a picture's desire as its 'lack' (Mitchell, 25). Indeed, for Mitchell, images' -main function is to awaken desire 
[ ... ] to provoke a sense of lack and craving by giving us the apparent presence of something and taking it away in the same 
gesture" (80). 
Things that TaDe: Object Lessons from.Art and Science (cd. Lorraine Daston; New York: Zone Books, 2007) is a collcction 
of essays exploring the ways the objects 'speak'. And it is not only 'things'-general which speak to or act on their hUInan 
counterparts; nor are studies of such rdationship confined to the general. In the essay -Battle Lines: EI027". in The Sex oj 
Architecture (Agrest. Conway. and Weisman. editors. New York: Henry N. Abrams, 1996), Beatriz Colomina presents the 
anecdote of the architect Le Corbusier making murals on the walls of Ellen Gray's house. -killing architecture" in ordcr to 
-[pursue] another task. that of telling storics· (174). Mitchell himsdf discusses the anthropomorphisation of architecture' 
terms of the -analogy between the living human body and the building·. In the story Colomina tells, Gray's house stand ~ ~
_ .. Sin 
for her own body; she compares the desecration of her house to a rape . 
51 Mitchell. 14. 
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uncontrollable: slippery. unfixable. It is texts in this slippery state that are at their liveliest. that seem 
most "'vital .. -turned into things that are "not merely signs for living things. but signs as living 
things'".52 Texts. in their unwillingness or incapacity to be pinned to a single way of being. present us. 
their readers. with a demand to be read for how they are and what they want. When Mitchell lays out 
his argument as to what pictures want in the beginning of the book What Do Pictures Want? The 
lives and loves of images. he writes that "'the tropes of vitality and desire we apply to visual works of art 
are transferred and transferable to the domain of textuality. That doesn't mean they are transferrable 
without modification or translation". 53 The fact that 'how and what a picture is' is not the same as 
'how and what a text is' precipitates the question: what are texts? More importandy. how are they? 
What are the qualities of a text? What are its ways of being? In order to answer these questions with 
reference to Mitchell's argument. we first need an understanding of how (and. to some degree. what) 
pictures are. what Mitchell thinks they want, and what we can understand by the word 'want'. 
c. 2: What are pictures? 
Mitchell divides pictures into two parts: the support, or physical being of the picture (the materials 
from which it was made. the sum of its physical parts. what we can see and touch; what can be hung 
on the wall). and the image. which "'can be lifted off the picture. transferred to another medium" and 
"'escapes the materiality of the picture when it is copied".S4 For Mitchell. the "concreteness of the 
artwork· and the "'immateriality of the image· make up a "'dialectical relationship without which 
neither art history nor iconology would be possible·;ss he identifies this immateriality as "the 
fundamental ontology ofimages".56 
A picture's material qualities point to its physical origins: cadmium red paint on French canvas is an 
index of geography. geology. economics. chemistry. optics. And that physicality is specifying. fixing. 
A pigment can only be made of the elements which compose it; linen is only made from flax. which. 
depending on where the painting on it was painted (and when), could only have come from a few 
small regions in Europe; tempera is only made from egg; bronze is only ever an alloy of copper and 
tin. though the exact amounts vary. Although recognising the materiality of a picture limits it (an oil 
52 Mitchell,6. 
53 Mitchell. 55. 
54 Mitchell. 85. 
55 Although this dissertation will not engage with Heidegger in depth. there arc obviously important rdations between his 
work and Mitchell's. 
56 Mitchell. 97. 
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painting cannot be a watercolour), that recognition also puts the pictUre into relation with its 
elements, and with their production, and thereby with a whole history that is not overtly present in 
the pictUre but to which the materials make reference. Like humans themselves, pictures an: not 
"separate entities detached from the natural world",57 and, like humans, it is in part the material 
systems by which pictures are constituted that indicate their relation to that world. 
An image's immateriality, in contrast to the fixative power of its material support, means that it is 
moveable and even fragmentary, that any single representation is incomplete or points to other 
representations. While the material properties of a pictUre fix it in relation to the physical conditions 
of its production, the immaterial qualities of an image put it in a relation in the potential sense, 
freeing the image to be copied, moved from medium to medium, adapted, translated. The 
immateriality of images illustrates their transferability in very clear ways: we can see how the itnage 
of the Madonna moves from its earliest representations, through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, 
and up to present-day representations like Chris Ofili's The Holy Virgin Mary (1995). 1hat the 
image is fluid means that it can occur over and over. And its recurrence calls for an understanding of 
image that takes relationality into consideration. 58 
Both the materiality of the support and the immateriality of images foreground the way that pictures 
are, and both prescribe a way of understanding pictUres implied by Mitchell's thesis. A picture that 
can 'want' is a pictUre whose desires can be fulfilled (or can go unfulfilled). If pictUres' desires can be 
fulfilled (or be neglected), then there must be someone who can fu.lfll (or ignore) them. If there is 
someone to fu.lfll pictures' desires, then there must be some relation between that someone and 
pictures. Materially, pictures are made by people 59 (relation: maker-made) and made to be seen 
(relation: seer-seen); their material production and existence is one which is always already in 
relation. The immateriality of images, their slipperiness, puts them in a constantly shifting relation to 
other images-which exist in the personal or social imagination. I f pictUres are, by grace of both 
their material and immaterial properties, construed as always already in relation (or, in Mitchell's 
words, as things that are "always already addressing US"60), it is because these properties are part of the 
57 Midglcy.192.193. 
58 A useful analogy for the ways the images arc. immaterially. and pictures arc, materially. might be to compare the latter to the 
·Saussurian perspective· in which ·speech ~ ~ above ~ ~ ~ a t t ~ ~ emitted. ~ ~ ~ from language ( ~ d d c o n s t i t u t i n ~ ~ it in return). 
and the former to the idea of language as the totallzmg [SIC] abstraction of the messages ~ M 1 t t e d d and rtceJved" (Barthes, 
Roland. MRhetoric of the Image" in The Responsibility of Forms. Trans. Howard. (New York: Hill and Wang. 1985) p. 36). 
59 Or. sometimes. animals. as in 'Jimmy'. the chimpanzee in a Rio de Janeiro zoo. who paints. 
60 Mitchell. 49. £n. 
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·social Add of the visual, the everyday processes oflooking at others and being looked at".61 As part 
of this social neld, images are co-constitutive with our social reality, and their constitution is 
fundamentally relational. In their materiality, pictures exist as things that begin by being made by 
people, a relationship that begins with touch and extends into a wider network of relations, 
including the relation of a picture as an object that is seen, an object in a commodity system with 
other pictures, other commodities, and the humans who buy them. The material life of images points 
to a system in which pictures participate, which is ever more particular and expansive-for instance, 
the progression from picture to paint; to pigment and suspender; to workshop and workers; to the 
mine, animal, or plant from which elements are harvested-but in which the picture is not what 
grows, but the system around it. In their immateriality, on the other hand, images indicate and 
present themselves as part of a 'text' that is perpetually in the process of its own creation, a web of 
references, repetition, and re-representation. The image is added to, complicated by, its other 
representations-its lineage and descendants, if you want. The statement that the way images 
perpetuate and propagate themselves is also a proof of their relational nature may be tautological-
images are related, and so they are related-but it is also true. And, just as knowing that someone 
grew up in the same house as their father can clarify aspects of their personality once you know their 
father, an awareness of the transference of images from medium to medium can tell us things not 
only about each image or picture but also about the way their relation plays out. 
The material and immaterial qualities of images put them in relation to the humans who make and 
look at them. Mitchell asserts that the "life of images is not a private or individual matter" ,62 and if it 
is not, then certainly this must be because the life of images is one which has its vitality in human 
imagination. It is we who transfer story to canvas to photograph; it is via human design that images 
receive their power. The idea that is an image is transferred from mouth to ear, from hand to eye. An 
image would not live alone because the life ofimages is in their life among people. 
If for no other reason, pictures and images are neither private nor individual because they are seen. 
The basic premise of a pictorial image is its visibility, and inherent in the idea of visibility is the 
presence of a seeing other. If we can understand relation in its most basic sense as what happens 
when things are together, then vision, even disinterested vision, is a relationship that happens 




on the etymology of 'species' and 'specular' several times63-and categorisation is a way of arranging 
things in terms of their relation. That beings 'look like' other beings (i.e. have a specular relation) is a 
function of genetics in living things. In the lives of images, Mitchell finds an analogous function: 
images' propagation (movement across supports, time) as an indication of their relationality 41UI of 
their 'liveliness'.64 He also acknowledges that the "idea of images as living species is a very disturbing 
one for art historians, not to mention ordinary people" anxious about "the way human creations take 
on 'lives of their own'''.65 
Consider the image as a specular object. Its specularity pins it as an object to be acted on and viewed; 
its 'species-ness' disorders that fixity. The former is about maintaining control of an image; the latter 
is about allowing that such a thing is impossible. To be in relation with an image is to help construct 
it, but not to construct it completely. This relation requires the understanding that images are -ways 
of world making, not just world mirroring";66 images and their viewers make something together. 
The creativity that is part of interactions with images, which calls us to see them as they are (in 
Heidegger's words, to accept an image "in its own constancy"67) and to ask them what they want 
predicates the development of "a delicate critical practice that [strikes] images with just enough force 
to make them resonate, not enough to smash them", 68 or, in other words, an approach that values 
'letting beings be'.69 
The 'delicate critical practice' of looking at images that Mitchell proposes, and to which Teresa 
Brennan's concept of discernment seems so readily allied, is not one to which assumption is SUited. 
any more than it is suited to the practice of interaction with other humans. It takes seriously the idea 
that "what pictures want, in the last instance, is simply to be asked what they want"70 and aims -to 
undermine the ready-made template for interpretive mastery [ ... ] to put our relation to the work in 
question, to make the relationality of image and beholder the field ofinvestigation".71 What this idea 
means for the critical practice of looking at things is that the looker is not exempt or removed from 
the equation, and that the effects things have on us cannot be discounted; it means that the 'we' who 
create, who move, and who mean may be a larger 'we' than 'we human beings'. It also means that 'wc' 
63 Mitchell. 13. 86. 92.136. 325 [ ... ] 
64 Mitchell. 88-89. 
65 Mitchell. 89. 
66 Mitchell. xiv. 
67 Heideggcr. Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York: Perennial Classics. 2001). p. 26. 
68 Mitchell. 9. 
69 Levinas. 1998: 6. 
70 Mitchell. 48. 
71 Mitchell. 49. 
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who create meaning by looking at objects do not make that meaning alone. 
When the relation between the work and the beholder is foregrounded, iconoclasm (the 'smashing' of 
images) can be seen as just one way of expressing that relation, rather than the necessary function of 
the critic. Mitchell uses the term 'critical idolatry' to describe the part of this practice that 
foregrounds our relation to images and that recognises iconoclasm as "itself an act of creative 
destruction for which we must take responsibility".n Mitchell's critical idolatry-and critical 
iconoclasm-recognise that at the centre of each the question of how pictures {or others} act on us is 
at stake. Both iconoclasm and idolatry can be seen as relational practices rather than unidirectional 
or necessary responses to pictures. Posing the question 'what do pictures want?', although not 
necessarily idolatrous, does "seem to be the kind of question that an idolater would ask"73 because of 
the vitality it imparts to pictures. The 'critical' part of this critical idolatry is the part of our "double 
consciousness"?4 whereby we both believe and do not believe in the ('magical') life of images. This 
'life: whether we think we believe it or not, is evidenced by "the passion with which we seek to 
destroy or kill" images.7s Seeing pictures and things in terms of their relation to us (and ours to 
them) opens the fleld for other approaches than the binary of iconoclasm and veneration. It forces 
the scholar to ask how she is implicated in her beliefs about images, and how she is responsible to 
them. 
C.3 What does it mean 'to want'? 
This section will briefly revisit a key concept in Mitchell's thesis: the question of 'wanting'. It will not 
explore a more general dennition or genealogy of the concept of desire, focussing instead on 
Mitchell's use of the word 'want' in order to understand his central question. 
'To want: in Mitchell's use, refers to the "claim [pictures] make upon us, and how we re to 
respond";76 it refers to what "they lAck, that they are inviting us to 6.ll in";n it refers to the desires we 
project on them and which are projected back at us, "making demands upon us, seducing us to feel 
72 Mitchell, 26. 
73 Mitchell. 25. 
74 Mitchell, 11. 
7S Mitchell. 93. 
76 Mitchell. xv. 
77 Mitchell. 25. 
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and act in specific ways".78 About pictUres, Mitchell writes that ultimately what they want is 
"mastery", their "power manifested by lack, not possession''.'9 The desire Mitchell identifies in 
pictUres is located in their lack, tying the two words together in the signifier 'want'. 
Both desire and lack indicate a deficiency or non-presence; the latter frames that absence in terms of 
impotence and the former in terms of potential presence. If images-and things-act on us by their 
lack or their desire, and if their power is "manifested as lack, not possession", 80 then the question 
famously posed by Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak about the subaltern becomes all the more obviously 
appropriate. If things as others are telling us what they want, they are also telling us about how we 
could and do relate to them and to their desires. Letting things 'speak' for themselves attunes the 
critical reader (listener, viewer) to the places where lack occurs and what desires that lack projects. 
The 'delicate critical practice' that Mitchell proposes hinges on a recognition of what pictUres want, 
and therefore on what they might lack; instead of placing things under an interrogating light, it 
positions them as subalterns-others-and asks them to speak. As such, the pictUre or thing as 
subaltern can make an appeal or issue a demand "whose precise effect and power emerges in an 
intersubjective encounter compounded of signs of positive desire and traces oflack or impotence-.81 
CA What do pictures want? 
The idea of drawing itself carries in one word two meanings, with opposite directional forces: 
drawing with a pencil, one pushes the pencil away from oneself along the paper; drawing something 
toward oneself (physically), or drawing a conclusion (figuratively), one pulls something. whether an 
object or an idea, nearer to onesel£ Drawing is thus both an approach and a distancing. something 
that can be held and something that escapes holding. It is also the sense of capturing something (as in 
on paper) or of opening something (as in drawing curtains either open to light, or closed, by 
loosening them). For Mitchell, drawing is the trace of the force of desire pulling in a picture.82 
Drawing is "figured by the 'bounding line'-the drawn line that leaps across a boundary at the same 
time that it defines it, producing a 'living form'''.83The pleasure in drawing is in its plenitude; it is 
78 Ibid. 
79 Mitchell. 35-36. 
80 Mitchell. 36. 
81 Mitchell. 39. 
82 Mitchell. 59. 
83 Mitchell. 61. The importance of bounding and unbounding is part of the question of exorbitance discussed by Jane Gallop in 
Anecdotal Theory (Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2002). as well as by Derrida in -AphOrism Countertime-
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Ddeuzian. "characterized by a joy founded in (but not disciplined by) ascesis" -or the dialectic of 
binding and unbinding. 84 Pictures' desires are informed by the qualities of drawing, which pushes us 
and pulls us, provides us with the illusion of presence and substitutes melancholy when that 
appearance proves otherwise. Pictures want "an idea of visuality adequate to their ontology".85 They 
want a seeing that fits in with how they are. 
Although he does not address pictures as such. Roland Barthes' statement that the text" demands to 
be rediscovered. 'restored'''B6 traces this same bounding line between what is known and what is yet 
unknown; the f.uniliar text still calls to be both rediscovered-made new, understood newly-and to 
be 'restored' in a return to how it was previously understood. The text or the picture, their 
production, and the production of understandings about them are part of "a signifying practice", an 
on-going 'productivity'87 that continuously indicates and crosses the lines that define its objects. For 
Barthes. the theory of the text is "a science ofbecoming'".88 Mitchell sees a similar practice in pictures 
or objects like Jeff Koons' The New series. which are treated "as specimens of a form of life, rather 
than 'lost objects' or 'part objects'·89 and thus force the viewer to redraw the categories into which 
these objects can fall. 'Pictures' like Koons' floor cleaners (which are not in fact 'pictures' at all but 
found objects in a Plexiglas vitrine) make it dear that objects are always objects in relation, while also 
both crossing and reinscribing the line that designates how 'pictures' (or 'art' more generally) are, as if 
"our virtual age were compelling us to start all over with the ontology of things".90 
Works like The New consider not only what art objects can be like, but how we can consider them-
how we think about what they are in relation to us, which also means how we understand what they 
want. The link between Mitchell and Barthes here is found in the idea of the theory of the text as 
something which is-becoming, which requires a continuous rediscovery of what it theorises. The text 
in continuous production requires rediscovery because its state indicates that it cannot be known 
simply by ways it may once have been understood91• Mitchell's central question, similarly. is 
(Acts of Liter4lurc. cd. Derek Attridge. (New York: Roudcdge.1992). pp. 414-433) and more indirectly in "Ulysses 
Gramophone· (1992; 253-309). Exorbitance. while though to different ends, is for both writers the quality of something in 
the work which keeps on crossing over whatever circumference has been set. 
84 Ibid. 
85 MitcheU,47. 
86 Barthes, Roland. -Theory of the Text· in Untying the Text. Roben Young. cd. (Boston: Roudedge & Kegan Paul. Ltd .• 1981). 
33. 
87 Barthes. 1981: 36. 
88 Ibid,45. 
89 Mitchell, 120. 
90 Mitchell. 153. 
91 Brennan identifies this with repression. which -involves firing something in place· (38). 
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concerned with the idea of an unfixed or continuowly redefining relation between ourscIves· and 
images, where we are able have an "encounter with the object as Other".92 This encounter Pl'Ofida 
the very basic answer to Mitchell's question, in fact-he asserts that "What pictures want, in the .. 
instance, then, is simply to be asked what they want".93 1he fact of relation (of observer to p i ~ ~ or 
of person to other person) is one in which the responsibility to ask 'what do you want' is embedded. 
But this question can only be asked from a position that takes on what Wendell Berry's editor 
Norman Wll'Zba calls "responsible thought", which "while not restricted to the local or regional. 
depends on the clarity and precision that comes from sustained attention to the particular".M .Asking 
a continuously changing other what it is they want means that we must ask continually IUIIlIfItt!IuJIS 
continually to the answer. Responsible thought is a "living attention", which "directs posiQw 
feelings toward the other by attending to the speciflcity of the other".96 For Teresa BrelU1all. both 
love and reason are "names for aspects of living attention" which is "the condition of reasoning and 
the embodiment of its connective ability".97 The responsible thought which Wirzba attributes to 
Berry's writing is not only a way of thinking, but an enactment of Mitchell's question and B ~ ' s s
living attention, an approach that makes the asking of questions like 'What do pictures 'Wantt' a 
central part of asking at all. The more clearly and precisely we sustain a particular attention, the 0l0ft: 
likely it is that we will begin to feel responsibility to the thing that has captivated us, whether that is a 
person, a book, or a painting. 
Sustained attention, living attention that is not based on projecting onto the other the qualities \ft 
do not desire in ourselves-this kind of attention allows for the employment of discerrunent. of 
"information from the body's divers systems [ ... J gleaned precisely by feeling or sensing",- which 
does not rely on separating the self from the other via the projection of negative affect. For MitcheU, 
asking what pictures want rather than what they mean or do goes against the ·usual way of sorting 
out" our cultural 'double consciousness' about images as 'living things, wherein, in a mOVe that 
exemplifies Brennan's definition of projection, we "attribute one side of it (generally the nain. 
magical, superstitious side) to someone else, and claim the hardheaded, critical, and skeptical ' 
92 Mitchell. 149. 
93 Mitchell. 48. 
94 Berry. Wendell. The Art of the Commonplace, ed. Norman Wirzba. (Berkdey: Counterpoint, 2002). p. 1. . 
95 It might be obvious. but again I want to point out the importance of the two m e a n i n ~ ~ of , attend' in this context-that it . 
mean both to wait for and to wait upon. The idea that to attend to something entails waiting for it fits in with Brennan' ~ ~
of living attention as a means ,of r e d r e ~ ! n g g the problems ~ a ~ d d by · p ~ o j e c t i n g g outside of o u ~ e s s unwa.'lted affects [ ... i ill. 
process commonly known as othering (12). A non-projective attention would be an attentlon that WlUted for the other . 
present itself, rather than one that jumped to a conclusion about what the other is. how to hdp it, what it wants, how it ~ ~
96 Brennan. 32. 
97 Brennan. 41. 
98 Brennan. 23. 
positions as [our] own". 99 Rather than severing us from "affective connections with the surrounding 
environment and others in it",I00 attention of the kind to which Wirzba, Brennan, and Mitchell 
allude returns the scholar to a connection with the circuits and currents that come to her from 
outside herself, and allows her to ask what these could mean, what desires they could indicate. 
C.5 A delicate method 
"It would be a delicate critical practice that struck images with just enough force 
to make them resonate, but not so much as to smash them".lol. 
"Feeling and sensing [arc] ruled out as methodological tools for studying the 
object [ ... ] because they constitute a connection with the object".102 
"The most hardened materialist would agree that ultimately all differences 
registered through chemical as well as electrical means are differences in the rate of 
pulsation or vibration, registered in the heart".lo3 
"[PhUosophy] is essentially about connections, so you cannot do it well if you 
insist on doing it in isolation". 104 
Mitchell poses his question about the 'lives and loves of images' in the context of a book that maps 
the denigration of pictures as "marked persons" and "as women".105 For Brennan, 'feminine beings' 
are "those who carry the negative affects for the other".I06 If pictures are similarly 'marked' by their 
blankness, their ability to receive projection, then they can live out our projections and become what 
we refuse to carry for ourselves. This creates a relationship that is at its base hierarchical, and it is this 
relationship that comes to the fore as vision attains an "objective status" in the 19th century,l07 
predicated by the philosophical 'birth' of the individual subject in the 17th century.108 The idea that 
"emotions such as sadness could circulate" 109 loses ground, and the bounded individual subject "has 
to be severed from affective connections" with what surrounds her.110 Thinking becomes objective, 
and, in this mode, to be objective is not "studying what one has experienced oneself and valuing it" 
(Brennan's definition of subjectivity) but to understand the objective as "in some way free from 
99 Mitchell. 7. 
100 Mitchell, 19. 
101 MitchcU, 9. 
102 Brennan. 19. 
103 Brennan, 96. 
104 Midgley, 199. 
105 Mitchell, 35. 
106 Brennan. 15. 
107 Brennan. 17. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Brennan. 16. 
11 0 Brennan. 19. 
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affcct".111 
This relationship is a product of "the split between thought and real feeling [ ... J of the same !Orca 
that bring you the subject/object distinction", a distinction which "deepens historically at the same 
time as the subject/object method captures the investigative high ground".1l2 In Mitchell's terms. a 
method that normalises thinking of pictures as things about which we ask "what does it mean- rather 
than "what does it want" follows from this split between the subject and the object, the creation of 
the bounded subject that Brennan identifies as "a culturally specific idea" by which -modem 
psychiatry presupposes a self-contained individual".l13 For Brennan, this individual is predicated by 
what she calls the ' foundational fantasy'. It is the foundational fantasy that" explains how it is that 1ft 
come to think of ourselves as separate from others";1l4 it is formed in the binary pairs of I .. 
goodlYou are bad and You are goodl! am bad.ll5 The most dangerous thing about such a fantasy is that 
it "will limit thinking unless it is actively resisted. It also limits practice";1l6 that is, to explain what 
seems self-evident, if a practice is signified 'bad' in whatever the language of its field ( ' u n p r o f c s s i o n a 1 ~ ~
'inappropriate', 'not done'), and if the field adheres to the binaries of the foundational fantasy, the 
possibilities inherent in practices which might contradict the 'best practices' of that field arc 
discounted without taking into account what they might have to offer as complementary approaches 
to the field. The limits that the foundational fantasy places on thinking explain in part why questions 
like "What do pictures want?" are unusual. The foundational fantasy is the place from which the 
assumption that the self is separate from the other originates; from this sense comes the primacy of 
sight-which separates the subject from the object-and the devaluation of" sensing and feeling-.ll? 
The foundational fantasy devalues this kind of understanding by the assumption that one's emotions 
are self-contained; it represses the very displacement or projection of negative affect by which it is 
produced and instead asserts the singularity of the subject. It gives rise to and participates in a system 
of thought that maintains the separateness of the individual and the impermeability of the boundary 
between one and others. 
As I have indicated. Brennan identifies a kind of thinking that from the Enlightenment onwards 
understands sight as scientific, empirical; by the 19th century, sight is objective. For Foucault, too. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Brennan. 23. 
113 Brennan. 25. 
114 Brennan. 14. 
115 Brennan. 13. 
116 Brennan. 14. 
117 Brennan. 19. 
sight is a Axative that comes into its own in the Victorian period. at the same time as an "interplay of 
prohibitions [ ... ] muteness. which. by dint of saying nothing, imposed silence".118 For Brennan, the 
importance of the primacy of sight is the power it is given to create divisions. Unlike other senses. 
sight is unidirectional. There is no penetration of one's own body when one looks at something. as 
there is when one hears something, tastes something, or smells something. There is no direct and 
physical. union of the body with something other than the body. as when one touches something. 
This union is avoided via projection of negative affect onto the other. including the "deadening or 
confining" idea of Axity.l19 Brennan identifles fixity not only with "the other's imprint" which 
·'makes' you feel connned"l20 but with any repression, which is produced by the self For "the 
bounded individuals of the modem West", 121 the discourse of sight is part of" an ordered system of 
knowledge·lll wherein what is seen is "Axed [ ... ] isolated and animated by [ ... ] attention".I23 In the 
system as it stands, this attention is a directed gaze. But for Brennan, the possibility of healing the 
subject lies in recovering the connection to the other and one's surroundings via other senses and via 
affect. Foucault is talking speciflcally about the possibility of subverting discourses around sexuality 
when he writes that discourse" also undermines and exposes [power]. renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it" .12.4 What Brennan proposes as a remedy to the bounded subject, and therefore 
to the subject/object split, depends on our f.uniliarity and comfort with those boundaries in order to 
foreground the "historical aberration"12S of such a subject, thus exposing it as constructed rather than 
natural. The hounded subject relies on the projection of negative affects in an "egoistic constellation" 
and seeks "knowledge as a means to control [ ... ] aligned with discipline imposed from without. or 
objectiflcation" .126 Recognising the transmission of affect means recognising what one projects onto 
the other. It provides the possibility to transform and "reorder aggression".l27 But this recognition 
"requires being in the world, rather than living the life of the mind [ ... ] subjecting oneself to eddies or 
even torrents of affect, while somehow maintaining equilibrium". The alternative to "the ego's status-
bound boundaries· is "an identity based on discemment".I28 Discernment is an "active yet receptive" 
118 Foucault. Michd. The History of Sexuality I: The WJl to Knowledge (London: Pdican Books. 1998). 17. Henceforth 
Foucault, 1986a. 
119 Brennan, 38. 
120 Ibid. 
111 Brennan. 15. 
111 Foucault. 1986a: 69. 
113 Foucault. 1986a: 45. 
114 Foucault. 1986a: 101. 
115 Brennan. 25. 
lU Brennan. 106. 
127 Brennan. 135. 
118 Brennan. 134. 
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state,129 related to the psychological concept of entrainment, or the transmission process by which 
people become alike (and, for Brennan, by which people "take up opposing positions in relation to a 
common affective thread" such as lover and belovedl30). Discernment cannot be based on the 
boundaries assumed to be present in the healthy' subject, because 
[some of] these boundaries arc formed by unconscious projection [ ... J Projecting is the opposite 
of discernment because projection directs affects outward without consciously (as a rule) 
acknowledging that it is doing so: discernment consciously examines them131• 
Projection as a means to create boundaries is "only one route to self-containment";132 Brennan 
proposes that codes of manners and courtesy, as well as religious and social moral codes constitute 
the affective boundaries of subject, while acknowledging that affect is transmitted and that tha 
transmission effects real changes in its receivers. (This is why, Brennan argues, we have moral codes 
that tell us not to 'blow up' at people-virtues like forbearance cut off the circuit of negative affi:ct.) 
When the subject is understood as unbounded or transmitting, discernment can take place. 
Recognising that affect flows between subjects means recognising that those subjects are not 
bounded as we might believe. I f the subject is in fact not bounded, then Sight, which can maintain 
separation between subjects, is no longer by necessity the only or primary way to understand the 
subject. Instead, all of the senses and all of the different kinds of sensory information can be used to 
construct understanding. 
Important to Brennan's theory is the understanding of the transmission of affect as a bodily and 
embodied process; affects are sensations, not just thoughts. Early theories of transmission, such as 
Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments, frame affective transmission as a kind of sympathy 
wherein one's emotions 'rise' in response to the thought of another's situation. In contrast to the 
physical transmission that Brennan posits, Smith's theory reaffirms the self-contained SUbject.,llS 
There is no physical (molecular) change as there is for Brennan; the passions we experience are our 
own-responsive, but not transmitted as in Brennan's understanding of transmission. Theories lik.c 
Smith's, founded on an understanding of the separateness of the subject, rely on what we see to 
change how we feel. Brennan's theory, however, in foregrounding the possibility of the transgreSSion 
of the body boundary (by pheromones, for example), demonstrates the way that the constitution of 
129 Brennan. 135. 
130 Brennan. 9. 
131 Brennan. II. 
132 Brennan. II. 
133 It makes sense that Smith writes this theory this way. because he is writing it just as sight, empiricism. and the self-contained 
subject begin to come into being (1759). 
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the subject is not an entirely self-contained and autogenic process. I f senses such as smell are 
penetrative, meaning that "a foreign body-something from without-can enter into one's own",'34 
and if, in order to develop an understanding of affect and the subject that extends beyond the 
boundaries as much thinking has them we must rely on these penetrative senses, then we have to also 
understand our selves as penetrable. I f we understand our selves this way, then how we understand 
others/the Other necessarily changes. And if we rely on senses other than vision (as well as vision) to 
tell US about the world around us, then "sensing and feeling"135 come into prominence, with an 
emphasis on the conjunction. 
Recalling-to begin to conclude this section-the history that "can unabashedly begin with things 
and with the senses by which we apprehend them".l36 In one line, Brown connects Brennan and 
Mitchell's work. The transmission of affect is a place from which a history concerned with sensing 
and feeling might begin; the question "What do pictures want?" is a way of beginning history with 
things themselves-not with projection or even perception, but with the thing (the other) asked 
about and speaking for itselE Reading Brennan and Mitchell together produces a discourse that 
values the intuition of a scholar who is working in detached but living attention to the objects 
around her. Asking the question "What do pictures want?" is a step away from the model of a 
separate, objective observer and toward a working method that acknowledges its own situatedness, 
rather than taking its position for grantedl37 The situatedness such an approach acknowledges is one 
which is always already in relation; it is "a profoundly social thing".l38 1he split between subject and 
object in Western thinking affects not only how we think of texts (or pictures, or one another), but 
what our philosophy then includes or ignores. In diagnosing the binaries that emerge from this split, 
this dissertation does not propose to render them defunct or even to address them in any 'complete' 
way; instead, beginning with the subject/object split and the binaries it engenders opens a space for 
an approach to thinking which includes love, feeling. and sensing with the body. 
What do the subject/object divide, the use of senses other than sight, and the idea of discernment 
134 Brennan,10. 
13S Braman, 19. 
136 Brown,2. 
137 1his isn't to say that the question 'What does this picture mean?' shouldn't be asked. or that that question could not be part 
of a delicate critical method. The implications of Brennan and Mitchell's positions for this kind of question are that these 
quations cannot be asked without a sense of their subjectivity. Following Mitchell. to ask what a picture wants is in some 
way to accord it a subjectivity. The question diverges from the diagonal rdationship of a subject looking at an object. Asking 
'Whac does this mean?' with an awareness of the subjective position of such a question brings it into the realm of questions 
lib 'What do pictures wand', because both questions then acknowledge as a starting point the limitedness of the one posing 
the question. 
138 Mitdtdl, 68. 
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have to do with the question on which this section began-the question W.}. T. Mitchell proposes 
as a way of looking at pictures? Mitchell argues that most critiques of images in our time have been 
iconoclastic. subjecting images to a discipline that regulates value judgements. and figuring as their 
main question that of the ttJaluation of images. His proposal that we concern ourselves with what 
pictures might want offers critics a way into an approach that is more "yielding". more -sym-
pathetic".139 This 'sym-pathetic' mode of critique is one that etymologically emphasises the role that 
senses other than sight can play in criticism. While textual engagement is certainly a different lllatter 
to the idea of interpersonal engagement based on the transmission of affect. the transmission of 
affect is a useful figure in the construction of a new way of looking at texts. In the conten of a 
discourse of reason that has histOrically been sight-driven. what happens when thinking is 
repositioned to be related to love? For Brennan. "thinking and loving are closely related in 
themselves".I40 Both reason and love are 
forms of resistance in the nonperpetuation of the negative affects. as it seems is any 
process of making or sustaining connections consistent with the known facts or the 
needs of others [ ... J. In short, the tendency to bind and bring together, to make things 
cohere, follows the lOgiC of the life drive.!"! 
The delicate critical practice that Mitchell identifies would 'sound' the icons. recognising that 
'smashing' them is itself a way of icon-creating. Sounding the icons means making them resonate. 
letting them speak. seeing them as more than objects of an imposing vision. To love the other is to 
"remove oneself from the loop" of projection and negative affect. l42 To sound the icons rather than 
smash them is to step. momentarily. outside of the critical norm and to "permit entry into a new 
idea".1"3 Thinking with our feelings-but not allowing ourselves to be dominated by them; that is, 
allowing them to take part in the discourse we create and which creates us-permits data we receive 
by means other than sight to enter into the circle of admissible 'evidence' and shows that the 
boundaries that seem to exist between what we think and how we feel are permeable. It also 
acknowledges that the objects of our study affect us-that our 'objectivity' is flavoured with traces of 
ourselves. Brennan's concept of discernment follows closely along these lines. In arguing fur the 
importance of a theory of the transmission of affect, Brennan is not arguing for the replacement of 
'thought' with' feeling' (where those terms stand falsely opposite one another). or for some theory of 
the personal in its se16sh. ego-bound form. She is arguing for an understanding of ourselves and 
139 Mitchell, 81-82. 
140 Brennan, 132. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Brennan, 133. 
143 Ibid. 
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others which takes into account both the way we see and the reasons we see how we see, an 
understanding based in "comparison, detachment and living attention".I44 Discernment is objective 
in the way that Midgley means when she conceives of an objectivity that is "fair, honest and 
methodical" about "the whole range where subjective experience affects objective facts".145 In terms 
of holistic approaches to the other, whether as an art historian, a literary critic, or a customer in a 
grocery store dealing with a clerk, projection, the subjective disavowal of negative affect and the 
'donation' of these affects to the other, cannot be objective because it hides the relation of the self to 
the other behind a cloak that gives the self little recourse but to 'other' the other and to close oneself 
off to it. Discernment, as "an openness to the distinct being who is sheltering behind the common 
ego, in oneself and others alike",l46 is a strategy for meeting the other without 'smashing' them. As a 
way of understanding and putting into action Mitchell's question about pictures and desires, it offers 
an example of a loving approach. 
Above all, in the context of a consideration of the desire of visual texts, discernment opens a way for 
the consideration of the desires of literary ones. In so doing. it requires the contamination of the 
isolated. individual, and 'objective' subject, and the mute, passive object by one another. The result is a 
·sym-pathetic" subject who "feel[s] along with [the text or picture] as a thing that is like no other"147, 
an 'object' which might speak, desire, or act on the 'subject: and the space of possibility between the 
two-which arises out of recognition of the unknowability of the other. A consideration of this 
space will take place over Chapters 2 through S. Chapter 2 will deal expressly with the text as a 
becoming. a continual unfolding which indicates by this continuousness the unknown which always 
lies just out of sight. 
1," Brennan. 122. 
14S Midgley,I72-173. 
146 Brennan, 134. 
147 Sc:dnbcrg. Leo. Other CriteriA: Confrontations with Twmtieth Cmtury.Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1972). p. 63. 
quoted in Mitchell. 82. 
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2/ 
An Ontology of/for Texts 
102 
A. Introduction 
In order to clarify and define what this dissertation means when it talks about 'text: this chapter will 
approach texts as relational objects. All objects are relational, but that this is true does not make the 
particular relationality of texts less meaningful: no single text exists; each 'text' is part of the "inter-
text [ ... ] the impossibility of living outside the infinite text".1 That is, individual instances of text are 
always already part of something concentrically larger than themselves, to which they are related, 
beyond their relation to non-textual objects or beings. How texts are-how they are relational-is 
an ontological, rather than an ontic question. (The latter is descriptive; it answers the question 
'what?', and fulflls what Heidegger refers to as 'thinghood'. The former is concerned with being. and 
answers the question 'how?' -the ontological is a question of the way things are, of their 'Being'.2) 
The question of the being of texts is a question of how they are and how their relation is allows for 
the possibility of relation with the text that is not only descriptive, i.e. that does more than answer 
the question 'what is a text?'. To ask how' texts are is compatible with a loving approach in that it 
refuses to define the other in question. Later chapters of this dissertation when referring to text, will 
do so as it is imagined throughout this one. 
The chapter situates itself in relation to Roland Barthes' discussion of how and what texts are in his 
book The Pleasure of the Text, especially focusing on the text of pleasure/the text of bliss/the erotic 
text. Here, I argue a link between relation and desire to show how desire is implicated in the being of 
texts, which are always already in relation among themselves and to their readers (and writers3). In 
addition, this chapter examines the connection between text and its physical-etymological 
counterparts, textile, stuff, and material. The chapter's second-to-Iast section uses mechanics to 
construct a figure for texts' resonance, which prepares the field for the reading of the "Envois" section 
of Derrida's The Post Card at the beginning of Chapter 3. By working toward an understanding of 
texts' desire/texts as desiring. Chapter 2 prepares a space for the discussion, in Chapter 3, of 
deconstruction understood as a loving approach to texts (as others with their own desires). 
1 Barthes.1975: 36. 
2 Heklcgger's definition of the two terms comes down to the difference between inquiry ·concerned primarily with &ing 
(ontological) and that ·concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them-. Heidegger, Martin. Being and TIme. 
Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Wiley Blackwell, 1962), p. 31 fo. 
3 Barthes (and others) would trouble this distinction; I leave it here for the time being. but will deal with it later in this chapter. 
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B. Why Barthes? 
Given the predominance of theories of text, language, and the play that happens in both over many 
years and even more '-isms' -structural, post-structural, modem, postmodem, and so on-a chapter 
aiming to explore the ontology of texts could begin almost anywhere, with almost any theorist 
writing in the 20th century, and make its way from there. This dissertation engages the work. of 
Roland Barthes because of his situation in relation to Reader Response criticism as well as to 
Structuralism and post-structuralism. His work is a thread that reflects those movements' changing 
attitudes to text, and it consciously and unconsciously revises itself and complicates itself in their 
terms (in the terms it makes for them) even as it reflects them. In particular, beyond any 
identification of Barthes with Structuralism or post-structuralism. the ways in which his work 
attempts both to name and to enact a theory of reading which does not neglect the relationship 
between the text and the reader as a bidirectional one locates Barthes' work within the practices. if not 
the canon. of Reader Response criticism. It is also this bidirectional and naming-enacting tendency 
that makes Barthes' work appropriate to a dissertation that is searching for a way of reading that is 
aware of the text as other. 
To begin with, however, I want to situate Barthes in terms of the relation of his work to reader-
response criticism; to Wolfgang Iser in particular. Although the focus of this chapter will be on 
Barthes. Iser is a good companion to him; their approaches complement one another. Iser's Writing 
takes into consideration the gaps and holes in the text that invite and imply the presence and activity 
of the reader. These holes call for a criticism that would respond to the text in terms of -the 
fundamental question ... what actUally does take place between text and reader?-.4 For Iscr and other 
Reader Response critics. "whenever the reader bridges the gaps. communication bcginsllS_ 
communication that is neither unidirectional nor authoritarian. but that is instead constructed by 
the play between two (or more) creators of meaning. Barthes also acknowledges this relationship, 
writing that the "text you write must prove to me that it desires me. This proof exists: it is writing-.' 
The desire of the text for the reader and the desire of the reader for the text (the proof of which is 
reading) are bound together. The play Iser talks about is what "allows author-reader-text to be 
conceived as a dynamic interrelationship'',7 and the space in which play can happen is opened up by 
difference within the text. That is, such play requires space in which to happen; this space is what 
4 Iser. Wolfgang. Prospecting: from Reader Response to LiterllrJ Anthropology. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), p. 3. 
5 Iser, 34. 
6 Barthes. Roland. The Pltasureofthe Text, trans. R. Miller (Ncw York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 6. 
7 Iser, 250. 
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occurs between something like 'intent' and something like 'reception' (for instance). It is the back-
and-forth pinging echo of what meanings are possible in any given space (occupied by a word, an 
utterance, a sound, another communicative movement, or not). Difference here refers both to 
internal difference (how the text is different to itself) and to three areas in particular which !ser 
identifies as the extratextual, intratenual, and that between the text and reader.s In all cases, the 
space of difference "triggers a to-and-fro movement that is basic to play ... continual movement 
between the poSitions reveal [sic] their many different aspects",9 and it is this movement which 
continually opens further space for play and transformation which for Iser works to "discredit the 
traditional notion of representation "10 wherein the text has a direct correlation in the world to which 
it refers. The discrediting of representation for which the playful, continuously constructed text is 
responsible in lser's work has dear parallels to the slipperiness oflanguage in poststructuralism. 
As far as Iser is concerned-and this goes back to the cocreation of meaning referenced above-the 
message or meaning in a literary work "is transmitted in two ways, in that the reader 'receives' it by 
composing it"ll as well as by reading it 'passively'. The difference between the reader and the text 
mean that the composition of the text in !ser's terms is never an absolute state; it is in continuous 
progress because there is always a further difference in which to create meaning. Iser's writing is 
important to this dissertation because of the implications it holds for the reader in the particular and 
her involvement with the text. It is also important for the way that it refers specifically to puncturing 
a dosed system of representation as a way to begin the process of worldmaking;12 for Iser's insistence 
that literature "can never be brought to an end, for every reality must ... produce its own irreality";13 
and for !ser's reimagining of the reader as co-author whose asking 'what will happen next' 
"automatically raise[s] the degree o£ .. participation in the further progress of the action".14 These are 
all considerations to which Roland Barmes' own writing on text is sympathetic. 
Both Iser and Barmes have as a central concern the idea of two communicating or relating bodies 
(textual, fleshly), but also of the space between those bodies across or within which communication 
can happen. In Barmes' writing. this separation takes the form of a suture or seam or, later, as the 









values the spaces in text where the text is not, which invite the reader into them; the effect of these 
gaps is a dynamism in the text which "proves to be unbounded by any recognisable teleology-,IS a 
dynamism that has echoes in Barthes' idea of signiflance. That is, the space within texts (and the 
space within which texts are able to occur) is without a definite end or limiting point. 
C. How are texts? 
How: Interrogative. In what way, in what manner, by what means; Used to ask 
about the condition or quality of something; Used to ask about someone or 
somethings physical or mental state; Used to ask about the extent or degree of 
something; The way in which; Any way in which. 
The interrogative 'how' presumes relation between the being in question and the questioner, at least 
insofar as there is a shared system of reference to which the respondent's being can be compared or in 
which it takes place. Yes, systems of knowledge may just as likely use 'how' as a question that sUences 
the subject of questioning by using 'how' rhetorically, as a point from which to describe or talk about 
that subject rather than as a hospitable question that opens space for the other to speak. As with. any 
word, there is nothing to guarantee one meaning or usage of 'how'. But equally, then, that means that 
'how' can be a question which allows the questioned to answer, or looks for that answer in the being 
of the other (rather than projecting answers onto it). Posed this way, the question 'how are you' as an 
ontolOgical one resembles Brennan's idea of discernment. 'How are you' is an invitation to the other 
to tell about his/her/itself in his/her/its own words, figure, idiom. In this dissertation, it is, as the 
poet Ellen Bryant Voigt puts it, a question also of style-of choosing or attempting a responsive style 
over a pre-emptive one.16 
The adoption of 'how' as a guiding question follows Heidegger's differentiation between ontic and 
ontological. As a way of being (rather than a subject who is), or an immersion (rather than an object 
or process), Dascin requires a shift from the ontic question 'what' to the ontological question nOW':17 
Dasein's "dynamic way of existing"IS cannot be adequately described via the question 'what', because 
'what' is a temporal and spatial locator, a fixative. Instead. the question 'how' demonstrates both 
15 Iser.26. 
16 Bryant-Voigt. Ellen .. "Double-talk and Double Vision". Bread Loaf Writers' Conference. Middlebury College. Middlebury, 
Vermont 12 August 2009. 16:11. 
17 Dasein "is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological-; that is, Hcidegger ·cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a ...... 
of the kind that pertains to a subject matter-. (Heidegger. 1962: 32.) 
18 Lb-inas, Emmanuel. trans. Committee of Public Safety. "Martin Hcidegger and Ontolog(.Diacritics. Vol. 26. No.1 (SPriD& 
1996). p. 22. 
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Dasein's dynamism and its relational qualities. Rather than objects waiting 'out there' to be described. 
Dascin puts them into relation by "the manner in which they encounter Dasein. the manner in 
which they are".19The object is "always 'in view of [en vue de] something, because it is not a separate 
entity [ ... ]. Its mode of being entails giving precedence to the totality of the function [oeuvre] in 
relation to which [it] exists".20 Relation in turn precipitates care. attention. What happens if the 
ontolOgical as a question of being (i.e. 'how') forms the attention given to understanding something 
like a text? 
The question is an invitation to speech ('how are you?') and to relation. a hospitable interaction with 
the other. which aims to welcome the other before knowing who the other is. and responds to the 
"imperative to effectively welcome someone in particular and not some indefinite anyone".21 Since 
'how' is concerned with particularity. before addressing the question of 'how' texts are. it is necessary 
to establish or outline an idea of'what' they have been understood to be in recent theory.22The scope 
of this dissertation does not allow for a detailed exegesis of understandings of , text' throughout the 
tradition of Western philosophy. Barthes' work is an obvious point of concentration for this 
dissertation because of its place throughout both structuralism and poststructuralism (discourses 
explicitly concerned with ideas of text), and because of the ways in which specific works of his 
demonstrate their concern for textual ontology. notably The Pleasure of the Text and S/Z. as well as 
several essays. The former will be the work to which this dissertation has most recourse. 
The text is unrestricted to "what is written (to literature)",23 Unlimited to literature. to the body of 
extant work, the being of the text opens up the possibility of textuality to that which has not been 
written. or to that which is unwritten. to that which is yet to be written. or even to that which never 
will be written. That which is-written (as an on-going process) is not limited to what is called 
literature; the text can even be illiterate or unliterary. It can be unreadable. Text. then. has being in 
the play between what is written (literature. as the extant body of words on paper. in books. on 
subway walls) and what is-written (that is. the on-going potentiality of being able to write or to be 
written, where writing is a non- or a meta-physical process as much as a phYSical one). Unrestricted. 
the text can move. can play. can stand in relation to one thing and then to another. It can form spaces 
or gaps, transfer meaning. or wait for meaning to fill it (more than once). Barthes refers to "a sort of 
19 Ibid, 19. 
10 Ibid,20. 
21 Nus, Michael. -'Alors. qui etes-vous?' Jacques Derrida and the Question of Hospitality-. SubSliI1Ice Issue 106 (Volume 34, 
Number 1), 2005. p. 9. 
22 Another way to say this is of course 'bow the word 'text' and texts themselves have been understood'. 
23 Barthes 1981: 40. 
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islet within the human-the common-relation "24 when he begins to layout the propcrties of texts. 
An islet: small island, geographically speaking. But, speaking anatomically, an islet is also a POrtion of 
tissue structurally distinct from surrounding tissues. What structural difference separates the teD 
from the common relation of humans to one another? 
C.1.1hen, what is (a) text? 
"[T]he text is what is written- 2S 
Having gone to some lengths to talk about the ways in which the text is not limited to what is 
written, this section begins with a quotation from Barthes seemingly saying just that. Of course, even 
this statement is subject to the kind of taking-apart and playful or wilful or multiple misreading that 
Iser, Barthes, and others champion as a way of relation with texts. A text is just what Barthes says: it is 
the thing that is written. 26 In those two words he points to the metaphysical concept of text as -at 
once original, univocal, and dennitive",27 the text as the thing whose being is already created (is 
written, in the past participial; is finished, complete, and whole). He also, however, invokes the idea 
of text as whatsoever is written, an 'is written' that extends beyond the work to gesture at, relate to. 
and include aU things that have being written'28 as a quality, regardless of their existence or 
'completion'. The sense of the text as 'whatsoever is written' underlies the inclusion of Cy Twombly's 
painting The Ceiling in Chapter 6. 
Barthes' work speaks to this second connotation. His text is manifold, constructed not by any 
individual work but by a network of relation that is limitless and expansive. The text in this 
understanding can be seen as "tissue";29 as a "system"30 and as that in which "the systent is 
overcome";31 as "a fragment of language",32 indicating that it is part of something greater than ia 
24 Bwes, 1975: 16. 
25 Bwes, 1981: 32. 
26 This docs, of course, beg the question "what docs 'is written' meant! For Bwes' purposes, the answer to this seems to lie in 
the question of signijiAnce, or "meaning. insofar as it is sensually p r ? d ~ c ~ e r y 9 7 . 5 : : 64). ~ ~ ongoing and multiple Pl'OCeas of 
becoming and generating. It is not limited to marks on paper. c.£ Demdas wntlOg 10 general. 
27 Barthes.1981: 33. 
28 'Being written' is an example of'processivity: the quality of forcgrounding the: being-made: or the: process of making the ~ ~
or. as Bwes puts it. signijiAnce. 
29 Bwe:s. 1981: 32. 
30 Bwes. 1981: 34. 
31 Bwes, 1975: 29. 
32 Barthes, 1981: 35. 
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singular instances; as a "practice" and a "productivity"33 rather than a product; as an "intertext";34 as 
·something woven"j3S as what is engendered by "All signifying practices"j36 as "a science of 
becoming".37 Its human form is "our erotic body"38-a network of synapses, receivers, nerves, all 
constructing meaning together from many ports. The text "[does] not respect the whole":39 that is, it 
gestures outside of itself and in so doing disallows the idea that it is complete unto itself and outside 
of relation. It leads us to "look up often, to listen to something else"40-an index of whatever else is 
out there (or just outside of itself). It is "atopic",41 decentred. The text is "language without its 
image-reservoir, its image-system",42 in a "collective economy",43 which is to say it is produced by and 
belongs to all the members of the group that make or consume it, a set which extends ownership of 
text beyond the set of those who write. 
The quality that defines text throughout Barthes' work is extension, the idea of text as something in 
production, something on-going. I f a text is the text itself and whatever is related to the text, this is a 
collection that cannot be delineated, an ever-open(ing) set. The text as a woven thing, a textile, 
extends beyond its fabric to implicate makers, modes of production, elements of composition, and 
strands whose ends are not contained by the doth. For good reason the idea of text as textile or 
woven thing has become a near cliche in theoretical considerations of the text. Not only does the 
embedded 'text' in 'textile' provide an immediate mnemonic link, explaining a (conceptual) text as a 
(material) textile succinctly alludes to the way in which both text and textile are composed. This 
figure is readily available in material terms; the likelihood that a reader is not in actual, physical, 
immediate contact with a textile while he or she reads 'text as textile' is extremely low. It is an 
eminently available comparison, whose implications are packed neatly into the familiar materiality of 
'textile', But despite-in fact, perhaps because of-the proliferation of this figure, it is worth taking 
the time to unpack it, because thinking about it attentively can tell us more about how a text is-if it 
is "like a textile",'" Although the figure presents us with an everyday point of reference by which to 
33 Barthes.1981: 36. 
34 Barthes. 1981: 39: intertcxt is "the impossibility of living outside the infinite textD (1975: 36). 
3S Barthes.1981: 39. 
36 Barthes. 1981: 41. 
37 Barthcs, 1981: 45. 
38 Barthes.1975: 17. 
39 Barthes.1975: 18. 
40 Barthes.1975: 24. 
41 Barthes.I975: 29. 
42 Barthes. 1975: 33. 
43 Barthcs. 1975: 24. 
44 As an interesting etymological sidenote. the word 'line' comes from 'linurn' in Latin. which is also the root for English 'linen' 
and referred in Latin to the flax plant. So many lines here: the line of the horizon on the far edge: of the field; lines of flax sheaves 
standing to ret; the stalks of flax themsdves; the fibres spun from them into linen thread (a line itsclf). which then might be 
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understand 'text: how often is this comparison followed explicitly to its end? I would like. b e f o ~ ~
going on, to unpack-or unpick-this figure. 
'T exttle' colloquially refers to any cloth, including cloths not made by weaving. such as knit or fated 
cloth, but technically refers only to woven fabric. Weaving is thus automatically implied if we an: 
using textUe as a figure for text. 'What is the importance of this? Weaving recalls us to the physical 
making of an object we take for granted and mctonymically transfers that making to the malting of 
the text, helping us understand that just as a cloth or a rug which is woven is made from ~ t t
strands (all of which may have come from separate spools, been dyed in d i f f c ~ n t t dyestuffs. and 
contained disparate fibres), a text is a made object. A text so made contains traces of many 'strands' of 
thought: it might contain holes' to be 'patched' by a reader's knowledge at the time of reading or at a 
later time. A text as a texttle is not just an artefact of some past time; it is an ~ b j c c t t of continued use 
and an object to which alterations or repairs may be made. It can be taken apan and put hack 
together. It can be reduced to its physical basis, its' fibres', so to speak. It has truck with the person 
who uses it (it has use), and its existence is necessarily related to those who make it and use it. Ten as 
texttle emphasises the artificial natUre of text, the fact that it is created and that it is t h e ~ f o r e - e v e n n
if no reader ever found it-always already in relation: to its maker, to the context in which it is tnadc. 
and to the texts that surround and interweave with it. And the idea of text as texttle gives insight into 
how texts are, not just what they might be. 
The figure that posits text as texttle is about how texts interlace: how they are in relation. how their 
relation to the world and to us is is an interlacing relation. A woven texttle. a text woven of other 
texts' remnants, memories, traces-these indicate what eue was or is with them. The text sets up its 
world-not only the world within the limit of ink on paper (or lit LEDs on a screen, paint on a walL 
etc.), but, like the jar in Wallace Stevens' poem, the world that the text's presence indicates is there, 
outside ofitse1£4S And-text as textUe calls to mind the synonyms for 'textUe': fabric, material. stuf[ 
Texttles as 'material' are what t h i n ~ ~ are made of: as 'stuff they rejoin the order of all created, generic 
objects. Both synonyms point to the being of the textile, and metaphorically to the being of the ten, 
as that which is used to make other things, and that which is among the ranks of things that have 
been made and therefore exist. 
woven into a cloth to line another garment. 'Textile' itself is from Latin 'T exare', to weave. Barthcs notes this in -From Work to 
Ten-, saying that ·etymologically, the ten is a fabric- {The Rustle ofLAngutlge. Ed. and trans. Howard. (Berkeley: Universityof' 
California Press, 1989), p. 60). 
45 Stevens, Wallace. "1he Anecdote of the Jar-. Accessed online at hnp:llwww.writing.upcnn.cdu/-a6lreis/88/steven. 
anccdote.html , August II, 2011. 
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Because in its being text refers. both materially and conceptually, to other texts (and also refers by 
extension to the people who produce and consume those texts, as well as to its own producers and 
consumers. and to the relations between and among these groups), its being is a being-With. It cannot 
escape being in relation if relationality is its fundamental state. The text cannot be without a reader, 
because its writer is also its reader; it cannot be without a writer, because even unwritten (physically), 
the text is produced or awaited in the company of its contexts; it is part of what is-written. For texts 
as for human beings, "[e]xistence is with: otherwise nothing exists".46 Because the text is an intertext, 
it contains within itself the "infinite text·47 and the impossibility of an escape from such a text. Text 
as textile, as tissue, means • emphasising. in the tissue, the generative idea that the text is made, is 
worked out in a perpetual interweaving";48 that everything is already part of the text in its broadest 
sense. The invocation of tissue makes the figure both textile and bodily; textiles as a plane in which 
we can see various threads interacting and creating patterns, and bodies as non-planar systems of 
interacting pieces which create meaning and intelligibility together. 
The text is not passively in a state of rdation; by its being-in-relation it creates (or destroys) relation 
between its producer and consumer. The text "does not give names-or it removes existing ones" ;49 its 
power in creation is the power to realign categories or to extend them, and this includes the 
categories of 'reader' and 'writer' in their traditionally separate senses. In the Barthesian sense of 
textual creation, that is, "there is not, behind the text, someone active (the writer) and out in front 
someone passive (the reader)·.so The text redistributes these categories such that the reader and the 
writer arc interwoven or even scattered throughout the text, rather than sitting on either side of it as 
though it were a physical division. The text, continually recreated and recreated moreover by many 
voices (not a single authorial voice), defects from the situation of absolutes and of fixed meanings, a 
"defection which approaches bliss-51 and "supersedes grammatical attitudes".52 If we extend the 
figure of text-making or image-making to world-making (as Mitchell does), then we can understand 
the availability of textual creation as an opening of subjecthood, of agency, and of authorship to all 
involved in this creation, rather than only to certain ones of a certain tradition on a certain 'side' of 
the text. In an economy where the fixedness of names guarantees the subject-object hierarchy and the 
16 Nancy,Jean-Luc. &ing Si1IguLv Plurlli (Stanford. California: Stanford University Press. 2000). p. 4. 
47 Barthcs, 1975, 36. 
48 Barthes.1975: 64. 
49 Barthes, 1975: 44-45. 
50 Barthes, 1975: 16. 
51 Barthes, 1975: 45. 
52 Barthes, 1975: 16. 
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dominion of those who write the history of what they conquer. the text "is (should be) that 
uninhibited person who shows his behind to the Political Father".S3 
So the text in its texttle-ness is extensive and multiple and diverse; in its creation by many voices it is 
what we might call democratic. Barthes uses a further word to talk about how texts are, and that 
word is 'erotic'. In fact. the erotics of texts come from a continual opening and extending (implied 
both by the figure of the texttle and the on-going possible inclusion/opening to other threads; and 
by the democracy of textual creation which opens to allow other voices). The how' of the text is also 
a question of its relation, and this relation is erotic, magical, enthusiastic,54 oppositional. 
changeable- 'erotic' as Barthes uses it means that" opposing forces are no longer repressed but in a 
state of becoming: nothing is really antagonistic, everything is plural".55 When the erotic56 properties 
of text go unrealised. it becomes stereotype, "the word repeated without any magic [ ... ] as though it 
were natural, as though by some miracle this recurring word were adequate on each occasion for 
different reasons".57 1he erotic properties of text point to its state of becoming; the erotic is erotic so 
long as it is incomplete. because the complete resists or even denies the liminal crossing which is the 
defining state of the erotic. In its eroticism the text becomes atopic and extensive, placeless and 
omnipresent. These are possible states. "makeshift[sJ" that "[allow] for writing (and reading)·,sa and 
"it is the seam between them" that becomes erotic. 59 
C.2 Implications of text as erotic 
"everything is relevant. / I call it loving.-6O 
The creative properties inherent in the idea of text-making. image-making. and world-making, as 
noted above, appear in both Mitchell's argument and Barthes; in Mitchell's, it is that images cretlle 
worlds. rather than simply mirroring them. In Barthes. the continually extensive and expanding 
nature of text means that if not creating new spaces into which it extends, it at least 'discovers' them. 
But discoveries are of course a kind of world-making; one need look no further than early accounts 
53 Barthes. 1975: 53. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Barthes. 1975: 31. 
56 Which is to say, permeable. oppositional. contrary. opening [ ... J 
57 Barthes. 1975: 42. 
58 Barthes. 1975: 5. 
59 Barthes.I97S: 7. 
60 Tate.Jamcs. "Rescuc" in Selected Poems. (Middletown. Connccticut: Wesleyan Univcrsity Prcss.1991). p. 28. 
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of an 'empty' 'New World' for examples of that. In any case, both Barthes and Mitchell assign creative 
agency to what might otherwise be thought of as inanimate objects. Barthes' conception of the erotic 
as it applies to texts provides further definition for Mitchell's idea of 'double belief and his argument 
for the lives (and loves) of images, and outlines one source of the power in texts and in images. 
Let w begin with the question 'What do pictures want?' in terms of an understanding of 'want' as 
'lack', since it is in this question that the idea of pictorial desire is established.61 Mitchell takes 
pictures as "ways of worldmaking, not jwt world mirroring",62 so when he asks questions about what 
is missing from pictures, what they lack, or what they might want, he is acknowledging that it is not 
only what is in pictures that creates and structures knowledge. The question about what is missing or 
what lacks in something acknowledges the importance of emptiness and non-presence in the 
creation of worlds; the "poetics" that Mitchell imagines addressing itself to paintings63 is a poetics 
that takes those spaces oflack into account. Particularly in the case of the erotic (and the case of the 
text understood to be erotic), lack creates meaning. Barthes, too, identifies a lack at the very centre of 
textUal creation-the lack of surety. The writer "mwt seek out [the] reader [ ... ] without knowing 
where he i s ~ ~ and this is the procedure by which a "site of bliss is then created" .64 The lack of the reader 
is the proof of the text's desire for a reader; if the "text you write mwt prove to me that it desires me" 
then .. [this] proof exists: it is writing".65The empty space in the centre of the text is the questionable 
presence of another/a reader/a co-creator, and with "the writer of the text of bliss and [its] reader 
begins the untenable textlO.66 Untenable: this text is slippery, unable to be held, in some way 
indefensible-indefensible because it cannot be pinned down, only spoken with, co-created. Sites of 
lack create an "impossiblelO67 text, and even more so if these are moving sites. The 'impossible' text is 
impossible to locate absolutely (is atopic) and by its movement does not captivate its reader so much 
as point to what (or where) else it could be. In the place where texts or pictures lack a 'something (or 
even a 'nothing) runs the seam of "an appearance-as-disappearance".68 This 
appearance/disappearance, the intermittence of a text-its flashing into and out of place-is erotic.69 
61 For the purposes of this chapter, and despite Mitchell's disclaimer that of course images and texts arc not the same things 
despite similarities in possible treatments, imagine here that the question could as easily be 'What do texts want?'. 
62 Mitchell, xiv. 
63 Mitchell, xv. 
64 Barthes, 1975: 4. 
65 Barthes, 1975: 6. 
66 Barthes, 1975: 22. 
67 Barthes. 1975: 22. 
68 Barthes, 1975: 10. 
69 Barthes, 1975: 10. 
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'What, then, is the erotic? It is the gap between what we believe to exist and the possibilities ror other 
existences; the split seam between the reality we have created and the one we imagine. Texts are one 
such seam: we are "moved as though these words were uttering a reality-,7° even though, as with 
Magritte's famous painting. the picture a text makes is not the thing itsel£71 Mitchell's corresponding 
example is the unwillingness to scratch out the eyes of a photograph of one's mother, despite the very 
rational knowledge that the photograph is not one's mother. The seam of the erotic is a place when: 
belief flickers and the unknown becomes possible. The erotic is the flickering back and forth from the 
known or believed into the possible and unaccomplished. A text "is a field of action, chanFt 
becoming-: "its constitutive moment is traversal (notably, it can traverse the work, several workst.72 
These movements, both evolutional and transversal, are erotic in the Barthesian sense, pointing to 
both sides of the seam. The way in which text crosses boundaries both calls them into question and 
charges the boundaries erotically by crossing them, seaming them, and showing the seam's 
construction. 
The erotic, which Barthes uses in company with 'bliss' and 'pleasure: is a state of being ·at once 
excluded and at peace"?3 which "contradicts the general rule that would assign bliss a fixed form-.74 
Once bliss is categorised and labelled, it becomes a stereotype. Bliss and the erotic, and texts as a site 
of both, require forms that accommodate movement, which "can very well take the form of a drift. 
Drifting occurs whenever I do not respect the whok»P If a text's eroticism requires a moving rorm. and 
if forms that drift demonstrate that text's lack. of respect for the whole (and for the SCnse of 
completion that the whole brings with it), this points to the text's own insufficiency and to its 
condition of always approaching fullness without gaining it. It puts the erotic text into a state of 
continual flux-or drift-if there is always more that can be known; the blissful text. despite its 
material length, "cannot be anything but short [ ... ] it will be an introduction to what will never be 
written" ,76 pointing forever beyond itself, no matter how much more is ever written. This is an 
optimistic and positive stance; a hopeful stance. To the text that takes this stance, everything is 
relevant. Eroticism expresses the being of the text if we can understand bliss as fundamentally plUral; 
70 Barthes, 1975: 47. 
71 I'm speaking, of course, of Magrine's famous image of a pipe with the words 'Ceci n'est pas one pipe' ('1his is not a Pipe') 
over it. Magritte, Rene. "La Trahison des Images- ("The Treachery ofImagcs·). Oil on canvas. 1928-29. Los Angeles CO\Ul 
Museum of Art, Los Angeles, California. ty 
http://collectionsonlinc.lacma.orglmwebcgi/ mweb.cxe ?request=record;id= 34438;type= 101 
72 Barthes, 1989: 58, emphasis in original. 
73 Barthes,I975: 29. 
74 Barthes, 1975: 27. 
75 Barthes, 1975: 18, emphasiS in original. 
76 Ibid. Here, 'short' might also be read as a neutral 'inadequate'. 
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then the text-as-erotic is also plural, and these pluralities have the quality of continual possibility, 
which is in fact the guarantee of their plurality. If the text, or if bliss, reaches a point at which it 
exhausts possibility, then plurality is jeopardised and in fact the text (or bliss) becomes bound to one 
way of being-and ceases to be text, in Barthes' sense. 
The text's logic means that it lives in association, coincidences, overlappings, disassociations, 
·structured but decentered, without closure".77 Broader than the material singular of the "work"-
limited by its author, its genre, and its linear nature-text becomes "that social space which leaves no 
language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in a position as judge, master, analyst, 
confessor, decoder"?8 Text as a social space which proceeds by inclusion and erases the hierarchy of 
authorlreader divisions, is "experienced only in an activity, in a production",79 as opposed to the work, 
which is static, singular, "held in the hand".80 In terms of the body, the text is out of a single body's 
scale, surrounding it and permeating it, becoming an activity (something the body takes part in but 
does not comprise). The body is able, on the other hand, to hold the work, contain it, create all of it, 
and reckon with it from a position of authority. Texts, therefore, transverse not only imagined or 
theoretical boundaries, but also the physical boundaries most personal to us: the seam between one 
body and the next, one name and the next. 
The understanding of the plurality of the text is central to its eroticism. Texts of pleasure are "a 
sanctioned Babel",81 made by many voices in collective economy,82 which Barthes also describes as a 
"kind of Franciscanism [which] invites all words to perch, to flock, to fly off again".83 St. Francis's 
inclusion of all creatures in his worship is a figure for a text that welcomes everything but 
understands in that welcoming posture that arrival does not mean permanence. The Franciscan 
mandate of poverty creates a space in its practitioners (even figurative ones) for objects, meanings, 
and ways of being to transverse, while acknowledging in its very stance their evanescent nature. That 
poverty means nothing is, originally, and so nothing can be assumed-and there is possibility for 
anything. It is a continuous poverty in a positive sense that is more about the possibilities inherent in 
emptiness than any kind of forlorn or pitiable state. A Franciscan text receives multiply, plurally-
and from "heterogeneous, detached substances and levels: lights, colors [sic], vegetation, heat, air, 
77 Barthes, 1989: 59. 
78 Barthes, 1989: 64. 
79 Barthes, 1989: 58, emphasis in original. 
80 Barthcs.1989: 57. 
81 Barthes.1975: 4. 
82 Barthcs. 1975: 24. 
83 Barthes.1975: 8. 
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tenuous explosions of sound, tiny cries of birds, chUdren's voices [ ... ] gestures, garments·.84 The a g u ~ ~
of Franciscan poverty both sanctines the material objects which text traverses and acknowledges that 
text is not lodged in them. The work, marked with "the Father's inscription"85 suffers from the 
heaviness which lodges it in history, in the singular author, and in itself; the text, and especially the 
text understood in a Franciscanism that emphasises the possibUity of perching, flocking, and Hying 
off, is a text that distributes meaning among its members. Like the 'body of Christ', the Franciscan 
text is unable to be delineated as 'this, this, and this, but not that'; in its state of "vital expansion-,''' it 
contains the possibility of including everything, forever-in hospitality, rather than in ownership. 
Barthes' declaration of the plural and transitory nature of the text of pleasure emphasises the 
decentredness of such a text, and in so doing relates that text to his dennition of the erotic as a site of 
intermittence. His definition of the erotic, which is to say the unfinished, the liminal. ~ i n f o r c c s s the 
idea of text as perpetually becoming. 
Before concluding this section. it is necessary to note that there is perhaps a contradiction to be 
pointed out between the idea of text as 'textUe' -which is a material and singular object, with its 
selvedge-limits and its particular and limited times. places. and means of production-and tcn as 
tranversive and continually created and extending social space. However, it is also possible to think 
about 'textUe' in terms of textual decentring. Thinking of text in relation to textUe-as-fabric (_ 
material. -stuff) might seem on the surface to be oppositional to a conception of text in terms of 
Barthes' text/work distinction. But what if we imagine not the single and concrete bolt of corduroy. 
sUk charmeuse. or boUed wool which can be pulled from the shelf, and instead think of these words 
in their most collective sense? The idea of the text as textUe and as 'material' or 'stufF makes only 
more clear its productive. expansive qualities. because these non-count nouns refer to an open set. 
Beyond the 'work' that is a singular textUe (this bolt of chambray). the word's figurative qualities give 
us a picture of textUe as a process. The invocation of its synonyms (stuff. material) gives us a scnse of 
the openness of the set and provides a sense of textUe that considers it to be nrst and foremost ill 
creation. Material is that from which anything can be made; stuff is the set of all objects ever (and 
ever to be) created. In those senses the figure of tex:tUe for text is especially meaningful. 
84 Barthcs. 1989: 60. 
85 Barthcs.1989: 61. 
86 Ibid. 
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C.2.1 What the erotic wants/the uncertain text 
What does the erotic want-that is to say, what does the erotic lack? The erotic is a continued state of 
arousal, heightened awareness, heightened sensitivity. It begins but does not end-once fulfilment 
comes, the erotic ends. The erotic therefore lacks fulfilment-it has being in the flickering state of 
incompleteness. The erotic wants fulfilment. This means, then, that the erotic exists in a state of being 
unfulfilled, which in tum allows its continuation. The erotic lacks finality, which means it is in a state 
of ever-becoming, ever-coming-into-being. Neither finished nor unbegun, the erotic exists as long as 
its own ending does not. 
How is the text erotic, in this sense? Understood in terms of its lack, the erotic desires fulfilment (but 
does not reach it), and is therefore figured as continually reaching and moving toward what it does 
not incorporate (but could). The text-as-textile, similarly, exists in a continual state of creation, a 
·perpetual interweaving";87 its position is "uncertain".88 As Donna Haraway writes, at the point when 
this interweaving stops and "the system of connections doses in on itself [ ... ] the world is frozen in a 
dance of death".89The text is erotic, which is to say alive, generative, in its betweenness, its flapping 
open and dosed, its place on the seam of created/becoming. It is "intermittence [ ... J which is erotic 
[ ... ] this flash itself which seduces".90 The erotic text both creates the space for and stages its own 
'appearance-as-disappearance', in and out of existence, here and there, available and reserved. 
Tc:xtual pleasure is not ·the pleasure of the corporeal striptease or of narrative suspense", which are "a 
gradual unveiling" .91 Unveiling would mean that eventually all would be known or seen; it is uni-
directional (clothes come off, veil falls). Instead, the pleasure of the text is a knowledge of both edges 
of the seam, the ·origin and the end",92 in combination with "tmesis",93 the unpredictable cutting of 
the text that the reader performs as she reads (and disregards or ignores). Tmesis, however, does not 
refer only to cutting, but also to the intersplicing of words between other words; not an unveiling 
and not a shearing-off, but a grafting. The erotics of the text lie along the seam of what is read and 
not read, or read and interspliced-and for that, they require a reader. Beyond the erotic's general 
87 Barthcs. 1975: 64. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Haraway, Donna. "The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others· in The Haraway Readn-. 
New York: Roudedgc. 2004) p. 110. 
90 Barthcs, 1975: 10. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Barthes, 1975: 11. 
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lack of finitude (and desire for continuity) the erotic text needs a reader who reads and does not read. 
reads and splices. A text with such a reader performs its erotics by its unpredictabUity ("the author 
cannot predict tmesis: he cannot choose to write what will not be readj94 and its excess (it "exceeds 
any (social) function and any (structural) functioning").9s Texts must therefore 'want' to express 
themselves as incomplete. And if texts want to show that they are incomplete, they must also want to 
enlarge themselves or run outside of the material boundaries that structure their physical forms 
(their works). If we are to understand texts as erotic, then we have to understand them as desiring 
without end. Whatever is cannot be enough for the erotic text, because 'enough' signifies a closure of 
enquiry and the end of the erotic. The erotic text requires a companion-a relation that is itself 
perhaps not erotic, but characterised by another kind of love: philia, which connotes friendship. 
famUiality, openness, and 'being in tune' with another. Eros is not the only kind oflove or relation. 
C.2.2 Possible relations to the text: idolatry, totemic 
When Mitchell begins to form his argument for assigning a kind of agency to pictures, he carefully 
acknowledges how closely his consideration of the desires of images might come to animism. Instead 
of jettisoning the possibility of pictures' desire, Mitchell incorporates the question of animism into 
his argument, identifying a "double consciousness'"96 whereby we both believe and do not believe in 
the lives of images, exactly because questions like 'What do pictures want?' seem to be "just the SOrt of 
question that an idolator would ask".'T! In other words, instead of denying the possibility of or even 
his own tendency towards animism (as if it were something to be ashamed of or something which 
could have no place in his inquiry), Mitchell nnds a place for it both in his consideration of art and 
in human lives more generally. This place is the 'double consciousness' itself-or even the scam or gap 
between the two sides. According to Mitchell, the "usual way of sorting out this double 
consciousness is to attribute one side of it (generally the naive, magical, superstitious side) to 
someone else, and to claim the hardheaded, critical, and skeptical [sic] position as one's own·.91 
Barthes also acknowledges something like Mitchell's double consciousness in the reader who -can 
keep saying: I know these are only words, but all the same [. .. J ~ ~ which he compares to the FreUdian 
94 Ibid. 
95 Barthes. 1975: 18. 
96 Mitchell. 11. 
97 Mitchell. 25. 
98 Mitchell. 7. This process exemplifies what Teresa Brennan calls the' foundational fantaSy' by which we project our negative. 
unwanted affects onto others. 
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economy in which .. the chUd knows its mother has no penis and simultaneously believes she has 
If relations (to images and text) which afford them agency or desire are considered idolatrous or 
quasi-idolatrous, then one way to deal with these relations might be to reconsider what action is 
required (or could be required) by such relation. The idolatrous relation wherein idolatry is figured 
as bad calls for iconoclasm because the idol cannot be a living thing; however, this in turn requires 
the creation of the double consciousness described above, because if the idol were not a living thing 
or if it did not have the qualities of and seem to be a living thing, then why would one have had such 
a relation to it in the first place? But idolatry is not the necessary relation to an object (picture, text). 
In place of an 'idolatrous' relation to the text, Mitchell proposes a consideration ofimages in terms of 
the totemic (rather than the fetishistic or idolatrous) in order to "disrupt the binary model of art 
history".IOCl Totemism, with its roots in relation (Mitchell identifies the origin of the word in 
Anishinaabe [Ojibwe] meaning 'a relative of mine')IOI, is, etymologically at least, a useful place to 
begin a relation that is attempting not to 'shatter' the other. Moreover, Mitchell argues that our 
attitude toward totems is one of "curatorial solicitude"lo2. With etymological roots in ideas of caring 
and preserving (both doctors and meats 'cure'), curation is an interesting figure to place across the 
table from iconoclasm's smashing and fetishism's material attraction minus communal investment.I03 
Totemism does not award the object, picture, or text a status beyond its being and its being-in-
relation, and, in Mitchell's words, historically "signalled a shift from the rhetoric of iconoclasm to a 
rhetoric of scientific curiosity" .104 WhUe this 'scientific curiosity' is by no means a flawless approach 
to the other, lOS and despite the ways that in actuality such relationships fall prey to the uneven power 
relations within them, the ideal relation between the observer and the observed would be one that 
asks how are you? How do you work? What are you like? What do you need and want to keep 
living?' and which would listen for the answers. It is in this sense-the sense in which the totem is a 
familiar, is something that is lived with, and is something that it is acceptable to know and to want to 
know about-that totemism is useful in terms of approaching the text or the picture. 
99 Barthcs.1975: 47. 
100 Mitchell, 98. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Mitchell, 100. 
103 Mitchell. 99. 
104 Ibid. 
105 This dissertation's objections to 'science' as an approach to texts in general. and to positivism and rationality in particular. 
an: outlined in the Introduction and in Chapter 1. 
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Perhaps some of the 'movement' of the text, its signifiance, is created in the repeatedly and minutely 
traversed space between belief and disbelief In having written a book that enacts the suture that he 
identifies between our belief in images' lives and our 'knowledge' that they are 'just t h i n g s ~ ~ Mitchell 
creates a text that, as Barthes says, creates meaning in its intermittence, its duality, in its 'appearance-
as-disappearance'. The meaning we can find in our belief and disbelief in the lives of images, in other 
words, is not located at either extremity (i.e. either at belief or at disbelief) but in the flick.erin& 
transitory, moving and unpossessable space between them. Mitchell's question and the quasi-animist 
treatment of images it implies assert the suture between belief and disbelief; Mitchell's primary figutt 
here is that of'resonance'.l06 
C.3 The resonant and incomplete text 
Resonance implies both a transmitting device and a receiving one, but it also requires the space in 
which what is transmitted or received resonates, and motions to the space between the transmitter 
and receiver as simUarly valuable. At this point, the focus of this chapter will tum to a SpeCUlC 
treatment of resonance as a figure for an understanding that goes beyond the either/or of 
signification, in order to demonstrate how resonance functions as a figure for Mitchell's 'Critical 
iconoclasm' / delicate critical method and the approach to texts suggested by this dissertation. 
Additionally, this consideration of the physical phenomenon of resonance will be &amed in terms 
that draw on concepts from reader-response criticism: resonance is the place where the text opens to 
the reader, because resonance both requires and indicates the presence of two bodies creatinl 
intelligibility together. It is via the work of Jean-Luc Nancy that this section will proceed with its 
inquiry, and with an understanding that the resonance described can be metaphorically transfcned 
to the relation between the text and itself. and the one between the reader/writer and the tcxt. 
Nancy's work on listening operates on the premise of two bodies between which resonance 
happens-and figures resonance as the creation of a kind of meaning which precedes a fixing or 
absolutising knowledge. Because resonance is experienced via the body, physically, the 'sense' it 
creates is dual: sensory and intellectual information. Resonance cannot happen in a vacuUll1: it 
requires the presence of bodies between which or a body within which to occur. The body as an 
accumulation of "erotic sites"l07 consists of continual opening-and openings are where resonance 
can occur. Likewise, the erotic text resonates with meaning in the spaces that open between known 
quantities. 
1 06 See Mitchell. 26. 
107 Barthes.1975: 56. 
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Nancy treats resonance as "the very beginning and opening up of sense, as beyond-sense, or sense that 
goes beyond signification", and within his definition of resonance points explicitly to the body as 
"wholly [ ... ] a resonance chamber", which leads him to argue that what resonates in that body is "the 
'subject' as that part, in the body, that is listening or vibrates with listening to-or with the echo of-
the beyond-meaning".I08 Nancy, writing about listening. is speaking simultaneously of a figurative 
resonance (which we might also call 'feeling') and of a literal resonance, that of sound waves in the 
bones of the ear. The discussion of resonance in this section cannot ignore this duality: resonance is 
neither simply physical nor simply figurative. It is complexly located at the axis of the two. Therefore, 
some examination of the figure's literal counterpart-that is, mechanics, the branch of physics that 
looks at the behaviour of bodies subjected to force or displacement-can enrich both the figurative 
and the literal understandings of resonance. 
In mechanics. all systems that vibrate are understood as having resonance (or resonant) 
frequencies. 109 At a system's resonance frequency. that system has a larger oscillation or absorbs more 
energy. The interaction between two resonance frequencies can have physical effects; for example, a 
crystal wineglass exposed to a musical note of its resonant frequency will shatter. Any system can 
have any number of these frequencies, and here it is that the idea of resonance resonates, so to speak, 
with an expansive, erotic text. The number of frequencies a system can have is equal to its degrees of 
freedom, or ways that it can move. The more complex a system is, the more vibrations it experiences. 
Complex or extended systems that experience resonance from internal vibrations-for example, the 
pipes on an organ. the string on a guitar when it is vibrating. or even the human body-are called 
resonators. Since these resonators are made of millions of joined parts, they can have millions of 
resonance frequencies, and so they can have millions of degrees of freedom-of possibUities for 
movement, direction-or, metaphorically, for intelligibUity. 
The quality of a complex resonator that is important as a figure here is its enormous number of 
resonant frequencies-the infinitude of things, following Nancy's language. that could touch it, or. 
following Mitchell's. that could "make it speak and resonate".110 This is the state of the text of 
pleasure. wherein "opposing forces are no longer repressed but in a state of becoming: nothing is 
1 08 Nancy, Jean-Lue. Listening. (N cw York: Fordham University Press. 2007). p. 31. 
1 091he number of occurrences of a repeating event per unit of time. 
110 Mitchell, 27. 
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really antagonistic, everything is plural".lll The erotic text, the text of pleasure is a dual affirmation of 
possibility and possible expansion, movement. Its multitudinous resonance frequencies are expressed 
by the "generative"112 quality of text itself-which reaches beyond any singularity-and in its state of 
bliss, which is "asocial",113 "atopic",114 and unflxed. 
Both the complex resonator and the text of pleasure express the possibility of movement in almOst 
limidess directions. Both allow for the possibUity of continued and unpredictable articulation, which 
remains "open, its densities accessible to action and intervention".115 This possibility marks a 
"defection which approaches bliss"116 as the text moves beyond the names given to it (its known 
resonance frequencies, if you like) and creates further meaning and the possibility of still further 
meaning. The text is a resonator like the unpredictable body of the other (and of the self), a "material 
semiotic generative node"117 which wants a continual redefinition and re-vision, reinvention in our 
imagination and understanding. 
Nancy points to resonance, which happens in the body, as the 'opening up' of sense, of a sensitivity to 
what goes beyond signification. Could we understand this 'beyond' as the index of those uncountable 
degrees of freedom a complex resonator would have? And if we so understand them, and if We think 
then of Mitchell's call for a new iconoclasm that would strike images enough to make them resonate 
but not so much as to smash them, aren't we talking about making a critical method that 
acknowledges possibility, the limit of one person's knowledge at one point in time, and the intricate 
ways in which systems of resonance affect one another? In other words, doesn't Nancy's figure 
provide a link back to physical phenomena that can help in conceptualising the qualities of the erotic 
in terms of its being a possible becoming, and the ways in which that becoming can hdp us 
understand the text as erotic? The erotic text so understood is inseparable from the body, whether 
that body splits "into erotic sites"l1B or acts as "a resonance chamber".119 In this instance, the "text and 
the body lose all distinction" .120 The text is the body of the other in which its otherness resonates. 
Mitchell's figure for the new method he proposes (which is centred around the question ''What do 
111 Barthcs.1975: 31. 
112 Barthcs. 1975: 64. 
113 Barthcs.1975: 39. 
114 Barthcs.1975: 29. 
115 Haraway.llO. 
116 Barthcs.I975: 45. 
117 Haraway. 68. 
118 Barthcs.1975: 56. 
119 Nancy. 2007: 31. 
120 Haraway. 327. 
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pictures want?') is a 'critical iconoclasm', which would cause icons (pictures, ideas, text) to resonate, 
rather than shatter, when struck. This points to a different sort of relation, one which puts the focus 
on both the icon (or idol) and the iconoclast (or idolater), rather than on the iconoclast alone, and, 
importandy, to the fact that iconoclasm is a relationship. Mitchell's use of the word 'resonate' 
supports Nancy's assertion that resonance is the 'beyond-sense'; the body is the resonant chamber 
within which this 'beyond-sense' can happen. The relationship in which a would-be iconoclast can 
strike a text or a picture and make it resonate rather than break. is a relationship in which the 
subjectivity of that other body is recognised. An approach that would call on that resonance, rather 
than smash the body, recognises the value of both the body itself and the resonance and possibility of 
resonance it contains. A resonant approach is a way of respecting the otherness of the text, and of 
calling it 'my relative', of being curious (as in curatorial) about it without letting it own you (as an 
idol) or needing to own it (as a fetish). It offers a way to preserve the distinction between one and the 
other without necessitating a hierarchy of one over the other. 
C.3 Resonance and separation 
-This is the strange thing about relationship. What you desire is what creates your 
quality. You are not made by yourself, but by the thing that you want." 
Fanny Howe l2l 
The question 'What do texts want?' (as with Mitchell's original phrasing of that question), when 
understood as a question about what is not there or what is lacked by a text, posits sites of lack, also 
figured as wanting or desiring. as one starting point for relations with texts. One distinct textual lack 
is that of an end point-the state of incompletion that renders a text in perpetual signifiance likewise 
renders it to some extent endless. Like the erotic, the text in a state of continuity lacks finality; the 
desire that sustains this being is a desire for continued incompletion such that the end (or The End) 
is always just a bit further away, in the distance. The text of pleasure in particular demonstrates this 
extensive quality; because bliss cannot be assigned a standard or fixed form, the text of bliss too 
escapes that assignation. Both bliss and textuality are terms shaded with the sense of on-going 
creation and modification. 
Further diversions into mechanics aside, here again, as with the other physical processes {draWing. 
painting} already invoked in the opening chapter of this dissertation, we have a link between the 
121 Howe, Fanny. ·Catholic·, in The Wedding Dress: Meditations on Word and Lifo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), p. 110. 
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material, mechanical, physical world and the world of the philosopher. The material happening-the 
actual and phenomenal occurrence of resonance between and within bodies-can give nuance to the 
way we use its name figuratively. Not only that: just as the material properties of cadmium red paint 
point to its geological origins,l22 and its name points to its discovery at Thebesl23 during the Classical 
episteme, the idea of resonance is an index of the material fact of resonance, and of the conditions 
resonance requires. Resonance happens within and between bodies, and indicates potential for 
movement as well as pointing back to the fact of those bodies; it cannot happen in a vacuum. The 
concept of resonance 'points back' to the physical presence of bodies (human or otherwise) because 
the necessary condition for resonance is space for sound to resonate in and bodies from which to 
resonate. In this way, the resonant itself (as any concept) is text "worked out in perpetual 
interweaving" .124 The resonant, then, wants both presence and absence, but not too much of either-
like the erotic, it requires a questionable or shimmering location rather than a static one. The very 
possibility of complex resonant systems having millions of frequencies at which they might resonate 
speaks to this idea-resonance is not something that is once and for all located, but a state of 
possibility that only after (or during) its occurrence invokes and indexes the presence of bodies. The 
primary state of the resonant, like that of the erotic, is that of intermittence and poSSibility, because 
before resonance can happen, conditions have to be perfect for it to happen-therefore, when it 
does, it points to those conditions. One of those conditions is the presence of something with which 
to resonate. 
The ontology of the erotic drawn from the question 'what does the erotic want: which is outlined 
above, comes down to a lack of completion. This lack can be construed as a desire to remain 
incomplete. It follows from this desire to remain incomplete that the erotic is a state of 
incompleteness-which indicates that this is an on-going or continuous state. If incompletion 
implies continuance in terms of the erotic, it implies thereby a desire to continue being and continue 
being to some extent unknown. The erotic, in its desire for a continual state of incompletion. then. 
involves a similarly continual generation of possible 'frequencies' such that there might be infinite 
new ways in which to touch it, to listen to it, to make it, to sound it. Resonance works as a figure 
when talking about the erotic-and about the construction of meaning in terms of a 'critical 
iconoclasm' such as that suggested by Mitchell-because it indicates not only the presence of two 
bodies' (a receiver and a transmitter, whether or not those two bodies are physically separate) but 
122 In the mineral Hawleyite. for example. which is mined in the Yukon Territory of Canada. 
123 KAdmeia = Cadmean earth; Cadmus was the prince who founded Thebes. 
124 Barthes.1975: 64. 
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also the space or difference between those two bodies which holds the possibility for the change, 
distortion, loss, or mutation of what is sent-a quality of both the erotic and the text. The space 
between two as a critical feature of relation will recur especially in consideration of the work of Luce 
lrigaray in Chapter 4, but it is a thread through much of the work which lays the ground for this 
dissertation, including Derrida's consideration of the other-as-other. Mitchell's insistence on 
resonance as a figure for a new iconoclasm, and Nancy's use of the same as a way of locating the 
subject, foreground the importance of that space in an approach which takes into account the 
otherness of the one approached. 
C.4lf/then 
To begin with, the form of the chapter feels scant: fitting 'text' into it seems impossible, when the 
defining characteristic of the object of study is its expansion, its slipperiness. But this very scantness 
performs the inability of the work to hold the text: not its inability to communicate some things, but 
its inability to say everything or fully describe the thing it approaches. By nature of its otherness and 
its incompleteness, the text escapes. Along the faultlines or seams of yes-that's-it/ah-there-it-goes, the 
text runs, winking and shining. The only answer that the question how is the text?' yields is that the 
text is plural, expanding. on-going. In this way it is a model for any Other, whose completeness is 
unknowable to us thanks to their otherness. One's treatment of the text, then, is a form of world-
making. not a mental exercise conducted in a vacuum, but a demonstration of one's values and one's 
approach to others. Text is an ideal medium for this because of its expansiveness; its limitlessness 
permits multiple or even revised approaches. It forgives, or perhaps invites, contradiction. Most of all, 
it sits in relation by the how' of its creation: brought into existence by language or the thought of 
language, the text exists is in relation to its makers and those who interact with it. 
If the text is open, incomplete, erotic in its running along the gaps in knowing/not-knowing. how 
then should it be treated? Treatment of the text as an other calls for an engagement of the space 
between two, the recognition of the absolute otherness of the other. It is this recognition that 
Derrida calls clove"uS and which is for Irigarayand others the basis of any interaction. This relation, 
which requires spaces of difference like those created by texts' continuous production (or 
reconfiguration) of meaning. is a relation texts desire. It acknowledges them as they are and as other, 
and it requires this acknowledgement as a basic principle-if love is essentially a recognition of 
125 Derrida: Interview (1997). 
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otherness, one cannot love what is subsumed or identical to onesel£ A loving approach would not 
only resonate with texts, it would also be able to acknowledge that the difference between the text it 
approaches and its approach are on-going, irreconcilable, and productive. Chapter 3 will outline the 
ways in which deconstruction, especially Derrida's work, has been to some extent such an approach. 
Chapter 4 will engage with other readings that constellate with Derrida's work to suggest the lOving 
approach this dissertation proposes. 
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3/ 
Deconstruction as a loving approach 
-Deconstruction is not a dismanding of the structure of a text. but a 
demonstration that it has already dismanded itsdf"l 
-It is always necessary that the other sign. and it is always the other who signs last. 
In other words, first.-2 
-love obeys a reason [ ... ] that [ ... ] deals not only with objects. but with those. like 
you and I. who handle. produce. are ever using them [ ... ] a logic that is completely 
different from the logic overseeing the management and arrangement of objects."3 
1 Miller.]. Hillis. ·Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure·. Georgia Review 30 (1976). p. 334. 
2 Dcrrida,]acques. -Force of Law", quoted in Naas, Michael. Tllleingon The Tradition:Jacques 1Jerridaand the Legacies of 
Deconstruction (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003) p. xvii. 
3 Marion,lean-Luc. Prolegomena to Chllrity. Trans. Stephen Lewis. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), p. x. 
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A. Introduction 
Having situated itself in the context of poststructuralist and postmodern discourse, as well as in the 
broader context of discourses on the production of knowledge; having staked its claim on the 
territory of an approach that might complement or revise the use of the term 'method' in literary or 
theoretical arenas; and having presented the view of 'text' from which it will proceed with such an 
approach, this dissertation now turns to the possibility of that approach already extant in the 
literature. The sources in question here are a range of post-structuralist texts and voices, to be 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, including the writings and practices of Jacques Derrida-on which 
this chapter centres. These writings and practices, as well as the diverse appropriations and reuses 
they have engendered, have come to be thought of collectively as a deconstruction, or as a 
deconstructive method. 
The chapter begins by offering an example of the text of pleasure introduced in Chapter 2, which. by 
grace of its situation in Derrida's corpus and in the poststructuralist corpus more broadly, prOvides a 
link between the resonant textuality discussed in the preceding chapter and the considerations of 
deconstruction which preoccupy this one. To some extent, it also serves to introduce and exemplify 
this writer's internalisation of so-called 'deconstructive strategies', or, in other words, to approach 
Derrida's text from a deconstructive position. In the terms of this dissertation, such a position can 
only ever be occupied singly-that is to say, the surety of what or how deconstruction is is only C'Ver a 
surety in the moment of approach as one makes it. 
I f this dissertation proposes deconstruction as a possible fulfllment of what it terms 'approach', then 
it is necessary to examine what is understood by the term ' d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ~ ~ as well as to define what is 
intended by the use of that term here. From such a definition, it will be possible to proceed to a 
consideration of whether and how deconstruction might escape the constraints of 'method' into 
which it is often placed. The chapter proceeds from its opening, performative gambit to take on both 
this identification of deconstruction with method and the (mis)readings of Derrida and his work 
which give rise to such an understanding, in order to show that Derrida's own insistence on the 
priority of the other means that deconstruction-as-method is an improper, if not impoSSible, 
approach to others, textual or not. The second aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the possibility in 
deconstruction for a loving approach to the other in order support the broader aim of the 
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dissertation, which is to propose and exemplify such an approach, the precedent for which is to be 
found in the literary/theoretical context surrounding the dissertation. 
B. Resonance, Romance, and the Between: Derrida's 'posts' and the text of pleasure 
Having asserted the importance of the thread of difference through Derrida's work to this 
dissertation, this section will offer a bridge between the reading of the erotic text as material-
semiotic4 and deconstructive readings/writings or approaches as possible sites of such textuality via a 
reading of one ofDerrida's own texts. When The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (to be 
referred to as The Post Cart!) was published in 1987, Jacques Derrida had already been an important 
flgure in the world of theory for almost twenty years. The book plays with textuality, meaning. 
language. It is dense. Its concerns are with technolOgies of communication and with the transmission 
or failure of transmission of messages of all kinds. While an in-depth discussion of The Post Card 
would easily run the course of an entire dissertationS, the scope of this dissertation does not allow for 
this; instead. this chapter will conclude by looking at one section of The Post Card in terms of 
resonance in a space between two bodies and in terms of the continually expanding. co-created text 
of bliss. 
The flrst section of The Post Card, "Envois", is ostensibly concerned with the sending of personal 
messages via a postal system; in filet, it is transmission, as much as receipt, which is at stake here. 
"Envois" is a collection of "the remainders of recently destroyed correspondence"6 about which there 
is no certainty to be had in regard to the questions "Who is writing? To whom? And to send, to 
destine, to dispatch what? To what addreSS?";7 these are things which "finally [ ... ] I do not know".8 
Not only are these "Envois" (or 'sendings') an amorous text-a collection of love letters, or at least of 
letters to a beloved-their forms intimate that they can be read as a text-of-pleasure made flesh. 
4 Donna Haraway: the term -[highlights] the object of knowledge as an active part of the apparatus of bodily production· 
(Haraway, 2004: 68). That is, the object of knowledge is no longer just means to an end. but part of the process of creating 
meaning. 
5 Sec, £Or example, Barker. Tom Paul. Disclosure and inscriptWn: HeiJeggn-. Derrid4, and the technological di§'trmce. Ph.D. 
Thesis, U nivenity of Warwick. 2003; Drake. William McClellan. Represmt4tion: Re-co/kcting mythology in an age of 
sbowi1lganJ telling. Ph.D. Thesis. Pacifica Graduate Institute. 2001; and Davis. Randal Bryan. Thesis as object (with scholarly 
AppRatus). M.A. Thesis. The U nivenity ofT ens at Dallas. 1988. 
6 Dcrrida. Jacques. The POSI Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Trans. Alan Bass. (Chicago: Univenity of Chicago Press. 
1987). p. 3. Henceforth Derrida.1987b. 
7 Denida. 1987b: 5. 
8 Ibid. 
129 
Occurring as they do in the space between the posts (between sending and receipt. in the hands of a 
reader who mayor may not be the intended recipient), the letters' meaning is distributed rather than 
localised. They perform textual bliss by their omissions (physical gaps where text is missin& 
chronological gaps where letters are missing) and by their having fallen into our hands. The diversion 
of the letters themselves opens up continuously new possibUities for reading. given that the writer, 
whoever he was, could not have predicted who the reader would be in the space between sending and 
receipt. Likewise, the gaps in the text are a kind of enforced tmesis-an enforced cuttin& at least, 
creating actual white space on the page into which the reader mayor may not actually inscribe 
writing of her own. If nothing else, these white spaces allow for possibUities of unknown happenings. 
therefore relegated to the imagination or surmise of the reader, who despite their non-presence must 
to some extent divine what might have happened. 
The metaphor of the resonant entwines with that of the erotic in its acknowledgement of the 
beginning and the end, the gap within which it is possible for meaning to occur. Derrida engages 
with this space of possibUity at length in The Post Card, where 'post' ('poste') points to "position f. .. J 
and to the entire topic of the 'thesis: the singular position",9 and its nuances of both "to station and 
to send"lo serve to remind the reader of how communication is happening by indicating both t h ~ ~
'stationed' transmitter and receiver (who are at least positioned in their own bodies,ll if otherwise 
mobUe) and the space between, through which messages are sent. Derrida writes that "the post office 
is the site of a great affair [ ... ]. Everything is possible there".u The post office in this instance is a site 
of resonance, of possibility, and of the erotic. in that it is "never certain", 13 that it requires distance -ill 
order to write", and that, despite the sender's best desires, receipt (or receipt of a message as it was 
sent) cannot be guaranteed-a "tragedy of destination"14 wherein non-arrival is as possible as arrival. 
By identifying the circulation of postcards, which are readable by anyone but addressed to one 
receiver, as "an open but illegible letter",ts Derrida acknowledges the possibUity of resonance that the 
sender or transmitter does not anticipate, and thus also the possibUity of an endless transmission 
which continues to resonate at any of its potential frequencies. 
9 Derrida, 1987b: xxv. 
10 Derrida, I987b: xxvi. 
11 Body in this context refers to more than the Beshly body-to something like Nancy's 'chamber of resonance'. which unites 
the body and whatever is beyond/behind/within/throughout/alongside it (mind, soul. heart, subject [ ... ] ). 
12 Derrida, 1987b: 69. 
13 Derrida, 1987b: 45. 
14 Derrida, I987b: 23. 
15 Derrida, 1987b: 12. 
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In The Postcard. what is created 'between the posts: as it were. is not only the written record of the 
text per se. but the institution of the archive. which in its expansiveness echoes the form Barthes 
assigns text. The archive here is the composite of ephemeral objects: "a small piece of Plato's post card 
that Freud has translated"; references to books; train routes; films; myrtle in a pot; proper names; 
references to poems; an aquamarine ring; letters and suicide notes; codes: "a monument. a house of 
cards" and other monuments to that ultimately ephemeral thing. life; universities and libraries; 
calling cards; telegrams; photographs taken in station photomatons and photomatons themselves: 
Derrida's own published worksI6 and his existent or imagined chUdren: Purim cakes (also known as 
hamentaschen) and their Proustian qualities; broadcast media: and everywhere the 'you'l7 to whom 
the writer addresses the postcards. letters. and stream-of-consciousness missives that fill the 'envois' 
themselves. The archive of unimportant objects (made important only by their inclusion or by their 
speciflcity. their private meaning) is a resonant space. a space where meaning can emerge given 
combinations of seemingly neutral things because of their relation to one another and to the writer-
transmitter and reader-receiver: the given object is "no longer tautological .. .it is interpretable".Is 
The reader is set down in the middle of a narrative which has already begun and may have been going 
for some time. and the extant work ends before the story does. with a direct reference to 
"tomorrow" .19 And what 'actually happens' in this narrative is what happens literally between the 
posts-between the posting of one card and the next. between the position of sender and receiver. 
between the position of reader and author. The happening of the "Envois" is the diversion from any 
intentionality. the loss of control over the reader and thus over the meaning the texts hold. Even the 
burning of the whole archive which the writer references several times repeats this motif of loss of 
control: flre as tmesis would be an ultimate randomness of choice-what goes. what stays. what 
narrative can be constructed from what fragments. The narrative that is constructed in the wake of 
this destruction (or even in the wake of the effacement of certain sections of the letters). however. 
requires an other in whose mind, memory. or experience to resonate. Not the author. because there is 
no gap in knowing there (having written what was written and lived what was written about. even if 
16 Citations on this page to this point and the preceding page, last paragraph, in order: Derrida, 1987: 166.; 82,189,225; 32, 
179,189;246;77;148.166.192;8;102;186;229;80.148.152;17;148;86,109.208;225;153;37.79;109;80. 
17 Citations on this page. fust full paragraph. in order: Derrida, 1987: 39; 73: 109.225; 4.16.23.25-26.33,69,109.170,210. 
232,256. 
18 Barthes. 2002: 78. 
19 Derrida. 1987b: 256. 
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that was just the writing), but an other whose knowledge is incomplete and can therefore expand 
into the empty spaces, or resound with them, or make them resound. The receiver-reader has access 
to parts of the stories that the writer sends to the receiver via the 'private' (but actually public and 
open) exchange conducted on the backs of postcards. We cannot know how the sections that are 
elided disappeared-whether they ever existed; whether those gaps represent what went unread in 
the first place; whether the text's disappearance points to what was read (and censored) by some 
author(ity), and so whether what we are left with is actually the traces of what was unread that other 
time, the positive space as the negative space of the 'blind spot'. 
It seems excessive but still necessary to state that "Envois" is epistolary, and by its nature an epistle is 
composed after the action that it describes-it can't pretend to the proximity that other narrative 
can. The letter is a record, a trace of the event, but not the event (that is described) itself; it is always 
scrambling one step behind the happening to which it attests (even as it and its writing/its being-
written are other kinds of happening and attestation). The text attests to the space between 
transmitters (the event being written, the writer) and receivers (the written page, the readers). 
"Envois" records, traces and invents paths for meaning, communication, and connection. 'The 
activities. places. relationships. and objects that are documented, however, take place on a scale that is 
greater than the postcards (the "Envois") themselves. The cards' existence makes sense in terms of 
their fragmentation. They can only represent part of what is happening, and as such they are 
essentially textual in Barthes' sense. They point explicidyand implicidy to an on-going production of 
meaning and feeling outside the work itself, whether that work is the book or the lives represented in 
the book. 
C. W'hat we talk about when we talk about 'deconstruction' 
Deconstruction is widely understood to be a way of engaging with texts, a practice of criticism. a way 
of taking things (concepts, ideas, objects) apan, or a literary theory that was initiated by early 
writings of Derrida. 'Widely: because not only is deconstruction a familiar term to members of a 
literary / cultural/ academic elite (to whom it is definitely familiar)2O. it has penetrated the vocabulary 
of people who are not involved in literary or academic circles by way of a certain, somctUnes 
20 See MichCle Lamont's article -How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case ofJacques Derrida- (The A ~ ~
Journal of Sociology. Vol. 93. No.3 [Nov .• 1987]. pp. 584-622) for a detailed analysis of the acceptance of deconstruction, and 
specifically ofDerrida's work. as legitimate currency in both academic and high cultural life in France and the U.S. 
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malapropic, adoption by news and other media. And 'or: because these multiple understandings are 
not necessarily present in every invocation of the name 'deconstruction'; nor are they necessarily the 
limits within which this 'deconstruction' operates. 
As with anything which is 'widely understood: what 'deconstruction' means is diffuse, conflicted. In 
popular] use, deconstruction is presented as anything from a process which "carefully dismantles or 
removes materials from structures, as an alternative to demolitionDll to .. the deconstructed Caesar 
salad {stacked romaine lettuce, an anchovy, an egg yolk, and some shaved Parmesan, in separate heaps 
on a plate)D,23 to "an on-going trendD in fashion.24 The use of the word "deconstruction" in these 
cases is relatively divorced from the way it is used in literary criticism, philosophy, and critical 
theory-even though that 'way' is in fact a multitude of often different inflections, to the point that 
in one newspaper article it is first defined simply as a word "used by almost anyone who wants to say 
that she disagrees with how things have been thought of or done"25. And the weak. grasp of just what 
one means when one says or writes 'deconstruction' is not limited to some public sphere. The very 
people who one might think ought to know just what it is, what it means, and how it works-the 
authorities, critics, and scholars-either struggle to define it or insist on its resistance to definition. 
This means that although the concept has legs, it is difficult to be sure of what kind of animal is 
walking around on them.26 
21 'Popular use' begs the definition of ' popular'. For the purposes of this dissenation, popular use is non-specialist use. 
22 Kinsdla, Susan. -What is Deconstruction?- {pdf file}. http://crra.com/rrarc/rrarcreuse.html 
23 -Deconstructed Food: Why didn't I think of that fust?-
http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976732943 
24 -Ghosts of Fashion Past: Deconstruction» htq>:lIfashionindie.com/ghosts-of-fashion-past-deconstruction/. Despite the 
temptation that might occur for further play with hauntings. ghosts. traces. and memory here. this enremdy brief article 
only states that some designers take apart and then rebuild garments. It identifies 'deconstruction' as a trend but does not 
point to the reasons for the use of that tenn, nor contenua1ise deconstructive fashion, nor point to the adoption of 
deconstruction as a tactic in fashion theory {see Alison Gill, ·Deconstruction Fashion: The Making of Un6nished. 
Decomposing and Re-assembled Clothes- and Hanne Loreck. -De/constructing Fashion/Fashions of Deconstruction: 
Cindy Shennan's Fashion Photographs-, for example}. 
25 Aquino. Fr. Ranhilio Callangan. ~ t t is Deconstruction?-. Manila Standard Today. 24 May 2010. accessed 12 January 
2011.hgp:llwww.manilastandardtoday.com/insideOpinion.htm? £=201 0962Fmay%2F24962Franhilioaquino.isx&d=201 0 
262Fmay%2F24 
26 It is this very instability that seems to attract and repel people in deconstruction. For an example, see John M. Ellis's article 
"What Does Deconstruction Contribute to Theory of Criticism?- {New Literary History, VoL 19, No.2. [Winter, 1988], pp. 
259-279}. Deconstruction's unwillingness to settle on a single meaning seems to make Ellis extremely uncomfonable. He 
undertakes a debunking of deconstruction-or, in his words. an analysis of the ·substance and value of this program as a 
contribution to theory of criticism- (261)-which is peppered with derision for 'deconstructionists' and their propensity to 
cake "the traditional [ ... ] and [stand] it on its head» {268} and a complete disbelief in, or even willingness to engage with the 
possibility that there might be privileged readings (265) in favour of a view of criticism which "provides real progress· {269}. 
without ever seeming to note that it is the notion of'rea1 progress' which deconstruction would call into question. 
133 
Even within the province of specialised attention to concepts such as deconstruction-the academy 
and communities of thinkers-what exactly is meant by the term or appellation 'deconstruction' is 
unclear in that there is no absolute consensus. Nor is there a merely general consensus or majority 
opinion, given the different receptions of what is variously called ' d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ~ ~ 'deconstructivism', 
and 'deconstructive theory' within subject areas as varied as literary theory, geography, feminist 
theory/women's studies, analytic philosophy, and so on. Instead. there do tend to be ways of 
imagining deconstruction that recur; there is also a certain set of vocabulary which haunts 
discussions of deconstruction, especially those in which writers attempt to understand 
deconstruction via or in the terms of already-existing epistemolOgical procedures. When attempts are 
made to describe what 'deconstruction' is, it is variously referred to as a 'method';27 a 'procedure' or set 
of procedures; a 'methodology'; a 'way of reading' (this is perhaps its most frequent deflnition); a 
'strategy'.28 More rarely, it is described as an approach. When definitions of deconstruction are 
attempted. it is heralded as anything from "the literary theory wing of poststructuralism, a roughly 
described antifoundationalist intellectual movement originating in France in the 1960s·,2.9 to 
something that merely "involves the reading of texts and the writing of that reading»,30 to something 
that is concerned with "formal analyses and close reading procedures»; with '"techniques of close and 
careful reading-.31 
Deconstruction, if it ever could have been said to have had a central or sustaining 'meaning',32 cannot 
be said to have such a thing now. There are as many 'deconstructions' as there are thinkers to perform 
them-which leaves deconstruction vulnerable to being reduced to instrumental positions, but also 
allows for free play with its tactics. This play (and the refusal to designate methods, origins or order 
which birthed it) means that deconstruction can be, for better or worse, the name given to all kinds 
of philosophical, critical, or theoretical work which aims to demonstrate the thinness of 
presumptions about how the world is and what it is made o£ To put it in a nutshell, deconstruction's 
27 As in Fuchs. Stephan. and Steven Ward. "What is Deconstruction, and Where and When Docs it Take Place? Making Facts 
in Science. Building Cases in Law". American Sociological Review. Vol. 59. No.4 (Aug.. 1994). p. 482. See also Royle, quoted 
in Pasanen. Ouri. "Review: Derrida in and out of Context: On the Necessity to Know: Why Derrida?" MLN. VoL 118. No.S 
(Dec. 2003). p. 1307. 
28 See note 2 in Edie.James M. "Husserl vs. Derrida". Human Studies, Vol. 13. No.2 (1990). p. 117; see also Poovey, Mary. 
"Feminism and Deconstruction". Feminist Studies. Vol. 14, No.1 (Spring. 1988). pp. 51-65. 
29 McCormick. John P. "Derrida on Law; Or. Poststructuralism Gets Seriow". Political Theory. Vol. 29. No.3 Oune 2001), p. 
419. 
30 Orton. 35. 
31 Barzilai, Shuli, and Morton W. Bloomfield. "New Criticism and Deconstructive Criticism, Or What's New?". New u.., 
History. Vol. 18. No.1 {Aurumn.1986).p.153. 
32 0 f course not; the rejection of jwt such a thing is part of its own project and has been since the beginning. 
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unwillingness to self-define means that definition is available to those who make the work, a kind of 
textual, theoretical, critical open-source. The only implications of open-sourceness are modifiability 
and availability. Open-source does not mean that every reinvention or reimagination of the 'software' 
will fulfll the intentions of those who first worked with it. In fact, those intentions cannot be known; 
once the software is released, intention is no longer in play, and it becomes a question of 
interpretation and of application.33 The open-source theoretical object is not inherently 'good' or 
'bad'; radical or conservative; necessary or exorbitant. It is simply availabk,34 which is both its 
strength and its weakness, but in the end its greater strength in a system which values choice and the 
trust that accompanies choice. 
However, deconstruction, like anything else, can ossify. Although it offers the potential of limitless 
movement, redefinition, turning. un-deciding. the achievement of this potential relies on the wakeful 
attentiveness of those who engage with it. It is not intrinsic to deconstruction that things should go 
on being-becoming undecidable; without attention paid to a continual movement within thought, 
-undecidability itself soon rigidifies into a meaning, i.e. another form of decidable closure".35 This is 
why what Fred Orton calls deconstruction's "second strategy"36 is so important to a practice which 
chooses to call itself (or which is identified by others as) deconstruction/ deconstructive: this strategy 
works to "prevent what has been accomplished by the first strategy-that overturning of the binary 
oppositions-from getting reestablished".37 To 'practice deconstruction', it is not simply a question of 
inverting binaries, but of inscribing the 'results' of such inversions-of inscribing one's own 
thinking-in the place of the undecidable. Inscribing one's writing/thought into the places of 
undecidability or the undecidable into one's writing/thought requires yet further movement away 
from binary opposition, without ever regrouping to a new concrete form-without "ever 
constituting a third term, without leaving room for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics".38 
Rather than standing as third-term synthesis, the undecidable is what disallows an integrating or 
synthesizing third term to arise from a binary opposition. Standing between the two, the 
undecidable forces consideration of both. It is a skin or a membrane through which both terms are 
33 I mean in this instance an application that is not that of one thing onto another. but the bringing-together of two things. 
34 Which is not to say that this availability is not political or tinged by this writer's perception. That is. 'availability' is a 
Albjective understanding of deconstruction. rather than a statement of objective absolutes. 
35 Rimmon-Kenon. Shlomith. ·Deconstructive Reflections on Deconstruction: In Reply to Hillis Miller-. Poetics Today. VoL2. 
No.1b (Winter 1980-81). p.188. 
36 Orton. Fred. ·On IHift8 Bent 'Blue' (Second State): An Introduction to Jacques Derridal A Footnote on Jasper Johns·. 
OxforJArtJou17Wi. VoL 12. No.1 (1989). p. 36. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Derrida,Jacques. Positions. trans. Alan Bass. (London: The Athalone Press. 1987). p. 43. 
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visible but inassimUable. In light of this. what is intrinsic to deconstruction. or to what might be 
called a deconstructive practice. is the responsibility one has to a continual re-evaluation of what has 
already been thought. 
D. Deconstruction. in Derrida's words 
Despite his reluctance to be identified with 'deconstruction' or even necessarily to admit to the 
assignation of such a name. Derrida's status as the author of certain texts taken to be deconstructive 
or on deconstruction meant that he was seen to be. or felt himself, responsible for undertaking a 
discussion of the terms assigned to him. even if he resisted them or disliked them. This section will 
take a few of Derrida's remarks on deconstruction into account in order to generate certain 
parameters for understanding what Derrida might have meant when he used the word 
'deconstruction'. even if these parameters are or were the parameters of a 'given moment' rather than 
eternal guidelines to be counted on and gone back to. 
First of all. in speaking about deconstruction. Derrida mentions that deconstruction is a question of 
"overturn[ing] the hierarchy at a given moment".39 What does this mean? It means. nrst of all that 
deconstruction is on-going; that it is not an action one takes and which then need never be taken 
again. Indeed. it brings the idea of 'an action' into question in the same way which seeing a prima 
ballerina dance brings the idea of 'a step' into question. or that in which seeing a master of karate 
perform a kata brings the idea of a single strike into question. Action in these terms becomes part of 
a longer movement. A moment in which one overturns the hierarchy may be deconstructivc, but 
only if this overturning does not result in a field in which the terms rest in a new opposition 
(containing in itself the terms of hierarchy). The moment in which the hierarchy is overturned is 
only a moment, only a single instance. and if things are imagined to have been 'resolved' by that 
overturning. so imagining indicates "a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous 6dd 
untouched. leaving no one hold on the previous opposition".40 In other words. if deconstruction is 
an overturning of a hierarchy. and if this overturning occurs only for its given moment. then if one 
desires a continual practice of deconstruction one cannot simply reside in the field created by the 
inversion of terms; one must in each moment overturn them again. and "mark the interval between 
39 Derrida, Jacques. "The Double Session-. Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), p. 271. 
40 Derrida 1987: 41. 
136 
inversion ( ... ] and the irruptive emergence of a new 'concept' [ ... ] that can no longer be. and never 
could be. included in the previous regime".41 Elsewhere. in Derrida's description of the occasioning 
ofhis work (in Positions). he sets out a sketch of possible interactions. writing that one can "put to 
work in the text [ ... ] certain [undecidable] marks [ ... ] which escape from inclusion in the 
philosophical (binary) opposition and which nonetheless inhabit it. resist it. and disorganise it [ ... ] 
without ever constituting a third term".42 It is in the space between the inversion and the irruption of 
a new concept that this undecidable. inassimilable third term resides. 
How. though. to go about this? How to proceed with inversion such that irruption occurs and the 
undecidable might be tracked down. pinned. examined, and set free? Of course these are rhetorical 
questions. and their rhetoric is fustian. The point is that such a procedure has not been outlined and 
perhaps. in the terms of what we call deconstruction. cannot exist. However. even the vague 
orderliness of the inversion -+ irruptive emergence of new concept seems to imply steps that might be 
followed in order to generate something called 'deconstruction'. When Derrida at one point calls 
deconstruction a "marching order".43 what might this mean? Is deconstruction something that takes 
an order. or gives one? In the terms of a 'marching order: we can understand it as a call to move out. 
to shift, with no further direction given Oust &us!). But 'marching order' also presumes one who 
gives the order (who knows where we are going. how we will get there; who directs us). 
Deconstruction-or what has come to be called deconstruction-relies not on the destruction of a 
tenn through to be foundational. but on its transformation in relation. Thus. to "deconstruct an 
opposition is to undo it and displace it, to situate it differently".44 If this is so. then deconstruction 
itself must be. despite (or because of) its resistance to procedure. somehow tangled in relation to that 
very thing. even if this relation takes primarily (or only) the form of questions. 
Derrida delineates what deconstruction is not ("not [ ... J a specialized set of discursive procedures. 
still less the rules of a new hermeneutic method that works on texts or utterances in the shelter of a 
given or stable institution") and in fact refuses even to capitulate to such an appellation. referring 
only to what "is sometimes hastUy called deconstruction". He goes on to indicate what it might be, 
41 Derrida 1987: 42. 
42 Derrida,Jacques. ·Positions·. DiAcritics, 2 (1972), p. 36. 
43 Derrida 1981: 271. 
44 Culler. Jonathan. On Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press .• 1982) p. 1 SO. 
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taking care not to denne what it is or how it is done, gesturing instead to ways of being that concem 
it: "It is [ ... ] at the very least a way of taking a position, in its work of analysis, concerning the political 
and institutional structures that make possible and govern our practices, our competencies, our 
performances·. But, he adds, deconstruction is "neither a methodological reform that should reassure 
the organization in place nor a flourish of irresponsible [ ... ] destruction, whose most certain effect 
would be to leave everything as it is and to consolidate the most immobile forces in the university-.45 
Even in delineating what deconstruction is not (methodological reform, flourish of irresponsible 
destruction) or what it does not do (leave everything as it is), Derrida allies it with some IemJ of 
procedures despite the fact that he refuses to layout how these procedures take effect or indeed what 
exactly they are. And in Positions, Derrida insists that while "Reading is transformational","" it is not 
haphazard; "this transformation cannot be executed however one wishes. It requires protocols of 
reading".47 However, despite Derrida's assertion that reading requires protocols in order for 
transformation to come about through it, he is not at the same time asserting that deconstruction 
could be these protocols (or indeed in any way asserting what deconstruction is in these terms), He 
goes on to note "bluntly" that he has "not yet found any [such protocols] that satisfy [him]-,'" It 
would seem that the philosophical work of Derrida himself could thus be characterised by this 
dissatisfaction, which has its expression in a continual desire to overturn what (by itself or after 
previous inversion) appears to be foundational, whole, settled. 
E. Deconstruction, a local definition 
From the varied definitions and descriptions of deconstruction, several things emerge. One is the 
consideration of deconstruction-or the desire to consider it-in the same way that scientific and 
other empirical processes have been considered, which is to say, to understand it in terms of its 
method (often broken down into two parts, as in Orton's establishment/inversion of two tenns ~ ~
prevention of emergent third term; see above). Indeed, the drive to understand deconstruction 
methodically often results in deconstruction itself being called a method, and means that disCUSSions 
45 Quoted in Culler, 1982: 156. 




of deconstruction are often tied to ideas of method or a calling-into-question of just what is meant 
when we talk about method. 
However. deconstruction's relationship to questions of method is not the only thing to emerge from 
descriptions of deconstruction. Twinned with these questions are deconstruction's relationship to its 
forerunners-its context and its history. This, too, points to the tendency of those who want to 
'understand' deconstruction to affiliate it with some already extant thing in order to do so (rather 
than attempting to take it on terms which are completely new and completely its own). 
The tendency to affiliate deconstruction with other things in order to understand it is the condition 
under which another common strand emerges. But given that the 'founder' of deconstruction 
himself refused either to be identified as its origin point or to provide a definition of just what was 
meant by the term in such a way as to be applicable across the board and eternally, the very idea of 
being able to 'do it right' seems to reflect more on the unnecessarily competitive 'industries' to which 
deconstruction has become fashionable or typical than on some absolute model which can be 
attained if one only tries a bit harder to find the origins of things. And, given the difficulty both of 
'doing it right' (whatever that might mean) and the difficulty of pinning deconstruction down in the 
shape of pre-existing models for thought and behaviour, Derrida's suggestion that the 
·'deconstructive' way of thinking context is neither a philosophical position nor a critique of finite 
contexts, which it analyses without claiming any absolute overview",49 implies that in fact what 
deconstruction 'wants' (to use Mitchell's term) is a consideration which will not lock. it in to 
preconceived notions of how it 'ought' to behave. The appropriate aspect here is curious, sensitive, 
and delicate; not necessarily methodical. not necessarily in line with its history (or necessarily out of 
line with it). 
Another way to understand objections to the categorization of deconstruction might be in analogical 
terms. Negative theology insists not that it can identify the essence of God, only that it can say what 
God is not. Neti. ned-not this. not this. Or. failing that analogy (given deconstruction's troubled 
relationship to theology in general), perhaps we can approach deconstruction as a "technique". If 
deconstruction is approached as a technique. this allows deconstruction a sense like that of techne, as 
a way of making. of art-making. thus of world-making, thus of being-with. A turning-toward, an 
49 Derrida. Jacques. -Toward an Ethic of Discussion-, in L i m i t ~ d , , Inc.. ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Pms, 1988). p. 137 
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attitude. This allows a route other than the necessity of pigeonholing deconstruction as a 'method' 
simply because it occurs in sites where methods have tended to occur (philosophy, scholarly writin& 
universities-choose your site). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, deconstruction may most usefully be considered in terms of an 
approach, which, in refusing to be absolutely defined. also refuses the ability to fully define the other. 
F. Criticisms 
It would be impossible to see deconstruction simply as a neutral theoretical object, and of course 
Derrida as its (unwUllng) representative is not in a neutral position. Besides its status as a piece of 
theoretical equipment imported from France to serve the needs of scholars at Yale and other 
universities, and besides Derrida's reputation as an intellectual, 50 and besides deconstruction's 
position in popular understanding as an 'arty'SI or 'intellectual's2 or 'edgy'S3 or simply 
confrontationalS4 mode of discourse. deconstruction is positioned specifically within the confines of 
academic thought by grace of its adoption over the past thirty or so years. And even in the arena of 
specialised readers (academics and scholars, critics and theorists) deconstruction has "the reputation, 
justified or not, of treating things obliquely, indirectly",ss a reputation widespread enough fur 
Derrida to both be aware of and comment on it. 
But obliquity is not the only, or even the primary (as in most often cited. or most foregrounded) 
criticism of deconstruction. 56 As often as it is criticised for density or linguistic decoration, for 
difficulty or for elitism, deconstruction is also the subject of a more generalised, and more damnin& 
50 For a discussion ofDerrida's legitimation both in France and in the U.S .• sec Lamont. 593-600. 
51 As in the 'deconstructcd' salad. 
52 Read 'overthought', as in the 'deconstructed' salad. 
53 As in Comrne des G a r ~ o n s s and other 'deconstructcd' fashion. 
54 As in the article by Fr. Aquino. but also in Ellis. etc. 
55 Derrida,Jacques • .Acts of Religion. Ed. and trans. Gil Anidjar. (New York: Routledge. 2002). p. 244. 
56 George Watson's criticism that deconstruction is a -technique of trouble· (Modern Literary Thought. Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter Universitatsverlag. 1978. p. 13) is a specific example: for a more general survey of the reception of deconstruction on 
the American scene in particular but with reference to European receptions. see From t h ~ ~ New Criticism to DecollSlrr4ctitm: 
T h ~ ~ Reception of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism by Art Berman (Champaign: University of Illinois Press. 1988).1b 
scope of this chapter does not support a detailed exegesis of the many ways in which deconstruction unsettled the field o ~ ~
literary theory, but certain readings of deconstruction (including by so-called 'deconstructionists') will be treated later in this 
chapter, and those treatments include an examination of the ways in which a defence against the uncanny slipperiness of 
deconstruction is incorporated even into documents meant to support or propagate it. 
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critique. This is the allegation of destructiveness, negativity, or relativism. 57 At worst, deconstruction 
is a 'negative' process undergone to uproot and replace a standing order, or, in Derrida's gloss of his 
critics, "a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical question of justice and 
before the opposition between just and unjust".58 
To summarise these two perspectives, deconstruction is obscure, difficult, snobbish-enough to be a 
little ridiculous. as in Paul McCormick's recognition that in some circles "deconstruction has been 
deemed salon leftism for the Reagan-Thatcher era".59 And if it is not snobbishly obscure. 
deconstruction is nihilistic, destructive. and 'godless'. 
'Negative' how? In the context of a positivist metaphysics-a philosophy of the presence of things-
deconstruction is 'negative' in the sense that meaning is not added to or found in things (a positive or 
additive process), but that the meaning understood to be in things is shown to be unstable. It is this 
instability that seems to carry the 'negative' feeling from which arise accusations of nihilism. This 
feeling of negativity ignores the logical conclusion of imagining that meaning is unstable and not 
located in texts. That is, if, as posited by deconstructive tactics, there is already no inherent meaning 
to be found in a text, then the process of engaging the text in tactics which play with its instability 
docs not deplete the text of meaning. but meets it on ground which is to some extent its native 
territory.60 The affront of "the deconstructive program", oversimplified. is that it "involves taking the 
traditional [ ... J and standing it up on its head".61 This simplification shows where the most basic 
objections to deconstruction occur: at the juncture between the traditional (what we're used to 
doing; what has 'always' been done) and its inversion. It also gives an insight into the tone of such 
objections: standing some thing 'on its head' is a disruption of the comfortable and 'natural' order of 
things. We stand on our feet, not our heads; we proceed through a text in this way, not that way. The 
57 For indirect allegations of rdativism in deconstruction. sec Armstrong. Paul B. -The Multiple Existence of a Literary Work-. 
TheJournai of Aesthetics antiArt Criticism. Vol. 44. No.4 (Summer. 1986). pp. 321-329. 
58 Derrida. 2002: 247. The quotation docs nothing. of course. to dispel accusations of obliquity. The language is dense and 
particular. But it is not purposeless jargon; that is the function of particularity in language-to try to get as close as possible 
to precision. knowing precision is impossible. by making use of the widest array of functions (stylistic. lexical. grammatical) 
awilablc. 
59 McCormick. 400. 
60 Arguing that the tactics of deconstruction could meet the text on 'native territory' would seem to imply that in fact there is a 
stable ground to return to. However. what is intended here is not the argumentative establishment of some absolute ground 
to which to return. but the tracery of the logic by which deconstruction meets texts in terms of their instability. and a 
demonstration of why it might do so. This is not to establish the necessary positivity of deconstruction. but to demonstrate 
that neither is negativity a necessary condition of such a practice. 
61 Ellis, 268. 
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objection to deconstruction on the basis of its topsy-turviness is an objection from a place of 
defensiveness62 and fear. I f there were really no substance to the deconstructive tendency to invert 
binaries, or to "[undermine] the referential status of the language being deconstructed",63 a defensive 
position would be unwarranted. 
Not all readers of deconstruction-the word. or the writings so called-have turned to it with this 
type of attention, however. In the literature that contains the response to its arrival in the United 
States, deconstruction attracts reactions from almost all comers: literary criticism, law, humanities, 
social sciences. Despite-or perhaps because of-the eager adoption of deconstruction as cause and 
mode by some American writers and scholars in the 1970s and '80s, there was a visible struggle 
against its adoption, which likewise crossed disciplinary boundaries. Deconstruction is obliquely 
identified. along with perhaps Structuralism to some extent64, as an "apocalyptic [ ... ] irrationalism-
which fabricated objections to the New Critics. At other times, however, deconstruction is seen as 
"merely a continuation and imitative form of the New Criticism"65 or even "traditionalism's last 
formalist buttress".66 So which is it? Is deconstruction a sign of the apocalypse approaching. the death 
of all criticism; or is it simply and dismissibly an opulent next step in the project of close reading set 
out by the New Critics, a project which was too narrow &om the start? 
Deconstruction is criticised as "just another decadent version of always narrow formalism";67 in other 
words, no better than what is seen to precede it, and in fact slightly more useless or dangerous due to 
its apparent Baroqueness-its form suiting no function but decoration. Along similar lines is the 
criticism that deconstruction is a game whose ends tell us that" actually carrying out deconstruction 
is a trivial pursuit"68-that is, that not only is deconstruction merely a game, it is a game which wastes 
our time and energy because only once we carry it out do we discover that our efforts have been 
spent at something which is 'trivial'. Elsewhere, it is criticised as "an attempt to delineate and exceed 
the limits not only of traditional metaphysical doctrines, but of the 'philosophical ground' derived 
62 Paul de Man: ·One must be feeling very threatened indeed to become so [ ... ] defensivc·, quoted in Derrida. Jacques. Eyes of 
the University: &ghl to Philosophy 2. Trans. J. Plug and others. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 20(4), p. 
294. Derrida further writes that "We can easily see on which side obscurantism and nihilism are lurking when on occasion 
great professors or representatives of prestigious institutions lose all sense of proportion and control; on such occasions, they 
forget thc principles that they claim to defend in their work- (Derrida. 2004: 147). 
63 Miller,J. Hillis. -Review: Deconstructing the Deconstructers-. DiAcritics. Vol. 5, No.2 (Summer, 1975). p. 30. 
64 Ibid; see reference to Barthes. 
65 Barzilai and Bloomfield. 151. 
66 Lcntricchia. Frank. After the New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 169. 
67 Leitch, Vincent. Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 142. 
68 Ibid. 868. 
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from those doctrines", 69 which sounds like a fair description of what deconstruction does indeed end 
up doing sometimes-except that the 'phUosophical ground' here is not understood to need that 
delineating or excess. 
Other critics see deconstruction as much more serious a problem than the decadence of a game 
played in university offices and between the pages of academic journals. Gerald Graff identifies 
deconstruction, in its most extreme manifestation, with "the force of consumer capitalism itself', as 
that which "rendered negligible" concepts of "nature, essence, immanence", all of which are supposed 
to hold the value of the human being flrmly in place, tied to its metaphysical Being. As consumer 
capitalism, deconstruction is "more powerful" than "any school of phUosophy or criticism".7° Graff's 
criticism is problematic because it can only see one possibUity for the loss of absolutes with which he 
identifIes deconstruction, and this possibility is in fact tied to his conceptions of 'nature, essence, 
immanence': the one possibility is the possibility of the void-void of value, void of belief This, 
however, imagines deconstruction as a one-way system whose adoption would only cancel out old 
relationships, replacing them with their opposites, and is a clear misreading of a deconstruction that 
must continually revise, but not delete, its relationships to its historical and present contexts in order 
to render the undecidable. Graff's proposition contains a contradiction of its own terms-
deconstruction as absolute flgure (absolute nU) is still absolute and thereby subject to taking apart, 
juxtaposition; in a word, to deconstruction. In Derrida's words, it is "a kind of general strategy of 
deconstruction ( ... ] to avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and 
simply residing within the closed field of these oppositions".71 Graff's fear that deconstruction is 
either the root or a symptom of the problems of end-game capitalism imagines something that 
resides precisely within the 'closed field' Derrida describes. 
Graff's criticisms of Derrida are related to others', in part because they focus on the relationship 
between what is called 'deconstruction' and the theoretical/phUosophical/cultural grounds which 
fonn its context, both historically and contemporaneously (at the time of the articles in which these 
criticisms occur). Terry Eagleton calls deconstruction "the death drive at the level of theory" because 
it "turns its violence masochistically upon itself and goes down with it, locked with its object in a 
69 Schwartz. Stephen Adam. -The Deconstmctive Imperative-. MLN, Vol. 105, No.4 (Sept.. 1990). p. 857. 
70 Graff. Gerald. -The Pseudo-Politics of Interpretation-, in The Politics of Interpretation. ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1982-83). p. 154. 
71 Derrida, Jacques. Positions. (Trans. Alan Bass. London: The Athalone Press, 1987). p. 41. Henceforth Derrida 1987 a. 
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lethal complicity which permits it the Rnal inviolability of pure negation".72 Many criticisms of 
deconstruction focus precisely on its apparent capacity to destroy, which begs the question. destroy 
what, exactly? Negate what, exactly? 
The focus on deconstruction's negating or destructive potential makes some sense in terms of the 
history of recent literary criticism seen as a straight line in which Romanticism is eaten by the larger 
fish of Modernism, etc., until we reach Formalism, Structuralism, the New Critics. And if 
deconstruction enters the scene here-a scene structured by the imagination of progressively more 
'right' methods for dealing with literature73-then according to the terms of the scene it has to be a 
threat. Although this syllogism is not laid out in the literature, the viciousness with which its 
detractors criticise it upholds it. These attacks are not only on how deconstruction appears to work 
(they are rarely about that, in fact). They are about what it is-the 'death drive at the level of theory: 
'pure negation'. As such, one function of these criticisms is to avoid seeing what possibilities there 
might be in deconstruction, instead assuming that it will take the form which the critic anticipates, 
i.e. destroying what came before it. I f the critic is also implicated in this before', no wonder 
deconstruction seems "apocalyptic".74 But if a critic is, or fiels, so implicated, then his or her criticism 
contains its own unreliability. Deconstruction is something which "undoes the very comforts of 
mastery and consensus that underlie the illusion that objectivity is situated somewhere outside the 
self"?S The text is not deconstructed. It is always already in the process of demonstrating its own 
deconstruction-the inclusion of and reconciling with its own opposites or others. 
G. Feminism and deconstruction 
I want to diverge for a moment from a discussion of the criticisms of deconstruction that take aim at 
it in the context of its introduction as a way of reading or a method for literary studies. There is 
72 Eagleton. Terry. "Marxism and Deconstruction-. Contemporary Literature. Vol. 22. No.4 {Autumn. 1981}. p. 482. 
73 Characterisations of 'best practices' for deconstruction manifest this concern with the righmess of one's methods. Whether 
offered by its defenders and proponents or by its detractors. these characterisations often descend into a kind of high 
theoretical name-calling wherein one party deflnes the other according to their ability {or not} to understand or perform a 
certain method or tactic. as well as in terms of the perceived usefulness or pragmatics of that tactic. The idea seems to be that 
the more another's reading adheres to one's own image of how deconstruction works. the more 'correct' it is. No surprise; this 
is. after all. a fairly standard way of evaluating information. But if we can nnd in deconstruction the possibility for another 
way of being with information than evaluating it, then this demands of us to flnd a likewise different way of behaving when 
we encounter approaches that seem different-even onhagonal-to our own. 
74 Wellek, Rene. "The New Criticism: Pro and Contra-. CriticAl Inqu;ry. Vol. 4. No.4 (Summer. 1978). p. 621. 
75 Johnson. Barbara. "Nothing Fails Like Success-. SCE Reports 8 {Fall 1980).11. 
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another place where deconstruction is taken to task-though not for its potential threat to a practice 
of literary analysis. This place is in feminist criticism and theory. However, as I will briefly show, this 
taking-to-task is not an attack so much as a reminder to deconstruction itself that both identity and 
the dissolution of identity are involved in deconstructive moves-and in feminism. The question of 
the relationship between deconstruction and feminism is especially apposite in light of this 
reminder: both entities are defined for convenience methodologically or ontically, but are in their 
(individual) practice. Nevertheless, the relationship has not always been a fond or uncomplicated 
one, and feminist readings are part of the larger body of criticisms of deconstruction. 
What is the space in deconstruction, or even in the debates around it, for women and others writing 
in tenns of identity politics; that is, writing theory that is based in part on the assumption that 
'woman' is a discrete categoryf6 Feminist perspectives on deconstruction are in part about the work 
of puzzling out whether or not one needs an a priori ground from which to reason; however, these 
are not intellectual games-questions about the being of women are questions that have real effects 
in the world. As Laura Lee Downs asks in the tide of her article, "If 'Woman' is just an Empty 
Category. Then Why am I Mraid to Walk Alone at Night?'"77The supposed 'emptiness' of absolute 
categories is no consolation when a woman is cat-called. groped, or harassed; denied control of her 
reproductive functions; refused education or compensation for her work. In other words, in order 
for political action to be taken, this action requires a ground from which to operate. In the case of 
feminism. this 'ground' is the identity 'woman' (or' female'). On the other hand, of course, it is the 
cssentialised category 'woman' from which spring arguments about 'women's p l a c e s ~ ~ underwriting 
the very oppression which feminism addresses; an "emphasis on female difference comes disturbingly 
to echo the very patriarchal prejudices against which the champions of women's equality are 
struggling·.78 
The relationship between feminist criticism and deconstruction is complicated; Derrida himself said. 
76 Because this dissertation stakes itself in part on a rereading and realignment of deconstruction in terms of ~ r i t u r e e feminine. I 
will only deal with feminist criticism's relationship to deconstruction. There is much more that could be said about all kinds 
ofidentity-bascd theory (queer theory. for example) in relation to deconstruction, but this is work that will in this instance 
6dl outside of the dissertation. 
77 Downs. Laura Lee. -If'Woman' is just an Empty Category. Then Why am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night?: Identiry Politics 
Meets the Postmodem Subject". Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 35. No.2 (Apr. 1993). pp. 414-437. This 
dwion, p. 414. 
78 Moio Toril. -Feminism. Postmodemism. and Style: Recent Feminist Criticism in the United States. Cultural Critique. No.9 
(SprinS 1988). pp. 3-22. This citation. p. 6. 
145 
"I am not against feminism, but I am not simply for feminism."'79 But Moi takes his statement to task, 
denying the real possibility of being 'simply for' feminism at all. Both feminism and deconstruction, 
though ideas which have intcl1ecrual being, are also faced with the "complexities of the real, empirical 
world".so One of those complexities is the embodied f3.ct: of women's bodies and the relation between 
those bodies and a systemic oppression of them. In order to address what is specific to the oppression 
of women-to address that what is oppressed is "not otherness, but speciflc, historically constructed 
agents", that "Women under patriarchy are oppressed because they are women",81 Moi argues that a 
certain kind of closure must be deliberately imposed on the feminist text. This 'closure' is the situation 
of "deconstructive gestures in specific political contexts"sz such as feminism. It is this ~ ~ of 
closure-the acknowledgement or even willing imposition of limits-which actually enacts a 
de constructive tum: "awareness of our own limitations and the necessity of certain limits fOr our 
discourse recalls a properly analytical [ ... ] stance, not simply a re-enactment of metaphysical 
authority".83 In other words, to begin by acknowledging the points of closure in one's work does not 
preclude, and in fact can assist, one's writings participation in deconstruction. To acknowledge sites 
of closure is, paradoxically, to open the text to further readings, and to assert incompleteness. Because 
there is no single feminism, however, these sites of closure take different forms, and what is 
foreclosed by the political necessity of writing as a woman is unpredictable. In the writing of Gayam 
Spivak, Moi writes, "'high theory' is impudently interrupted by apparently unrelated personal and 
pedagogical anecdotes"84 with Moi's analysis of the results varying from the explosion of linear 
sequentiality and the decentring of the subject to the creation of a text which makes connections ·so 
elusive as to become private".85The sites of closure that Moi identifies are represented by the word 
'etc: in Judith Butler's examination of the failure of theories of feminist identity: these theories 
"elaborate predicates of color, sexuality, ethnicity, class and able-bodiedness" and "inVariably close 
with an embarrassed 'etc: at the end of the list".86 'Etc: is the indication of the impossibility of 
completely describing or including the situated subject; it is the failure or limit of inclUSion. 
However, Butler sees in this word the possibility of the "illimitable process of signification itscJF; 
using Derrida's word, she calls it "the suppllmmt, the excess that necessarily accompanies any effort to 
79 Jacques Derrida, in conversation with Geoff Bennington, ·On Colleges and Philosophy," in lCADocuments 4 una S, cd. Lisa 






85 Moi, 21. 
86 Buder,Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofldmtity (London: Roudedge. 1990), p. 143. 
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posit identity once and for all".B7 The limitations of feminism-the problems of relying on an 
identity which can neither be stable nor central, and the inevitable neglect of individual experience 
which occurs when systems of description arise-reflect the concerns of deconstruction. After all, 
even to deconstruct something, one must begin by acknowledging it, defining it. And in Moi's 
words, "Definitions may well be constraining: they are also enabling [ ... J .To name is to exercise 
power. The notion that closure, or conceptually rigorous definitions, is merely constraining is a 
fashionable dogma of poststructuralism: such a simplistic view is not only utterly undialectical, but 
also a travesty of the thought of Jacques Derrida himself'.88 A feminism which did not begin with an 
essentialising move might neglect the specific, embodied situation of women as subjects; one which 
limited itself to such an essentialism, however. would run the risk of perpetuating the oppression it 
set out to confront. Acknowledging points of closure (of identity. of essentialism) allows the feminist 
writer to enact the deconstructive gestUre which points to the identity it overturns as false. and 
admits its simultaneous meaningfulness. 
H. Culler's deconstruction 
Setting aside the possibility or even the appropriateness of such a task, it is not only the detractors of 
deconstruction who tend to place it in the box marked 'critical methods'. And so placing it indicates 
no f.Wure other than that of the imagination. which clings to the models already buUt for it. whether 
by positivist science, by the history of phUosophy, by linguistics. by Structuralism, or by literary 
theory. But perhaps before a new container can even be imagined. we need to exhaust the possibilities 
for placing what we study into the categories we already have. This is the role of work like Jonathan 
Culler's On Deconstruction, which will be the centre of this section's questioning. On Deconstruction 
attempts an understanding of deconstruction which. if not conclusive or exhaustive. might at least 
"describe the logic according to which meanings are engenderedlOs9 by the processes and attitudes 
which by the time of Culler's writing had become known as deconstruction (in this case referring 
pretty much directly to Derrida's writing and that of a few other post-structuralists). In other words 
(again Barthes'), what Culler is buUding is "a science of the conditions of content'".90 In the first 
section of the book. Culler historicises the emergence of deconstruction and places it in terms of its 
r! Ibid. 
88 Moio 9. 
89 Barthes, Roland. Criticism and Truth (Critique a verite), p. 63, quoted in Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction. (Ithaca: 
Comdl University Press). 1982. p. 32. 
90 Barthes, Roland. Criticism & Truth. trans. and ed. K. Keuneman. (London: The Athalone Press. 1987). p. 73. 
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various adoptions, adaptations, and affiliations, relating it to Structuralism, feminist theory. and 
reader-response criticism. He does this for the most part without making a direct connection 
between the explications of, for instance, feminist theory (which he designates 'reading as a woman: 
underlining my point above regarding the simultaneous 'double belief in and deconstruction of 
identity) and deconstruction; in a way, these early sections act as predictive case-studies, 
demonstrating deconstructive possibilities at work. for instance in the way that feminist readings 
confront "male readings with the elements of the texts they neglect",91 thereby inverting the 
hierarchies male readings put in place in those texts and calling those elements into question. These 
first sections prepare the reader not only by demonstrating how and in what contexts deconstruction 
might be at work. but also by providing a historical gloss to the period during which 'deconstruction' 
emerged as a term naming the practices which Culler identifies throughout On Deconstruction. These 
'stories of reading-reading as a woman, reading as a New Critic, reading as a structuralist. reading as 
a post-structuralist, reading as a responsive reader-are confronted by deconstruction. which 
"explores the problematic situation to which stories of reading have led US".92 In other words, 
deconstruction is what allows us to see the ways in which stories of reading are only part of the story 
of reading. the whole story (if perhaps unattainable or inexpressible) being that which contains all its 
own contradictions rather than suppressing or denying them. 
Culler also attempts to describe the conditions out of which Derrida's writing arises, situating it in 
terms of Saussure's work as well as Austin's, in addition to in terms of the history of philosophy. 
While a historical understanding of context is important and helps to shape one's impression of 
deconstruction and how it might appear in contrast to other ways of engaging with texts. such an 
understanding is both reductionist and impossible-or at least contradictory to deconstruction's 
inversions of causality and origin, identified by Culler in the second chapter of his book ("Writing 
and Logocentrism"). A historical understanding of deconstruction reduces it to a product of such-
and-such a time or set of conditions, which then might be (or must be) replicated in order to 
'replicate' deconstruction itself If deconstruction is an attitude that allows for inversion and 
contradiction. then a historical understanding of deconstruction in some way goes against this grain. 
by forcing a progress and a direction. Deconstruction may have appeared. in a literally chronolOgical 
understanding of things, after semiotics, for instance. But seeing semiotics as a precedent for 
deconstruction only sees a genealogy without further trying to determine "what this history has been 
91 Culler, 55. 
92 Culler, 83. 
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able to dissimulate or forbid".93 
In keeping with this attitude, Culler begins his explanation of what deconstruction is by noting that 
it, too, is engaged in the flux between the story and the reading of the story; deconstruction is 
·variously presented as a philosophical position, a political or intellectual strategy, and a mode of 
reading.94 Note that in Culler's reading of others' readings of deconstruction, deconstruction is both 
the thing which can be read (i.e., a philosophical position) and the way of reading (a strategy, a 
mode). Thus, implicit in his initial definitions of what deconstruction is or how it can be is an 
acknowledgement of deconstruction's own tendency to cross the boundary or to exist on both sides 
of it-calling the meaning of a line between reading and being-read into question. A philosophical 
position is also something that can be taken and from which a mode of or strategy for reading can 
devdop, so inherent in Culler's description is also a possible notion of cause and effect which is, by 
Culler's later examination of the properties of 'cause' and 'effect' itself. open to deconstruction-that 
is, to the inversion of understandings, such that the philosophical position emerges as an effect of 
reading. for example. Culler refines and revises-corrects-the readings of deconstruction as 
philosophical position/mode of reading by proposing deconstruction be understood instead (or as 
well) as "a strategy within philosophy and a strategy for dealing with philosophy" which "aspires to 
be both rigorous argument within philosophy and displacement of philosophical categories or 
philosophical attempts at mastery".95 
Perhaps the most important word in this description is the small preposition 'within', because it is the 
quality of the 'within' that signals deconstruction's rdation to texts it deconstructs. Deconstruction 
is not a force which applies itself to texts from outside of them; it is the principle at work within texts 
which dislodges the hierarchies in them and which, in overturning these hierarchies, {re)introduces, 
makes visible again, an undecidable term which "can no longer be included within philosophical 
(binary) opposition".96 Culler sees that deconstruction ·works within the terms of the system but in 
order to breach it" and that "to deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy 
it asserts".97 By Derrida's admission, the "classical philosophical opposition" is not "the peaceful 
coexistence of vis-Ii-vis, but rather [ ... ] a violent hierarchy" which requires the overturning of that 
93 Derrida 1987a: 6. 
94 Culler, 85. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Derrida 1987a:43. 
"., Culler, 86. 
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hierarchy.98 Despite Derrida's figuration of the violent hierarchy and despite the relatively aggressive 
phrasing Culler uses (breach', 'undermine'), Culler's assertion that "deconstruction appeals to no 
higher logical principle or superior reason but uses the very principle it deconstructs-99 offers an 
understanding of deconstruction which from its first principles-and not necessarily by violence, 
but even by something which we could understand as passive or non-violent resistance-slips out 
from the rigid up-down structure of a hierarchy and into another kind of relation. We might tlgure 
this other relation as mutually concentric, a relation in which each term both contains the other and 
is contained by it. In any case, deconstruction coming from within that which 'is deconstructcd' 
means that deconstruction is an interior function, a sympathetic one, even, in that it produces an 
effect similar to others also arising from and in the text. Deconstruction is not an attack; instead, it is 
a resistance to a system (the system of phallogocentrism or of the metaphysics of presence within 
which Western thought has been formed) that is violent by its insistence on one term's placement 
over another, violent in its insistence that a space might only ever be occupied by a Single term. 
Culler sums up the 'origins' of deconstruction in Derrida's writings, pointing out the instances of 
Derrida's discussion of what are now major deconstructive tropes-diffCrance, supplement, meaning, 
presence, logocentrism, Writing/speech, iterability, grafting/intervention. In so doing. whether or 
not his intention was to avoid it, Culler creates something of a guidebook to deconstruction, which 
by the nature of the limitations of a book's physical structure (linear; a set number of pages; one-
directional readinglOO) is forced to behave as though deconstruction were a set of strategies so 
containable. That is, in setting out to talk about deconstruction, what Culler is able to do is talk 
around it, neglecting or unable (a fault of the book form or of the possibilities of writing/language?) 
to confront the pOSSibility that deconstruction is an attitude or way of being whose traces arc visible 
but whose scheme is not. That is, that deconstruction may not be able to be talked about in terms we 
already use; that it may not be able to be oudined or replicated-that, despite similarities, each 
iteration of what has come to be called deconstruction or a deconstructive practice is different and 
98 Derrida 1987a: 43. 
99 Culler. 87. 
100 For the most part; see David Foster Wallace's essay -Host- in ConsiJer the Lobster (London: Abacus. 2007) for an example 
of non-linear reading. But we still read left to right across the page. or across the word. We do not experience a 
dimensionality of writing. It is not. for instance. sculptural. See Jonathan Safran Foer's Tru of Codes (London: VISUal 
Editions, 2010) for a further counter-example. especially in terms of reading in three dimensions. Of course. there is another 
medium in which reading routinely becomes. at least to some extent, three-dimensional. and that is hypertext. Although we 
arc still confined to read from left to right (or right to left. etc., depending on the language being used). the way that links 
and other texts interrupt the 'main' or 'original' text suggests hypertext as a model of deconstruction-the disrupdon is 
inherent to the text, not imposed. and this inherence resists a structure of text (writing or reading. in English or other L-R. 
top-down writccn forms oflanguagc. in this case) which adheres exclusively to a left-right. top-bottom program. 
150 
gains its very meaning by that difference; and that deconstruction can probably not be caught in any 
meaningful (or at least exclusive) way between the pages of this or any book. Deconstruction. then. is 
the relation between the theory and the practice. theory being what is public. set down. spoken. and 
momentarily fixed; practice being what is private. enacted, fleeting. This makes Culler's book-and 
every other text 'on d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ~ ~ including this dissertation-a cautionary tale. since each reading 
is incomplete and open to amendment. criticism. The warning is ontological. buUt in to the attempt 
to talk about what deconstruction is. how it works. what its effects have been; "no reading can escape 
correction [ ... J this account of misreading is not. perhaps. a coherent. consistent position, but its 
advocates would claim, it resists metaphysical idealizations [sic] and captures the temporal dynamic 
of our interpretive situation ".101 By Culler's own admission the things his book might caution against 
(in its failures) are unavoidable since all readings are misreadings, all representations are incomplete 
and failure is a built-in part of beginning to write. In this way, the warning is not a thou-shalt-not but 
a thou-wilt. He recognises that his "own misreading of Derrida may in some contexts pass as 
sufficient understanding. but it will also be attacked as a misreading". 102 
There is a problem with the word 'attack' used here, and that problem is the omission of a kind of 
scholarly compassion for others whose readings do not, in one's opinion, go far enough, dare enough. 
risk enough, or find the 'right' conclusions. A judgment is not an attack (necessarUy). It is an 
engagement with the project the writer puts forth. And so, when Culler writes that "historical 
narratives are produced by interpreting the supposedly less complex and ambiguous texts of a 
period", and defines these narratives as "stories of changes in thinking and of the thoughts and beliefs 
appropriate to distinguishable historical periods",103 although he is not arguing for an understanding 
of history (or narrative) that is "invoked as ultimate reality and source of truth",I04 he nevertheless 
builds a historical narrative of what he calls deconstruction {mainly the writings of Derrida} and of 
its surrounding texts, both complementary and critical. One effect of this narrative-construction is 
that despite Culler's sympathy to the project of deconstruction (and its refusal to "[define] meaning 
in order to tell you how to find it"IOS). his method of talking about it inadvertently fixes 
deconstruction. Why this might be the case-questions of the performative aspects of Culler's 
writing; his Anglophone style versus a francophone style; his historical position writing at the 
101 Culler. 178. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Culler 129, 
104 Ibid. He also notes. on p, 130, that history has no special privilege as pan of "the general text, which has no boundaries-, 
lOS Culler 131. 
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beginning of deconstruction's appearance in the U.S.-would provide the backbone for a whole 
chapter, which this dissertation's scope does not encompass. What does, however, fall within the 
remit of this dissertation is the question of method in terms of Culler's approach to deconstmaion. 
This dissertation's critique of Culler here has taken into account Culler's own side note that cthe 
edifying philosopher necessarily writes hybrid texts"; 106 I recognise that in part Culler's project in 0. 
Deconstruction is a demystiflcation of , deconstruction' and that this is undertaken out of a respect for 
Derrida's work evidenced by Culler's familiarity with his texts in the original and in the translation. I 
also recognise that this project requires Culler to create a text which both plays by old rules-about 
how literary theory operates and what it is-as well as models new ones. I argue that in fact his ten 
does too little of the latter, and that his reliance on tropes of method and procedure is in part to 
blame for this. 
Call to mind Derrida's assertion, quoted in full in Section C of this chapter, that deconstruction is 
not "a specialized set of discursive procedures, still less the rules of a new hermeneutic method-,,07 
Why does Culler, in light of this assertion, still argue things like "deconstruction leads not to a brave 
new world in which unity never figures but to the identification of unity as a problematic figun:-?101 
The problem here is not the topic. In fact, the idea at stake-difference-is inarguably central to 
much of what calls itself or has been called 'deconstruction'. But how Culler writes here-using the 
verb ' l e a d s ~ ~ for example, which gives the feeling of progress and contiguity-takes the form of a 
prescription. This exemplifies Culler's difficult position, which is in part a consequence of his 
historical context. On Deconstruction had to discuss or clarify what 'deconstruction' was 'about: how 
it 'worked' because that operation was emblematic of (Anglophone-American) literary criticism 
and academic writing in the humanities. Culler is using the language that he is expected to use, both 
in order to be understood and in order to gain credence (for himself and his subject). His audience, 
who were not only non-practitioners of deconstruction, but also others interested in or Practicing it, 
were to some extent hostile.109 Culler is writing into a time and place where the ideas he explains ar.: 
both threatening to the general order and vulnerable to "attack and misunderstanding·.llo 
106 Culler. 152 fo. 
107 Culler. 156. 
108 Culler. 182. 
109 See Culler. 228.fo. for example; also pp. 227-228 for examples of the reception of deconstruction by mainstrcarnlclitc 
media (Newsweek. the New York nmes &view of Booles) and by prominent academic critics (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy; 
Gasche). 
110 Culler. 150. 
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But. because of these constraints or regardless of them, what this means is that despite Culler's 
dedication to the project of looking at and talking about deconstruction, what he buUds is to some 
extent a prescription for its performance; a removed, descriptive observation of how it works and 
what it does. At the centre (almost exactly!) of the book is Culler's logical syllogism for 
deconstruction, a six-step schema of deconstructive reversal.111 Statements such as these tell us that 
deconstruction does have procedures; that it is, then, a specific method rather than a way of being-
with. Method is ingrained in Culler's reading of deconstruction by the idea of deconstruction as 
something which might be replicated (more faithfully), and in the readings of critics of 'mechanical 
applications' of deconstruction likewise, by their implied assertion that it has been replicated less 
faithfully (to its "original radical force",1l2 for example). 
However, at several points in On Deconstruction, Culler concentrates on the idea that the "attempt to 
'know thyself', whether by a person or a poem, may produce powerful interpretive discourse, but 
something crucial will remain unknown or unnoticed". I 13 (This statement in particular comes from a 
section on framing and parerga.) The unknown, the unnoticed, or what slips out of view supplements 
the text (self, poem). In Culler's text, what seems to go unnoticed is the way that, despite his 
argument via recourse to Derrida's insistence that deconstruction is non-methodical, Culler 
repeatedly describes, figures, and lays out deconstruction in ways that make it appear to be a method 
or fold it into an understanding based on method, order, procedure. For instance, besides the 
examples earlier in this section, at one point Culler differentiates deconstruction from other 
theoretical practices; deconstruction "makes itself felt not by disturbing critical concepts but by 
identifying a series of important topics on which critics may then focus in their interpretation of 
111 Ibid: summarised here. 
(A) demonstrate opposition is an imposition of metaphysics/ideology 
1. bring its assumptions and role in metaphysics to the fore via analysis of texts 
2. show how this is undone in the tens which rely on it. 
(B) simultaneously. maintain this opposition 
1. usc it in your own argument against it 
2. reinstate it via reversal. 
In this way, Culler demonstrates that the project of deconstruction is displacement and reinscription rather than 
deconstruction. Still. his mode of accomplishing this demonstration is to rely on a procedure which. further. he lays out in 
an orderly fashion. as though it might be followed from step to step each time one wishes to undertake a 'deconstruction', 
Seen in tandem with accusations of 'mechanical' applications of deconstruction (228.fo). it is difficult not to understand 
such presentation as contributing to the problem by which deconstruction becomes a method to apply to texts or into which 
to force them. 
112 Culler. 228 fo, 
113 Culler. 205. 
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literary works".114 The list he makes, which includes speech/writing. presence/absence, origin. 
marginality, representation, and indeterminacy, is written with serial commas and no final 
conjunction, demonstrating rhetorically that the set is not closed. But there are two objections to 
raise here. First, that such a list of topics undoubtedly eIoes disturb critical concepts because the topics 
are not merely objects of study but also ways of studying. lenses through which to sec history, 
literatUre, art, etc. Second, and this is the greater objection: Culler's phrasing pretends to-or actually 
maintains-an ignorance of the way that deconstruction understood as an attitude rather than a 
method is not limited to a treatment of one set of ' important topics' but can become a way of dealing 
with the world in its encountered materiality and tcxtuality. 
Yes, no one would question that there are major ideas in Derrida's work (which is not the sum total 
of deconstruction, but that is another matter): writing and speech. The name. The signature. The gift. 
Truth. The archive, inheritance, genealogy. But these, or even the full bibliography marked D ror 
Derrida or deconstruction could not spell the limits of what deconstruction ought to or could be. This 
is why Derrida's writing (for instance) can engage with everything from Freud's pleasure principle to 
postcards to the Joycean 'yes' to e·mail to the secret. Not because these concepts are innately bound 
to deconstruction, but because if there is an 'innate' quality of deconstruction it is its Propensity to 
touch everything. Availability to everything. Taking ideas from Derrida's work and saying 'These are 
the topics' narrows the field in such a way as to make it thinkable that a single method could be 
applied to it, much as in a particular kind of laboratory (with certain equipment and a specific 
question to answer) only specific procedures will be undertaken. 
Culler is doing something useful and probably necessary: constructing a map or a geography of the 
theoretical terrain he occupies. At no point does he state his explicit intention for this work to be a 
deconstructive work itself, and his style and form likewise do not demonstrate such an intention. 
Therefore, perhaps understanding the work of On Deconstruction as that of a guidebook. in a fOreign 
city would be a fitting trope. However, this still leaves us with the problem of deconstruction if it is 
understood as not only unmappable but something to which the fitting of maps is inappropriate. 
Culler is an advocate for deconstruction. But in his advocacy. he misplaces an attention to the 
potential that deconstruction holds when it is seen outside the matrix of method, and, in writing 
deconstruction into that matrix, he contributes to an understanding of deconstruction as 
114 Culler, 206. 
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instrumental and end-oriented which does not acknowledge the possibilities it provides for 
interaction based on approach rather than application. 
L Another possibility for deconstruction 
The final section of this chapter will focus on a short excerpt from an interview with Derrida that was 
conducted by Nikhil Padgaonkor in 1997. Padgaonkor asks Derrida to explain "the view that 
deconstruction is not an inherendy negative term, that it is not to be understood as criticism or 
destruction-.IIS Padgaonkor cites a previous interview (1982), which had also been published in Le 
Mtmtle. wherein Derrida had said that Kdeconstruction is always accompanied by 10ve",1l6 and asks 
about the love in deconstruction; specifically, he asks whether that love is "phUia". I will begin by 
quoting Derrida's reply in full. A reading of this reply will comprise the rest of this section. 
This love means an affirmative desire towards the Other-to respect the Other, to pay 
attention to the Other, not to destroy the otherness of the Other-and this is the 
preliminary affirmation. even if afterwards because of this love, you ask questions. There 
is some negativity in deconstruction. I wouldn't deny this. You have to criticise, to ask 
questions, to challenge and sometimes to oppose. What I have said is that in the final 
instance. deconstruction is not negative although negativity is no doubt at work. Now, in 
order to criticise, to negate, to deny. you have fust to say "yes". When you address the 
Other, even if it is to oppose the Other. you make a sort of promise-that is, to address 
the Other as Other, not to reduce the otherness of the Other, and to take into account 
the singularity of the Other. That's an irreducible affirmation, it's the original ethics if you 
want. So from that point of view, there is an ethics of deconstruction. Not in the usual 
sense, but there is an affirmation. You know, I often use a quote from Rosensweig or even 
from Uvinas which says that the "yes" is not a word like others, that even if you do not 
pronounce the word. there is a "yes" implicit in every language, even if you multiply the 
"no·, there is a ·yes". And this is even the case with Heidegger. You know Heidegger, for a 
long time, for years and years kept saying that thinking started with questioning, that 
questioning (fragen) is the dignity of thinking. And then one day, without contradicting 
this statement, he said "yes, but there is something even more originary than questioning, 
than this piety of thinking." and it is what he called zusage which means to acquiesce, to 
accept, to say ·yes·, to affirm. So this zusage is not only prior to questioning. but it is 
supposed by any questioning. To ask a question, you must nrst tell the Other that I am 
speaking to you. Even to oppose or challenge the Other, you must say "at least I speak to 
you", "I say yes to our being in common together". So this is what I meant by love, this 
reaffirmation of the affirmation. 
11 S Derrida. InterView (1997). 
116Ibid. 
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The affirmation in question here is the affirmation of being-together. The project of deconstruction 
cannot even begin without the affirmation that the other is an other and that each other sees the 
other and affirms the otherness of the other, because without an other there is nothing to 
'deconstruct', i.e. nothing with which to engage in relation. The love in deconstruction is the 
'affirmative desire' towards the other, which is at least the affirmation that the other is there and 
cannot be assimilated. Before any of the negative functions of deconstruction can be performed: 
before criticism, questioning, negation, destruction, challenge, the one who deconstructs must 
already have said 'yes' to the other. Even being able to pose a question to the other is already to have 
acknowledged that absolute otherness, the boundary or frontier that in its unapproachability affirms 
its continued otherness. Such acknowledgement is the respect Derrida calls for: a way of paying 
attention to the other. Derrida sets out three qualifications of this affirmative desire: mpect, 
attention, and non-destruction, all three of which echo the premise that in order for deconstruction 
to take place, the other's presence is required. Respect tends to the boundaries between self and other 
and judges the kinds of transversals that are appropriate. Attention is a living-with the other. Non-
destruction means that the other's remaining other, which precipitates everything, is ensured: the 
other can neither be smashed, nor assimilated. if relation is to occur. Like Mitchell, Derrida, in 
insisting on the afFtrmation of the otherness of the other, is calling for a delicate and resonant critical 
approach, one that requires two bodies. 
Affirmation, then, is primary: it is "even more originary than questioning". Affirmation is, in fact, 
the place from which questioning can begin and which is almost invisible in its priority. The yes to 
the other takes the "form of a promise or an agreement or an oath",m wherein "the 'yes' must be 
absolutely inaugural [ ... ]. Inauguration is a 'yes'. I say 'yes' as a starting point. Nothing precedes the 
'yes'. The 'yes' is the moment of institution, of the origin: it is absolutely originary".118 The form of the 
yes as a promise means that it is bound by the relation it forms to reiterate itself, a reiteration which is 
a continual reinvention and renewal of relation, not merely its replication. The yes-affirmation of the 
other is a choice to be made over and over: it is not made once and then inescapably in place. Yes is 
the place from which relation begins: it is inaugural, an inauguration itself, a starting point, 
unprecedented, the 'moment of institution', origin itself, originary. The link between 'yes' and 
something irreducible for Derrida is dear. Although deconstruction as an approach cannot be 
117 Derrida, Jacques, from "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear-Say Yes in Joyce-, quoted in Caputo, John. Dtco1lStructioli ill • 
Nutshell: Conversations withJacques DerridA (New York: Fordham U. Press,1996), p. 27. 
118 Ibid. 
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systematised, it can be said to have founding principles. The attitude of an approach that has yes as its 
inaugural moment must also be a yes; that is, must be open to the other and to the unknown. The 
'yes' institutes relation, without which deconstruction cannot occur. Therefore. yes, and specifically 
the yes of the promise to be in relation, is the first principle of deconstruction, whatever else follows. 
Yes is the promise which assures the otherness of the Other, acting not only as its guarantee in the 
moment of the yes, but as the ·yes. yes"1l9 which commits the speaker to confirming his or her 
commitment (the yes) "in the next second, and then tomorrow, and then the day after tomorrow" 
and ·implies memory in that promise".120 'Yes' is not only originary but contains within itself the 
promise of its own iteration-of continued resonance with the Other, who is irredUCibly other. The 
irreducibility of the other ensures that relation is on-going and that the 'yes' of affirmation will 
likewise be a promise that must be made and remade, "reinvented every day".l21 Relation reinventing 
itself with each moment means that "every speech act is fimdamentally a promise",122 as even the act 
of addressing the other first requires the affirmative desire-the recognition of other-as-other to 
whom one can speak-which is itself a promise. 
The 'yes' of the interview and section of "Ulysses Gramophone" quoted above is the yes of a promise 
that has always already been made; it precedes relation without itself being precedable. Yes is the 
promise, the attitude, that makes relation possible, because inherent in the yes is the 
acknowledgement that the other is in fact other (infinitely so) and therefore is for relation. The other 
and the self in deconstruction cannot be described in terms of what they are (because the principle of 
affirmation of otherness affirms no less than the unknowable in the other and therefore in the self to 
whom the other also relates). Instead. they must be thought in terms of how they are. Their how' is 
the how of turning towards one another and of opening. The one says yes to the other. to the 
possibility of relation with the other. The ontology of the other in deconstruction is a quality of 
being open to relation. The ontology of the self is likewise. The "irreducible affirmation"l23 in 
deconstruction is this being-open. It is irreducible because in terms of deconstruction-as-relation, 
there can be nothing beyond it. Without the other. there is no relation. therefore no deconstruction 
of that relation. With the other. all being is being-together. and therefore requires the 
119 Caputo,27. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Caputo, 28. 
122 Caputo, 23. 
123 Derrida, Interview (1997). 
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acknowledgement of the other as an other. a non-assimilated other. which is this affirmation from 
which relation begins. 
From this affirmation of the other, Derrida suggests the existence of·an ethics of deconstruction'". 
The ethics of deconstruction, then. are based on the continual reaffirmation of the al:Bnnation (the 
other is an other) and on the primary value of this affirmation even in the evCDt of criticism. 
negation, etc. The ethics of deconstruction. then. is a foundationally mational ethics, one that values 
relation and one that, without relation, would not exist. This relation is what Dcnida rcfas to as 
love. What would a tcnual relation with the other based on love-based on the affirmation of the 
other as other being that which pennits mation in the first place-look like? Dcrrida's work. and the 
work of deconstruction in general is often seen as a practice which breaks things apart, a method to 
be applied as rigidly to texts as any other (invert binary; introduce third term; ta-daa!). But this is in 
part because the modds that exist for looking at texts have anticipated a method that can be broken 
into steps and then replicated; a method that acts upon, rather than with. the things it finds. But it is 
also possible to read in Derrida's writing, as well as within that of other theorists. philosophers, and 
writers of the last forty years, a pursuit of relation in and to texts that seeks 1101 to impose a method 
upon them but to be with them. I f we avoid reading deconstruction as a method or something to be 
applied to texts, then we have an opportunity to discover other ways of seeing it and other 
possibilities for it. One of those sumy must come from deconstruction's rdation to philosophy, to 
the root of philosophy. which is philia-that is to say. its relation to love. 
No matter how we proceed after that initial (and continually reaffirmed) yes, it would seem from 
Derrida's own insistence on it that there is a ·positive side of deconstruction which does not consist 
in merely inverting a binarism but in suggesting how the inconsistency in question can be inscribed 
in another ... system".12"This positive side is the absolute ethical stance of the yes that recognises the 
other a priori to any inversion, criticism, or negation that might follow. And so the responsibility of 
deconstruction, regardless of difficulty. is to realise that the ·infinite(-ly other) cannot be an object 
because it is speech. the origin of meaning and the world'",.2S to avoid a rhetoric which could 
-amount to the violence of theory. which rtducts the other,".lU It is on the basis of this responsibility 
124 Hadreas, Peter. -Deconstruction and the Meaning of Music·. Pmp«tiws qfNtw Millie. VoL 37. No.2 (Summer. 1m). pp. 
5-28. This citation. p. 12. 
125 Derrida,Jacques. Writing"". Diffn-m€t. Trans. Alan Bass. ( R o u d ~ : : London. 1995). p. 106. 
126 Ibid. emphasis in original. 
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160 
A. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation. tensions between positivist science and poetry. between philosophy 
and love, were laid out. But the suggestion that there are tensions-that for example philosophy 
must to some extent repress the pbilia that makes up half its name-docs not mean that the schism 
between love and wisdom is so great that no one traverses it. In Chapter 3. a re-reading of 
deconstruction as a potentially loving approach to the other was offered; such an approach is one 
means by which a bridge between the tradition of critique and a new reason "completely different 
from the logic overseeing the management and arrangement of objects· l might be constructed. This 
chapter offers texts that, along with the readings of Derrida presented in Chapter 3. demonstrate the 
p ~ e n t t that exists for a loving approach in philosophy. This chapter will show that the potential 
fOr such an approach is latent in the literarure. waiting to be constellated into new ways of moving 
with love toward texts. This will prepare the fidd for Chapter S. which presents an authorial 
approach to texts whose performative and philosophical qualities supports and devdops a loving 
readerly approach to texts. I f it is of any use. a modd for thinking about these three theory chapters 
(though not proposed within the chapters themselves) is as concentric circles. where meaning spirals 
or radiates. rather than traveling in a single direction. 
B. Uvinas to Brennan: the body's knowing 
Despite the problem of origins. it can be said that Derrida's approach to the other as other. as well as 
his understanding of love as a 'yes' have roots in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. To Levinas and 
his writings Derrlda owes some of his considerations of Jewishness. of ethics. of the other. and 
especially of the other in relation to justice. From Uvinas also comes Derrida's idea that "that the 
'yes' is not a word like others, that even if you do not pronounce the word, there is a 'yes' implicit in 
every language. even if you multiply the 'no: there is ayes'·. 2 In the same response where he 
fOrmulates an approach to the other which begins with the responsibility one has to acknowledge the 
other as other and to respect that otherness. Derrida also acknowledges his debt to Levinas as regards 
his ability to have fOrmed such an approach. For that reason. this chapter begins with a consideration 
of love and the other in the works of Levin as. 
1 Marion. 2002: x. 
1 Dcrrida. Interview ( 1997). 
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How can we understand love? If we understand it as relation with the other via eros, asks L&inas, 
can this relationship -be characterized as a failureB?l Uvinas goes on to answer his own question in 
the affirmative, saying -the answer is yes, if one adopts the tenninology of current descriptions. if one 
wants to characterise the erotic by'graspin& 'posscssin& or 'knowingB .• But this affirmation is sly, 
because Uvinas tells us that the answer is yes-that the relationship of love is a failurc-only if we 
characterise it via the relations we arc already familiar with; that is, the love relationship or a rdation 
through love fails if we try to enact it via other relations already in our repertoire. These relations are 
-grasping-, -possessing-, -knowing-. 
What does it mean, then, that a relationship to an other via love-not just eros, but any 1ovc-
cannot succeed in familiar channels; not by grasping, possessing or knowing? First of aU. it means 
that the relationship to the other cannot take place in terms that arc foregone conclusions. Ihinas 
describes these teons as ·currentB descriptions, giving the sense that. for one, these dc:scriptions 
change, arc current (or not); and that. for another. they arc shared, in common use. To be in COUUnon 
use, a term must be generalised. at least enough to have meaning within a community. TherefOre. the 
teons we use for love cannot be general or communal; they must be specific. 
Not only must these teons be specific-tailored. made by hand, to fit the needs of each situation and 
each other-they must be invented and then reinvented (Dcrrida: So this is what I meant by love, 
the reaffirmation of the affirmation)S; the relation will fail if the words spoken or the actions made or 
the approaches undertaken arc those which grasp and know. The words that Levinas chooses to 
exemplify the failure of the love relation have to do with fixing the other. anticipating them. In a 
relation typified by grasping, by knowing, the other is always presumed; always, then, somehow 
assimilated to the selfby this knowing-of-the-other. Grasping is the process of going after the other, 
trying to hold onto them. Even here the slipperiness of alterity is implied; grasping. while it can 
connote attainment, also refers to the attempt to catch something that eludes one. 
Successful, accomplished love, then. is not - ' g r a s p i n ~ ~ 'possessing. or 'knowing-, but something else; 
it is, again in Uvinas' words. the relationship with the Other as -the absence of the Other [_.] in a 
3 Uvinas. Emmanuel The Uvin4s lWdn. Ed. S. Hand Oxford: Blackwell. 1993. p. 51. 
4 Ibid 
5 Derrida. Interview (1997). 
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horizon of the fUture-.' In love. the other. rather than being known in their totality. is continually 
rueding; there is always more to find out (or not nnd out). And LCvinas traces the distinction 
between knowing and loving to Heidegger. for whom, he writes. -to relate to beings qua beings 
means to let beings be. to understand them as independent of the perception that discovers and 
pups them-.7 1he state of bdng independent of an exterior perception seems to me to be what 
Urinas refers to when he talh about the 'absence' of the Other. LCvinas' separation of the grasping of 
knowledge from a love of a continually unknowable Other culminates in responsibility to that 
Other (to -let beings be-). which he also states directly as -charity and love-.8 So with LCvinas we can 
arrive at a consideration of what love is not (it is not knowledge, it is not possession) and what it is 
(laponsibility to the other). 
The question of how love is remains. however. and Levine's identification of love as ·worn-out and 
debased" in part provides an answer-or at least a direction. In Chapter 2, this dissertation discusses 
the idea of franciscanism as it relates to the erotics of the text as a ·mandate of poverty [which] 
crates a space in its practitioners [ ... ] for objects, meanings. and ways of being to transverse, while 
acknowledging in its very stance their evanescent nature- and which -means nothing is, originally. 
and so nothing can be assumed-and there is possibility for anything-.lo In a franciscan poverty. 
what is possible begins cxacdy in what is -worn-out and debased-.11 Discarded by the communion of 
c:um:nt description, love is hardly worth a public and general attention-it is worn-out and now 
diche. debased by too general a usc in the past. So discarded, debased, and worn out, love becomes 
BlJal with the potential of continuous poverty in the franciscan sense, which refUses to limit the 
possibilities for love. 
Uvinas calling love worn-out makes its own kind of sense. Not only, as above. does love's 
dcbuement free it for unprcscribcd work within un-pre-scribed stories, Uvinas also identifies it as 
·originary-.12 Originary. and therefore long in usc, providing the sense of being 'worn-out'; iflove is 
worn-out, then its tatters mean that it works long hours establishing places for others. Of what, then. 
6 Urinal. 51. 
7 Urinal, 1998: 6 • 
• 1bid.2CM. 
9 Ibid. 103. He also caI1s it ·worn-out and ambiguous· (108). Ambiguous-having more than one interpretation. 
10 Hotr would I cite this? W..u I even cite this? 
11 For c:umpIe. a cow', manger in a subk in Roman-era Judea. rather than, say. a palace of the same place and time. or a high-
rech hOlpital in Manhattan in the We 20th century. Whether or not the story is believable. it b ~ ~ in that place because no 
DllDtive was conSprc:d for such a birth-except the prophetic one. the aim of which is to break with ordained narratives. 
11 Lmnas.1998: 108. 
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is love the origin? "Justice comes from 10ve",13 he writes. Justice, the quality of being reasonable-of 
paying a living attention l4 to the other-is what establishes the worth of human life. It is the 
expression of the value of other humans in a world where the "only absolute value is the human 
possibility of giving the other priority over onesdf".IS Love is "the fust value, which is that small 
amount of humanity by virtue of which alone the creation deserves to continue",16 not a concern 
exclusive to theology, to poetry, or to private affairs. When lbinas writes that "besides curiosity, 
knowledge of the other also demands sympathy or love, ways of being that are different from 
impassive contemplation",17 what he does is to set up love as an attitude of philosophy-a way of 
being adopted in order to know about the world. Love, the attitude from which a just consideration 
of the other comes, is also a point of possible change in the way the other can be approached, and our 
ways of trying to know the other can be changed. 
Love, by its relation to justice (and therefore its relation to the other), is not a process by which 
worth is evaluated and from which methods of establishing value are instituted. It is instead -the 
beginning of the intelligible".18 Difference is the beginning of intelligibility; love is affirmation of 
difference. Uvinas again: "The sphere of intelligibility-of the meaningful-in which everyday life 
as well as the tradition of our philosophic and scientific thought maintains itsel£ is characterized by 
vision [ ... ] .Hence the priority of knowing"'. 19 I f vision is linked to knowing (6.xing. grasping). then 
love as a way of knowing the other (or the world) must be enacted by sensory means other than those 
which have historically been identified with philosophy. 
The expression of love in philosophy, or a way of trying to know the other which would coneem 
itself with love fust. would be a "a non-thematising wisdom of the flesh, which is art or poetry-,W 
Non-thematising because this is the action of love, not to organise but to approach the other. This is 
a way of knowing which does not enact categories into which to cram all that it encounters; it allows 
for the encounter with the other as the other because it docs not call for the other's immediate 
assignation to this or that kind of thing. Again. Uvinas is insisting on love as something that resists 
13 Ibid. 
14 This is Teresa Brennan's word; see Brennan, pp. 116·117, forcxamplc. 
15 Levinas. 1998: 109. 
16 Levinas, 1993: 231. 
17 Levinas. 1998: 5. 
18 Levinas.I998: 109. 
19 Levinas, 1998: 159. 
20 Levinas.1998: 183. 
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the pre-established descriptions into which people, ideas, things, and places fall, insisting instead on 
the potential of their own deflnitions and of their difference to that which has already been 
encountered. He dennes this non-thematising wisdom as, fustly, "of the flesh", and secondly, as "art 
or poetry·. The ways of knowing the other, the origin of this wisdom, are not primarily intellectual, 
but corporeal, originating with the body which feels and makes. Making and lOVing are linked by the 
possibility of their refusal to ordain what comes next, and their willingness to go and find out on 
terms other than their own. 
Like Lbinas, Brennan considers love a way of knowing things. She, too, identifies this knowing as 
having its locus in the body instead of in the intellect alone. Brennan goes further than Levinas, 
however, in identifying the problematic relationship between philosophy and the body. She bases 
her arguments on clinical observation and chemistry, providing evidence in these modes that support 
her thesis that the separation between the body (affect, hormone, emotion) and mind is a culturally 
constructed. rather than natural and absolute, one. 
Brennan's argument about the extension of emotional knowledge and experience outside of the 
distinct individual, which she calls the transmission of affect, begins from what is known about the 
·communicative function· of pheromones, detected "by touch or smell".21 Brennan argues against a 
purdy chemical (i.e. pheromone-based) understanding of the transmission of affect, writing that 
·olfactory [is not] the only means for the transmission of affect",22 citing "body movements and 
gestures·, "rhythmic aspects of behaviour", ·prosody" (the rhythms and patterns of speech), and even 
the transmission ofimages from the eye to the brain as "an anatomical process, rooted firmly in brain 
physiology".23 The experience of affect is not, then, limited to an interior one, but instead is shared. 
We are linked to others by affect, by 'sympathy and love', by passions; that is, by non-rational modes 
of interaction. 
The problem of knowing with the body in the Western tradition of philosophy is not only that the 
mind and body have been imagined to be split, of two completely different substances, but also that 
the body has heen imagined as a container, separating its feelings and its parts that feel from other 
bodies and from the effects of those bodies. Unlike intellectual communion, which has a long 
21 Brennan, 69. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Brennan, 70. 
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tradition in Western philosophy-beginning with Socrates. even-the transfer and sharing of 
emotion is hedged by the idea that the ·psyche is structured in such a way as to give the person the 
sense that their affects and feelings are their own, and that they are energetically and emotionally 
contained in the most literal sense".2A If the body is distinct and separate, then the things which 
'really' seem to make us up individually-that is to say, our feelings, rather than our thoughts, which 
we already know are shared with a long tradition of other thinkers-can be counted on to be likewise 
separate, and this separation guarantees the identities of 'subject' and 'object'. It also allows the 
'empirical' study of the one by the other. 
This "distinction between subject and object" forms our ways of thinking and gives primacy to sight 
as way of knowing. The subject/object split is "essential to all received views of knowledge and 
perception, to Western philosophy, and to the history and practice of science-.2S This distinction is 
woven into the fabric that makes up the many modes of thought and inquiry that descend from that 
philosophical tradition. so ingrained as to be almost invisible. And its • emotionally contained subject 
is a residual bastion of Eurocentrism in critical thinking, the last outpost of the subject's belief in the 
superiority of its own worldvicw-.26 By constructing a difference between the subject and the object 
(the self and the other), the self "divides itself off from the rest of the world-P But the divided self 
does not exist in a vacuum, and what it represses is the relationship it shares not only with the other 
but with its own other parts. If" repression involves fixing something in place, holding it still, 
preventing it from coming forward",28 then what is constrained here is the concept of subjecthood 
and the relation between the other and the sel£ So ingrained into ways of knowing, the split between 
the boy and the intellect, the self and the other, seem to be facts; conceiving otherwise is difficult. But 
the 'fact' of this difference is contradicted by "the fact of feeling and the existence of affects-;'1!J 
separation arises out of what Brennan calls the 'foundational fantasy', by which weaknesses are 
projected onto others and one's own fears become others' faults.30 
Brennan makes an argument for ·feeling and sensing [ ... ] as methodological tools for studying the 
24 Brennan, 25. 
25 Brennan, 94. 
26 Brennan, 2. 
27 Brennan, 93. 
28 Brennan, 38. 
29 Brennan, 94. 
30 For further explanation of this, please see Chapter 1. 
object [ ... J because they constitute a connection with the object·.31 Rather than depending on sight, 
individualism, and cognition, which are "associated with the subject/object distinction, with 
thinking in terms of subject and object-,32 Brennan argues for a thinking that would take subjectivity 
into account, one that would rely on -knowledge gleaned precisely by feeling or sensing·.33 By this, 
Brennan means -srudying what one has experienced oneself and valuing it, or valUing the subjective 
side of one's interactions with the object srudied·34 and rejecting the notion that to think or study 
well the -individual has to be severed from affective connections with the surrounding environment 
and others in it-,3S which is part of -a particular understanding of objectivity [ ... ] based on the notion 
that the objective is somehow free of affect-.36 Brennan's argument is based in the idea that the selfis 
11111 bounded in the way that it has been imagined. Instead of positing a naturally constituted 
individual-severed from affective connections with the surrounding environment and others in it·,37 
Brennan writes that -the idea of boundaries' [ ... ] is a culturally specific tool" ,33 and that "the person is 
not affcctivdy containcd·.39 The affective non-containment of the individual allows for the 
possibility of knowledge via the body and for a relation not only between thinking and feeling but 
between the subject and the 'object'. This relationship is also intimated by Derrida in his assertion 
that deconstruction begins from the point where one says yes to the other. 
Neither Brennan nor Uvinas subjugate one thing called 'thought' to another called ' feeling'. Instead. 
they establish a ground from which Ceding can be reconsidered as a way of thinking which offers 
possibilities for wisdom that other modes of encounter (such as empirical research, observation) do 
not necessarily provide . ..o In fact, when he writes that it is besides curiosity that we need "sympathy or 
love, ways of being that arc <lifkrent from impassive contemplation" ,41 LMnas establishes the 
coprcscnce of both intellect (represented by CUriosity) anti these other ways of being which are not 
31 Brennan. 19. My emphasis. 
32 Brennan. 19. 
33 Brennan. 23. 
3-' Bmman. 19. 
3S Blennan. 19. 
36 Brennan. 19. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Brennan. 25. 
39 Bmman.2. 
40 Brennan calls love -living attention·. which can break the cycles of abuse. hierarchy. and dependency which constrain the 
penon to a belief in their separateness. Note, however. that Brennan docs not identify only love as lived attention; she also 
calls RUOn lived attention. pointing to the multiple possibilities for the ways of knowledge on which philosophy has 
cnditionaUy been based. Reason, too, can be about a sustained attention to the being of the other and to the rdationship 
between the other and the self. 
41 Urinal 1998: S. 
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"impassive"; that is of ways of knowing which deny feeling, and other ways of knowing which 
centralise it. 
Curiosity and love (or sympathy) can perform similar roles: they can be conduits by which the self 
extends into the world and interacts with it. The idea of extension is etymolOgically linked to a lOving 
approach: it is tender. Tenderness is imbued with the idea of our being-in-common; it takes into 
account the being of the other. These qualities inform, for example, both Barthes' and Richard 
Rotty's definitions of tenderness. For Barthes, tenderness is "nothing but an infinite, insatiable 
metonymy",42 that, is, a state in which the desire to identify with the other is continually in flux as the 
other changes, leapfrogging just behind those changes in a continually renewing desire to keep 
feeling with the other, but-'insatiable' and 'infinite' -never reaching a space of actual identifiCation. 
When "you are tender, you speak your plural";43 in tenderness, one extends one's consideration across 
the gap. Being tender, extending toward, one cannot forget there is an other, because it is toward that 
other that one extends. 
Rotty's considerations of tenderness come in the context of an essay on Nobokov, aesthetics, and 
cruelty in which he defines the expression of tenderness as having "time for other people's fantasies, 
not just [one's] own".44 Tenderness is about being able to identify with the other in such a way as to 
remain distinct (understanding that others' fantasies and one's own are not the same) while 
extending (both tenderness and curiosity are externally directed) across the distance between us. A 
willing extension. An impossible but nevertheless credible pluralisation of the singular tense of the 
self 
The tender expression is a caress that "would renounce possession [ ... ] It is tender in that it docs not 
push to take anything".45 Tenderness. then, exists in paradox. It caresses (one could even say 'grasps') 
but does not possess. Its claims are translucent and delicate and irreal. The tender "tends to give, 
extend, tender forth the tender: 'Tiens: hold, take what I do not possess, nor you, what we do not 
and never shall possess. This will not be properly our own; of this, we shall never be the masters and 
42 Barthes, 2002: 224. 
43 Barthes, 225. 
44 Rotty, Richard. Contingmcy. Irony. and Solidarity. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 1989). p. 159. 
45 Derrida,Jacques. On Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 93. 
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owners-.46 Tenderness revokes ownership as Levinasian love revokes grasping and possessing. Both, 
however, are about movement toward wisdom, moving out of the single self and toward the other, 
toward an intelligibility that is offered rather than applied. 
Derrida broaches the possibility of a tenderness even toward the text in his preference to "tenderly 
attend to these words".47 He approaches his own three-word text ("tender, tend, extend"48) with 
tenderness; he extends toward the words on their terms as others, taking account of possible 
secondary meanings, nuances, connotations, translative equivalences, and plays on words that do not 
translate. That is, Derrida's exploration of this text begins with a 'yes' to the otherness, the beyond-
understanding of these words. The words that are offered to us by language are also withdrawn, 
impossible to pin down absolutely. The 'yes' of tenderness takes place because of the impossibility of 
absolute identification of or with the other; the 'yes' is unstable and practical, requiring ongoing 
renewal, or, in Derrida's words, the "reaffirmation of the affirmation -.49 
Tenderness, then, is the possibility of extension outside of oneself in order to be nearer, imaginatively 
speaking. to others. Such tenderness to act as an approach not only to human others, but to textual 
ones; an approach by which the non-human other, too, is ungraspable. This approach is the realm of 
those who study literature, images, ideas; in short, in the realm of the thought-the philosophical. 
What would a philosophy that actively remembered its roots in love (philosophy) look like, what 
would it add to the generational conversation? And what would a philosophy that not only 
remembered those roots but cherished them. paid attention to them. look like? What new ways of 
speaking would it offer? What spaces would it create? 
What would a philosophy that remembers its roots in love feel. look, behave like? In other words, 
how would such a philosophy he? An 'artistic, musical. touchful' way of communicating and of 
creating meaning could not rely on a single mode of articulation. nor on a single perception, nor on 
the simply objective or receptive presence of the other. In a practice-thinking itself-that prides 
itself on its remove from emotion. even defines itself that way, a move toward this 'artistic' way of 
being is already happening from time to time. in one small way which has indications for larger 
46 Ibid. 
47 Derrida. 2005: 94. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Derrida. Interview (1997). 
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changes. One such move is the presence of the I. 
C,AnotherI 
Tenderness, as any extension, requires not only an other towards which to extend, but also a site 
from which to extend. In other words, to be tender requires two acting subjects: one to make the 
gesture and one to receive the gesture, Although the I in philosophy has been the centre of that 
universe, the thinking subject who has lawful, 'natural' dominion over aU (non-thinking) others, the 
male subject whose gaze and imagination and hands roam over bodies and landscapes that do not 
belong to him, this is not the only I there is. What if the / could be another /, a radically different I. I 
as trace not of mastery but of the tender extension of the fallible, individual sem 
The I is the trace of the maker, the mark of the hand in the work. The slim body of the I stands in for 
the subject's body. The I acknowledges that the work does not stand alone, removed from the process 
of creation and the one(s) who created it. It replaces a pretence of distance and objectivity with the 
embedding of the subject within the text itself, integrally. grammatically. Such an I is not 
the I of philosophers, that I who is supposed to be universal, a disengaged spectator or 
transcendental subject, a spokesman for each and everyone because he thinks exclUSively 
what anyone can by right know in the place of anyone else [ ... ]: that which concerns no 
one personally; so 
instead, it is the I that represents the one who signs. the maker of the work. The I acknowledges its 
own incapacity to be everywhere and know everything by its association with the fallible subject. 
Despite saying I in the name of the other, the I also indicates that we -don't know the same thing [,',] 
yet we know as much-,sl The / of the philosophy of love enunciates that each knowledge is 
incomplete and requires supplement from elsewhere (other people. other ways of knOwing). It 
implies that being is being-with; that our theories (our touching, our art, our music) only make sense 
in terms of one another and in terms of us. Touch, art, music: they aU begin in the one and proceed 
to the other, indicating the presence of each. Indicating their m41ieness. 
Not all the writers whose work suggests a loving approach to be desirable employ the I as a strategy 
50 ~ a r i o n , 2 0 0 8 : 9 . .
51 ~ a r i o n . . 2008: 10. 
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in their writing: for instance. there is no I in The Way of Love, apart from Irigaray's prefacing 
remarks52• However, this is one strategy that can be undertaken when approaching texts as others-
acknowledging the singularity, vulnerability, and fallibility of the subject.53 
D. Philosophy 
Luce lrigaray begins The Way of Love by identifying the "wisdom of love" as "perhaps the first 
meaning of the word 'philosophy'·,54 which retains only the other side of this meaning, the 'love of 
wisdom'. lrigaray's setting forth of the concept of the wisdom of love pluralises understandings of 
philosophy so as to join together "the body, the heart, and the mind" and does not "resort to a logic 
that formalizes the real by removing it from concrete experience", instead providing its users and 
creators with ·measures that hdp in living better".55 Wisdom-of-Iove positions philosophy as "a 
knowing how to live· that affirms that ·most rational knowledge is first mystical".56 Irigaray removes 
wisdom from the rarefied and separate space in which it is a 
fonnal knowledge [ ... ] reduced to a mental exercise, passed on from a master to disciples, 
of usc in populating universities and in having discussions among the uninitiated but 
without the impact on our lives that a wisdom prcsUppoSCS57 
in order to "resist the formal games"58 of knowledge-transfer and of inside/outside binaries. These 
'games: by which lrigaray means the transfer of information qua information rather than the 
creation of a being-together (a conversation between subjects), privilege "the object, the similar, the 
multiple·59 in a language that lrigaray identifies as the ·speech of little boys, adolescents, and men".60 
In so doing. lrigaray emphasises the generally masculine tradition of philosophy and emphasises the 
role of the feminine (the other) in reintroducing love. It is a typically poststructuralist flourish by 
S2 1hat Iripray'. book would not have been complete-or at least, so it would seem, as she and her editors have chosen to 
include them-without the I-voiced introductory remarks is a perfect example of her very thesis that new or unorthodox 
ways of speaking arc required to even begin speaking to and with the other. Which, then, is the supplement-the personally-
YOiced essay introducing the work. or the work itself, which insists on the necessity of such a voice to the kind of work it 
doa, but does not manifest that voice in its own body? Obviously this is an undecidable question. 
53 See exemplary reamn&, in Chapter 6. 
54 lripray, 1. 
SS lripray,2. 




60 Idpray, S. 
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which she intimates the relationship of the othered (feminine/love) dement to the centralised 
(masculine/wisdom) one. 
The masculine language of the history of empirical knowledge and positivist science is supplanted in 
Irigaray's work by ecriture feminine, • an artistic, musical, touchful way of speaking or saying and of 
listening able to be perceived in a written text [ ... ] not reduced to a simple assistance for 
remembering meaning or to some code to be respeeted-.6J &rlture feminine is elsewhere described as 
a language • more fluid, less narrative, less constrained by reason, and more given to juxtaposition and 
ambiguity than older norms of prose and poetry had allowed-.62That is to say. this other language, 
identified by name as feminine. is less dependent on absolute identifIcation of terms, is more 
comfortable with a general slipperiness or ambiguity. Unknowability is par for the course. Moreover. 
this is a 'touchful' way of speaking or listening. depending not (only) on vision for affirmation. 
understanding. or world-construction, but on other senses; it is a 'musical' and an 'artistic' one, 
expressing its experiences in forms other than immutable ones. 
What ecriture feminine proposes is a fleshing of the whole world, an incarnation of the world, 
through the -whole body·,63 in place of a language that -cares more for words than for persons, 
attitudes or acts-.64 The 'whole body' involves not only the static physical presence of that body. but 
also the parts of the body which extend outward in the production of thought, objects, song. speech. 
affeCt, feeling. touch. This body is. then. ontologically rooted and winged. It does not only consist of 
the inescapable ruin of the body (the undependability of the body). but also of the possibility of 
creation that belongs especially to the female body. Such a language is therefore tied to the 
reinvention (re-incarnation) of the world. 
A writing or a language that is of the 'whole body' is cellular as well as holistic: it acknowledges the 
way that regeneration and change on a microscopic level offer the possibUity of the regeneration of 
the whole, or parts of the whole, such that what and how the whole is changes. It does not r e q ~ ~ its 
61 lrigaray, xx. 
62 Burt, Stephen. -I Came To Talk You into Physical Splendor: On the Poetry of C. D. W right-. (On the 'Modern American 
Poetry' secrion of the website of the department of Englisth at the U nivenity of illinois. Accessed 14/8/2011. 
http://www.enldish.illinois.cdu/maps/poctslsz/cdwri&ht/burt.html). n. pas. 
63 Cixow 1994: 203. 
64 Burt, n. pas. 
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maker -to mourn. to look back to resented or idealized pasts. to regret or lament already-lost 
powers"6S because it acknowledges that change is on-going. Because it calls for the use of the whole 
body. rather than one part of that body. the tendency of such writing is to draw the outside in, to 
permit the other to enter. and to make exchanges that are not plotted, "starting with this 'permission' 
one gives oneself. the multiplication of the effects of desire's inscription on every part of the body 
and the other body".66 
Via lrigaray and Cixous it is possible to rethink philosophy in terms of the place of love within it. If 
philosophy. forgetful of its origins in love. considers only those things which preserve the Singularity 
of the self. its autonomy, its isolation; and if the language of this philosophy is then preoccupied with 
ill own reproduction through codes of transmission and replication; then this philosophy will be 
rorever scrambling to contain itself and its productions. limiting who can say, write, teach, think. 
(that is, hold authority). and what can be said, write, taught, thought {and how, and why, and where, 
and by what means, and at what times}. Philosophy that forgets its roots in 'philia' represses the 
memory of what wisdom can come from beginning in mystery and continuing in an approach of the 
other that does not presume to grasp them. Karl Marx's accusation that the "chief defect of all 
previous materialism [ ... J is that the thing. reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the 
objea fir of ctmtempLuUm. but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively"67 provides an 
example from within the tradition of critique of the stated desire for a philosophy such as the one 
which lrigaray and Cixous propose. 
1he question is. how do we fInd a place, as philosophers, as theorists, as academics, as scholars, and as 
stUdents, for an exchange which can ·exist as loving between us [ ... ] prepare for a loving between 
us" when as it stands ·we stUllack a culture of relation with the other-r9 How do we find (how do 
I find) or make the space of silence that signifies "I am listening to you, I wait for you to speak to 
mea? How do we apply ourselves (how do I apply myself) to "not appropriating the thing but letting 
it be a thing-?1O How do I -encourage the other to be and to remain other-?7l How do I "let the 
6S1bid. 
" Cixous 1994: 41. 
fI1 w.x. KarL Theses.1I Fnm6Mh. (Reproduced on Marxists.org, 
_"""" m ' r J i m . o ~ a r c h i v e / m a r x / w o r k s / l 8 4 5 / t h c s c s / t h c s c s . h t m . . Accessed 14/8/201.). n. pag. 





other come into presence [ ... ] without claiming to be their foundation·?n This is 8 a question of 
making something exist'"73-a call to creation, generation, and newness or renewal. This question is 
about the possibility for speaking-bidirectional speaking-and for listening that arises when the 
otherness of the other is not seen as a challenge to the self, but as something precious to be respected 
and taken care of It is a question which, with Mitchell's concern for what pictures want and 
Derrida's for the affirmation of the other as other prior to any critique, is part of a collection of 
gestures toward the other and toward a concern for the other which would not destroy the otherness 
of the other. 
The question of a place and a language in which to meet the other is a question of making: because 
the existing languages and places with their 8formal and a priori moral code would not be able to 
recognise such an evolution-,1" we find ourselves in need of an other language in which to form our 
relation to one another. lrigaray's solution is based not only on another language. but on 8another 
relation with language, a relation which favours the act of speech in the present and not a language 
already existing and codified-,7s that is, a relation which takes as its appropriate expression a language 
which changes and shifts to reflect the dynamic natUre of the relationship itsel£ The exchange 
between two is a space in which 8 meaning quivers and always remains unstable, incomplete, 
unsettled. irreducible-.'6 The language lrigaray is searching for is not the 8descriptive and narrative 
[language] [ ... ] to which we most often resort today-,n but a 8poetic language [ ..• ] the articulation of 
thinking and poetic saying- which -first of all exists in a present dialogue with an other different 
from myself'.78 Where the descriptive and the narrative name and tell the story of a thing. l'CSOrting 
to preordained patterns of meaning and relation, the poetic, for lrigaray, recalls its roots in Greek 
poeisis: making. Poetic language is a language that continually reinvents itself and its saying such that 
its forms do not become codified and the onus is always on the spcakcr{ s) to make meaning that docs 
not reduce either the self or the other-or their relation. It is a 8language that creates, that safeguards 
its sensible qualities so as to address the body and the soul, a language that lives-." Most importantly. 
72 Ibid 
73 Irigaray, viii. 
74 Irigaray, xviii. 
7S Irigaray, ix. 
76 Irigaray, 28. 
77 Irigaray. viii. 
78 Irigaray. xi. 
79 Irigaray. 12. 
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it is -a matter of being attentive to what is proper to the other without wanting to appropriate it".80 
Poetic language as a way of being with-listening to and speaking to-the other involves 
-questioning another possible relation to language, thus modifying the statUs of language and of 
oneself as human"") When this questioning takes place, possibility comes into play; the "encounter 
itself can create a new specch".B2 Newness, renewal, a "radical disappropriation", something that 
-open [ 5] anew upon the unknown":83 these are the qualities of this new speech.84 
Poetic language-an actively changing and making language-would value "intersubjectivity [ ... ] 
dialogue in difference [ .. ,] attention to prescnt life" and raises these things "to a level of wisdom",8s 
That is, lrigaray is proposing a way of making speech but also of making understanding that is meant 
to take its place beside the codified, rigidly structured language and philosophy she calls "the speech 
of little boys, adolescents. and men'"86 which has forgotten the wisdom of love and replaced that 
wisdom with -a taste for games [,',] A certain contempt for life",87 1he winking game of philosophy's 
belief/non-beliefl'in other wisdoms (our simultaneous understanding that the body teaches us, and 





U Iripray CODtl'UtS this new speech with ·information. recital. narrative· (46). 
IS Jripay, vii. 
" Jripay, S. 
rJ lripny.4. 
.. Iripr.ay's dismissal of philosophy with its 'contempt' for life is a perfect aample of this double bclie£ After all. she herselfis 
making philosophy very much in the tradition of philosophy she deplores: obtuse. difficult, dense. full of wordplay. and 
definitely ·of USC in populating universities and in having discussions among the initiated· (3). Anecdotally: I recently 
actendcd a seminar given by lrigaray. which was followed by a reception with professors from the host institution. graduate 
ttudents attending a week-Ions series of workshops. and others (like myself). The seminar was on engagement with the other. 
At no point-and this was remarked upon repcatcdly by groups of people from different areas of the University-were the 
hosting department. the inner circ1e of graduate students. or lrigaray herself openly welcoming. If lrigaray is honestly in 
punuit of an engagement with the other. and especially one that opens to the other via the body. touch. and other ideally 
noo-IUcran:hical spcakinp. then I have to say that any obvious engagement with this was not in evidence on this occasion. I 
bring this up as an example of the insidiousness of the winking-game itself: that we say we believe (and we believe!) one 
thing. but we also say (with our actions or words. etc.) the opposite. and believe (i.e. act on) it, too. In lrigaray's own words. in 
any case. "It docs not suffice. in fact, to speak about the present, it is important to make this present, and the being in 
presence. aist- (xv). This call. however, to 'make' the present (to create a way of being-together which is non-hierarchical and 
tapects. in Dcrnda's words, the otherness of the other) is of course not easily accomplished in a structure like a university {or 
any of our cultural structureS} where hierarchy is both implicit and expected from even those members who cite most 
tdipously their adherence to non-hierarchical relation. I don't point a finger at lrigaray alone here. I know that as an 
aadcmic and as a memhcr of any community I am also responsible to perform this opening to the other and extension 
roward the other that allows the other to be whatever they are, rather than only what I expect them to be. And even as I point 
wharcYer fingas I point at lrigaray. myself. or anyone clsc.1 have to do it with the knowledge that 'everyone I meet is fighting 
a bard battle·; with mercy. With an awareness in the approach to the other that the only quality I can be sure of is 
contradiction and complexity. and with an awareness that my responsibility in my approach is to stay on guard against my 
impulse CO reduce the other CO a form that fits my ideas about the world 
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created by things other than the intellect, and relegates those know ledges to 'other' subjects. One of 
these subjects is love. Setting out to make room for love in philosophy, lrigaray calls for "an artistic, 
musical, touchful way of speaking or saying and of listening able to be perceived in a written tcxt"89 
that would counter the tendency our "rational tradition" has of being "much concerned with 
'speaking about'" while reducing "'speaking with' to a speaking together about the same things. 
\Vhich supposes a common universe and conversations about a third without real exchange between 
ourselves".90 
The space in which this 'artistic, musical, touchful' speaking can arise is the same space that enables 
one person to love another: it is the space between the two that is irreducible, expansive, and 
different. And it is "always becoming" ,91 always in flux, and therefore always calling the one and the 
other into relation. What relationship could tolerate this? Not commerce, which relies on knowing 
for the other what is good, constructing desires and wants before they can be born (unruly!) and slip 
into their own routes. Not any kind of hierarchy, with its tendencies toward assimilation of the less-
dominant party and its dependence on communication through 'closed words'.92 Not in any 
"suspension in immutable truths or essences" but a relationship that "provides a faithfulness to 
oneself in becoming".93The relation that can tolerate and bear the always-becoming, that can resist 
"fusion, or [ ... J couples of opposites whose relation will be governed by hierarchy, submission of one 
to the other"94 is love, a "constitution of two worlds open and in relation [ ... J which give birth to a 
third world as work in common [ ... ] and to be shared".9S This is what lrigaray calls the "clearing of 
language-the vastness [ ... ] a place where the intimate is possible with measure thanks to the respect 
for the one or for the other. And also thanks to the renunciation of dominating".96 
In lrigaray's case, she is in part invoking 'love' as a way of interacting with the other in a modality of 
resistance within a stultifying milieu (especially an academic or a philosophical one}. Derrida, of 
course, in the discussion of love cited earlier in this chapter, is not speaking of love in the romantic 
sense necessarily-he is not dispensing deconstructionist relationship advice, but appealing to a 
89 lrigaray. xx. 
90 lrigaray. 7-8. 
91 lrigaray.9. 
92 Irigaray, 25. 
93 lrigaray. xiv. 
94 lrigaray. xv. 
95 Irigaray. 10. 
96 lrigaray. 29. 
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more 'universal' consideration and respect for the other. Both Derrida and Irigaray are looking to 
love as a way of understanding all kinds of relation, including the relation between people in the 
particular institutions of which they are themselves part. That is exactly why their positions on 
love-Derrida's brief statement that the 'love' he finds in deconstruction is its 'original ethics' during 
his interview with Nikhil Padagaonkar, and lrigaray's choice to set a love relationship as a model for 
interscholastic engagement in a discipline that has obscured or forgotten its roots in love-matter to 
this thesis. The movement from the personal relationship or the poetic expression in works such as 
Roland Barthes' .A Lover's Discourse to a stylised, formal expression of love as a figure for relation to 
and within institutions, including the institution of textual criticism mirrors what lrigaray identifies 
as problematic in philosophy-the codifying and estrangement from the knowledge produced by 
feeling per se. But it also reflects the possibility of engagement within the academy in a loving way. 
And what that does is to say that in &ct, we do not study love to 'objectively' understand and isolate 
our private lives from the ones which we are living in community with other thinkers, writers, 
scholars, artists, makers. We study it, and we act on it, because it forms an integral part of our study 
of other things. Not-knowing, unknowability, unsubsumability, or our own willingness to give up 
the desire to subsume the unknown to our knowing: these are what make us go out into the world 
asking it what it is, how it is, what it wants. They are also the basic stance of the lover. 
E.Space 
"What is thus built is not only a refuge. It is also a space where the horizon of the 
already lived and defined reopens. A space where the bridge between past, present, 
and future is elaborated, as well as the passages between the other and oneself· 
lrigaray'" 
Irlgaray's concern for an 'other' language, which would challenge the "normative science of the 
truth-,· arises in what she terms a ·world-,99 an "expanse"lOO that is not "a world proper to all 
subjects-10I but that "is generated thanks to the withdrawal imposed by difference".lo21his means 
that the 'space' which is imagined or experienced to be there when two people converse with (rather 
than speak to) one another is because of the acknowledgement by each person of the difference of the 
other. lrigaray's deployment of space as a figure in talking about love in philosophy is not only 
If? lrlgaray.l46. 
98 Irlgaray, 2. 
99 Irigaray. 9. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Irlgaray.8. 
102 Irigaray. 9. 
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explicit, however. Above all, that a 'musical, artistic, touchful' way of being and of knowing should be 
present implies a breaking-apart of the limitations of positivism and empiricism. In so doing, this way 
of being creates new fields, new spaces, and especially makes a place for the body in thinking; for 
voices and bodies which have not had spaces to speak from (for bodies which have not been 
considered rational, for example). 
The field created by difference between two means that its constitution is one of "always becoming-
and "calls for a relation between subjective and objective where the one could never assume nor 
integrate the other because the one and the other are two· .10) As a basis for the generation of this 
world Irigaray sets the impossibility of objectivity, which "is not [objective] [ ... ] and, moreover, the 
sensible and feelings have their objectivity and are worthy of being thoUght-. I04 lrigaray presents the 
possibility of this kind of speaking in the terms of the discipline in which she is trained and in which 
she writes-Western philosophy, which, as noted earlier in this dissertation, plays a winking game 
with its own belief in objectivity. In lrigaray's terms, this game means that philosophy becomes ·the 
relation between a subject and an object or a thing he tries to analyze, hardly caring about speaking 
to the other, in particular [not caring about] starting from a listening to the other-.IOS This, then, is a 
philosophy that is disinterested in what there might be between two. In order to invert it, lrigaray 
foregrounds the qualities of silence (the silence of the other) that facilitate speech, bringing the other 
again to the centre of things. If the possibility of speaking together (conversation) begins in the 
possibility of silence, then speech itself requires that a space is left for the other. lrigaray's 
understanding of the possibilities-the conditions-for expression of the relation between two, and 
of the language that we use to create those expressions, are similar in their insistence on the space 
required for speaking-with to happen to Roland Barmes' concept of the lover's discourse. 
Like Irigaray, Barmes uses spatial tropes to talk about love. This is a figurative or perhaps 
metaphysical space: its boundaries are the bodies of people or the thoughts of people, language, 
thought, feeling. Nonetheless, in its creation-the hollOwing-out of a place to talk about love, for 
example, or the various ways in which it is sensed or transversed-it is spoken about in terms that put 
it in an intermediate position between the material and the textual. Love is intermediary in two 
senses: first of all, in that it goes between two; and second, because it is what is produced when two 
103 Ibid. 
104 Irigaray.8. 
105 Irigaray. 15. 
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aR together in conversation. 
Barthes calls Jove the "site- of a discourse that is "exiled- (a space, therefore, embodying 
separateness). In Barthes, there is both the separation of love as a discourse and a material or formal 
separation within the object that is his book (comprising 80 fragments of this discourse). The form 
of the book-its 'arbitrary' ordering and its fragments-is a representation of a discourse in which 
much slips out of meaning. or is never included in the first place. The tropes of love in this book 
come with a place of articulation or sense of field-paradise; the body; a gift; song; the novel; a map; 
a ship; a tapestry; the embrace (a space between arms); a train station; a tableau; a constellation, 
village. netWOrk. "a little cosmos-; a theatre. Even writing gives the amorous subject a place: "I am 
alongside it- (writing); Janguage is a "region-.106 Barthes' examination oflove returns over and over 
to the trope of space to describe love, linking it to expanse, distance, area. His insistence, meanwhile, 
on love's 'atopia' means that love reserves its potential to change, to be tailored, to mutate; to go, as it 
were, off the map. 
The concurrent metaphors of place and atopia of love mean that Barthes offers a way to understand 
what love is like without ever saying 'this is it' or 'this is where it is'. His descriptions hold two things 
simultaneously-the spaciousness or space-like-ness of love and the fact that love occurs in a 
nowhere, is unmappable, and therefore remains to be charted, always unauthoritatively each time, by 
whoever strikes out for it. 
Bwes writes that it 
is not true that the more you love, the better you understand; all that the action of love 
obtains from me is merely this wisdom: that the other is not to be known; his opacity is 
not the screen around a secret, bur. instead, a kind of evidence in which the game of 
reality and appearance is done away with. I am then seized with that exaltation of loving 
someone unknown. someone who will remain so furcver. 107 
The qualities of llmidess space, even figurations of such, mean that there is no endgame. Across the 
limidess expanse of the other, the fact that "I cannot open up the other, trace back the other's origins, 
106 Ckations &om these sentences, in order from the beginning: Banhe:s. 2002: 76 (see: De:rrida, 2005. p. 95. for more: on the: 
cncnsion of the gift across space): 77: 93: 95: 101: 103: lOS: 118: 123: 138-39: 142:98:99. 
107 Barthcs, 2002: 135. 
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solve the riddle" means that "W'here does the other corne from? W'ho is the other?"I08 are permanent 
questions that leave the asker ever further and further to go. 
The code which is the lover's discourse itself is a further space: we "fill in this code according to [our] 
own history [ ... ] the figure must be there, the site (the compartment) must be reserved for it·.I09 It is 
precisely the 'own'-ness of the history and the site that, for Barthes, has necessitated the book. 
Everything in it "follows from this principle: that the lover is not to be reduced to a single 
syrnptomal subject".l1o Barthes identifies the "necessity" for the book in the ,. extreme solitude·l11 of 
the lover's discourse "spoken, perhaps, by thousands of subjects [ ... ] but warranted by no one [ ... ] 
forsaken by the surrounding languages: ignored, disparaged, or derided by them" and "severed not 
only from authority but from the systems of authority", an "exiled" discourse.lll But Barthes ends his 
jeremiad by attesting to the possibility of this exiled discourse containing or prodUcing the 
possibility "however exiguous. of an affirmation". 113 The lover's discourse. solitary and meek as it may 
be. is also the site of a promise. an assertion important enough to be "the subject of the book that 
begins here".114 Its solitude and its disenfranchisement as a discourse are the necessary conditions for 
its (self-) constitution. The lover's discourse is in each instance because 
there is no system of love: and the several systems which surround the contemporary 
lover offer him no room (except for an extremely devaluated place): turn as he will 
toward one or another of the received languages, none answers him. except in order to 
turn him away from what he loves. Christian discourse. if it still exists. exhorts him to 
repress and to sublimate. Psychoanalytical discourse (which. at least. describes his state) 
commits him to give up his Image-repertoire as lost. As for Marxist discourse. it has 
nothing to say. lIS 
This discourse, perhaps as with any, is initially about creating a space within which what has no place 
for utterance can be uttered. The particularity of the lover's discourse means not only that it has no 
built-in place. but also that even as it creates its own place, its self-difference means that this place 
continually expands. changes. fabricates its own unknownness. 
108 Barthes. 2002: 134. 
109 Barthes.2oo2: 5. 
110 Barthes. 2002: 3. 
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The lover's discourse is a site and so in some way 'locatable: but it is also "unclassifiable, of a 
ceaselessly unforeseen originality", JJ6 an 'originality' represented by the fragments of the book's title 
and form. Formally, the book represents the structure oflove as partial, disordered, and incomplete; 
the short pieces of writing do not form a greater narrative or produce a sense of continuity. Instead, 
they achieve a sense of sensual and textual accumulation from which a feeling may be arrived at. 
Barthes' conception of the lover's discourse as a code written and rewritten according to the history 
of the lover in question l17 figures this discourse as to some extent non-replicable. This means that the 
lover's discourse of Barthes' book, for example, is not a 'recipe' or how-to, but a transmission in a 
language which seems familiar but whose uses we cannot fully grasp. It also means that each new 
producer of this discourse is a producer of a new discourse, not simply a new producer of an 
established one. 
The Lover's Discourse enacts and exemplifies the form the discourse of being a lover in the individual 
and particular instance takes, which is that of a continuing revision of official counts-an escape 
from the accustomed descriptions of the world and a creation of a new one, with suitably new ways 
of expressing itsel£ The form ofBarthes' book-its 'arbitrary' ordering (it is alphabetical rather than 
random in order to escape "the wiles of pure chance" which might have created "'a philosophy of 
love' where we must look for no more than its affirmation"ll8-is a representation of a discourse in 
which much slips out of meaning, or is never included in the first place. The book of fragments is like 
a sentence with ellipsis or a series using commas without an 'and': its form indicates its own 
incompletion, rather than pretending to comprehensiveness. Barthes' use throughout the text of 
marginal annotations likewise points to the impossibility of including everything. classifying 
everything. describing it, but also to the infinite pOSSibility of relation. The form and its contents 
represent the experience of loving as greater than the container created to hold it, whether that 
container is stereotype, story, language, expectation. The lover's discourse and the book Barthes has 
created to represent it "have been left in the frequently uncertain, incomplete state suitable to a 
discourse whose occasion is [ ... J the memory of the sites (books, encounters)"U9 which precipitated 
its creation. The incomplete and 'arbitrary' state of Barthes' work also allows for the possibility of 
reordering-since the order is arbitrary, the work can be read in any order, opened at any point. Any 
116 Barthcs. 2002: 34. 
117 Barthes, 1978: 5. 
118 Barthcs.I978: 8. 
119 Barthcs, 1978: 9. 
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part of it can be more or less important. The work respects the possibility of other readings, and by 
association, the possibility of other experiences of love; this possibility is addressed directly by 
Barthes in the section ".AJorabler. The beloved is perceived by the lover "as a Whole (in the &shion 
of Paris on an autumn afternoon), and, at the same time, this Whole seems [ ... ] to involve a 
remainder-;I20 the "loved being [ ... ] endlessly withdraws and pales·PI Whatever is t h e r ~ ~ is not 
enough; the beloved is always just a little bit further beyond the point of attainment. 
The remainder in love-the unspeakable optical illusion that hovers just out of sight, and which is 
that thing that preserves the otherness of the other, ·something like a syncope in the lovely phrase of 
the loved being»lll-doses off the lover's discourse at the point where language cannot exceed the 
words "I love because I love you».123 Love and its discourse may seem isolated from or repressed by 
logic and the discourses of authority but love's power comes from its ·stubbornness·, which is not 
about a rdation to larger systems but the filet that" despite discomforts, doubts, despairs, impulses to 
be done with it, I unceasingly affirm love, within myself, as a virtue [ ... ] I counter whatever 'doesn't 
work' in love with the affirmation of what is worthwhile·.1u Enacting its own resistance against "the 
most divergent systems employ to demystify [ ... ] limit [ ..• ] erase [ ... ] depreciate love-,125 love creates a 
space, hollowing out and making room for itselfby these affirmations; for 
what I have affirmed a first time, I can once again affinn, without repeating it, for then 
what I affirm is the affinnation, not its contingency: I affinn the first encounter in its 
difference. I desire its return, not its repetition. I say to the other (old or new): Let us 
begin again. 12.6 
On beginning again, the discourse restarts itself; it finds new ways to affirm and new affirmations to 
make. Whatever space it makes is changeable and restless. It "resists description, definition, language 
[ ... ] [it] makes language indecisive: one cannot speak of the other, about the other; every attribute is 
false, painful. erroneous, awkward: the other is unqtulifiable·.127 Barthes identifies the space of the 
lover's discourse as atopic-without a set location. 
120 Banhes.2002: 19. 
121 Banhes.2002: 112. 
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Atopia means that the discourse cannot be mapped according to the structures in which we already 
participate. It is not part of agreed-upon descriptions or categorizations of the world. Where, then, is 
this atopic space, this site of discourse, to be found? Ifit is atopic, unplaceable (ungraspable), can it 
be said to exist? Yes-like weather, which is unmappable but present, the lover's discourse moves 
through and is created by spaces. It is created in -relation itself".l28 Its strength 'evaCUates' narratives 
that pre-cxist it: -when the relation is original, then the stereotype is shaken [ ... J evacuated". 129 The 
placdessness of love and its discourse is their strength; being transient, they retain the possibility of 
movement. 
F. Exorbitance and saying yes 
-Philosophy defines itself as the 'love of wisdom' because it must in effect begin 
before claiming to know·. 130 
'The potential for an approach to the other of which deconstruction is one representation is further 
carried out by lrigaray's concern for the language by which we construct our relations on the one 
hand, and by Barthes' consideration of the potential of lovers' discourses in particular to be models of 
tatual bliss-changeable, unpredictable, and open. Rather than offer a methodology, this 
dissertation, and Chapters 3 and 4 in particular, attempt to mobilise a collectivity of voices that 
represent the possibility of reading lovingly. The desirability of such a collectivity of voices is 
indicated by the insufficiency of 'Derridian deconstruction' alone for the task of constructing a 
loving approach to texts. 
Deconstruction is supplemented by these texts; as with any supplemental relationship, the effect of 
this is to demonstrate the necessary relationship between the two elements. Although 
deconstruction is widely studied, practiced, and 'replicated: Derrida's explicit identiflcation of the 
role of a loving relationship between the 'deconstructing self and the 'deconstructed' other is limited, 
which has allowed deconstruction to be interpreted and applied in ways that are not aligned to this 
attitude. Therefore, in order to offer a more textured and fuller picture of the possibilities of a loving 
approach (which deconstruction, as in Chapter 3, can be one example of), the introduction of these 
other voices is necessary. Where Dcrrida leaves off-or, we could say, where he begins, because his 
128 Banhes. 2002: 35. 
119 Banhes. 2002: 36. 
130 Marion, 2007: 2. 
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statements arc about fundamentals-he leaves space for a rdationship with writers with whose 
writing his own can be constcllatcd. Uvinas' insistence that love is about what cannot be mown. and 
that this is the place from which justice proceeds, reinforces and adds complexity to Derrida's 
definition of the love in deconstruction as the yes to the other.lrigaray's world-construction duougb 
listening to the other and the pcrfonnance of a new kind of speech begins from the point ~ ~
Derrida insists that priority for the other is the 6rst movement in any dcconstructive cngagrment. 
Barthes' and lrigaray's usc of space between the lover and the beloved as a figure lOr the 
unknowability of the other provides a visual mnemonic for Derrida's assertion of the otherness of the 
other. And Teresa Brennan's argument that we arc not afftctivdy separated means that a n:onIcring 
of the relationship between subject and object such as the one Dcrrida offers is necessary-and oam 
evidence from philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and chemistry as support. 
The point of identifying the links between these thinkers is not to construct a master narrative of 
philosophy, a genealogy of ideas which can be traced to an authentic source, but to demonstrate that 
ideas identified by Derrida as central to the project of deconstruction arc actually present across 
many and diverse bodies of writing; that the attitude of deconstruction toward the other is shared 
and proposed by thinkers even outside the canon of poststructuralism; and that a constellation of 
these texts and thinkers can show the poSSibility of and desire for a loving approach. 
The diversity of these texts, which arc by no means the limits of texts which could be so constdlatcd. 
resists the methodological drive to containment: such diversity denies the satisfaction of achieving a 
set of rules which may be followed to a consistent end. and it presents the texts as exemplary. rather 
than authoritative. As such, it practices saying yes before knowing. Instead of devdoping from a 
framework that is pre-made, an approach that respects the space between two acknowlcd.ga the 
necessity of mystery to knowledge. One result of this is the on-going openness and incompletion of 
such an approach. It cannot be proven best' at anything. It can only be taken. As such, it is to SOme 
degree an exorbitant approach. Yes is an exorbitant answer because it is by 'yes' that the outer circle of 
what is possible expands. Yes is excessive, not ascetic. 
The exorbitant offers models for approaching texts, as well as for creating them (whether in the 
juxtaposition of extant texts or in writing 'new' ones). It acknowledges the scam between 'inside' and 
'outside' information. 'permissible' and 'impermissible' sources of information, and performs the 
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, flash' Barthes identi6es with textual eroties. The exorbitant is no place; it is the continued traversal 
in both directions of whatever line is set up to designate what belongs where. Like the lover's 
discourse. it exists in relation. 
1hc enactment of exorbitance calls up escape, exit, cthe attempt to get out of a rut ... to get outside the 
metaphysical closure that sequesters theory from the real-m. But such an escape is impossible. It 
would be impossible to devdop a purely exorbitant approach, to speak only of what is unspoken, 
forgotten, excluded, or ignored. or to write in such a way as to perpetually slip outside the bounds of 
the academy (for example). Furthermore, such an approach would forget its own necessity-the play 
between presence and absence that calls to mind both-and lose its erotic flashing between 
here/not-here. The impossibility of a purely exorbitant method is what exorbitance speaks to-that 
there is always something that slips out of grasp or just beyond language. What this approach aims 
for. then, is to be informed by the qualities of exorbitance that direct thought outward, which 
demand a continual reformation and creation of the world. Exorbitant is a description of questions 
like 'What do pictures want?' and considerations of the other-as-other in a history of philosophy 
which has had little time for non-objectified subjects. Considering subjects in terms that allow them 
to speak for themselves. instead of only those that assign meaning. is an exorbitant approach. The 
exorbitant represents a space of continual expansion, continual possibility, of which tcxtuality is a 
perfonnarive aspect. and love is one form. 
The choice in this dissertation of exorbitance as a description of the approach being developed is not 
unique. In fact, Derrida calls the exorbitant a cQuestion ofMethod-132 and -[prepares] to privilege, 
in a manner that some will not fail to judge exorbitant, certain texts". 133 The exorbitant participates in 
the construction of meaning as the aphorism does-as an -exposure to contretemps"l34 and a 
simultaneous ·promise of a now in common [ ... ] the desired sharing of a living present" .135 The living 
present of Dcrrida's aphorism and the necessity of the exorbitant to continually redefine and 
transverse the boundaries express the same interest in an unstable communication. What is living is 
untypifiable because: it has not yet finished devdoping. mutating. growing. This means that the 
131 Gallop. Jane. ,A"mltJtJ ThetwJ. (Durham and London: Duke University Press. 2002). p. 8. 
132 Dcrrida. Jacques. "The Exorbitant. Question of Method- in Of Gr4111m41Owgy. T fanS. Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak. Oohns 
Hopkins University Press: 1976). p. 157. 
133 Derrida.1974: 231. quoted in Gallop. 7. 
134 Derrida.1992: 416. 
US Dcrrida.1992: 419. 
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exorbitant as a living state is a relational one. Living-ness and exorbitance incorporate the fact of 
contradiction. almost insouciantly. Any representation of what is living or exorbitant should include 
the caveat that what you see is not what you get-that the totality on the page or canvas or 
projection screen is partial to an infinite degree. despite claims to the contrary that may be made by 
its creators, its contexts, or any combination thereo£ An approach that includes what it should not, 
or includes the fact of it own limits; an approach which reactivates the subject in all of its ways of 
knowing; an approach which reorganises the relationship between subject and object in terms of 
what has been • excluded from recognizable. sanctioned knowledge ... relegatcd to 'the personal'-l36 is 
an approach with room for tenderness toward the other it approaches. It acknowledga the 
impossibility of grasping. It echoes in the work of these writers. 
136 Gallop. 56. 
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5/ 
"love's function is to fabricate unknownness": 
E. E. Cummings, Rainer Maria Rilke 
and approaching the other 
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A. Introduction 
-an identity not of roots but of mectingplaccs·· 
In the Introduction of this dissertation, the problematic schism between science and poetry. 
philosophy and love was established. Subsequent chapters dealt with the demonstration of the ~ ~
for, rather than the repression of, the love in philosophy. In Chapter 3, this dissertation IDaIysed 
understandings of deconstruction in order to demonstrate the possibility for a reading that takes 
deconstruction as exemplary of, or as holding the potential for, an approach to texts which tabs the 
otherness of those texts into consideration. Dcrrida agora the 10ve in deconstruction' as rapect fOr 
the otherness of the other that forms a place from which one might begin to critique. neptc. or 
invert. Via Derrida's explication of this love, it can be seen that in fact one way of understanding love 
itself is as a respect for inviolable distances which exist between the one and the other. Chapter 4 
advances from Derrida's engagement with texts to the engagements of others, including L6rioas, 
lrigaray, and Barthes, who consider love but do not necessarily posit it as a mode of u:ztual 
interaction. One of the large concerns of Chapter 4 is the question of how to speak with the other; 
the possibility of engagement with the other comes out of recognition of their non-union with the 
sel£ Therefore, any engagement with the other occurs across a space arising between two non-
assimilating beings. 
Chapter 5 will continue to construct a reading of approaches to the other (and the tcxtual other) via 
the work of Cummings and Rilke. In so doing, this chapter submits that such approaches are not the 
exclusive domain of one discipline or mode of writing: that in fact approaches to the other can be 
generated in many adds and in many styles, and that, therefore, these approaches arc mutable, 
subject to repositioning, adaptable, and dynamic. The collective of voices mobilised in this 
dissertation is only one possible pennutation of these voices, which arc a subjective and limited 
selection of all possible such voices. Further to this, the inclusion of two poets' voices is intended to 
disrupt the positivist idea, discussed in Chapter 1, that certain ways of thinking have exclusive daims 
on truth, authority, and ways of being. Instead, this dissertation assumes that ways of being arc 
constructed by any relationship, regardless of the mode of knowing with which or through which it 
engages. The writings of Cummings and Rilke presented here arc, by virtue of their freedom from the 
1 Rich. Adrienne. WhAt is Fou"a T h t 1 ' ~ : : N o ~ b o o I u u ()1J Pomy ANi Poutics (New York: Norton. 2(03). p. 258. 
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constraints of philosophical 'authority' or scientific 'truth: able to enact something like Irigaray's 
more musical, haptic way of speaking. and identify in language the space between the other and the 
self which, when recognised. creates the possibility for a lOving approach. These poets offer an 
authorial approach to texts that performs their own philosophies about love. As such, they offer 
performances of a loving approach. 
B.Rilkc 
In the work of Roland Banhes and Luce Irigaray, the question oflove involves three things: the lover, 
the beloved, and the space between them, across which communication takes place. This space, while 
potentially a physical one (the fact of skin which keeps bodies, however close, apart preserves an 
inBnite space which cannot be transversed), is also a figure for the unknowability of the other. In 
terms of an engagement with the other. it is this space which functions as a reminder of the 
inassimilability of the other and which preserves the otherness of the other. It is across this space that 
relation can happen. rdation to that which is assimilated being impossible. The space between two 
thus preserves not only the otherness of the other but the non-identity of the self with the other (the 
otherness of the self). A non-assimilating self and a non-assimilated other can continue in an infinite 
relation, because no matter how far they travel together. there is a continual expanse of unknownness 
arising between them. 
Rainer Maria Rilkc was an Austrian poet born in Bohemia in 1876. writing in German. He is best 
known for two works, the Dumo Elegies and the S o n n ~ t s s to Orpheus. but besides these and other 
works of poetry he also wrote letters and other prose-essays. a novel In some of his letters, Rilke 
takes on a consideration of love: what it is. how it works. Although this consideration extends 
markedly beyond the bounds of this dissertation. there are a few instances where Rilke's discussion 
clarifies that of lrigaray and Banhes-or even of Uvinas in terms of the question of justice and 
seeing the other. as well as of love's relation to poetry and making-and these instances have to do 
with Rilke's conception of love as a spatial phenomenon. Rilke's consideration of love is situated in 
relation to a consideration of marriage. which. in -the twilight of Christianit(2 from which Rilke 
writes, is still the authorised location for the physical expression of romantic love. 
2 Rilke. Rainer Maria, cd. and trans. Mood, John J.L IWIet tm Love."a Other Difficulties: TranslAtions ana Consilkrations (New 






Considerations of love begin for R.i.lk.e with considerations of sex, and sex, for Rilkc, is something we 
must ·creep round [ ... ] and get into [ ... ] in the end; like burglars and thieves-,) a place we. by virtue of 
repressive ways of understanding the world (such as Christianity, with which R.i.lk.e had a fraught 
relationship), do not belong. The self is thus separated from ·what is most mysteriously ows-." In 
R.i.lk.e's conception of sex, therefore, even between the self and the thing that is most self-like or most 
belongs to the self there is a schism. Of course, to R.i.lk.e this is not a 'natural' way of being. but one 
constructed by the invention of guilt and sin; it is by these that sex and the body are made 
-homdcss·,5 without a place to which they belong. This sets him in opposition to the institutions of 
Christianity that regulate relationships, and specifically to marriage. which sanctifies sex as a union 
-directed only toward posterity-6 and which. in that union. ordains the subsumption of one self to 
another. Sex within the Christian sacrament becomes an instrument, not of mystery. but of order and 
ownership; in so becoming. it mimics the historic role of marriage itself in that conteXt. For Rilke, on 
the other hand, love and sex serve to produce separation between individuals-a separation which 
creates the space for what he designates love to happen. 
R.i.lk.e's orthogonal position in regards to the institution of marriage within Christianity can be 
expressed in spatial terms. In the Gospel of Matthew we find the admonition that the husband and 
wife Care no longer two, but one'" joined by God into ·one flesh-. The two bodies are, in m ~ ~
transformed into a single flesh-one set of desires. one experience of the world. The Christian idea of 
a single flesh was echoed in the English. American. and French legal concept of covertwe (or 
couverture). by which a married woman's rights to own property. sign legal documents, enter into 
contracts. obtain education. or receive a salary for herself were ceded to her husband. Coverture also 
prohibited husbands and wives from testifying against one another; such testimony would be 
impossible, since the woman was in effect now part of the man-one flesh. spiritually and legally. In 
both Christian sacrament and legal expression. the assimilation of the wife into the husband's 
physical and legal body means that there is no space between these two; the two disappear and are 
replaced by the (masculine) one. Spatially, there is no gap to cross. no separation across which for 
relation to occur. There is only the one. 
7 Matthew 19:4-6; also Mark 10:7-9. 
190 
By contrast, Rilkc insists that the most holy purpose of marriage is not to consecrate a union that 
d&ccs the singularity of two people. but instead to preserve that separateness attentively. The 
condition of being human is a condition of· deep isolation-;8 occasionally. this isolating expanse is 
-dlytbmically [interrupted]- by true sharing. What is this 'sharing if it is not the fusion implied by, 
for insWJcc, the Christian 'one flesh'? Rilke writes that the ·highest task of a bond between two 
people- is ·that each should stand guard over the solitude of the other-.9The word 'guard' implies not 
only that solitude is precious-valuable enough and delicate enough to warrant not only care but 
",..am& active protection against hann. The word also implies that there is a threat which exists 
apiost this solitude-which of course there is, in the prevailing legal. social, and moral doctrines of 
RiIkc's time (which still resonate in the 21- century). This threat is the threat of assimilation as the 
means and end of marriage. an absolute 'togetherness' within which one person is lost-or both are. 
Assimilation is the social and religiOUS norm to which it is easy and comfortable to turn; throughout 
most of the 1 ~ ~ century it is also the legal norm. Therefore. non-assimilation is a position of 
raistance, and, as such. must be undertaken with an attitude of alertness-for -if it lies in the nature 
of indif'Fcrence and of the crowd to recognize no solitude. then love and friendship are there for the 
purpose of continually providing the opportunity for solitude-. lo In other words: what is mandated 
1Odally. religiously. and legally is in fact oppositional to the purpose of love. which is to reinforce the 
cI.iflaence between individuals which creates the feeling of solitude. 
Marriage and friendship arc, for Rilk.e. moments in which separation can occur. The 'sharing he 
writes of is not assimilation. a sharing of one location by two bodies becoming one flesh. Instead. it is 
the gracious sharing by two people of the value of the solitude of each. In resisting assimilation. in 
keeping guard oyer the solitude of the other. a new space is created between the two. across which 
their rclation can live. Moreover. Rilke writes that the work of a marriage is not to create a ·quick 
community of spirit by tearing down and destroying all boundaries·.ll Again, he assens that what 
maka a marriage 'good' is the ·confldence- shown by each person in entrusting the other with his or 
her solitude.12 In order to be with the other in the most proximate way. the nrst responsibility 




11 JUIkc. 28. 
11 Ibid. 
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neighboring soliwdes·,u Rather than a state of inclusion whereby one person becomes another 
(legally, physically, psycholOgically), the most holy relationship two people can enter into is defined 
by Rilke as a state of continually alen exclusion of the other by the self on the pan of each penon. 
Because of the requirement not to cede the self to the other, the task of love becomes -the most 
difficult of all our tasks, the last test and proof'" .14 What is lost when people are unprepared for the 
work of love are the Cexpanses and possibilities»IS which come from not knowing the other. Loring 
someone, aware that love means both acknowledging the otherness of that person and entrusting 
them with the acknowledgment of one's own otherness, generates space across which to relate 
('expanses') and allows the fuwre ('possibilities') to be unknown and to develop on its own, 
uncontrollable terms. 
Rilke figures love, then, not as a way of being together tending toward assimilation, but a way of 
warily guarding the separateness of each member. The most vulnerable position one can enter into, in 
these terms, is one in which one's solitude is entrusted to another. Togetherness itself is -an 
impossibility. and where it seems. nevenheless, to exist, it is a narrowing. a reciprocal ~ t t
which robs either one patty or both of [his or her] fullest freedom and development-.I ' If 
togetherness is 'narrowing, then the careful guarding of each solitude mUst be expansive. And expanse 
is precisely Rilke's figure for this: he writes that ·once the realization is accepted that even between 
the closest human beings infinite distances continue to exist, a wondcrfulliving side by side can grow 
up·. 17 The aim is not for one being to replace another. for one to assimilate to another, or for two to 
merge. It is the development of a ·living side by side»: two lives next to one another and in relation to 
one another. The necessary condition for this living side by side is that the two ·succeed in loving the 
distance between them which makes it possible for each to see the other as whole and against a wide 
Sky-.18That is. that the distance between the two must also be loved-guarded. cared for-because it 
is this distance that guarantees the 'wonderful living side by side' and therefore which guarantees love. 
The love so guaranteed is what ensures the ' fullest freedom and development' of each person. Love is 
the existence and acknowledgement of and respect for this space between the two. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Rilkc. 31. 





C. Three poems by E. E. Cummings 
I would like to return briefly to the beginnings of this dissertation; it was there that W. ]. T. 
Mitchell's statement about pictures being ·'ways of worldmaking', not just worldmirroring"19 was 
introduced. Both pictures and texts are ways of creating the world: of revising the one we have or of 
imagining a new one and calling it to life. This creation is performed by any representations made by 
humans, reordering the way things are seen and felt, and therefore experienced as real or true. 
Cummings's poems call for a reconsideration of what rationality is, and how it is evaluated. He 
inverts terms and relationships in order to demonstrate the possibility of other ways of being and of 
being-together. These poems are concerned at their very heart with the creation of the world. The 
point of view from which this world is created is that of the lover, the person to whom love is the 
supreme consideration and reference. 
Jean-Luc Marion, in The Erotic Phmommon, rejects a philosophy of the 'subject' that neglects or 
wilfully ignores that which is not -defined by exercise of the rationality exclusively appropriate to 
objects and beings-, in other words, a Cartesian subject -who, by thinking. is originarily".20 In other 
words, Marion is looking for a definition of a subject which docs not stop at the rational. but which 
makes room for the contradiction of the irrational as well. (Mary Midgley calls Descartes' thought a 
·wrong place- in that it begins with the -sharp division of mind from body".21) For both Midgley 
and Marion, the Cartesian formation of worlds is flawed in its omission of the other: other ways of 
thinking. other minds with which to create thought. The isolated brain, without the other parts of 
the body to form relations. cannot be fiilly communicative, because it is not fiilly experiential. 
Midgley insists that what thinks -has to be the whole pmon".22 this whole person whose wholeness is 
guarded by those around them, not assimilated into a single way of thinking established for them by 
some dominant class. We are whole bodies-bodies that feel, sense, sing. quiver, tremble, and prickle 
with rising hairs, • always already caught in the tonality of an erotic disposition"23 that the Cartesian 
ego and the tradition of'objectivity' of which it is the base omit. 
Marion faults the Cartesian construction of the ego for its self-containment. The Cartesian ego, that 
19 Mitchell, xiv. 
20 Marion, 2007: 6: my emphasis. 
21 Midgley, 118. 
22 Midgley. 119. 




thing which -doubts. which affirms, which denies, which understands iN things. which is iponnt 
of many, which wills, which docs not will. which imagines. too. and which even fuJa-.M is 
incomplete insob.r as Descartes himself neglected to assign it any passion-it neither lOYes. nor ~ ~
and thereby separates those actions from the basic and rational construction of the sdf. Marion tabs 
exception with this construction. which eliminates love from -the first modes of thoupt- that 
determine the ontology of the ego. because it claims -a fUndamental erotic neutrality-. Low: is -the 
phenomenon I am to myscli.2S writcs Marion. He proposes a substitution of-erotic mediradoas for 
metaphysical oncs·.26 
The question that Marion proposes in the place of Dcscartcs' is 'can I love first?: a question of 
replacing a thinking ego with a loving one. Cumminp. in the poem -61- also performs this 
replacement. The poem is a sonnet; its form announces its position in the firmament of sonoets. & a 
sonnet, -61· has recourse to the tradition of writing on love, but to some extent it refuses both the 
formal conventions of that tradition (Cummings maintains the fOurteen lines and 
ABAB/CDCD/EFEF/GG pattern of the sonnet but uses the lines' interior space innovatively; he 
also uses parentheses to block out areas of ten and create separate spaces within the 6mn) and the 
way love is framed within it. If, as the first line of the poem goes. -love's fUnction is to &bricae 
unknownncss·, then the fUnction of the love poem is to bear witness to this unknownncss. Wbae fOr 
Rilke. love is figured as unknown, in this poem. love is also the site of a continually rcaewal 
unknownness: a fabrication of the unknown. Cummings bears witness to this by manipulating 
customary syntactic, grammatical. and punctuative devices to distort the act of reading and of 
creating and gleaning meanings from the poem. The poem in full: 
61 
1 love's function is to fabricate unknownncss 
(known being wishless; but love.all of wishing) 
though life's lived wronpideout,Sameness chokes oneness 
truth is confused with fact,fish boast of f1shing 
5 and men are caught by wonns(love may not care 
if time tottersJight droops.all measures bend 
nor marvel if a thought should weigh a star 
26 ~ a r i o n . 2 0 0 7 : 8 . .
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-dreads dying lcast;and less,that death should end) 
how lucky loyers are( whose selves abide 
10 under whatcyer shall discoyered be) 
whose ignorant each breathing dares to hide 
more than most fabulous wisdom fears to see 
(who laugh and cry)who dream.create and kill 
while the whole mOYC5;and every pan stands still: L7 
The f1rst line serves as a thesis for the poem altogether; that the purpose oflove is not to make things 
clear, to establish facts, or to offer truth. Instead. love's function is to make, actively, the quality of the 
not·known, the continually unknowable and strange. Cummings plays with the non-instrumentality 
of love (love is a passion, rather than a rationality, and as such is not expected to be of 'use') by 
assigning it a ' function' and describing that function as one of' fabrication'. Love in this figuration is 
like a factory, with a dedicated purpose and outcome. 
However, the comparison of love to a factory is ironic. Love is not like a factory, because what it 
produces eludes quality control or mechanisation: it fabricates unknownness. Every Single thing that 
comes from love is difttrcnt from every other. There is no system for understanding or predicting 
what it will be; the best thing is to attempt to understand it on its own terms. The terms of love are 
set out in line 2, which directly compares the known (Cwishless·) to love (call of wishing-). Love, 
being that which fabricates unknownness, must be the opposite of the known. The quality of the 
known is to be 'wish1css' -without desire. As noted in Chapter 3 in discussion on the erotic, the 
erotic exists in a state of suspense. Once jouissance is attained. once the stripper has removed all her 
clothes, once the story is resolved. the erotic disappears. To be desiring is an erotic state because it 
exists only when there is something missing-something for which to wish. Once all wishes are 
fUlfUIcd, there can be no desire. What is known is 'wishless' because it has already, in Lbrinas' words, 
been grasped-there is no further to go once all is known. Love, on the other hand. is call of 
wishing--the totality of what is not present but which might be, a set that continues to expand to 
accommodate a greater and greater 'all'. 
The terms of love are not the terms of the world that surround it, where clife's lived wrongsideout-
(line 3). Because love is being set against the known, the terms of the world against which love is set 
must be the terms of knowing. The things of this world are time. light, measure, thought (lines 5-7), 
27CIIDUIlinp. E.E. No TIwJu (Ncw York and London: Livcright, 1998). p. 74. 
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but each of these is treated disrnissivdy by love, which -may not are/if time totters [._] nor marvel if 
a thought should bend a SW'- (lines 5-7). Love has no stake in ensuring that time is a continuous and 
steady march; in proving that light travels in ceaseless straight lines; in establishing a set of 
unchangeable measures; or in weighing human thought against the stars. Its worth comes not from 
knowing these things but from not-knowing them. The difference between not-knowing and 
ignorance is activity: as in Rilke's admonition to guard the solitude of the other. the lovers in 
Cummings' poem must actively not-know, not merely be ignoranL Love is a choice, a decision on 
how to approach the world. 
Love, because it is unknown and indeed continues to create its own unknownncss and the 
unknowability of the world, cannot be choked (line 3), or ·confused with &ct- (line 4). or mcasurcd 
(line 6). The known in this poem is related to loss of individuality ('oneness') to a collective being 
('sameness') similar to Rilke's concept of a narrowing togetherness wherein one or both individuals 
lose themselves. In the known, ·fish boast of fishing- (line 4); that is those who are caught in the net 
imagine themselves to be holding iL I f the net is read as a figure for the constructs of k n ~ _ _
philosophy, education, science, f.act, pedagogy-the poem disparages the folly of those who are 
within it thinking that they control iL A net is made to keep and to limit; no matter the facility of 
relation between the contained and the container, it remains that one kept in a net is kept in a nct.1f 
knownness keeps fish in a net of their own device, then knowing cannot be a way out of the net. The 
poem proposes love-an other way of experiencing the world-in place of knowing. In fact, it 
inverts the hierarchy it assumes (where knowing> love) by associating knOwing with delusion. 
confusion, asphyxiation, and love with fearlessness. freedom. and creativity / generativity. 
The most instinctive movement of those who love (-ignorant each breathing-, line 11) in this new 
arrangement bides' more than -most fabulous wisdom fears to scc- (line 12). What can it mean that 
the breath of lovers is described as 'ignorant', biding'? The breath is ignorant insofar as it is 
autonomic;21 it occurs without a conscious direction from the brain, continuously accompanying the 
actions of the body. But it is also in this poem a representation of the decisive not-knowing of the 
lovers; the body, reduced figuratively to breath, is even at this particular level wilfully un-knowing. 
What is hidden in the breath is what is unknown between the lovers, a greater ponion of territory 
than even that expanse which the known fears to approach. The smallest gesture of the loving body. 
28 Involuntary or unconscious; relating to the autonomic nervous system, which governs functions such as the heartbeat. the 
breath. 
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the unconscious breath, contains more space than the greatest expanse of wisdom because love begins 
at the point of affirming the unknown in the other and the sd£ That the breath '"hide[s]/ more than 
most f.abulous wisdom kars to see- (lines 11-12) reverses our expectations about where the source of 
experience of the world lies; it is not in wisdom, limited by what it I fears: but in the bodies of the 
lovers themselves, which, rather than being limited and knowable, continually '"abide/under 
whatever shall discovered be- (lines 9-10). Lovers are '"ignorant- (11) and their ignorance is 
privilegcd-an ignorance that is necessary to their state in love; an ignorance that descends from the 
very fimction of love to f.abricate unknownness. Their ignorance is their guarantee. Cummings 
provides a description of the lover in the case that love is understood to be that thing which 
continually outruns knowledge. Additionally, it is their '"breathing- which is specifically identified as 
'"ignorant- (11); the lives of the lovers are identified with bodily processes, which are technically 
ignorant. When we realise that in fact '"ignorant- is a positive term in '"61'", however, we can see that 
Cummings is placing value on the 'ignorant' bodily processes which provide us with feedback (raised 
hairs, quickened heartbeat, shallow breathing) about feelings. 
The lovers' selves, which abide despite whatever discoveries come to be made about them (by one 
another or by others) indicate a depth and breadth to the self that echoes Rilke's wide expanse of sky 
and infinite distances between two people. Knowledge cannot cross the distance to the self, which 
continues to abide regardless of what becomes known. The condition of the lover is '"lucky" (line 9) 
not through their own volition but circumstantially; because to love is to be '"aU of wishing- (line 2), 
their brcathinglbcing is continually in a state of ignorance, which, rather than closing the world off, 
admits the possibility of always further discovery. That discovery will never lead directly to a 
permanent, stable centre, but always to the recognition that still more is hidden. It is lucky, then, to 
be in a state where desire is on-going and discovery always remains to be made. 
Although the lovers in Cummings' poem abide, their abiding is not passive. They '"laugh and cry [ ... ] 
drcam.crate and kill- (line 13). In their activity, lovers, who have no recourse to final knowledge 
about the world. crate it anyway. Where a grasping, fixative way of being in the world "chokes 
oneness- (line 3), for lovers in this poem, '"the whole moves;and every part stands still" (line 14). The 
lovers here are agents of the cration of a world that centres on them, but are without the choking 
fixity that comes from a subjective understanding being generalised and figured as objectivity. 
Because their agency to move comes from the space of the unknown that love creates, this agency is a 
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subjective one, without the power which objective or empirical knowledge have in the poem to make 
measures of time, light, or thought (lines 6-7). Loven' being is assured through somethiug whose 
function-whose purpose-built use and anticipated way of working-is to -fabricate unknownness-
(line 1). The whole can move and the parts can stand still because the parts an: in fact also moving-
dreaming, creating, killing, laughing, crying. Cummings' use of a colon in the sentence-6nal position 
is telling; it makes a space for the yet-to-come and does not dose off the world of the poem (as a full 
stop would). effectively performing in punctuation what Cummings identifies as the role ofioft. The 
poem leads its reader out of itself and into what is 1101 written yet; into continual unknownness (a 
pause will always follow the colon) as a representation of love. Love is the thing that writes into that 
space-love is the creative act. 
As in many of Cummings' poems. love and wisdom an: set in what appears to be opposition hett-
but in fact love has its own wisdom or reddlnes wisdom in its terms. As Marion writes, love is not 
irrational, but has its own rationality which -unfolds in paradoxes, which dude the most quotidian 
rationality. the calculations and measurements of technology that an: sufficient for constituting the 
world's objects-,29 Love as the generator of the unknown requires its own syntaXeS, its own ways of 
creating that do not rdy on. or even tip their hat to. established ways of making and COmmunicating 
knowledge. The intention to put love into words -follows a logic that is completely differaat from 
the logic overseeing the management and arrangement of objccts-.30 That is, the creative logic oflove 
cannot be the same logic as the lOgic of knowing, because knowing is a case of putting thinp into 
their places. assigning categories. naming, and fixing. Love's logic is a logic of aIlowing-to-be that 
comes from the assurance of not-knowing. The voice of the knowing subject is Cartesian; it says &1 
think. therefore lam». and divides the world in front of it into classes to be arranged in an absolute 
order. The voice of the loving subject cannot say or do any such thing because its power to speak 
comes from its subjectivity and its not-knowing. Any arrangement it makes is limited and personal. 
Love is therefore spoken in the voice of limited knowledge or surety; Marion's critique of much of 
the tradition of Cartesian philosophy is that -only phenomena [ ... ] poor in intuition can be avem:d 
[ ... ] rich in certainty-.3l This statement's assumption is that those phenomena which we cxpcrience 
and communicate intuitively (Brennan might say 'afFectively') or in terms of the personal are 
29 Marion, 2002: x. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Marion, 2007: 13. 
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rendered uncertain and. because of their unverifiable nature, are excluded from the realm of thought. 
The voice of that which is rich in intuition is a voice speaking in terms that fabricate unknownness, 
because to follow intuition docs not necessarily lead, via channels of trial and proof, to knowing 
cxactly what is going on, or even having a strong hypothesis. Because the intuitive voice is inflected 
with the unknown, one grammatical voice that can represent it is the I-voice in its personal form (not 
the form wherein 'I'spcalcs for a generalised 'all', but the form in which I speak for my limited self). It 
is this voice which makes the argument for an understanding of the world which descends (or 
ascends) from our nerve endings, our intuition, our sense of music and warmth and being-together 
across a field of in6n.ite, uncrossable difference. Cummings speaks with this voice in another of his 
poems: 
1 since: feeling is fust 
who pays any attention 
to the syntaX of things 
will never wholly kiss YOu; 
S wholly to be a fool 
while Spring is in the world 
my blood approves, 
and kisses are a better fate 
than wisdom 
10 lady i swear by aU Bowers. Don't cry 
-the best gesture of my brain is less than 
your eyelids' Butter which says 
we are for each other: then 
laugh, leaning back in my arms 
1 S for life's not a paragraph 
And death i think is no parcnthesjs32 
Again, the argument of the poem comes in the first lines-or even the first line alone. The poem 
presupposes that fcc:ling is -first-: 'first' meaning both 'primary, privileged', and meaning 'occurring 
before other things'. In the poem, whatever else happens. including thought (or even wisdom), is 
second to feeling in all senses of the word. Those who feel are compared favourably to those who pay 
attention to -the syntaX of things-, or, in other words, those who place importance on the correct or 
habitual order of things that has been culturally determined to create generally agreed-upon sense. 
The comparison hinges on the word -wholly·, which occurs twice (lines 4 and 5) in relation to the 
verb 'kiss' and the verb phrase -to be a fooVwhUe Spring is in the world-. This suggests that the 
32 Cummings. E. E. Pomu, 1923-1954 (New York: Harcourt. Brace, and Co .• 1954). p. 208. 
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appropriate behaviour of being a fool in springtime is ruled out by -the syntax of thing,. and that 
this syntax, for all its concern with appropriateness, acrually misses the boat when it comes to the 
appropriate way to approach love. 
In the world the poem creates, those who pay attention to the syntax of things are in fact ignoring a 
more fundamental order in which &ding is first. That this order is fundamental is gestural to by the 
first word of the poem. -since-, which indicates that the sentence to follow it is an already_ 
understood premise. Those who, despite this premise, pay -any attention/ to the syntax of things-
(lines 2-3) are incapable of -wholly- engaging on a bodily or non-cerebral levd-of kissing or of 
being a fooL The history of fools includes not only those who choose to behave strangely or to 
disobey social commandments, but also people with brains which actually function diiTamtly to 
those of the general population, and in the poem such being is -approved- not by any sociaI.lcp1. or 
logical inclusion but by -my blood- (line 7), common substance of all bodies. Approval for knowing 
the other via the body and in a different rationality comes from the body itself, rather than fiom an 
outside legislator, and the fate of the body within this rationality (-kisses-, line 8) is -a better 
fate/than wisdom- (lines 8-9). Wholly to be a fool is to invert a hierarchy that would value -the best 
gesture of my brain- (line 11) over -your eyelids' flutter- (line 12). the trappings of syntax (brains, 
paragraphs) over the movements of the body (laughter, flutters). But Cummings docs not tmlJ invert 
the hierarchy of fool/philosopher, because both live together in the same, controlled, rhetorically 
complex space of the poem. He inserts this inversion into a logical proof that obeys syntactic logic. 
The world in which feeling is first lives in relation to a world of syntax. The tension ~ n e n t c d d by the 
poem's resistance to that syntax and the syntax's resistance to the terms the poem sets out is what 
allows both to continue in relation. Because this e x c h a n ~ ~ takes place within a syntax (poem, 
sentence) that is common, however, it remains intelligible. It is the relation between syntax and 
expression that creates meaning as much as anything, rather than the absolute destruction of one in 
favour of the other. 
The temporality of the poem makes it dear that whatever 'syntax' it sets up to replace the -syntax of 
things- (line 3) is a transient one: the poem takes place -while Spring is in the world- (line 6)i the 
fleetingness of the season is underscored by the word 'while' which precedes it. The vow that is 
sworn-that -kisses are a better fate/than wisdom- (lines 8-9)-is sworn -by all flowers- (line 10), 
rather than by something eternal and unchanging. However, the last line of the poem, with its 
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unpunctuated ending. implies that in f.u:t the vows which are made on the lovers' terms-the terms 
of the body and of the soft, sweet things (eyelids, £lowers, kisses, laughter)-are more than just 
passing. Despite the f.u:t that they do not go by the assumptions produced by .. the syntax of things", 
the vows made by the body, privately and outside of law or common lOgic, are not capped by death. 
In some way, they are infInite. 
The space within which the lovers operate, their life, is "'not a paragraph" (line IS); it cannot be 
parsed or divided into clauses, summed up. This resistance to syntax, to the gestures of the brain, is 
brought about by the poem's reliance on the subjective experience; that is, by its own choice of a 
limited scope (the scope of human life/human imaginings of afterlife) and by its dependence on 
experience which cannot be guaranteed by an cnernal, positivist, empirical body (the approval by 
"'my blood", the privileging of feeling itself). It is communicated in the first-person singular pronoun 
that by way of its rejection of a ·syntax of things" or a general classification system for what is as a 
way ofbcing. manages to represent an exchange as a personal and limited exchange (the I speaks for 
the I and not for everyone). Cummings signiB.es the limits of the I by de-capitalising it, rendering it 
of the same weight as the other words in the poem, except those which begin sentences ("Don't", line 
10; "'And", line 16) and the word ·Spring" (line 6).1he lower-case"'t of the poem does not assert a 
hierarchical posture, invoked by a majuscule, over the "'lady· (line 10) to whom it relates; instead, 
both Arst-person pronoun and tide are stripped of their proper capitals.33 This is a sentence-level 
poverty which has the result of offering the players in the poem a greater freedom to move and 
become, unconstrained by 'proper' being. with pre-set roles. 
In many of Cummings' poems. the question of space is a question of poetics. The possibilities the 
space of the page offers in terms of moving words, opening them up, breaking lines, and creating 
movement are important characteristics of much of his work. But space is not only a poetic concern; 
33 Not all ofCumminp' poans usc the convention of the lower-case -i·; see for example -vI. from -Three·, in Is 5, collected in 
PHmS 1923-1954. p. 203. This implies that either this is a choice he made poem by poem or that it is an attirude that 
emerged as he wrace and which he began to employ as a representation of his ethics/poetics. But in any case it demonstrates 
chat what we cannot do hen: is dismiss the presence of the lower-casc -i· as a gimmick or as background noise signifying only 
chat this is a Cumminp-pocm. In the same sequence of poems, in V. Cummings employs both the capital and the lower-
c:aK Ui in order to differentiate them: -(here the absurd I; Iitt, to peer and wear dothes.1 i am altogether foolish. i suddenly 
make a 6st! OUt often Rogers· (line 14. broken to fit on page: p. 202). The -absurd I- is the I which 'peers' and 'wears clothes: 
an I that is ocular. worried about seeing and about being seen. The lower-casc -i- is the voice of the speaker of the poem, 
raiIting the incursion of the 'absurd I: and this i is -altogether foolish--that is, operating on a different rationality-and 
active, making -. Ast/out of ten fingers-. The lower-casc -j- holds the possibility of rebdlion. unpredictability, even violence. 
Even the deletion of the habitual uppcr-casc mark is a kind of texrual resistance. There is no tradition lOr the lower-case -i-
and 10 then: can be no expectations lOr its behaviour. In the poem spoken in its voice. anything can happen. 
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it is also a motif that recurs in Cummings' work. Cities, worlds, landscapes. and the space between 
people's bodies appear over and over. Cummings also deals with space conceptually, as in the poem 
called .58 8 from No Thttnles. 
In "588 , Cummings figures love spatially as an inexhaustible resource (rather than something which 
can be hedged in by description). The poem itself is extremely brief. even for Cummings' work; it 
comprises ten lines, none of which is longer than five words. The longest words in the poem are 
.brightnessB (line 4; ten letters, two syllables) and ·Ski1fullyB (line 9; nine letters, three syllables), but 
all other words, with the exception of.placesB in line 5, are single-syllable words. The nouns in the 
poem are "'love-, .yesB, ·placeB, and .worldB; the former two arc repeated twice, and the latter two 
are repeated three times, giving the poem an even slimmer fed by its narrow vocabulary. Added to 
these are the verbs "'move- and .liveB (lines 3 and 8, respectively); the two adverbs noted above; two 
instances of ·all8 used as an adjective; the copula .isB, twice; the demonstrative adjective .thisB, 
twice; the article "'a8 , twice; and the prepositions "'throUghB (once), ·or (twice), and Olin- (once). 
There are also two ampersands taking the place of the word 'and'. The poem itself does not take up 
space. It is frugal with the language it uses, but the effect of this frugality is not miserliness-rather, 
because the poem is so slight, the nouns receive even greater emphasis from their repetition, making 
it clear what the poem is about: 
58 
love is a place 
& through this place of 
love move 
(with brightness of peace) 
all places 
yes is a world 
& in this world of 
yes live 
(skilfully curled) 
all worlds 34 
Structurally, .588 comprises two stanzas, each of which is made up of three clauses, one contained in 
parentheses. The structure of each stanza is identical, and each begins with a clause containing the 
copula The two stanzas can be divided into two parts each: the first line, and the rest of the poem, 
34 C u m r n i n ~ . . 1998: 70. 
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which is separated from the fust line not only by the break but by the use of an ampersand at the 
beginning of the second line. In each stanza, the first line sets up the premise, and the following four 
lines describe the premise. In each stanza, the premise is topological-to do with place. The first 
stanza begins with the assertion that ·love is a place" (line 1); the second with the related declaration 
that ·yes is a world" (line 6). The two lines are not only related by their grammatical structure, but 
also by their components: they each begin with a positively inflected conceptual noun ("love". "yes"). 
which is followed by the copula 'is: the indefinite article 'a: and a noun of a topological or 
geographical nature which is indefinite or large enough not to be specific (and whose generality is 
compounded by the indefinite article). 
The parallel structures efFectively act as 'nesting-doll' pieces; "love is a place" (line 1) becomes ·yes is a 
world" (line 6). In the second iteration of the structure, we move from a localised feeling and a 
smaller expression of topos and toward a more general feeling ('yes') and a topos that is in fact • a 
world" (line 6), something large enough to contain 'places'. But the poem, by its use of the indefinite 
article, ensures that neither the place nor the world it invokes are the representation of all possible 
worlds; they are two of many. And neither the ·place" nor the "world" are themselves the finite, be-
aU and end-all of what is in the poem. Through the place that love is move·all places"; in the world 
that yes is live "all worlds". The singular 'place' and 'world' are figures for greater expanses of meaning 
encountered upon entering the space of love or the space of the yes. The figure wherein love is a place 
through which JJ places move is a puzzle built to show how a loving relationship, rather than 
pinning the other and solving all that is unknown, continually opens further and further unknown 
territory such that one assumes that opening the door to one of the places within the place of love, 
one would only find further places (and places within those, and on and on). 
Despite the notion of containment in the poem (the worlds curled within worlds, the places passing 
through places), what is 'contained' is greater than that which contains it. The logic of this poem 
comes from the same gesture that is at work in "61", above. In that poem, the role of love is to 
'fabricate unknownness'. Here, it is the filbrication of the unknown which love engenders that 
expands the territory once one is in that place. Thus, that which might seem to be contained or 
containable is, if we borrow logic from "61", exactly not that. The known opens ever further into the 
unknowable as further places and worlds are excavated. Where ·58" represents these further spaces as 
"all worlds" and "all places", "61" refers to them in the future tense, as ·what shall discovered be" 
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(line 10), which is to say, things which continually remain to be discovered. The form that the ideas 
take in ·58·, a greater space nested inside a more limited one, is like a fractal image-but imagine 
that the origin point of the fractal is not in any way larger than its smaller, identical children, except 
in perspective. 
The poem provides some understanding of the nature of the ·place· and the ·world· beyond their 
resemblance of the fractal. As noted above, in dividing the stanzas of·58· into two parts. Cummings 
occasions a premise and a description of the premise. To be specific: The place that love is is a place of 
transit-·all places· move ·through this place off love· (lines 2-3). These places bring with them 
"brightness of peace·. The ·place·, then, is occupied or transversed by love, brightness, and pcace.1n 
stanza two, the world of the yes is inhabited by ·all worlds· (line 10), which, in order to fit 
themselves in, are "skiJ.fully curled-.The word "live· (line 8) is opposed to ·move· (line 3) in the 6rst 
stanza; rather than a place of horizontal transit as in the case oflove, yes is a world that is deeply lived 
in by ·all worlds-. For Cummings, the 'place' of love is the place of the 'yes'-an equivalence that is 
borne out by the para1ld composition of the poem, which makes love a place and yes "a world- (line 
6) in which "live/ (skilfully curled)/ all worlds· (lines 8-10) in a structure that is mirrored across the 
poem's two stanzas. Cummings' valuation of love as a place in relation to 'yes' is not, however, 
exclusive. His choice of words ('place' and 'world') provides the reader with nesting-doll spaces, one 
larger set containing the next. Love as a 'place' and yes as a 'world' imply that there are more ways than 
lOving alone to say yes-Brennan's ideas of the variety of living attention,lS which includes reason as 
well as love comes to mind. In Cummings' poem. love and yes are permeable containers of 
possibility-of "all places· (line 5) and "all worlds· (line 10), which mUst therefore include those 
places and worlds that are unc:xpcctcd. unpredictable, and as yet unforeseen. 
The concerns of ·58· are not limited to love, in the same way that its geography is not limited to a 
singular and relatively localised "place-. The second stanza expands the tenns of operation to include 
the word ·yes". Recall that for Derrida the word yes is intrinsically linked to the idea of love-the 
idea of what he calls the love in deconstruction, which is primary consideration of the otherness of 
the other, saying yes to the otherness of the other. By setting the poem up so that its two stanzas 
parallel one another and so that the second expands the 6rst, Cummings prepares us to see that the 
'place' of love is the place of the 'yes'-not only in conceptual tenns, but also in tenns of actual 
35 Brc:nnan.41. 
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sentcncc ordcr. This equivalcnce is bornc out through the poem, which makcs love "a place" (line 1) 
transvcrsed "with brighmcss of peacc" (linc 4) by "all places" (line 5) and yes "a world" (line 6) in 
which "livc/ (skilfully curled)/ all worlds" (line 8-10) in a structure that is mirrored across the poem's 
two stanzaS. In Cummings' poem, lovc and yes are permeable containers of possibility-of "all 
places" (linc 5) and "all worlds" (line 10), which must therefore include those places and worlds that 
are unexpected, unpredictable, and as yet unforeseen. The ·unknownness· fabricated by love in the 
terms of"61" is not referred to directly in "58" but is nonetheless part of the way that love operates in 
that poem.36 
The context of the poem provides for an understanding of this expansion-that just as "worlds" 
replace "places", "love" is replaced by the similarly larger term ·yes" -but so does the greater context 
of Cummings' poetry. This is one of many occasions on which "yes" appears in a Cummings poem. 
Ncither, for that matter, is this Cummings' only treatment of the word 'yes' in terms of its spatial 
properties and connection to love, which are themes throughout his work. See, for example "yes is a 
pleasant country:", whcrein conditional tenses ('if') are "wintry" and call for the 'opening of the year; 
both' ("not either") is a generative temporal space (·when violets appear"); and love is "a deeper 
season/than reason". The absolute opening of 'yes' here, in contrast to 'if, for example, allows for the 
possibility of any kind of growth, in whatever the conditions may be. In this case, the conditions are 
"April": the kind of growth (which Cummings identifies with possibility and 'yes' itself) that takes 
place in April in countries in the hemisphere where Cummings lived and wrote should suffice as an 
explanatory image here. 
In "SS", Cummings is recognising a relationship between distance and love; between the respect for 
distance and an affirmative stance. His poems are not 'deconstructive', but here, too, the most 
important thing is the distance between the other and the self, across which relationship can occur, 
and without which it cannot. In his poems, Cummings speaks with a voice and in a form that 
attempts to be musical, haptic, and artistic; that attempts to resist dominant structures that describe 
not only how a thing should look but how it ought to be envisioned (cliche). Although his poems 
predate lrigaray's call for such a language (or such languages, personal creations as they must be) by 
decades, they nonethdcss can be read as examples of such speech, embodying the concerns that other 
36 And, when thinking of chis in thc conten of Derrida's usc of thc words ·ycs· and "lovc· together (Interview). this is cspecially 
meaningful for thc rwo poems whcn they are read together. Furthcr discussion of Dcrrida's conccptualisation of love in 
deconstruction in termS of thc 'yes' position will takc placc later in this chapter. 
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writers addressed in this dissertation have made their own. 
D. Approaching the other via Rilke and Cummings 
Both Rilke and Cummings are writing about the experience of loving another person; their 
approaches are not to texts, but to human beings. However, that does not mean that what they say 
about the experience of love cannot be taken as metaphor or analogy for the experience of love as an 
approach to a text. After all, it is the experience of hum4n love that is, for most people, originary. not 
the experience of loving ttXts. The relation between the lover and beloved as it is in the works of these 
writers refers to human beings but does not only hold meaning in tenns of relationships among 
people. Therefore, although the discussion of approaching the other in their work will use the words 
'person' and 'people', this is not the limit of the relations proposed by Rillce and Cummings. 
What Rilke and Cummings are talking about when they write about love is the realisation that the 
other person is exactly that-an orb" person, inassimilable and to some extent always 
unapproachable across those 'infinite distances' which contain 'all places' and 'all worlds' and are as 
such unknowable in their totality. love, for Rilke and Cummings, must be accompanied by the tacit 
knowledge that the other person is known only in part. and even that part is only known in pan. The 
fabrication-the active creation-of unknownness means that the beloved and the lover continually 
differ from one another (and from themselves). This difference is what necessitates the act of 
promise-of the • reaffinnation of the affirmation· which means a continued • affirmative d e s ~ ~
towards the Other-to respect the Other, to pay attention to the Other, not to destroy the otherness 
of the Other8 ;37 the difference necessitates a renewal of the yes which was said yesterday or an hour 
ago in light of the changed, expanded. or differentiated being of the other. What might Rilke's 
definitions of love and marriage mean in terms of trying to develop an approach to texts that begins 
from a point of acknowledging their othemess-a point Derrida also calls love? If Derrida set the 
philosophical-theoretical scene for a new engagement with texts in terms of 1 o v e ~ ~ Ri.Ike anticipated 
him in demonstrating how that love might be conceptualised. Rillce's work also lends nuance to the 
famous Derridian assertion that deconstruction is not a method and cannot be pinned down or 
bound to a series of steps by which one 'deconstructs'. 
37 Derrida: Interview (1997). 
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Rilkc's conception of love being a relationship where two people come to love the space between 
them. allowing each to be whole and unassimiJatcd by the other, necessitates the acknowledgement 
by each of the separateness of the other, and. to some extent, the acknowledgement of the 
unapproachability of the other. Expanding what for Rilke is a -wide sky", Cummings' space of 
unknownncss, which grows up between two people or is fabricated by love itself. is a whole world 
made of worlds, a compound place made of other places-the investigation of which is complicated 
each time it kgins to know by the more and more complex and multi-partite nature of these places 
and worlds. Together, these two philosophies of love offer another facet to the approach that this 
dissertation has begun to construct. 
Most of all, what is operative in the works ofRilke and Cummings is the presence of the unknowable 
in the other. It is this unknowable that defines the love relationship and makes it possible, but, 
paradoxically, this distance is also a result of the relationship and an outgrowth from it. For both 
Rilkc and Cummings. the loving relationship happens in a place where the one is essentially 
estranged from the other, in the most literal way. The warning in Rilke is that upon experiencing the 
difficulty of relating via love, our tendency is to fall into convention-where in fact it is precisely the 
individual nature of love, and its resistance to convention (and in fact the inappropriateness of 
applying convention to it) that make it what it is, and that make it so difficult. It is as an individual 
that one meets one's life, despite the fact of the existence of social, cultural, and epistemolOgical 
convention (to which one resorts if one cannot bear or has not learned to live in the space of not-
knowing). The fact of being an individual ensures solitude and the space between the self and others, 
which is there whether one acknowledges it or not. If one is able to acknowledge it, however, there is 
the possibility for fruitful and loving relationships within which one is aware of the problems of 
assimUation to or of the other. 
Such becomes the role of the reader, writer, or scholar when approaching a text with awareness of the 
ten's own propensity to mean more than can be contained by a single reading; awareness that 
c:ncnds to the possibility of readings that contradict one's own, or readings that one cannot fathom. 
Instead of then attempting to draw these readings in, incorporate them. and in some way render 
them neuter in the face of one's absolute and domineering one, the reader who approaches the text 
with the kind of love Rilkc and Cummings describe must be able to live with the contradictions. the 
negative possibilities, and the questions themselves. Love as an approach to the other cannot be a 
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question of fixing the other into a place that renders them knowable. Instead of a tether, it supplies a 
door to a field, an ever-widening expanse on which meanings. never absolute, may be constructed 
and taken apart and built again. 
How might this be accomplished? And what role could it have in a positivist situation, structured by 
hierarchy? The questions posed here cannot be answered in absolute terms, and that in itself is 
perhaps part of the answer. If the unknowability of the other is the thing. then Derrida's assertion 
that there is no formula to follow to complete some manoeuvre called deconstruction makes sense. 
There is no one thing. one process, which can be called deconstruction. Instead, it seems to be a III"] 
of being with texts, objects, and other beings that takes into consideration their inassimilable 
otherness prior to any other kind of engagement. This is a frustration of the project of research as it 
stands, in that it does not lend itself to a demonstration of confirmed and replicable knowledge. 
Instead. what it offers is the possibility of reforming the way knowledge-philosophy-is produced, 
instance by instance, to individual specifications. It offers the possibility of dealing with the ten in an 
unfamiliar way, which in tum frees the researcher from convention. None of this is a guarantee that 
what will happen will be 'deconstruction' or 'love' or a 'musical, touchful. artistic' way of speaking. or 
any of the other names that have been given to such approaches here. In fact, no guarantee can 
possibly be offered, except that which is produced by the writer doing the work of affirming. 
constantly and continuously, the otherness of the work (object, text, being) that is approached. The 
guarantee of approaching the other with one's hands open is simply that: that in this case, an attempt 
is being made at approaching without meaning to dominate, to fix, or to know absolutely. In 'letting 
beings b e ~ ~ the writer accomplishes the creation of a space between herself and the other that not only 
allows for unknownness but necessitates it. It relaxes the stringent hold the need to be sure has on 
academic work, and opens up the possibility of gaining wisdom from sources other than what is 
observed empirically or proven materially. 
None of this, however, is a recommendation of an approach derived from Rilke, Cummings.lrigaray, 
Barthes, Derrida, Uvinas, Marion, and Brennan over any other. What it is is an entering of this 
approach into the field of other approaches, to live in relation to them and to be adapted, changal. 
approached by others. The point is not to abandon other ways of working, but to imagine new 
constellations, new patterns of being-together from the things that exist. This means that these 
constellations are unfixed, always available for new eyes to arrange newly. In keeping with this, the 
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approach proposed in this dissertation docs not come from nowhere, springing fully-formed, arriving 
as a redeemer; it comes by a careful and diligent rearrangement of pieces (ecriture feminine; 
deconstruction; tcnual erotics; Rilke and Cummings's poetics) which are already in play and as such 
are already engaged with by others in other ways. 
This chapter has shown that the approaches recommended, invoked, and ascribed to other writers in 
this dissertation have also been enacted in the work of Rainer Maria Rilke and E. E. Cummings. The 
intention of so doing has been, firstly, to demonstrate that the location of such an approach is 
disparate and diffUse, rather than locatable and centralised; secondly, it has been to complicate the 
terms by which the dissertation considers phUosophy, demonstrating that the poetry phUosophy has 
historically been called to repress in fact participates in its construction. That such an approach is 
necessarUy incomplete is one of the challenges in writing about it. Its openness can be compromising, 
making it seem vague or noncommittal. But in its best-which is to say its most attentive-forms, 
such an approach leaves space for other approaches to coexist with it, as well as allowing for the 
possibility of that which is studied to have its own life, whether literal or figurative. 
The chapter which follows this one, and with which this dissertation comes to an end, will attempt to 
demonstrate such a way of approaching texts. In form, such an approach resembles a close reading-
an enactment of attention to the text, in tcnual form. Its questions are ontological (how) rather than 
ontic (what). Its attitude is curiosity that must remain vigilant against coming to understand the 
other in terms of the sd£ In short, it can be accused of attempting the impossible-of attempting to 
let beings be via interference. Thus the importance of attention to the other, and indeed of love for 
the other, which both affirms the otherness of the other and commits to guarding the solitude of the 
other. Impossibility is no reason not to begin to approach; in fact, the impossibility of such an 
approach is its spur. Calling such an approach impossible implies the limitlessness of the fleld of 
what is unknown, and provides a starting place for the approach itsel£ In terms of an intellectual 
engagement with the world, failure to grasp in the first instance is not necessarily an ultimate and 
total failure; failure can be an indication of the otherness of things (/ have foiled to understand you 
beClll4Se / emb.leeJ on uNkrstllnJing vi4 the iJu thai you were liIee me; you are not; / did not arrive aI 
uNkrstll1llling thlll WIIJ) and failure can also be the impetus to further exploration, experimentation. 
FaUure to grasp something can, of course, simply be the manifestation of intellectual or emotional 
laziness or of ignorance. But in Rilke's and Cummings' terms, the failure to completely reach or grasp 
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the other inheres in the act of loving with attention (with on-going and continual interest in the 
other)- by affinning the unknownness or otherness of the other. 
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A coda: reading the burning bush in Exodus 
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A. Introduction 
·We can find no sear/ But internal difference/ Where the Meanings are--
Emily Dickinson 
The approach aimed at in this dissertation is about difference. otherness, disjuncture. unbinding. 
about the otherness of the other as a starting point for rdation. However. this approach is m o ~ ~ than 
a ~ s t a t i n g g or rearrangement of one theory of text or another; it activates extant theories which have 
to do with the other. the text, and the relation between loving and knowing in order to disturb their 
boundedness and show the ways in which they are implicated in one another. Although it finds a 
precedent for reading textS in terms of otherness in what is generally called deconstruction and found 
in Derrida's works. it supersedes a Derridian deconstruction as it has been explored by Culler and 
others in that it incorporates a concern for the body. affect, and the feminine which has not appcaml 
in those explorations. In constellating the voices of many thinkers. I have aimed to mark • an 
incompleteness in the internal coherence-J of each discipline or area. opening them to outside issues 
which trouble their boundaries and demonstrate their relatedness. 
In this coda, I want to reengage with the question. 'How does this approach work?: by providing a 
second exemplary case that bookends the 'opening foray' and its reading ofTwombly's painting. To 
reiterate. the choice of the word 'example' to describe these two pieces is purposeful: an example is 
neither general (as is a system of concepts) nor particular (as is the material to which the 
system is applied). It is 'singular', It is defIned by a disjunctive self-inclusion: a belonging 
to itself that is simultaneously an extendibility to everything else with which it might be 
connected [."J . In shon, exemplification is the logical category corresponding to self-
relation.2 
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation. the example as a form is inseparable from a I a y e ~ ~
and active attention to details because its ·success [ .. ,J hinges on the details. Every little one matters-,' 
The example is. therefore. a particularly apt form in terms of this dissertation's concern with a non-
systematisable way of being with texts. 
1 Mitchell. 339. 
2 Massumi, 17-18. 
3 Ibid. 
212 
The reading ofCy Twombly's The Cnling that began the dissertation, and that of the story of Moses 
and the buming bush that makes up this chapter are radically different. They mark the edges of the 
dissertation's concerns: one centres on law; the other on emotion. The first exemplary case, which 
looked at The Cdling, argued on behalf of an understanding of the relation between feeling, affect, 
and knowledge, and also argued that in this case the former two are, at least in part, generative of the 
latter. When Mitchell writes that -[v]isual culture entails a meditation on blindness, the invisible, the 
unseen. the unsccable, and the overlooked; also on deafness and the visible language of gesture; it also 
compels attention to the tactile, the auditory. the haptic, and the phenomenon of synesthesia", it is 
perhaps this kind of reading he indicates; a reading that includes information gleaned from all kinds 
of sources, using and acknowledging aU of the body's receptors.4 This coda and the second exemplary 
case it presents-a reading of the story of Moses and the burning bush-finds within a narrative of 
absolutC5 and fundamentality a gesture toward openness and the unknowable that undermines a 
mading of the story that would place it exclusively in the domain of that which is ordained, 
unchangeable. Speaking together from one end of the dissertation to the other, the exemplary casess 
show the space reserved in law for the unknowable-in what is arranged, set, known, and 
commanded for what is uncontrollable and other-and in knowledge for the unknown: what comes 
from the 'irrational' centres of the body. the heart (what is felt or sensed). They provide touchstones 
within the dissertation for models of thinking about authority in the collective voice, authority 
deriving from both law and affect; the field over which a loving approach is played out is the space in 
each which is contaminated or disturbed by the other. 
B. On Exodus. naming, and the void: a secular midrash (W1m). 
Although what I write in this section is not a midrash, I invoke the word midrash for several reasons: 
A.rst. because the example which is approached in this section features, like most other Torah stories, 
in the rabbinic interpretations and hermeneutic treatments of texts that is the midrashic tradition. 
As such. it takes part in drawing the boundary between written law and oral commentary; between 
fixed meaning and fluid interpretation. Secondly, the midrash as a homiletic mode is a figure which 
suits the approach developed in this dissertation. Thirdly, the midrash already appears in the 
literatUre of critical theory, which makes it a resonant figure in the landscape into which this 
dissertation makes its way. Elisa New calls midrash the 
" Mitchdl. 343. 
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-non-legal, often highly imaginative writing that comprises a l a r ~ ~ part of the Talmud 
and indeed of the whole Jcwish c x e ~ t i c a l l corpus [ ... ] . In midrash we find what is antic, 
wayward and even perverse in Jewish writing. In midrash one discovers an intrepid 
delight in word play, an imaginative precocity and a resistance to what is nowadays called 
closure akin to the most daring of deconstructionist acrobatics·,s 
identifying in one movement the tendencies which most closely align the two ways of mading. 
despite fundamentally different attitudes toward. for instance. the absolute presence of the divine. 
However, the aim of this section is not reading the midrash themselves; the midrash is a ~ ~ for 
what I am doing here (investigating a Torah story) because of the precedent that exists in critical 
theory for seeing midrash as a way of reading that is sympathetic to the concerns of much 
poststructurallst or deconstructionist writing and reading. The most basic reason that the tcnual 
interactions in this section only use midrash as a figure is that, as Beth Sharon Ash writes, midrash is 
-restrained by the requirement to respect God's words-.6 1here is no such divine requirement to be 
respected here; thus the midrash as a figure only inflects my reading insofar as it models an approach 
to the text which is contradictory, open, possible. Midrash anti Uterature-the 1986 result of a series 
of seminars which brought Derrida. Hartman. Bloom. and other literary critics from the U.S. 
together with scholars of the Hebrew University. and the most obvious precedent for work like 
this-engages with the question of the possibility to find in the form, figure, or texts of the midrash a 
way of understanding some literary works or ways of being with texts. Essays in MiJrtUh II1IIi 
Literature -interpret literature. including authors such as Milton. Defoe, Kafka, Borges, and Agnon, 
guided by the critical assumptions of midrash", further providing a precedent for midrash as a way of 
reading even non-religious texts. or the reading of religious texts in a non-religious cil'CWllSWlce (as 
in Derrida's atheistic reading of kabbalah and midrash). 
Furthermore. that midrash in the Jewish tradition a homiletic form lends nuance to this dissertation's 
argument that wisdom does not only come from empirical. 'objective' observation: a homily is a kind 
of religious teaching which is intended primarily for spiritual education rather than for doctrinal or 
dogmatic instruction. As such. it has potential as a mode of investigation which does not rdy 
exclusively on the known and fixed. and which is open to anomalous u n d e r s t a n d i n ~ ~ of or 
5 New, Elisa. -Pharaoh's Birthstool: Deconstruction and Midrash-. SubSulue. Vol 17. No. 3.1ssuc 57 (1988). pp. 26-36. This 
quotation. p. 27. 
6 Ash, Beth Sharon. -Review: Jewish Hermeneutics and Contemporary Theories of Tcnuality: Hartman. Bloom. and Dcrrida. 
Modem PhiJIJlogy, Vol. 85, No.1 (Aug. 1987). pp. 65-80. This quotation. p.70. 
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approaches to the world. The homily is a space of interpretation. Not only that, it is a space of 
interpretation that opens the listener or reader up to things which cannot be proven but must be felt, 
intuited. or taken on faith. It docs not align itself with a rational positivist understanding of the 
world. The homily's spiritual aim means that it-as a way ·of 'worldmaking: not just world 
mirroring'"7 -takes its understandings and meanings from things which cannot be seen, proven, or 
demonstrated. not only from the empirical.8 
The midrash is part of the tradition ofJcwish education; it is an name for both a way of studying and 
for compilations of homiletic teachings themselves. The midrash complements the central biblical 
tens. and tests the -notion that knowledge of reality is absolute, static, and eternal", instead 
·convey[ing} a pluraL contcxrual. constructed. and dynamic version of reality [ ... ] a heretical 
multiplicity of answers-.9 To see the midrash in relation with the biblical texts is to come to an 
understanding that ·the gaps. repetitions, contradictions, and heterogeneity of the biblical text must 
be reJ".lo which is to say that the 'errors' or 'misreadings' or openings-the eroticism-of the text to 
the reader C41Inot be JiscounteJ simply becA.use they go against some singular. fondamental reading. The 
fundamental reading is biased (in the way that Mary Midgley describes positivist science or 
'objectivity' as biased-partial in every sense, without acknowledging its partiality). Moreover, such a 
reading ignores what it professes, which is a complete and immersive faith in the book as written (by 
God), which must incluJe its contradictions, gaps. and &.lIings out of the tradition of the rationally 
sensible. 
Sanre writes. 
How can anyone choose to reason falsely? It is simply the old yearning for impermeability 
[ ... J there an: people who an: attracted by the permanence of stone. They would like to be 
solid and impenetrable, they do not want change: for who knows what change might 
bring? [ ... J They have no wish to acquire ideas, they want them to be innate [ ... ] to adopt a 
1 Mitchdl. xiv. 
• 1bac is no denying that the writinp of the homiletic tradition of various faiths can be and have been used to doctrinal and 
dopwk ends. But that they hIIIIt been so used docs not mean they cannot be otherwise approached. In addition, the 
aadition ofhomilctic writin& while it descends from religious traditions (like many pursuits of wisdom). is not exdusivdy a 
rcIigious one; there arc humanist precedents beginning in the 16th century with the work of Johannes Reuchlin and 
Daidcrius Erasmus of Rotterdam. This section locateS itself to some extent within that tradition. However, this section docs 
not. and this approKh is not meant to. identify itself as a form of religious or secular humanism. That is, there is no 
inYaanent in the tradition of humanism beyond its figurative appropriateness for the approach taken here. in this exemplary 
inIancc; nor is then: any anaduncnt to panicular religious implications. 
9 2'..ombcr& Avinh. TIN pM'titJJAn -.!RAptflrt (New York: Doubleday. 200 I). p. S. 
10 Ibid. 6; quodng Danic.l Boyarin. 
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mode of life in which [ ... ] nothing is sought except what has already been found. in which 
one never becomes anything else but what one already was. I I 
Here, he is talking specifically about anti.semitcs, people who adopt an attitude which goes against 
their higher' senses-reason, intellect, logic. But the 'yearning for impermeability' he cites here is 
likewise part of the orthodox resistance to 'contaminating readings of a holy text. There is no 'logical' 
or 'rational' reason to reject them. if the matter at heart (the existence and desires of God) cannot be 
proven empirically. Since it cannot, can it really be threatened by such alternate readings? Clearly the 
feeling that it can is there. since these readings have been for the most part sidelined, suppressed, or 
punished. But the midrash is a reading of multiplicity. of negative space. which in fact falls within the 
tradition of readings; which falls within that tradition despite its alterity. The midrash shows the 
space within the orthodox for the possibility of alternate readings. and of undemandings or 
conclusions which are not absolute. As I will discuss more specifically below. this possibility for other 
readings both exemplifles the tcxtuality of the stories and offers them as sites within which other 
ways of knowing-know ledges disjoint from the written law. from rationality. and from absolutes-
can take place. These other ways of knowing. which have the maintenance of the otherness of the 
other at their heart, 12 offer a place for a loving approach. an approach that refuses to grasp. possess, or 
know. but relates in fact to -the absence of the Other [ ... ) in a horizon of the future-.13 The specific 
instances in the story chosen here (Moses and the burning bush) of the unknowable other suggest it 
as an exemplary story. But it is also the corpus of texts which began as oral commentaries on the 
written Torah (law). the midrash itself as a way of reading, which suggests such an approach. 
Because of the way that the midrash can show the incompleteness of that which represents itself as 
orthodox. absolute, or unchangeable. there are certain parallels which have been drawn to the 
relation of deconstruction to the metaphysical tradition of philosophy. The centrality of conceptions 
of reading to deconstruction mak.es the midrash a rich figure and a space for investigation; both the 
midrash and deconstruction can be seen as theories of reading, or ways of reading. Likewise, the oral 
nature of the midrash (complement to the written text of the Torah) has obvious parallels in 
deconstruction; so docs the interplay between law in the Torah and the revision or play oflanguage 
11 Sanre, Jean-Paul. A"Ii-Semm """Jew. trans. George J. Becker. (New York: Schocken Books.. 1948). no ~ ~ given. Quoted 
in Zomberg, 200 1: 103. 
12 For instance the unnamcdness of God-compare this to Rilke's conception of love being a condition in which each person 
guards the other's solitude (see Chapter 5. Section B). 
13 Uvinas, 1993: 51. 
216 
in the midrash. Geoffrey Hartman goes so far as to write that "criticism and midrash also blend",14 
and Ash calls Hanman's readings of midrash and his location of criticism and midrash on the same 
plane ·a self-conscious detennination to save the Bible from what he sees as the locked room of 
literatuR, the closed corpus·. IS 
One noted similarity between midrashic texts and deconstructive or poststructural readings/writings 
is a mode of reading which approaches the gaps in a text-that, as Ash puts it, "hold the Talmud 
open -.16 Another is that both deconstruction and midrash foreground reading as an act of 
interpretation. ·as henneneutic, as generated by the interaction of [ ... ] readers with a heterogenous 
and difficult text-.17 Although a reading of midrash that aligns it with the concerns of 
post5tructuralist or deconstructionist readings is not unchallenged, 18 nevertheless, writers like 
Boyarin. who insists that the ·sovereign notion infonning the reading of midrash is 
'intertcxtuality'·19 and identifies three specific qualities of intertextualiry20 which infonn his readings, 
demonstrate that a reading which figures midrash in the same vein as deconstructionist readings of 
other texts, or understandings of deconstruction itself, is neither unlikely nor unwieldy. 
As noted above. the midrash has already been investigated as a mode with similarities to literary 
criticism, and in particular to deconstruction.21 While it is invoked in this dissertation alongside 
names associated with poststructuralism and deconstruction, this section does not propose to 
undertake a reading that primarily foregrounds an argument about the similarities or differences 
between a midrashic reading and a deconstructionist one. Instead. it approaches the story of Moses 
and the burning bush in order to find the potential, in a fundamental story for both Judaism and 
14 Haranan. Geoffrey. -The Struggle for the Text- in MiJrllSh """ Liurllturt. Ed. Geoffrey Hartman and Sanford Budick (New 
Haven: Yale UP. 1986). p.l2. 
IS Ash. 71. 
16 Ibid. 
11 Boyarin. Daniel. m ~ " " " tIH RuJiIIg ofMiJrASh (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). p. S. 
18 Sec the debate between David Stem and Susan Handelman in Prooftext (1984-85) follOwing his review of her book. Tht 
Sltl]trs ofMtJSeS: The Iinurpce ofRAbbmk IlUerpretlUion in MoJern LiterlD'J Thtory (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1982). 
19 Boyarin.12. 
20 Specifically. Boyarin circs the following three senses ofintertext which resonate with poststrucrural echoes: -the text is always 
made up of a mosaic of conscious and unconscious citation of earlier discourse-; -tats may be dialogical in nature-
contesting their own assertions as an c:sscntial structure of their discourse-; and -there are cultural codes. again either 
conscious or unconscious, which both constrain and allow the production (not creation) of new tats [ ... ] these codes may be 
Mknti6cd with the ideology of the culture. which is made up of the assumptions that people in the culture make about what 
mayor may not be true and possible. about what is natural in nature and history- (12). 
21 Sec Daniel 8 o y a r i n . 1 ~ " " " the RuJiIIg of MiJrASh; Susan Handdrnan. The S14ym of Moses; the debate between 
Handelman and David Stem in ProtJ.{tal (1984-85) about Handdman's reading of midrash; Geoffrey Hartman in MiJrash 
""" Literlllllre; and JOICph G. Kronick. DerrUJ..". the Futurt of Uttrllturt. 
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Christianity. fOr the unknown to emerge. The unknown in the story is what the approach outlined in 
this dissertation focuses on, because that space-space of incomplcnon-is what calls for a loving 
approach, an approach which is not 6rst of aU or even III aU about being able to identify and 6x the 
other. Along the way, it would be impossible 1101 to mention deconstructive or midrashic possibilities 
for or exemplars of reading. But the fOcus of the chapter is not a dissection of the debate about the 
relation between these kinds of reading or writing. Instead, the fOcus is an approach to this ten via 
the questions set up in earlier chapters: What could this text want, where lack is construed as desitt? 
Mitchell's question about the desire of inanimate objects relics on a way of reading that is based on 
what cannot be absolutely known (the desire of any other). The homiletic fOrm of the midnsh-a 
fOrm that is composed as interpretation-indicateS the desire of the text to be read and intcnct.:d 
with. This disallows the singular, fundamental reading and opens the ten to continual reading and 
interpretation. 
Investigation of the term 'midrash' and its application in or relation to recent literary theory, 
especially that part of theory caUed 'deconstruction' has not only occurred in the work of Derrida. 
Heisemann, Hartman, Handelman, and others who are associated with literary theory, critical theory 
and/or deconstruction at some historical moment which is now imagined to be past or even passe 
(the 1 9 7 0 s ~ 9 0 s ) . . The how' of the interpretation of midrash. and the legitimacy of understanding 
midrash as a way of reading that is meaningful for literary theory, arc ongoing debates. 
Contemporary Israeli scholar Avivah Zornberg also undertakes a study of and through midrash in 
order to investigate what she caUs the 'Biblical unconscious'. Zornbergs work is of panicu1ar inten:st 
to this section because by fOregrounding the place of the unconscious-the midrash being the space 
in which the unconscious is given room to play and create meanings which complicate the central 
stories of the Torah-her work gives importance to what goes unsaid and must be sensed. fdt, or 
drawn out by play in meanings. Because of her emphasis on the unconscious, in Zombergs analysis of 
the midrash we arc faced with scenes in which we can never be assured of the absolute verity or 
meaning of the f a c e ~ t o ~ f a c e e encounter (human with divine or human with text). There is always 
something inexpressible beyond what has been written on paper or carved into stone tablets. 
Zomberg sees the -blurring of boundaries between revelation and interpretation, between the 
written [i.e. absolute] and oral [i.e. ephemeral, mutable] Torah- as -a fundamental mode of the 
rabbinic imagination-. 22 The rabbinic imagination is the place of foment fOr the midrashic texts 
22 Ibid. 2. 
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themselves. which. in their Chospitality to the very concept of multiple alternate narratives"23 refuse 
an either/or alignment. and in so doing -destabilise the public narrative".24 In Zornberg's words. if 
cfuller and richer languages for redemption arc to evolve. fantasies that fetishise the past must be 
relinquished [ ... ] .This is where the midrashic mode is powerful. Here. past and present interact: the 
original ten of Exodus and the [supplementary] narrative" which creates meaning and interrogates 
the text itsd£2S Where a fundamentalist reading of a text reads only the 'positive space' -the accepted 
history. the text as an uncomplicated. unified. and impenetrable object-the midrashic texts. and this 
reading. both form and read the 'negative space' of subjective experience. commentaries, and "a 
persistent intertextuality that makes it impossible to imagine that meaning is somehow transparently 
present in the isolated text·.26 
Central stories. whether those of a religious fundament or a philosophical one. are about 
containment; about ruling in what supports the central meaning. and ruling out the things that 
complicate it. In dealing with the central narratives (for the midrash. of the Torah; for 
deconstruction. of law. knowledge. origin). however. the centrality of these stories is acknowledged 
even as the contradictory or supplementary narrative unseats or repositions them. The midrash as a 
figure or a space of investigation is a way of playing by old rules in order to change the possibilities 
for understanding the world. The next section of this chapter will approach a biblical story of 
fundamental importance to Judaism and Christianity. the story of Moses meeting his God on the 
mountain. in the form of a burning bush. The role of fundamental stories in orthodox religions is to 
represent in stone. so to speak. the origins and beliefs of those religions. This role requires a single, 
stable understanding of these stories. so that ideas of origin. hierarchy. and truth of belief arc not 
c h a l l e n ~ d d from inside. The apparition of God (Yahweh or YHWH) to Moses is central because it is 
part of the story of the beginning of Judaism as Judaism, and. for Christians, the beginning of the 
one-God-one-People story that they trace as Christ's genealogy. I want to reread that story to see 
whether something which is of rigid. central. fundamental importance in stories of religious 
obedience and belief might also be a call to opening. to wonder (at the unknown). to the absence of 
fundamental answers. and even to disobedience. This rereading has at its heart a desire to understand 
the story in terms of its possibility. not simply its precedence; if cthe terrible beauty which is born at 
23 Ibid. •. 
24 Ibid. 3. 
25 Ibid. 13. 
26 Ibid. 2. 
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Sinai is to be of more than historic interest. it must [ ... ] be continuously reexperienced-.vln short, I 
want to approach this story asking what is lacking or what opens in it, to see whether it is possible to 
find in it something that runs counter to a fundamentalist reading: to approach this story. set in 
stone. and to do so in order to look for dimensions other than those which have been calcified into 
the strong bones of fundamentalisms. What in this story offers the possibility of reading the 'yes' to 
the other-yes itself being the fundamental affirmation. the 'love' of the other? Where in this story 
are the traces of love that call for a loving approach in return? 
B.l: Dereliction of duty 
The example with which this section is concerned is a story in the book of Exodus, the second book 
of the Torah (known in Hebrew as Shemot, nmm). The book itself narrates the Exodus of the 
Israelites from Egypt, beginning with their enslavement. Exodus recounts the story of Moses' birth 
and adoption by the pharoah's daughter, his encounter with the burning bush. the plagues. the 
Passover, the flight through the Red Sea, the journey in the wilderness, and the giving of the 
Commandments at Mount Sinai. I choose the story of Moses and the burning bush because it is the 
first instance where relation happens directly between YHWH and the people. I also choose it because 
this is the beginning of the rule-giving relationship that most famously culminates in the handing-
down of the stone tablets on which are written the commandments central to both Judaism and 
Christianity (at least, for the latter. until they arc supposedly expunged by Christ). This rule-giving. 
hierarchical relationship forms the basis in orthodox versions of both religions for other such 
relationships. such as that of the father to his daughter or a husband to his wife. Therefore, the 
moment at which it begins can be, and traditionally has been, read as part of this rclationship-one 
based on obedience. 
Moses is keeping the sheep of his father-in-law near Mount Horeb, in -the farthest end of the 
wilderness, when something unusual happens: an a n ~ l l appears to him in a fire, a bush that is 
burning without consuming itsel£21 At this point, alone except for sheep and a being who might be a 
hallucination or a threat, what Moses docs is to tum tDWllrJ the thing he docs not understand. 
Moses' action, which leads to a conversation with his God, is the beginning of the split between 
27 Ibid, 277. 
28 Emdus 3: 1; Horcb is generally thought to be another name for Mount Sinai. 
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polytheistic Egypt and monotheistic Israel. 29 It is the origin of fundament which deepens in 
importance in monotheistic cultures, the identification of the single author, single source. But 
despite its position at the beginning of a story which can be used to justify an exclusive and even 
punishing fundamentalism, the story of Moses and the burning bush is also a story about the 
importance of disobedience, of turning away, and of paying attention to the unorthodox. In short, it 
is a story about saying yes to the unknown other-the importance of approaching the other with 
love rather than fear (i.e. without a demand for fixed knowledge or identification). 
When he sees the bush burning; when the angel speaks to him, Moses' bodily gesture is a gesture of 
'yes'. He says, -I will tum aside now, and see this-.30 This is the first part of the story. The whole first 
part: Moses tends his f.u:her-in-law's sheep, sees something strange, and goes to look at it. What does 
this story want? At its centre is a beckoning hand, the demand of the strange to be seen and 
considered. Moses's affirmation of this demand's validity (by his responsiveness) emphasises it: it is 
correct in the tenns of the story to see and respond to things which are not immediately understood, 
or even arc not part of the vocabulary of a time or place. The story must want its readers also to 
respond to the unknown or unfamiliar with attention. This makes sense in terms of the story as a 
religious text, which wants exactly that-the affirmation of the listener or reader of the existence of 
something which cannot be explained and which is beyond understanding (the divine). But as a text, 
besides its religious sense, the affirmation of the unfamiliar or unknown points to the text's own 
otherness. Moses' yes to the burning bush is a model for a readerly yes (of continued reading, 
interpretation) to the ten itsd£ 
What does it mean to make a bodily gesture of yes to the unknown (even the unknowable)? And 
how can we read this gesture within this story? A fundamental reading is reductive: it reduces this 
action to an unavoidable impulse. But there are many instances in the Torah of people 'hardening 
their hearts' (i.e. not paying attention to communications with their God), implying some freedom 
of choice in their relatiOnship to God. So it cannot be impulse alone. In this case, what might be read 
as unavoidable impulse can also be seen as a conscious decision to tum aside, away from the task, and 
'see this'. After all. Moses is in this moment doing work he has been assigned by a very present, and. I 
'J!J Jan AIanann: "1hc spacc severed or dovcn by this distinction [between Egyptian and Israelite cultures and religion, which 
cakes placc in Emdus} is mc spacc ofWc:stcm monothcism-. Moses in Egypt: Tht Mtmory of Egypt in Wtstt11l Monothtism 
(CambridJe. Massachuscas: Harvard Univcnity Press, 1997).2. 
30 &odus 3:3. 
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presume. possibly threatening authority-his wife's father. Turning aside from his work tending the 
property of his father-in-law. Moses is not responding to a higher authority. but to his own sense of 
what is important or right to be doing. In the first moments of this story. Moses is deciding that in 
fact the rules (of family hierarchy. or obedience to one's superiors) are not what matters: this thing 
which is not part of the ordinary system is what matters. As a foreigner (despite his embeddedness in 
Egypt). Moses' choice to tum away from the order of his assumed famUy and country is especially 
precarious and therefore especially noteworthy lIS a moment to be read. His self-preservation (that 
part of himself which sees and acknowledges the things he individually. rather than socially. 
familially finds important) is IIOt. in this instance ·subordinated to something higher- in -a kind of 
blind automatism which drives the system-.ll Instead the beginning of this relationship is found in 
Moses' rejection of his place (shepherd) and his disobedience to the mown order in favour of what 
he does not mow. 
Moses' decision affirms the value of the unknown relative to the work he has been doing (for the 
known order). When he says that he will 'tum aside now. and see this: Moses designates two actions 
in response to the Other: abandonment of the known. and attention to the unknown. Moses' gesture 
implies curiosity. willingness. and courage: he goes to meet the unknown and unknowable Other in 
response to its call. He turns away from the work an authority (his father-in-law) has set for him. and 
goes to find out his relationship to what is calling him. Moses' yes begins with this curiosity. 
willingness. and courage that allows him to set aside his responsibilities and develop a relationship to 
the Other who appears to him. Regardless of the historicity of this story. or of Moses, this gesture is a 
figure for meeting any other. Moses decides to treat the other with belief; that is, as though the other 
were divine. To treat the other with belief is what allows the abandonment of the pre-ordained path, 
not once. but continually. The divine. which is perpetually unknowable. must require a renewal of the 
desire to know. Where fundament sees Moses' turning primarily as the instance in which all is solved 
(leading finally to the utterance 'I am the Lord your God; you shall have no other gods before me). it 
is also possible to see Moses' attention to the burning bush not as a final model but as an inaugural 
model In this case. the 'ycs' which is signified by his willing attention to what is unknown in the 
place of what is known and expected (his responsibilities and role) must be reiterated in the face of 
an endlessly unknowable Other. 
31 Havd. Vaclav. The Power of the Powerlm (New York: Palach Press. 1985). p. 29. 
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To read Moscs' gesture here as anti-fundament (that is to say, to read it as other than the erection of a 
stable and singular mode of reading and understanding the passage itself and the world as it relates to 
the passage) is to complicate the kind of relationship possible between the human and the unknown 
or unknowable, here represented as the divine. I f, in turning away from the known, Moses is not 
entering into another version of the known or determinable but into a relation with the continually 
unknowable, then the nature of this relationship is also unstable and to some extent indescribable 
other than in its efkcts. I f the relationship is unknowable, then it is difficult to say what forms it 
'ought to' take. However, the Other with whom Moses speaks is not completely other. As the story 
continues. Moses is given information which both situates him in relation to that Other and 
underwrites a reading of that relation which sees it as continually inaugural. 
The result of Moscs' approach of the burning bush is a conversation with it; a conversation which is 
recorded in the bodily gestures of one party (Moses) and in the spoken gestures of the other (God). 
But, rather than fixing that relationship into place and deSignating each participant's being and role, 
the conversation offers a way of reading that renders this relationship in flux. 
B.2: Unflxability. unspcakability: 'I will be what I will be' 
The story of Exodus is a story which is ritually retold: it forms part of the Passover Haggadah, the 
stories told every year. Although the ritual retelling of a story can indicate its ossification and 
solidification. the nature of oral storytelling means that it also will tend to mutability, adaptation. 
The oral retelling and the ritual repetition of the story of Exodus mean that the story's being is 
multiple: it is also the repetition, the recreation of itsd£ Because of this repetition, there is space 
made in this story for the unknowable, for the gaps within the larger narrative. In f.tct:, the fact of 
God's rcluctance to self-identify leaves space for further and further readings: the meaning of the 
divine is (re}constructed each time the story is told; the waiting-time for the divine (the time before 
'will be' becomes 'am'; the time of waiting for the Messiah) is perpetually spun out and reconfigured. 
In reading this story. this second part of this short story-the part where, having left his flock and 
stepped out of the hierarchies of domestic and working life, Moses goes to have a conversation with a 
burning bush-I want to concentrate on the reply that is given to Moses when he attempts to 
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ascertain the identity of the being with which he is speaking. The question Moses asks, and the reply 
he is given, are concerned with the function of the name: the place it assures, its fixative properties. 
Moses' name is obvious: it is Moses (brother of Aaron). The name of the being to whom he speaks, 
however, is another matter. The descriptive word 'God' is used. but the name God gives itsclfhcre is 
represented as YHWH (illi1'), which is not necessarily 50 easUy pinned down. The incxacmcss of the 
name of God (in this story. the being with whom each other actor has an originary relation) indicates 
that the relation to the other always and primarily takes place on a Sdd underwritten by the 
unknowable. An approach to the other which acknowledges that as such is lOVing. 
Within Exodus, the story of Moses and the burning bush is not a long ODe. It has two main dements: 
Moses turns aside from his work. and Moses speaks to God. Moses' conversation with YHWH is 
short; in fact, it is hardly a conversation. YHWH speaks to Moses, telling him that YHWH has-seen 
the affliction of My people that are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters-
and has ·come down to deliver them-.32 1he 6rst exchange between YHWH and Moses ends with a 
request: ·Come now therefore [ ... ] that thou maycst bring forth My people the children of Israel OUt 
of Egypt-.33 Moses' answer foreshadows what will come: he asks ·'Who am I, that I should go unto 
Pharaoh, and that I should bring forth the children of Israel out of Egypt?'-.34The concern with the 
place and nature of the self that Moses expresses (who am I [to you] to deserve this; who am ( [to my 
family, to my nation] to do this thing) also expresses his desire to be fixed by YHWH in a place which 
will guarantee his actions. To some extent, this guarantee is in place: YHWH says that Moses will 
·scrve God upon this mountain- after having brought the people out ofEgypt.3s But Moses' question 
is a question of relation (Who am ( to do this: who am ( to you, and who am I to them?) which relics 
on an undemanding of the parties with whom he finds himself in relation. Even after YHWH affirms 
Moses' place as a servant of God on Sinai, Moses asks ·'Behold, when I come unto the childrm of 
Israel, and shall say unto them: The God of your [parents] hath scnt me unto you; and they shall say 
to me: What is [the name of God]? what shall ( say unto them?,-.l6 Moses is attempting to Ax the 
being in front of him, to find a way of referencing and encompassing it so that it, too, can act as a 
guarantee for his speaking. In order for the name to be such a guarantee, Moses needs one that will be 
intelligible to those to whom he will speak. 
32 Exodus 3:7-8. 
33 Exodus 3: 1 O. 
34 Exodus 3:11. 
35 Exodus 3: 12. 
36 Exodus 3: 13. 
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The answer given to Moses does not necessarily conform to this desire. The words spoken by God, 
il!iJ' '1118 il!iJ' (YHWH asher YHWH), can be and have been variously translated. Typical English 
translations include 'I am who I am: 'I am who am: 'I am that 1 am', or 'I am what I am'. All of these 
translations have in common a certainty of being which, despite its non-taxonomic stature, still gives 
a sense of how the being is which is speaking. That which 'is what it is' creates by this tautology a sense 
of permanence. actuality. presence, and stability. It makes sense, in a reading that looks for a solid 
foundation. to translate the utterance in this fashion, because such a translation casts the speaking 
divinity in a way which renders it self-absolutising. The divine itself. in these translations. by the 
pragmatics of the sentence, assures the listening human that the being of the divine is the being of 
the divine, a totality that pervades time and continues in an unchanging being. The fire that says 'I 
am what I am' to Moses is a proof, for those who take the Bible at its word, of the self-professed 
unchangin& absolute nature of God. 
There is. however. another way to translate the answer given to Moses, and that is to read YHWH 
asher YHWH as 'I will be what I will be'. The imperfective verb-not the accomplished action of 
being in one state which is and has been always so-is a place of ambiguity. It represents a lack of 
commitment on the part of the divine, or a lack of willingness to fix itselE YHWH's refusal to provide 
a definitive name by which Moses can call YHWH means that YHWH's being remains mysterious and 
ungraspable. In an interview. Avivah Zornberg glossed this interaction, saying, -God is being evasive. 
I'm not giving you a handle [ ... ] to say, now I've got him [sic]. That's a name. Instead God says. I am 
the very principle of becoming, of allowing the possible to happen -.37 This God is "to be encountered 
in the challenge of 'words: of language that asks for responsive language, that requires a 'listening to 
the voice' of the speaker. in all its human resonance-.38 In other words, the God who speaks to Moses 
is a God of relation and of what happens in the space between two. This is a space of the 
unknowable, in which the otherness of the other is a continual obstacle to fixing identity. In this 
story in particular, it is a space in which the possible (the unknown future tense of 'will be') can 
happen. The principle of allowing the possible to happen is antithetical to a reading which seeks 
fundamental absolutes and fixes meaning. It is. however. central to a reading which approaches the 
other from the position of saying 'yes' to the unknowability of the other-as-other. 
37 Zomberg. Amah. aF.mdus: Cargo of Hidden Storics-. Interview with Krista Tippett. On &ing. April 14. 2011. 
38 Zomberg, 2001: 4S. 
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The ritual occurrence of the story of Exodus lends nuance to this principle, and it is also this ritual 
which underlines its textual nature. In being repeated. in re-incarnating in the mouths of people, in 
their minds, and in their spaces, the story performs the ten's expansion and ceaselessness; each 
repetition invokes the repetition that is to come (next year). At the same time, the f.act in the story of 
Moses stepping off the assigned track and of the God who refuses to make itself solid and 
understandable (graspable, fixable), seem to call for an approach to that story which also honors the 
places where it departs from orthodoxy, order, and namcability. A reading which is multiple (i.e. 
which takes place over and over by its natUre, each generation reading and thereby reorganising, 
reordering, the meaning of the storT') is already a departure from a religious mctanarrative which 
privileges the singular and absolute. The demand for retelling, and therefore, in this context, the 
divine ortkr for multiplicity is explicit in some passages, for exarnple Exodus 9: 16 (I have freed you so 
that you m4J tell my name over all the unh), Exodus 10:2 (I have hardened his heart so Ihlll you 1NlJ 
tell your chilJrm IInti your chiJJrms chiJJrm what 1 have done), or Exodus 13:8 (God telling future 
generations how to speak retrospectively about the event of liberation from Egypt, including telling 
them to say that the Passover Seder is celebrated because of what God did in Egypt). The story, even 
as it is happening, or, in the latter example, even before it is happening (the 'story' of this verse is the 
prediction of the celebration of the Seder) is of something being done in order for a story to be told 
about it. A story (lin be retold exactly as it was first told-the existence of moveable type made this 
not only possible, but of a dominant likelihood. But, especially with situations of oral transmission 
(such as pre-Gutenberg. or simply the oral repetition of the Passover story), the chances arc that 
'errors' in transmission will be made; that the story will not remain' faithful' to a single way ofbcing, 
but will mutate and shift according to who tells it. The centre of the story becomes everywhere and 
nowhere; it lacks a single deSnitive telling. Likewise, the God at the centre of it, in refusing to 
provide a fixing. graspable N arne, eludes the human desire for affirmation of the permanence of what 
is known. The God who says 'I will be what I will be' in the conten of a story which is mM1e to be 
retold is a God who rests in the certainty of uncertainty, whose being is not attached to a single 
authorised way of telling the story, and indeed whose identity (such as it is) is founded on the space 
of what cannot be known. 
In the story of Exodus, a story concerned with the liberation of a people, the centraL liberating figure 
39 Zombcrg, 200 1: 12. 
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(God) refuses to td.I all the story and in f.u:t anticipates the recreation of the liberating events in 
languagt:. It is therefore in the adaptability of human storytelling that liberation happens; freedom, 
ruher than being 'out there: waiting to be attained, is achieved through retelling the story. The 
creation and recreation of a text on liberation shows that "language is the very means by which the 
imprisoned heart gains frccdom-.40 The story of the liberation happens by being told-by God, by 
humans. The role of language is its possibility for 'corruption: for change, for being what it will be. 
What truth there is is generatcd by speaking, each time the story is spoken. Each speaker is in Moses' 
place-asking 'Who am I to tell this story?: speaking, in Zornbergs words, beyond their means. But 
speaking beyond onc's means, beyond thc limits of reason or of what is already known, does not 
delimit this speaking from the gencration of affective, spiritual, or emotional truths; "one does not 
have to possess or orvn [. .. ] truth in order to cffectivdy bear witness to it-."1 'Truth' in a stoty where the 
locus or origin of truth refuses to reveal itsdfis neccssarily shaky and decent red, hard to find. In such 
a story. it makes sense for truths to be generated multiply. 
In this reading of the story of the burning bush and its rdation to the context of the liberation story 
of Exodus, the relationship of thc human to the divine is a continual deferment of knOWing. The 
relationship is not an absolute. static. ready-formed thing which can be objectified, described, and 
formulaically undertaken. This dckrment renders both the relationship and the parties involved to 
some extent in the dark. But this dark is not empty, unapproachable, or itself absolute: it is the space 
hctwcen two which is fruitful. full of desire to know, full of obstacles to knowing which provide for 
the continuance of desire. A reading which suggests that all is already present in the positive spaces of 
this story ncglects the negativc spaces, the unwritten ways in which the story represents a tum away 
from absolute, known orders, and toward a relationship with the unknown, which refuses to be 
known, and also toward an undcrstanding of that relationship as renewable, mutable. and 
unorthodox. The possibility of reading the story of the burning bush as the story of the unknowable 
Other, and of a relationship to the other based on turning away from the established order does not 
necessarily replace any other reading of this story. But it can exist alongside other readings. especially 
other readings that might fix and concretisc the relation and its parties, troubling them. Where 
fundamental readings require absolutism, a reading of the spaces here-the space between the 
unknowable and the known, between the self and the other who speaks, the space one crosses to say 
40 Zomberg. 2001: 16. 
41 Felman. Shoshana. -Education and Crisis, Or the Vicissitudes of Tcaching-, in Ttstimony: Crists ojWirnessing in Literature, 
PJychtNUUJysis, MIll Hism'y (New YorIt: Roudcdge. Chapman, and Hall. 1991). p. 15. 
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yes to the other via the gift of one's attention-requires the opposite: it calls for a willingness to allow 
the unknown to rest as such. Unfixed and ungraspcd. the unknown can still teach, eflea, and make 
us feel What it cannot do is dictate a single way ofbcing with it. Without such dictation. we are me 




A. On the way: via Derrida 
-Between our responsibility and our actions. the passage is never given in advance. but 
must be reinvented with each welcome-right there on the threshold.... 
deconstruction as hospitality. would be neither as science nor a method. but. to usc 
Derrida's words, an art or a poetics that attempts to invent new ways of inviting or 
welcoming the uncxpccted into a particular language and conten without 
immediately subjugating it to them. without immediately making it conform to 
them-) 
I want to dose the dissertation with a return, rather than a straight passage out: a return to Dcrrida 
which is at the same time not a return. since although I am returning to his writing, I am returning to 
writing that is not considered elsewhere in these pages. Throughout the dissertation I have been 
writing about the text as an other among Others. something which can be approached and which 
approaches us. Implicit in the idea of approach is the encounter on one's own or foreign territory. and 
the question of hospitality -of welcOming the foreigner and ofbcing welcomed-is integral to that 
encounter. A reading of the transcriptions ofDerrida's lectures tided Of Hospit4lity complicates the 
approach to texts I have tried to develop and demonstrate in this dissertation. I hope it also shows, 
pointing backwards through this text, the importance to my writing of Dcrrida's thinking, both in 
terms of concepts and in terms of process. and I hope it demonstrates where my writing might make 
a small movement onward. 
Derrida opens Of Hospitality with the question of the foreigner. That is. with an examination of that 
question: -the question of the foreigner is a question oftht foreigner. addressed 10 the foreigner. As 
though the foreigner were first of all tht ont who puts the fint question or tht ont to whom you 
address the first question. As though the foreigner were being-in-qucstion -2 The question of the 
foreigner: that is to say. what to do with that outsider over there, the one who doesn't belong or isn't 
from here? The one whose very being-as-foreigner is assigned the moment she speaks or makes any 
motion that renders her intelligible. visible. part of a scene that is the sort of scene requiring 
response. Whose bcing-as-foreigner and whose being-there is an implicit question or first move itself 
(precipitating the public movements oflaw and the intimate movements of emotion) . .As though. he 
says. The question of the foreigner is as though the foreigner were (were summed up as. were 
definable as) 'the one who puts [ ]'/'the one to whom [ ] is put'. where [ ] = 'the first question'. That lIS 
Nus, 2003: 165. 
2 Dcrrida.Jacqucs.OfHospillllity. trans. Rachd Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Pras, 2(00). 3. 
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though. Meaning that the clauses that follow it are not necessities. Instead of statements of truth 
about the foreigner, they an: statements about how the foreigner appears: both at the moment of 
apparition (the foreigner appears by) and the way the foreigner looks (to those who look at or 
respond to or read her). -But also the one who, putting the first question, puts me in question,"3 
Dcrrida writes. Where arrival on the scene is a question for the arrivant, it is as much a question for 
the one who is already prescnt, because the foreigner changes the order as it exists: where before it 
w:as (x). now it is (x+ 1). An arrival from outside makes the inside recognise itself as inside, and puts 
the inside in question: what can it accommodate? How can it be itself-as-it-was now that this new 
dement has arrived? Or docs the as-it-was only exist as a backwards projection, visible because of the 
foreigner whose arrival has made the host the host? So it is that the outsider, the foreigner, defines 
the one who is at home. The arrival describes not only the one who arrives but the one who is arrived-
to. 
The most intimate home is the one we carry with us, which is to say the body. Or language. But 
what in fact docs language name, the so-called mother tongue, the language you carry with you, 
the one that also carries w from birth to death? Doesn't it figure the home that never leaves us? 
The proper 01' property. at Icast the fantaSy of property that, as close as could be to our bodies. 
and we always come back there, would give place to the most inalienable place, to a son of 
mobUe habitat, a garment or a tent? Wouldn't this mother tongue be a son of second skin you 
wear on yourself. a mobUe home? But also an immobile home since it moves about with w?" 
Language as a second skin is a home one step removed from the body, which with its first skin covers 
the soft and penetrable insides, both of which move around with us, rendering us always 'at home' or 
at least in a fantasy of'at-home-ness' regardless of where we are. Rendering also the world into 
concentric rings of at-horne-ness and foreignness? The self at home in the body. language at home in 
the sdf.language foreign in contact with others' at-home languages (even while at-home to the self), 
the foreign body in its host country (speaking the language [with an accent] or [badly] or [not at all] 
or [with the wrong inB.cctions] or [with regional vocabulary], giving itself away). And in giving itself 
away, which is to say revealing itselfbut also providing itself as a gift to the other (to the host in the 
case of the foreigner but also. in the case of the host who reveals nativity in one way or another, 
including through her abilities with her own language). What are the conditions of this giving-away? 
Is the foreigner -to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible extensions, 
before being able and so as to be able to welcome him-?s That is, is the intelligibility of the foreigner's 
3 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 89. 
S Ibid. IS. 
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speech required before the foreigner can even be recognised as a foreigner, i.e., as someone who is-to-
be-welcomed? Or, in other words. is the foreigner only the one whom I can already see? The one who 
already falls within my understanding of what is not native or internal (demonstrating by marking 
out this limit that there is "no hospitality without finitude")6? Is even recognising a foreigner an 
indication of some kind of unsightedness. that is, of an inability to see anyone who might be foreign 
but still unintelligible (invisible). foreign in ways that are unpredictable? 
Derrida's address to this question is in the differentiation he makes between hospitality and absolute 
hospitality: 
To put it in different terms, absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I 
give not only to the foreigner (prOvided with a family name. with the social status ofbcing a 
foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give plAce to them, 
that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without 
asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names? 
To welcome the foreigner absolutely. even without knowing them as ' foreigner', which is to say 
without confirming one's own status as within (native, welcoming. host). is almost passive. The I 
'gives place'. 'lets come', 'lets arrive: and 'offers' without asking anything-without even asking the 
foreigner to identify hersel£ Absolute hospitality is a question of making the most intimate 
boundaries permeable not only to those with the correct identification and permissions, but to those 
who come without warning. unexpectedly, and without papers. Perhaps. then, absolute hospitality is 
also a question of not-knowing where the boundaries are (ofleaving the border stations without 
guards, as it were), such that there is not even a case of pennission for the foreigner to approach but 
simply points of entry which the foreigner mayor may not take. Is it more welcoming to ask the 
question 'who are you'-to recognise the other standing there-or to go without the question, to 
perform "a double effacement. the effacement of the question and the name? Is it more just and more 
loving to question or not to question"?i 
Derrida provides his own answer in the form of an attitude, a way of turning oneself: "say yes to who 
or what turns up, before any determination. before any anticipation, before any identification, 
6 lbid,55. 
7 Ibid, 25. 
8 Ibid, 29. 
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whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected 
visitor-.9 Being in the attitude of saying yes means letting the door be already-open, regardless of 
who crosses it or doesn't. Saying yes, that is, even without the expectation of the arrivant being a 
foreigner; with no expectation at all, even the expectation of arrival. Saying yes to what arrives 
without requiring that what arrives be categorised as ' foreigner' or some other kind of thing means 
enending welcome without needing to do so: without doing so because that is what one does vis a vis 
the foreigner. And in order to extend a welcome without the 'need' to do so (without it being called-
for by the kind of relation at hand) one has to extend this welcome regardless of what it is extended 
to. Hospitality, in its absolute sense, must arise because it arises rather than arising only as the 
appropriate response to the foreigner's arrival. There can be, therefore, no 'must' about it. It is perhaps 
instead a question of election or decision, in each moment rather than ahead of time, to "[suspend] 
language. a particular determinate language, and even the address to the other", to "submit to a sort 
of holding back of the temptation to ask the other who he is, what her name is, where he comes 
from- and to -abstain from asking another these questions, which herald so many required 
conditions-.10 Saying yes to whoever or whatever turns up might mean even not-speaking to it, not 
giving in to one's own desire to know (to name); it might mean acknowledging that even what one 
can ask about the other represents a set of expectations that in their being already limit who and what 
the other can be. Absolute hospitality exists in the possibility ofletting the other be even as she/he/it 
crosses one's own threshold. In other words, maybe, it consists of not requiring the other (via one's 
questions) to assimilate itself to the limit or set of understandable beings/ways of being. 
How can I encounter (can I?) a text as a foreigner, without anticipating what that means? How can I 
encounter a ten without an assumption of its qualities as a foreigner or not-foreigner? If a text is a 
foreigner to whom I can speak. with whom I can have a relation by being-read or by being-written, 
what is my responsibility to it? Likewise, interrogated by a text that asks me 'who are you?', how 
should I respond? Should I respond? Can I? Who I am changes in relation to where I arrive and who 
is there; where I arrive and who is there change in relation to my arrival. Perhaps silence is the best 
way to approach: unspcaking. without even the assumption of nativeness that a greeting might 
imply. But 'tipping one's hat' is also a sign of being in a space together, of acknowledging shared ways 
of being. To approach a ten as an other, to respect its fundamental otherness and to attempt, in 
9 Ibid. 77. 
10 Ibid. 13S. 
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reading it, not to assimilate it but to consider it as something enernal to, and therefore unknowable 
in some part by the self who reads. is, in the terms of this dissertation, to approach it lovingly. This 
dissertation has been my attempt to answer these questions, even though they are to some cxtcnt not 
answerable, or only answerable on a case-by-case basis rather than by a generally applicable law. 
These writers' gestures toward a language and wisdom which are corporeal as wdl as cerebral, ask for 
a way of being with the other, an approach to the other, which is relational, which takes the 
unknown into consideration and which makes room for it. The question of what it means to love a 
text or to read lovingly, and the answers that the history of philosophy and theory I encountered 
provide, as well as my own answers, add a smaIl facet to the body of work that exists-from Dcrrida 
to affect theory. 
B. Afterthoughts about method 
·Such is the genesis of the theory oflove: an accident ... a desire to talk. -II 
To some extent, I see my way of working during the writing of this dissertation as trying to perform 
Derrida's challenge to suspend or hold bade one's questions for the other. That is not to say this was 
entirely intentional. I did not enter the writing with an academic background, which meant some 
assumptions I might have been able to make about relationships between writers/ tens I was" ~ ~ able 
to make. I had assumptions about theory and about literature. not all of them thoughtful or useful; I 
was not (am not) an ideal encounterer of tens-as-forcigners. I have my own hangups and 
problematic prejudices. But at times. coming to theory. I found my lack of foreknowledge (not only 
of a canon but also of some of the usual ways of approaching or reading the canon) allowed me to 
read in ways that were different to but that complemented reading with my rational intdligcnce. I 
also read with my body that shivered and prickled. with my sense of synesthesia that colored tens 
gold, silver. pink, blue. 
My entry into theory and into writing about it insofar as I have been able to enter these things began 
after an afternoon walking around in the 20m-century section of the university library and coming 
across.A Lover's Discourse: Fragments. It came about via my willingness to (or my inability not to) 
trust my sense of texture as a way of grouping things and a way of interpreting them. What I was 
11 Barmes 2002 [1978],183 
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learning with my intellect I was also learning with my sense receptors. I put faith in the seemingly 
accidental-the coincidental. the felt. the intuited. the contingent-as a way of arriving, and found 
an ethic of reading and of writing in how accident defers (to an extent) my ability to control what 
will happen. Writing about love did. initially. come out of a desire to talk. and more than that. to be 
able to explain-to myself as much as to anyone else-what was happening in my own life. While the 
&cts of my life while I was writing arc not part of this dissertation, they form its impetus and 
substrate. They contributed to its formation and sensitized my eyes to the combination of words in 
Banhcs' tide. The anecdotal and theoretical, the affective and the rational. are bound up in the 
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